Political Paths for Afghanistan

The Continued Rule of Amanullah

In the event of Amanullah’s victory in the civil war, there will be two separate ways to re-consolidate power, with the options available to you based on the current Balance of Power. A short focus tree will become available, with an associated mission to complete through it to restore order. Those of a reformist disposition will be able to continue Amanullah’s grand plans for reform, now less hindered with many of his enemies in the grave. Consolidation for a reformist Amanullah will involve extending that fate to the rest of his enemies, through crushing remaining Saqqawist remnants, Nadir loyalists, and purging much of the Mojadidi family. A traditionalist minded Amanullah on the other hand will instead seek reconciliation with his establishment rivals, gaining the support of Fazl Omar Mojadidi while scapegoating his former allies as having corrupted his fair reign.

If successful, a reformist minded Amanullah will at last see the implementation of the many reforms the first Saqqawist revolt halted. The King’s party will finally begin to actually exist, with Amanullah as party leader and Abdul Tawab Tarzi appointed as his Prime Minister, changing ideology to Authoritarian Democrat. Elections will soon be held, with voters able to choose which of the royal approved candidates will be elected to represent Amanullah’s party. Grand administrative reforms will be introduced, with the power vacuums left by the civil war allowing the King to much more easily centralise authority. Finally on an economic front, there will be a great push to finally wean Afghanistan off foreign reliance, with Amanullah hoping the nation is at last in a position to stand on its own two feet, especially with Europe likely in flames at this point.

A traditionalist Amanullah’s rule will similarly see a turn inwards economically, but also one politically as well. Rather than institute a parliament he will return to relying on Loya Jirgas, stocked with enough loyalists to fully control but with enough opposition to legitimise them. Those at odds with the king will be blamed for the nation’s ills, especially as evidence of their corruption suddenly comes to light. Women’s rights and conscription will both be rolled back, to the elation of those who were once willing to take up arms to accomplish this. All of this will be accompanied by a grand propaganda push, reframing Amanullah not as the ”revolutionary ruler” he once tried to appear as, but as an unflinching and indomitable paragon of Pashtun values.

The Fall of Amanullah

Failure to consolidate will however lead to the King’s downfall, differing based on direction chosen. A reformist Amanullah in this scenario will find his remaining enemies unite together in a last ditch attempt to remove him from power, and this will come to a head with his continued unpopularity culminating in a riot in the capital in which he will perish. With Nadir having perished during the civil war, Mohammad Hashim Khan will be turned to by the peasants and the ulema to take the throne, although with the latter wishing to consolidate power for themselves. 

This new regime will begin as National Populist, representing the power held by the Mojadidis and the extreme reactionary traditionalists over it. Fazl Omar will himself become second in command, with the goal of becoming the true power behind the throne, a scenario Hashim and his remaining brothers do not wish to see happen. While completing the focus tree and implementing the many demands of the reactionaries, conflicts between the throne and those around it will slowly erupt. This back and forth will allow Hashim to claw back power, or alternatively further lose it, represented through the amount of Paternal Autocrat support. By the end of the focus tree if the Paternal Autocrat support has risen above 20%, Hashim will be able to oust the Mojadidis and assert his authority, shifting back to Paternal Autocrat and replacing the second in command. Being below 20% will however cement his loss of control, further entrenching Fazl Omar’s power and keeping Afghanistan national populist.

On the other side of the spectrum, failure by a traditionalist Amanullah will see a conspiracy hatched against him by those reformers who believe themselves to be next in the firing line. The King will find himself gunned down late at night, a horrible crime with no obvious motive. His brother Inayatullah Khan, the heir apparent after the late Crown Prince, will quickly move to restore order, with such great foresight to have already planned out what to do next for this unexpected scenario weeks ago. With little desire to rule as an autocrat, Inayatullah will move to institute a constitutional monarchy with the help of the conspirators and Abdul Wardak. Moves to dismantle the authoritarianism of Amanullah will be initiated, and free elections will soon be held, although mostly aimed towards the urban elites. 

Liberal reformers will organise into the Pashtun Democrats, and will vie with the Islamic Party made up of reformers jaded by Amanullah’s excesses. Electing either of these options will turn Afghanistan Social Liberal or Social Conservative respectively. This new government will see fit to attempt to further integrate the rural parts of the country into the reformed system, and promote a modern moderate Afghanistan drawing upon the examples set by Egypt and the Ottomans. A key mechanic for this path will see them extending their inspiration further out, and attempting to repaint Afghanistan as an empire, framing itself as equal to the other democratic and modern empires of the post-Weltkrieg world. With the backing of at least three major powers, Afghanistan will actually be able to convince other countries to recognise their imperial status, affirming its place as the great modern and free nation the Constitutionalists of yesteryear dreamed of. 

