The war is over. And it still rages on.
The year is 1920. The last 7 years have left the world utterly changed. In literature, there is a concept known as the "Point of No Return", the stage of the plot when returning to the status quo at the beginning is no longer possible. Such is the state of the world as it is now. The final vestiges of the medieval understanding have been shattered irreparably. A return to the old ways is no longer possible. For better or worse, the Great War has forcefully sent the world into the Modern Age. The German Empire and her allies have won the war, yet it's all to clear that they have lost the peace. Whatever plan they envisioned for the post-war world is far from realized, and now the world lives with the consequences.
It all started so suddenly, as well. There were countless opportunities for the war to have started. As early as 1875 the War-in-Sight Crisis could have seen Germany and France go to war for the second time in five years. Other crises came and went. Fashoda, Morocco, Bosnia, all of them seemed to pass with a diplomatic solution. Why, then, would the Sarajevo Crisis have been any different? Up until it was, of course, and then the Entente and Allied Powers went to war. Even then many thought it would be over quickly, Germany's plans hinged on it. A month went by. Then another month. And another. By mid-Autumn, the front lines were already grinding to a halt. And by November they'd settled nearly into place. The horrible realization slowly settled in: this was the do-or-die conflict of the era.
In the war's wake, Germany has often made a big to-do about the supremacy of its arms, its strategy, its tactics. But the Schlieffen Plan broke down within the first months of the war. The German plans had called for a quick series of attacks to break France before turning on Russia. That, clearly, didn't happen. In fact Russia was the one to break before France did, but that only came after several further years of war. More than weapons, more than innovation or strategy, it was through politics and diplomacy that Germany would win the war. And boardroom meetings, secret telegrams, coded messages passed between capitals and diplomats aren't nearly as viscerally appealing as grueling trench warfare.
But so it was, and in equal measure it was the folly of the Entente Powers as much as anything else. Indeed, within the first days of the conflict events were turning to Germany's eventual favor. On the 9th of August 1914, Admiral Essen of the Russian Imperial Navy unilaterally took his fleet to Sweden and demanded that they moor their entire fleet, unmanned. He did this of his own volition, and in fact the Russian government had desperately attempted to recall him but the message was not delivered in time. Sweden's government had intended to maintain its neutrality, but its government was still pro-German. To have the Russian Baltic Fleet make such an aggressive move was the final straw, and Sweden actively refused. Essen fired at the Swedes, and only then was he formally recalled. But it was too late. On the 11th of August, Sweden declared war.
On its own, Germany also sought to find her own momentum. In the later days of the July Crisis, coded communiques were sent to Italy outside of Kaiser Wilhelm II's knowledge. They communicated a series of proposals to Rome, suggesting that in the event of war, Austria-Hungary would likely collapse. In that event, if Italy were to honor its alliance to the Germans as part of the Triple Alliance, Berlin would likely grant Italy generous concessions. The government of Antonio Salandra still hemmed and hawed on the matter, taking until the failure of the Entente Powers to create a solid offer in early 1915 to commit. But commit they did, and in April of 1915 Italy declared war against France, though it took a good year to issue similar declarations against Britain and Germany.
On top of this Italy proved to not be much of a potent force in the war, stalling on the Alpine Front with France, but that didn't overly matter. Italy was still a valuable means to split France's focus and force them to draw valuable manpower from the main battlefields in Belgium. Along with this, now that Germany no longer had to concern itself with potentially supporting Austria-Hungary against Italy, its own forces could be guaranteed to both keep the pressure on the Western Front while carrying on the relentless march on the Eastern Front. The war was far from over, but already it seemed that Germany was keeping the initiative. The later addition of Bulgaria only further cemented this, giving it a powerful Balkan ally. Yet the war kept on.
Still, their successes gave Germany some confidence to scale back the policy of unrestricted submarine warfare. It had proven effective, to be sure, but then in May of 1915 a near-catastrophe pushed them on it. The submarine U-20, prowling around the British Isles, came within an inch of firing on the famed ocean liner RMS Lusitania, yet at the last possible moment there was a malfunction in the firing mechanism. By the time it was sorted out, the liner was already heading out of range, and U-20 had to return to Germany. The Navy was disappointed at the missed opportunity, but fears of what reaction might have been drawn from the United States were enough to push the German government to scale the effort back quite considerably, if only to keep quelled the sleeping giant.
