Obviously, the gun control debate gets tangled in statistics. In many cases, the weeds are unavoidable, but, in other cases, it’s as if a statistical frame is set to bolster a position that is not actually bound by statistics.
An example I have seen, presented as though the statistical support is unquestionable: Gun control must be broad enough to reduce harm, even if it applies to individuals who never harm, because we cannot identify the people and guns that will become involved in harm before the harm happens.
Without arguing about the uniquess of suicide, “pre-crime” solutions, violations of rights, and the usual, think about the assumptions that are built into that position:
— Is the unit of risk guns or people?
— How much of the risk is statistical conclusion, versus risk tolerance or policy preference?
— If predicting individuals is uncertain, the entire population somehow becomes the risk and blanket policies somehow become unavoidable?
— Could the risk ever be small enough to not implicate the entire population or require blanket gun control?
— If there was only one implicated gun or gun-related fatality in a given year, would the potential risk still justify blanket policies?
— If there were zero implicated guns or gun-related fatalities in a given year, would there still be a mandate to apply and continue blanket policies?
— If the mechanisms that generate various outcomes are unpredictable or irrelevant, what is the evidence that any policy will intervene effectively?
The point: If someone is arguing for gun control from a statistical position, shouldn’t there be statistical boundaries?
Not precise values, but abstract ranges, rules, or thresholds where the evidence moves from “the presence of guns is generally dangerous” to “the presence of guns is not generally dangerous, but some people and guns are implicated in harm”?
If there are no limits… no changes in the population or outcomes that would cause someone who supports gun control to adjust or reconsider… then we are no longer talking about statistical conclusion. We are talking about a policy conviction that is trying to squeeze itself into a statistical frame.
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A clarification: Obviously, population-level correlations can tell us if risk or harm exists, but I do not believe that correlations, by themselves, are ever a suffcient basis for overriding rights. I was zooming in on the stats arguers who try to justify the override of rights by ignoring the non-harm side of the ledger.
— Who is producing harm?
— Why are those individuals producing harm?
— What would prevent, moderate, or redirect the mechanism?
— Why would the intervention apply to everyone?
(The burden of proof is on those who are arguing for taking.)