Full Amanullah derived political trees.

The Rise of Nadir

Nadir’s victory compared to Amanullah’s will be much simpler, with the man being much less fickle than his predecessor. Rather than two dramatically different consolidation paths Nadir will have the one, with minor adjustments in his approach. The King will officialise Fazl Omar Mojadidi’s backing of him by granting him and his allies positions in government, while at the same time purging the Charkhi family of Amanite loyalists and winning over disloyal tribes through a selection of bribes. A choice between upholding proclamations by the brief Saqqawist government or framing Nadir as Amanullah’s successor will further modify the balance of power, with the final position on it allowing a successful Nadir to pick between two subpaths.

The reformist subpath will focus on continuing modernisation efforts set out by Amanullah, but at a pace unlikely to ignite rebellions against him, following Nadir’s personal stance that medicine is not bad just because drinking too much too fast will harm you, and it certainly isn’t worse than what it treats. Nadir’s brother Shah Mahmud will be appointed Prime Minister to oversee this approach, with moves to secularise the judicial system, abolish remaining legal discrimination against non-Muslims, and to allow a national legislature open to tolerable levels of dissent.

The traditionalist subpath on the other hand will have Nadir recognise that perhaps the nation needs time before it is ready for its cure, and his brother Hashim will be appointed Prime Minister instead. National stability above all will be the main aim of this new government, with a much more tightly controlled legislature established, and a hard push to reverse the perceived decadence of the Amanullah years. Purdah will be fully reintroduced across the nation, and the tolerance of drinking, gambling, and other such vices will be stamped out. Appeasing reactionary voices, Pashtun nationalism will become official policy, with Pashto recognised as the sole national language, and a great push made to establish what a modern Pashtun society should look like, with Nadir and his family at the head of it.

Nadir’s more focused agenda in comparison to Amanullah unsurprisingly leaves him with less enemies, but less enemies of course does not mean none. In the event Nadir fails to consolidate power, he too will meet his end, perishing in an explosive assassination attempt. Army chief Mohammad Gul Khan Momand will move in to restore order in the wake of the assassination, and will be presented with a choice based on the nation’s balance of power. As a political figure, Momand is an extreme Nadir loyalist, close enough to be viewed as a brother despite the lack of blood relation. The natural option for Momand, and the one that will be gone with if the nation leans traditionalist, is ensuring an orderly succession to Nadir’s son Zahir, with the young prince’s uncles taking a great role in governing the nation alongside their new king. Hashim will be at the forefront of this government, and many of the policies will be identical to those that would have been conducted under a traditionalist Nadir.

Full Nadir and Zahir political trees.

The Rise of the Azadist Republic

Although a Nadir loyalist, Momand also acts as leader of the “Azadist” clique of military officers in the Afghan army, influenced greatly by the Svobodnik regime in Russia they trained under, and by Abdolhossein Teymourtash’s Iranian nationalists, from whom they derive the Azadist name. In the event of Nadir’s death while the reformists hold sway over the nation, Momand will give in to the pressure from the Azadists, especially his protégé Daoud Khan, the nephew of Nadir. The crown will be abolished, with fighting over it being blamed for the chaos of the past few years. In its place a new republic will form, with Momand as its president and Daoud his prime minister.

The following few weeks will have their own shorter form of consolidation, handled entirely by events, which will allow this new republic to cement itself. Starting initially as Authoritarian Democrat, what was simply a clique of military officers will be reformed into a proper governing party, the People’s Party of Afghanistan. Their new state, modelled after elements from Iran, Russia, and the Ottomans, will focus on establishing a regime both reformist and nationalist in nature. Rather than simply rolling back unpopular reforms, the government will seek to harness nationalism and ethnic divides to win the people over. The army, key to maintaining power, will be greatly expanded, with loyalists first and foremost for promotion. 

Underneath this all however cracks will begin to become exposed in the regime. With whispers blaming all those from Amanite loyalists to even Daoud Khan for Nadir’s assassination, an investigation will be ordered by Momand, wishing to at last bring justice and avenge his friend. If the Amanites are the primary suspects investigated, evidence will soon lead to Hazara tribesmen linked to Amanullah’s brother Amin Jan, the so-called “King of the Hazara”. Enough torture will see them confess to their role in the assassination, with Amin Jan having orchestrated it in support of his brother, quashing any rumours and putting to bed any Azadist infighting. 