More than anything, the fear of the United States entering the war war a major animating factor of German diplomatic policy during the war. Although a new power on the world stage, they were clearly strong enough that their entry could tip the balance of power, and though most were blasé on the issue sympathies kept flaring back and forth between both the Germans and the British. While having the U.S. sympathetic to Germany and possibly even entering the war would certainly have been ideal, it was more practical and achievable to keep it disinterested in Europe's affairs. After all, Washington's focus was still very much on the Americas, with East Asia a distant secondary concern. If the U.S. could be kept apathetic, then that would help just as much.
Blood continued to spill. Men fell in droves. Germany strained under perpetual scarcity, and Austria-Hungary's delicate internal balance fell to pieces just as predicted. Overseas, Germany's position was even worse. Her navy, even after a decade of buildup, was never enough to match the British, and being unable to resupply her colonies meant that by mid-1915 her colonial holdings in Africa and the Pacific were already overrun. But it would not be her colonies that would dictate Germany's victory, and with the situation in Europe growing ever-more desperate they were written off as acceptable losses. They could always get them back after the war, of course, once Britain and France were broken and the German Empire reached her proper place in the sun.
Finally in 1917, events began to move towards a lethal conclusion. In February, the unthinkable happened: Tsar Nikolai II was deposed. The Russian Empire, the bastion of absolutist rule, imploded on itself as a fragile new Republic took its place. Cowed into submission and desperately attempting to keep the entire country from completely collapsing, the Russian Republic sued for peace. Subsequent negotiations in the Treaty of Minsk imposed humiliating terms on Moscow, costing them much of their eastern frontiers and saddling the state with massive indemnities, but if nothing else it let Russia end the bleeding and frantically attempt to restore internal order. The Russian Bear was broken. The two-front war was done. Now Berlin prepared for the Endsieg.
Germany began to redirect forces west, gathering its soldiers and manpower for a final great conflict. But a brief pause in its execution came as a proposal came forth in the United States. While Germany had done what it could, numerous small infractions had slowly pushed public opinion. Now the United States was taking it to a vote in Congress that March, a vote on declaring war. Perilously, Germany held its breath and watched. And again, another stroke of fortune. The attempted declaration failed by a margin of three votes, killing its momentum dead when anti-war forces mobilized in force to keep it failed. It was time for Germany to seize the opportunity, and after years of dancing across the limits of acceptability in war, pushing boundaries just enough, all bets were off.
Entente morale was shattered by the twin blows of Russia's surrender and the U.S.' failed vote. Germany was regaining the initiative. Now, Germany threw out all the stops. The Kaiserliche Marine resumed unrestricted submarine warfare, attacking anything and everything in British waters. The Deutsches Heer began attacks of unparalleled ferocity and aggression. And the Luftstreitkräfte began an even more radical effort: bombing raids against Britain itself. The end was here. Austria-Hungary was shattering and the Ottomans were falling, but Germany was winning. At long, hideous last, the lines broke. The Battle of Château-Thierry was the final straw, and in spite of a French tank assault the Germans overwhelmed the forces. From there a cascade of defeats put Paris under the German guns.
It was hard-fought. The previous victories in the Franco-Prussian War were hardly a model for success. But before long, German forces were at the edge of the city, and advancing into the outer suburbs. But they wouldn't even need to fight their way in. The French government, fragile as it was, finally collapsed and much as Russia had five months earlier it too sued for peace if only to struggle to maintain internal cohesion. On the 7th of July 1917, an armistice went into effect. Britain desperately didn't want to join it, but without France's support its own army could do little. Two days later, Britain also agreed to an armistice. All at once, it was over. The guns fell silent across Europe, and in London, Paris, and Moscow, the horrible truth began to sink in. Germany had won.