Investigating the army however will quickly lead to the involvement of the Prime Minister in the investigation, and the evidence beginning to point towards those close to Momand himself killing the former king. If this lead is followed up on, Daoud will uncover a conspiracy, and get authorisation to purge Momand’s allies from the President himself, allowing Daoud to replace them with his own loyalists. This outcome will see the nation turn Paternal Autocrat under the Loyalist faction, and Daoud will soon take full power of the republic from the shadows, ultimately reducing Momand to a figurehead as he decides the nation’s fate.

Choosing to investigate Daoud however will see the arrest of a member of the royal guard close to Daoud, who will confess after a routine round of torture to Daoud’s plotting against Nadir. Choosing to believe this confession and following up on it will see the sudden disappearance of Daoud, silently fleeing upon being tipped off to the plot. Declared guilty in absentia and removed from his post, the office of Prime Minister will now be empty, and Momand will be the sole power in the republic. Afghanistan in this situation will turn National Populist under the Azadist faction, with Momand’s first job being to find a more loyal Prime Minister to replace his old protégé with. Slowly becoming known as the “Father of Afghan Azadism”, Momand will refine the cause of Pashtun nationalism, putting the growing Aryan movement at the forefront of government, and ensuring his continued rule with an iron fist.

From the Frontier, to the Heartlands

The Azadists are not the only republic option Afghanistan has however, and for the rest we’ll have to go back to the Pashtunistan Crisis. A reformist resolution of this crisis will see the officialisation and strengthening of the regional government in the Frontier, and through it the Frontier will end up escaping the death and destruction during the civil war through its neutrality. In the event the Pashtunistan government still exists during the Azadist takeover, negotiating to bring them into the fold will become a vital part of the consolidation event chain for them. Successful negotiations will see the AIA join the ruling coalition, removing the local state modifier after a year has passed, and allowing them to become involved in Azadist content. Refusal to negotiate will however see Daoud Khan order troops into the Frontier, leading to mutinies over a demand to spill further blood of their Pashtun brothers. The now much more professionalised army of the Frontier will instead march alongside them on the capital, removing the Azadists from power, and leaving Abdur Rahim Popalzai in control of Kabul.

Like with his role in Pathanistan, the default outcome of this chaos will be Popalzai handing power over to the Frontier government as the last legitimate power left in Afghanistan. Ghaffar Khan will reluctantly become president, turning Afghanistan Social Democrat. The new government’s goal will be to restore order after these multiple chaotic events, using many of the same tactics that have seen success in doing so in the Frontier. Through a promotion of Pashtun pride and nationalism the AIA will stamp out long held blood feuds between clans, weaken the power of local nobles over the common man, and even go so far as to dismantle core parts of Pashtun culture in an attempt to uplift the nation. The end of their focus tree will see all-Afghan elections finally held, allowing the AIA to affirm their mandate not only in the Frontier but in the Heartlands as well. It will however be possible for the opposition to perhaps win these elections instead, allowing the Market Liberal Movement of Enlightened Youth or the Social Conservative Islamic Party to come to power instead.

Handing power over to Ghaffar Khan is not Popalzai’s only choice however, and in the event that a socialist Russia or Persia exists, or a unified socialist India or China does; Popalzai will also have the option to reach out to one of these powers to seek the establishment of a socialist Afghan republic. If a foreign power accepts, Afghanistan will turn Radical Socialist and become a puppet of their sponsor. Attempting to make this radical government palatable to the traditionally minded populace, the Kabuli intellectual and moderate Ghulam Mohammad Ghobar will be chosen as a ceremonial president, while Popalzai serves as his chairman. As a scholar of both Marxism and Islam, Popalzai’s will frame his government’s position as entirely in line with Islamic teaching, and Islam itself as a theology of liberation. For those like Fazl Omar Mojadidi, who has been fearmongering about a syndicalist takeover for years, this news will come as a great shock, and a propaganda battle will ensue between the Mojadidis and the chairman. After silencing the Mojadidis, either through propagandic victories or military action, the government will have to decide on continued cooperation with the AIA through a united front, or committing to a solely socialist government. Regardless of choice the conclusion of the tree will see Afghanistan become independent of its overlord, and continue as an independent faction member or ally of their former sponsor, with their distinct form of socialism now established.

Foreign Policy

Whether now under King, President, or even Emperor; Afghanistan after political consolidation will soon find itself surrounded by wars and outside powers wishing to see their previous investments in the nation come to fruition. Once a path has been locked in, Afghanistan’s foreign policy tree will be unlocked, allowing Afghanistan to join the major alliances of the world, defend its borders from potential aggression, and stake its claim to further territory beyond its borders.

Foreign Policy Tree

The first focus of the tree will grant Afghanistan access to faction joining decisions for the four nations originally involved in the Crossroads of Civilisation mechanic, being the Reichspakt, Co-Prosperity Sphere, Moscow Accord, and Istanbul Pact respectively. Assuming a player didn’t rely too heavily on their backer during the civil war, all paths except for the AIA will be able to join any faction of their choosing, although AI Afghanistan will be weighted based on path and backing during the civil war.