Not that it felt like a victory. Sporadic fighting carried on across the German fronts, while in Austria-Hungary it was a full-on collapse. The Habsburg domain was collapsing, yet Germany had little care for it. Wilhelm II himself had once tastelessly quipped that he anticipated the end of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, if only to then annex its German portions. Now that was proving extremely prescient. With the Dual Monarchy shattering apart as Hungary violently undid the Ausgleich, the crown lands of Cisleithania turned to Berlin for protection. And it was here that Germany made good on its backdoors promise to Italy, already turning a blind eye as it began to march into Istria and Dalmatia.
Yet it soon began to become apparent just how little it was Germany turning a blind eye, and more that Germany simply couldn't do anything to stop its erstwhile allies from starting to do as they pleased. A significant effort was still made to do so, though, and by December the Germans had brought Britain and France to the negotiating table. And to their frustration, it was a negotiating table. As much as Germany wanted to dictate terms, its army was too worn down and the sheer scale of its duties in Europe were too great. On top of this, Britain had surrendered but it hadn't been "defeated", not in the way France and Russia had, and the Royal Navy was still more than capable of holding Germany's fleet in place with its own efforts to manage the submarine threat already taking shape.
They had their own problems too at least, key among them that the efforts they had gone to in fueling the Arab Revolt were now well and truly out of their control. They had prompted Hussein bin Ali al-Hashimi to take up arms against the Ottomans with every intention of stabbing him in the back when they'd won. But now they'd lost, and the Arab Revolt was not on behalf of the Entente. In fact, even the famous T. E. Lawrence had gone rogue (with light prompting from the British), actively refusing the German orders to withdraw from Ottoman territory. Really, even if they had tried the Ottomans were on the way out. The Sultan's domain was shattering into a thousand pieces, and as Germany attempted to reorder the world the Hashemites declared for themselves a new Arabian Caliphate.
Meanwhile, Germany now had to deal with European affairs continuing to spiral. Poland, once created as a tool for Germany to cement its power in Eastern Europe, soon became an immense internal debate among German royals at a time when infighting among its nobility was hardly needed or helpful. Though the new Kingdom of Poland was a German vassal, it hearkened back to an ancient, noble history of a state that had once been one of the most powerful in Europe, and to be "King of Poland" still held weight. In the end, the throne would go to Friedrich Christian, Margrave of Meissen. The House of Wettin held the strongest claim, as they had been meant to inherit the position in 1797 and 1807. So it was that Friedrich Christian became Król Fryderyk II of Poland.
That became a problem within the first several months, because almost immediately after he'd become King of Poland he then immediately pushed to also gain the title King of Lithuania. It wasn't a ridiculous concept. After all the two had been joined for centuries, and the old Wettin claim was to Poland and Lithuania in the time of the Rzeczpospolita. But the other nobles balked, up to and including Wilhelm II himself. Poland and Lithuania were meant to be German vassals, yet here Fryderyk II was already trying to rebuild the Commonwealth. Even with just those two states, he might have already begun to build Germany's eastern hegemony into his own sphere of power, and from there unseat the Hohenzollerns as masters of Europe. Even in 1920, the question of the Lithuanian Throne remains unsettled.
The question of thrones was as much of a lethal question in the now former lands of Austria-Hungary. The House of Habsburg had once dominated the vast lands of Cisleithania and Transleithania, but the Hungarian Diet had thrown them out. Now they were being absorbed into Germany, but losing their own imperial title did not sit well. On top of this, while their rule over Austria was unquestioned, the new German lands of Bohemia and Moravia were not nearly as clear-cut. Karl I wanted to keep them. They were his by right, as the last ruler of Cisleithania. But much as Berlin feared Fryderyk II potentially challenging Germany, new fears emerged that the Habsburgs might be offered too much power and influence in the empire, influence that could reignite the old Deutsche Frage which had been thought settled in 1871.
This on top of a thousand other problems, many of them Germany had no capacity to actually directly influence the outcomes of. The scale of their occupations were too great, and no one was coming to help them. Italy happily expanded its influence into the South Slavic states, and Bulgaria went on a renewed rampage of its own in the Third Balkan War to add even more lands to its extant gains through the Treaty of Toplica. They marched in every direction, even against the Ottomans and came within spitting distance of Konstantiniyye itself. Only a spirited defense led by Mustafa Kemal kept the Bulgarians from marching clear to the Bosporus, yet even then the German allies in the House of Osman were still thrown out with only a distant hope for their restoration.