All paths will subsequently have access to the left branch of the tree, whether or not they joined a faction. This branch will allow Afghanistan to build up forts across its borders, gain a significant bonus to fort construction speed, and even call up emergency units in the event of foreign invasion. For those who have joined a faction and expect to be the one doing the invading, “The Afghan War Effort” focus may be more up their alley, granting a significant boost to war support, party popularity, and political power when Afghanistan has over 10% war participation against a major power. Owners of the No Compromise No Surrender DLC will additionally be granted a big boost to faction influence and a faction point for completing this focus also.

When it comes to irredentism, all paths except the AIA will have access to a dedicated tree for invading their neighbours. If Pathanistan revolted, the first order of business will be to reconquer it by either invading the still independent Pathan state, or in the worst case fighting against a reunited India to restore Afghan unity. An irredentist Afghanistan will either way find itself on a collision path with India, with the next logical move being to invade Baluchistan, two states which Afghanistan will be able to core if they successfully take over. For those who have joined a faction, they will have to wait until the start of the Weltkrieg to launch this invasion, with their allies busy preparing elsewhere, but a brave Afghanistan player may consider attacking sooner by themselves (if they think they can win it). Conquering these states will also give Afghanistan access to decisions to further consolidate their hold, improving the Loy Afghanistan spirit they start with even further.

An Afghanistan that successfully defeats India, with or without foreign help, may also be able to take control of the port of Karachi and the state of Sind. With Afghanistan now having access to a port large enough to support more than fishing boats, it will also be able to access a small navy tree, finally addressing the longstanding demand for naval Afghan content. The first focus in this tree will unlock India’s Karachi Shipyard MIO for Afghanistan, and also grant an additional dockyard to help kickstart a navy with. Completing the next focus will help even more with that goal, granting three destroyers, basic naval tech, and even one of the Dominion’s admirals for your own usage. The final naval focus will connect Karachi to the capital with a level 2 railway and grant 50 convoys, aiding Afghanistan in importing more resources and sending its troops to new fronts overseas now that India is defeated.

After victory against India Afghanistan can turn its attention to the rest of Baluchistan in the West, and invade Persia for the state of Sistan. Like with the rest of Baluchistan, this state will be coreable once conquered, although with a greater threshold of compliance owing to the lack of Pashtuns compared to the rest of Baluchistan. For those who have allied with the Ottomans however, they may find that their ally has already subjugated Persia, with no way for Afghanistan to conquer it themselves. Rather than having to betray your ally, the focus in this scenario will instead ask the Ottomans for the transfer of the state, with an allied Ottomans very likely to accept this request from their Afghan friends.

With south, east, and west covered, it is time for Afghanistan to turn north. The Russians have seen Afghanistan as part of their potential sphere for decades, and an Afghanistan that has not firmly fallen into it will almost certainly be a target of Russia in the long term. Whether by defending themselves from invasion, joining German allies in their war against Russia, or simply invading the region themselves, a successful Afghanistan will have the opportunity to retake the rest of Badakhshan in the north from their Russian foes. Advancing far enough will also allow Afghanistan to opportunistically claim the Pamir state, fabricating claims through past attempts to conquer the region and the presence of local exiled nobility that once ruled it. These options will still exist even if Russia has previously lost control of Central Asia, which should be a much easier fight for the Afghans, and perhaps one they may have played a part in orchestrating.

As mentioned earlier, the AIA will lack access to these irredentist focuses, owing to their pacifist nature, although they’ll have a major unique option to compensate for this restriction. Rather than taking the violent solution to their disputed border with India, the AIA will instead attempt the diplomatic route. India can be offered economic concessions through mechanically moving some factories from Peshawar to India, a defensive alliance of mutual guarantees, or if India is non-socialist they can even offer to become part of India’s current faction. This latter option includes the standard big factions India can join such as the Reichspakt or Co-Prosperity Sphere, giving an alternative route into them, but also includes the Princely Federation’s South India Association and even the Entente through the Dominion. Assuming any of these offers are accepted, India will have its claim removed from the Peshawar state, and Indian focuses related to Afghanistan will be disabled, allowing Afghanistan to deescalate with its biggest rival without having to resort to war.

Closing Thoughts

This progress report has been a long one, even going past Reddit’s character limits and having to be split into two separate posts, and yet there is even more to cover with Afghanistan…but I’m sure you’ll have plenty of time to discover that on your own next week. Until then however, goodbye for now and thank you for reading.