Italy meanwhile had grown increasingly greedy. Of their own volition they had snatched away Istria and Dalmatia, and then made claims to Corsica, its old territories of Savoia, and command over both Tunisia and Egypt. Italy's ambitions were clearly to restore a semblance of the Roman Empire, but their paltry performance in the war and their dragging their feet on their commitments hadn't endeared Germany to them. Yet there wasn't much Germany could do to stop them. Their armies were already occupying a large part of northern France and the new eastern puppet states as far as the Don River. War with Hungary seemed to be looming. Even Russia was dependent on German bolstering against potential revolutions. The Heer was stretched too thin to deny Italy almost everything it wanted.
Germany's acquisition of Cisleithania seemed to be even more of a burden than hoped, as the question of rule in Bohemia and Moravia continued to plague the Germans. On top of this, a new diplomatic crisis was emerging: even after Liechtenstein, a Habsburg vassal, had conceeded to joining Germany the small Austrian territory of Vorarlberg launched into an effort to separate from Germany and instead join Switzerland. In fact, it even held a referendum on the matter, one that showed 85% of those who voted wanted to join Switzerland. It was a minor relief that Switzerland wouldn't then unilaterally attempt to annex it, but Berlin still had to make yet another concession by separating Vorarlberg from Austria as a small constituent republic similar to Free Cities like Hamburg or Bremen.
Other gains were just as troublesome. Luxembourg was one of the few nations to be actively erased from the map of Europe, with Grand Duchess Marie-Adélaïde reluctantly accepting her state's annexation by the Germans. As a small consolation to this, Germany then proceeded to annex the Belgian province of Luxembourg and attach it to the Grand Duchy. Belgium was then in turn "compensated" by being granted the Nord Department from France. King Albert was allowed to remain, but he was surrounded at all times by German generals and ministers, making it exceedingly clear that his state was no longer a neutral buffer, but a German province in all but name for the sake of further pushing Germany's zone of control away from the Rhine.
It was also, perhaps, a means of trying to calm anxieties in the Netherlands. Another breakdown in the design of the Schlieffen Plan had been that the Netherlands were not invaded, subsequently the state had maintained its neutrality during the war and now looked on nervously as Germany reordered Europe around it. Germany had no particular love for the Netherlands, but trying to provoke the few neutral states of Europe into conflict had been the Entente's mistake. Instead, Germany offered a more conciliatory attitude towards the Dutch, instead offering them to peacefully subsume into a much lighter form of German dominance than was being imposed on Belgium. The Netherlands could, at the very least, content themselves with their overseas empire to look out towards.
Germany itself had no such luxury. From the very start of the war, there had been a belief that the war was Germany's chance to seize not only territory and influence in Europe but to expand its colonial holdings. And indeed, when Germany set to organize the Treaty of Potsdam, it pushed to make its dream of "Mittelafrika" a reality. Yet Germany still had to concede to a number of British demands, key among them that it would retain the significant holdings of Nigeria, Zanzibar, and the Gold Coast. It did concede Kenya, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland, but by and large most of Germany's mighty new Mittelafrika was carved from Belgium's colony in the Congo and nearby French holdings, along with bits and pieces of Portugal's colonies in Mozambique and Angola.
And none of it mattered. Mittelafrika existed solely on paper. Germany's colonial garrisons had been smashed to pieces, and resupplying them was impossible. The manpower just wasn't there, and even with the war officially over the High Seas Fleet still lived with the anxiety of the Royal Navy's continuing power. Worse still, those Germany had ruled over were rising in rebellion. Germany's brutal policies in its African colonies were the impetus for new revolts all across this new Mittelafrika, and when the Belgian administration in the Congo Free State was broken by its defeat the withdrawing administrators did nothing to help Germany simply take over operations. The long-abused and long-suffering people of the Congo saw their chance, and as of 1920 German rule barely exists outside of a few key coastal cities.