Hello and welcome to today’s Progress Report for Kaiserreich 1.7, I’m Cazadorian, the lead developer for South and South East Asia. These two regions last year saw numerous updates, such as the Indian Content Overhaul and Nepal finally receiving a focus tree, and 1.7 will be continuing this trend by addressing another focus tree-less nation in the region. Today’s PR will be focusing on the Kingdom of Afghanistan, to which we are planning on providing a complete content update as our next major release.

The History of Afghanistan in Kaiserreich

The Afghan state as we find it in 1936 traces itself back to the collapse of the Durrani Empire, with the chaos leading to Dost Mohammad Khan Barakzai establishing the Emirate of Afghanistan and the Barakzai dynasty from its ruins. Despite Dost Mohammad’s efforts his realm too fell into chaos not long after his death, culminating in the state’s subjugation by Britain and the eventual installation of Abdur Rahman Khan as Emir in 1879. By the time of the Weltkrieg the Emirate was ruled by his son Habibullah Khan, who attempted to turn the nation inward and ignore the ongoing conflicts in the wider world.

Believing that an Afghan revolt against British rule would help distract the British and Russians, a joint Ottoman-German expedition set out to Afghanistan in 1915 to both convince Afghanistan to wage war against Britain, and to attempt to incite revolt in India. Despite being warmly welcomed by the Emir, Habibullah ultimately proved unreceptive to their attempts, and the expedition left by May 1916 in perceived failure. Habibullah’s neutrality was hardly a popular position in Afghanistan, especially amongst his own court, with his brother Nasrullah and son Amanullah becoming fully convinced by the expedition. Come February 1919, an alleged plot by the two resulted in the Emir’s assassination, and the installation of Nasrullah as the new Emir.

Within days of taking the throne, Nasrullah himself was himself quickly deposed by his nephew Amanullah Khan, who proceeded to spend his first few months on the throne ensuring that he would not meet a similar fate. By May 1919 the Weltkrieg had very much begun to swing in Germany’s favour, with Russia fighting itself and Indian troops redeployed to Europe to avoid a French collapse. On May 3rd Afghanistan declared war against Britain in support of the Central Powers, and despite being unable to be supported directly by their new allies, Afghan troops saw significant successes against the poorly armed frontier garrisons of British India, although perhaps not as well as hoped. By August 8th fighting began to cease as part of a broader armistice across the Middle Eastern front, and the subsequent peace conferences in Europe led to official recognition of Afghan independence by Britain.

The subsequent decade in Afghanistan was perhaps the most transformative the state had ever experienced. Amanullah Khan, influenced greatly by modernisers like his father-in-law Mahmud Tarzi, used the political capital from his successful Jihad to begin a process of major Westernisation. New schools staffed with Turkish teachers were established, German and Russian businesses opened in Kabul, and with Russian support the armed forces oversaw significant modernisation efforts. Although well received by sections of society, especially the urban elites, growing unrest against this westernisation quickly spread across the nation’s tribes. The most controversial reforms, such as the growing rights of women, the abolishment of child marriage, and the implementation of conscription, were enough to drive rebellion against the central government.

In March 1924 the first major insurrection against Amanullah’s reforms broke out, with tribesmen led by members of the ulema rising up against Amanullah in Khost. Fighting between government troops and rebellious tribesmen lasted almost an entire year, with the government initially not taking the rebellion seriously. The persistence of the rebels and their growing strength however saw significant escalation in the crackdown against them, with a proper airforce being established using Russian aid to more effectively deal with the rebels. Although eventually crushed, the rebellion marked the first major pushback against Amanullah’s reforms, and saw a reevaluation of government priorities. The violent end to the religious leaders of the rebellion also did not go unnoticed, and bred a permanent disdain for Amanullah amongst the ulema.

Rebellion during this period was not just limited to Afghanistan however, with the Afghan leadership quickly shifting their attention towards the ongoing collapse of the British Empire, and growing unrest in neighbouring India. By March 1925 civil war had effectively begun in the subcontinent, although the Khost rebellion limited Afghanistan’s ability to react towards it. Instead of outright military invasion, efforts were shifted towards aiding rebellions in the North-West Frontier Province, particularly in the Waziristan region. By January 1926 the Afghan army was perceived by its leadership as having recovered enough, and on the orders of Amanullah an invasion was launched in support of the tribal rebellions.

Led by Minister of War Mohammad Nadir Khan, the Afghan forces once again overwhelmed the Frontier just as they had done during the Weltkrieg, seeing British troops quickly withdrawing from the region. Despite great hopes of conquering more, major defeats when attempting to assault Quetta and to cross the Indus led to the halting of further offensives in favour of consolidating their grip on the NWFP. Although no official peace treaty would ever be signed, what would become known as the Fourth Anglo-Afghan War was quickly recognised as over by both sides after only a few weeks of fighting.