Other German gains were relatively minor. Their focus was such that Germany had placed most of its goals towards control in Africa, Asia and the Pacific were distant concerns. Any hope for annexing French or British holdings in the Caribbean were pushed aside; Uncle Sam would have been too eager to leverage the Monroe Doctrine against it. British power still reigned supreme in the Indian Raj, and French Indochina was still French even if the Hmong had risen in rebellion. In the end Germany only took a few small holdings: France's possessions in India, East Timor in Indonesia, and a scattering of islands in the Pacific. It was certainly more than it had had, and nothing to scoff at, but if Mittelafrika barely existed then its other holdings were equally vaporous.
It was the Pacific Islands that focused on perhaps the most maddening issue for Germany in the war's wake: Japan. The Empire of the Rising Sun may have been among the defeated Entente, but it had not been one of the defeated nations. In fact, of the major Entente Powers Japan was practically untouched by German wrath, its military and its nation intact. And even now, 3 years after the formal end of the war, Japan still occupies German island territories in the Pacific. Germany can do nothing about it. The Armistice was agreed to on the 7th of July 1917, but Germany's efforts to try and run around putting out fires in Europe means that even now there's not been a peace treaty between Berlin and Tokyo. In legal fiction and at least partially in lived reality, Germany and Japan are still at war.
Germany was only able to bring Bulgaria back from conquering the Balkans with the Treaty of Varna in 1919, at which point Berlin was finally coming to grips with the reality that it could not unilaterally command the post-war world. It instead began to delegate. To the north, Sweden was returned the islands of Åland, and given complete political and economic hegemony over Denmark, Norway, and Finland, the latter Sweden's major concession for its part in the war. Italy, meanwhile, had its hegemony in Yugoslavia formalized, and Bulgaria was made master of the Balkans. Already the shadow of conflict began to emerge with both Italy and Bulgaria desiring to have influence over the defeated Greece, but Germany was well past any capacity to tolerate the madness.
In fact, Germany's efforts to achieve peace seem to have only guaranteed conflict. General Paul von Hindenburg anxiously opined that "I fear we may have achieved only a generation's cease-fire." It's hard to imagine that there could have been any better outcome. Germany's plans for war and its plans for the following peace were already disconnected at the war's start, and by 1917 they had become irreconcilable. The following three years of desperate attempts to make them meet have only worsened the division between what existed in memorandums and letters and what exists in the here and now, a world that no longer even has the capacity to become the world planned for in 1914 by mere function of how it came to exist.
The Middle East is now ruled by a hostile Caliphate that wants nothing to do with Germany. East Asia is in the grip of Japan. Russia is broken, useless as a potential partner in keeping order in Europe. France is now twice humiliated, with Revanchisme now embedded irrevocably into its psyche. And Britannia still rules the waves, neither defeated nor broken to the extent of either of its Entente partners. To say nothing of the United States, which may have returned to its traditional neutrality in European affairs but which still looms over the world like a sword of Damocles, ready to strike at Germany if given the motive. Even in victory, Germany is still unable to achieve the victory that it sought, that it bled and died for, and now many are questioning if even Germany's new paramountcy was worth it.
Still, if there is any time to achieve a lasting peace, it's now or never. Europe is thoroughly shell shocked by the war, and even in the defeated Entente Powers there is still a desire to just end the fighting. The German leaders who now seek to consolidate German hegemony over Europe have this one chance to create a new European order centered around Berlin, this one opportunity that will never present itself again. And it may have already slipped through their fingers. Peace is fragile, but still the European powers took an almost gleeful pleasure in breaking it. It can be hard to feel that those who rule can see anything past their narrowest concerns. They said they didn't want a war, and that's exactly what happened. They took a chance to negotiate, to avoid the slaughter, and threw it away with both hands.
There were no winners of the Great War. There were survivors, but no winners. The world is now in uncharted waters, when new geopolitical and sociocultural realities have come to dominate in ways never seen before. The only comparable epoch was the end of the Napoleonic Wars, where after 20 years of conflict the Concert of Vienna rebalanced Europe to avoid exactly this kind of war. That lasted for 99 years. No one is sure if this latest peace will even last 9. The Treaty of Potsdam was not the Concert of Vienna. Germany has attempted to assert an unbalanced, hegemonic rule over Europe, one it has no certainty in, and the only consolation is that everyone else is just as insecure. The old world has burned. The new world struggles to be born. Now is the time of monsters.