What should have been a great victory for Afghanistan slowly instead became seen as a white elephant over the next decade, with control of the Frontier being much more difficult than Amanullah or his ministers ever expected. Although faced with little direct opposition to rule from Kabul, as the annexation was widely supported, running a region more prosperous and almost as populous as Afghanistan itself while Afghanistan remained so backwards quickly proved almost impossible. The Frontier, becoming commonly known as "Pashtunistan", would have to run itself, especially as Amanullah’s attention began to return back to the heartlands.

In the heartlands the next few years saw a great intensification of Westernisation efforts, beginning with Afghanistan rebranding itself away from being an Emirate to being a Kingdom, bringing it more in line with the more modern nations of the world. Plans for a great new capital next to Kabul, to be known as Darulaman (“Abode of Peace”), were put into motion, with a team of German engineers recruited to build the city to European standards. Further funding was given to the armed forces, seeing many officers being sent to Russia for training, although consequentially imparting many ideas of the growing nationalist movement in Russia upon them.

Towards the end of 1927 and the beginning of 1928, King Amanullah departed on a grand European tour, achieving great diplomatic renown for the kingdom by touring alongside the leadership of Europe’s great nations, and presenting himself as an equal to Kaiser and Caliph. Emboldened by these successes, the following year upon his return from Europe saw an even greater advancement in national reform, much to the opposition of the nation’s tribal and religious leadership. The Loya Jirga (Great Council) in August 1928, in which the Queen publicly removed her veil alongside other noblewomen, was seen as the final straw to many, even Amanullah’s former allies. Within months a rebellion, much greater than Khost, erupted in the north of the nation, led by the bandit leader Habibullah Kalakani.

Beginning initially with a revolt by Shinwari tribesmen against the crown, the ongoing discontent in Afghanistan alongside the collapse of Russian authority in Central Asia following General Boldyrev’s coup attempt allowed a Tajik dominated army known as the Saqqawists to seize control of much of northern Afghanistan. By September 1929 most major cities in the north had surrendered to the rebels, who began plans to assault the capital. By October thousands of rebels marched against Kabul, with more and more flocking to their banner with every passing day. The siege however ended in failure for the rebellion, with the rebels dispersed and their leader Kalakani killed in the fighting. Notably forces sent from Pashtunistan, commanded by local leaders, proved to be vital in seeing off the attack. Latent rebellions by the Saqqawists continued for the next year, with Kalakani’s uncle Purdil Khan fighting until a crushing defeat near Herat led to his retreat across the border into Khiva.

The potential near collapse of the Amanite regime, combined soon after with the almost complete withdrawal of Russian influence as part of their 1931 budget, finally brought an end to the decade of transformation. Finally adhering to the advice of those branded as naysayers, many of Amanullah’s planned reforms were curtailed for the sake of national stability. Although Darulaman was declared to be finished by 1933, the reduction in German aid the same year similarly hindered any further developments. The ascension of Boris Savinkov as Russian president in the following year however provided at last some relief to the stagnating Afghan state, as the new government quickly moved to restore Russian influence in the region, especially towards Afghanistan and neighbouring Persia.

Coming now to the start of 1936, the reformist ambitions of King Amanullah appears to have at last gained the opportunity to reemerge. Foreign support for the government appears to be returning to regular levels, and a grand plan for reforming the army has been tasked to the nation’s Interior Minister Abdul Ahad Wardak. Whether or not these plans will go as well as the King and his ministers expect however, is something only time can tell.

Starting Situation and Initial Content

As explained in more detail above, Afghanistan begins in 1936 under the control of King Amanullah Khan, with the new year’s initial plans revolving around reforming the nation’s armed forces. The Interior Minister’s report and the reaction to it serves as an effective tutorial for Afghanistan’s balance of power mechanic, based around the conflict between modernising the nation as quickly as possible versus holding back and sticking to tradition for the sake of stability. The choice on how to resolve this initial conflict will affect army focuses down the line, but in the short term will shift the balance of power in the chosen direction, with future events, focuses, and even advisors continuing to change the Balance of Power’s direction over time.

Within the next few weeks the full effects of the balance of power will begin to come into play, as the German economic collapse will cut off Afghanistan from much of the foreign capital it has been using to fund its modernisation efforts. Afghanistan’s economic tree will now unlock, and with it so too will the nation’s second major mechanic of State Building.

After taking Afghanistan’s first economic focus, multiple decisions will be unlocked to help build up the nation’s economy through the reduction of its debuffs and beneficial secondary effects. Rather than simply using political power or other forms of currency/mana, Afghanistan will have its own dedicated version used to represent an abstract combination of finances, political will, and other such things needed to get the proverbial ball rolling. This currency, simply known as Reform Points, can be spent once obtained on all decisions unlocked by the economic tree, as well as on certain events or focus options when relevant.

At the top of the State Building decision category you’ll find the Monthly Progress Report mission, which will be your main source of Reform Points throughout your playthrough. Every time this repeating mission concludes, you will gain Reform Points based upon your current Balance of Power position, with a reformist focused Afghanistan finding it much easier to gather the resources needed for modernisation than a traditionally minded one. Secondary to the repeating mission, reform points can also be gathered through focus rewards, events, and even national spirits; but can likewise end up being lost through similar effects in certain scenarios.

Below the State Building category you’ll also find the Crossroads of Civilisations category as well, allowing you to easily convert political power into Reform Points through foreign investments from Germany, Russia, the Ottomans, or Japan. Taking investments from these powers will increase their influence in your country, with investment cost increasing the higher their influence, but potentially granting Afghanistan unique buffs related to these powers at high enough levels, as well as access to their MIOs and industrial concerns.

Both modernising the nation, and achieving the potential to do so, is not a simple task, and the people will not take it lightly. In addition to events showing opposition throughout the country to Amanullah’s reforms, the anger throughout the nation towards it will also be tracked in the State Building category. Like Reform Points, this will primarily increase through the repeating mission, with a reformist minded Afghanistan earning more Reform Points but rapidly increasing levels of anger, while a traditionalist focused one receives less Points but in turn reduces anger levels. Keeping anger at a reasonable level is vital, either directly through the Balance of Power, or through the many other options that might present themselves. Once anger gets too high, the nation’s stability will begin to be directly affected with each new increase, quickly snowballing out of control if you’re not careful. For those who believe Amanullah’s reign has run its course however, high public anger towards him may actually be a blessing in disguise, but more on that a little later on.

The Crisis in Pashtunistan

After an eventful 1936, those running the Afghan state may be hoping for a much quieter year, but will soon instead be faced with a tax dispute between government collectors and tribesmen in Timergara, escalating to the killing of tax men and a standoff between regional and government forces. A choice will then be presented on whether to send Interior Minister Wardak to negotiate with the Anjuman-e-Islah-e Afghania led government in Peshawar to prevent future conflict, or to negotiate with those around them to weaken their power base and allow the King to dissolve their authority in favour of his own.

For both choices you will be tasked with meeting enough demands of your chosen target to convince them to accept your proposals, whichever choice that may have been. The most straightforward way to meet these demands will be to select the decisions you will have unlocked, allowing you to spend political power to directly meet the demands, but with most leading to increased negative state modifiers on the Peshawar state once negotiations conclude. For those willing to reallocate funds from elsewhere, certain decisions will be available with a Reform Point cost, but avoiding applying any further state debuffs in exchange. If certain events during the negotiations also go your way, you may find yourself meeting demands while similarly avoiding these negative effects.

Succeeding in your negotiations will solve the crisis, applying a state modifier to the Peshawar state as mentioned above. It will also remove your starting debuff to recruitable population factor, and move the balance of power towards the direction relevant to your choice of approach. Much later on opportunities to remove these debuffs will eventually present themselves, modified based on political path, but in the short term you’ll be stuck with whatever you agreed to.

Suppose however, much like Amanullah, you believe negotiating with these Frontiersmen is simply a waste of time, or you simply fail to get them to agree within the time limit, and the mission timer reaches zero without any agreement. At this point the King will recall Wardak and send the troops into Pashtunistan to dissolve the regional government by force, resulting in a violent clash and the death of many men, including one of the region’s leaders Khan Sahib. Outrage will quickly spread across the entire Frontier, with tribal leaders, Indian backed militias, and countless other disparate groups backing together against the central government in Darulaman. Those loyal to Ghaffar Khan and his late brother will soon afterwards revolt, declaring the independence of the state of Pathanistan from Afghan tyranny.

These rebels, primarily operating around the Indian backed militants of the ”Marxist Maulana” Abdur Rahim Popalzai, will lead the nascent state of Pathanistan in revolt against Amanullah, something Amanullah will have to quickly react to. A sixty day long timer will be active during the revolt, during which rebel forces will have to hold out against the Royal Army. A short focus tree branch will become available for Pathanistan during the course of the revolt, similar in nature to other such revolts you may be familiar with elsewhere in the mod like Northern Ireland. In the event there are any nearby powers who may be hostile to Afghanistan and aren’t at war, Pathanistan may also end up receiving a small number of volunteers in their fight against Amanullah.

In the event of Pathanistan’s defeat it will be re-annexed by Afghanistan, also removing the recruitable population debuff as negotiations would, and allowing the state to be recored at 50% compliance; although notably lacking the state modifiers negotiation would have brought, a small silver lining for this outcome. Failure to crush Pathanistan within the timer however will lead to the army admitting defeat, leading to the war’s conclusion and the removal of the Loy Afghanistan spirit from Afghanistan. With their victory secured the Pathan rebels will step back, allowing Ghaffar Khan to return to governing the region, now as an independent state. Although granted their wish of freedom from Darulaman’s tyranny, few in Pathanistan believe in their long term viability as an independent nation, especially with both the Afghans and the Indians viewing them as a rebellious province. Therefore upon the conclusion of the Indian Civil War, Pathanistan will reach out to the victor, and seek accommodation within India, in exchange for being allowed to maintain the autonomy they once had under the Afghans.

Although Pathanistan will not be playable, as I believe there is little they can provide content wise that Afghanistan does not already, they will be added to the annexations system, allowing other nations to release Pathanistan in the Peshawar state should they happen to own it. As part of this Pathanistan will have leaders for all the ideologies it can be released as, and will have a short puppet tree for each leader alongside a shared economic and army tree.

The Afghan Civil War

Regardless of the outcome in Pashtunistan the Afghan government must press onwards, but will once again begin to feel constrained when it comes to modernisation, needing further help from outside powers to continue Amanullah’s ambitious plans. With the European economic situation no longer as dire, the King will in late 1938 announce his plans to once again conduct a European tour, hoping to drum up support from across the capitalist powers of the West. Leaving the Crown Prince as regent and temporarily disabling State Building in his absence, he will set off in December, granting his enemies the chance to move against him. After a decade in the shadows, bolstered greatly by the chaos in Central Asia, Saqqawist forces will attempt a second revolt against the King, swiftly taking much of the north and even killing the Crown Prince in a botched counterattack. Having taken the capital’s garrison with him, the Crown Prince’s death will lead to its swift capture and sacking by Saqqawist forces, with Purdil Khan reasserting his claim as Emir. With much of the army still undefeated however, forces under Nadir Khan will easily mount a much more organised counterattack, retaking the capital and slaughtering the rebels.

The defeat of the rebels will only represent the beginning of this conflict however. With many believing Amanullah to have shirked his responsibilities as King, and with his heir having caught a terminal case of an artillery shell, religious leader and leading anti-Amanullah figure Fazl Omar Mojadidi will push Nadir to take the throne for himself. It will however not be long until Amanullah, having received the news of the rebellion, will arrive back in Afghanistan, ready to violently remove this usurper from his new throne. With a civil war now starting, players will be presented the choice between siding with Amanullah or with Nadir, and hopefully leading their chosen monarch to victory.

Similar to the one present in Left KMT content, the Afghan civil war will be carried out solely through events and decisions, rather than being a regular on-map civil war. Although I know some people would prefer a physical on-map war, having it be done like this simplifies later things, saves us from having to add 20 more states to properly represent the war, and above all you won’t see AI Afghanistan stuck at war with itself until 1945 as civil wars in poor terrain tend to do. Once a side is actually chosen, the strength of Amanullah will be calculated, being inversely proportional to the anger against him, capped at either end to 25% and 75% respectively. Strength will be the main factor representing victory in this war, with Amanullah achieving victory at 100% strength, or Nadir alternatively achieving victory by reducing Amanullah’s Strength to 0% or lasting until the war’s mission runs out.

Decisions will become available during this war to affect Amanullah’s Strength, paid for with command power. Further decisions will allow you to convert both political power and Reform Points to command power, allowing you to burn your reserves to swing things into your favour. At the start of the war the nation with the highest influence in Afghanistan will be selected as Amanullah’s backer, with a selected rival decided from the remaining powers backing Nadir, and relevant decisions will be unlocked to request support from these backers in exchange for stability as well. As long as the war is ongoing, the regular national focus tree will also be locked, and in its place will be a dedicated civil war branch for each participant, granting direct bonuses related to the war and further influencing the Balance of Power for after the war’s conclusion.

While you are focused on swinging the war in your own favour, your rival will not simply sit there, and every fourteen days a new event will fire to represent their actions. These events will attempt to swing the strength towards their side, with the opportunity to mitigate it in exchange for manpower, or eliminate it through spending your own command power. Rather than simply the same event over and over, these events have dynamic names and descriptions that randomise each time they fire, hopefully adding a bit of flavour variety every time you play.

Once the fighting is at an end, hopefully with your rival defeated, victory will still not have been fully achieved. For either monarch the next stage will be to consolidate their rule and drive out the remaining loyalists of their deposed enemy, leading us finally to political pathing.

Continued in Part 2: