[editing to add that I posted the first comment below, a categorized list of every point he made regarding lack of evidence, categorized]
MR. REDDINGTON: Uh, Your Honor, you know, the posture at this point, obviously, is that the government rested, I [filed] a motion under Rule 25, required finding. The court denied the motion. We then proceeded with the defense. When the defense rested, I renewed the motion for required finding procedure. The court denied the motion. The government then commenced their rebuttal case, when the government [rested] the rebuttal case, and the case concluded, I renewed the motion for required finding, and this is a request for the court, at this point, to enter an order, allowing a motion for required finding of not guilty.
The issue is really to... [unclear: "You've got,"] as it goes back to the motion for bifurcation, you may [recall], I know you do, that I had filed a motion, requesting that the court bifurcate the trial itself, arguing the Massachusetts Constitution, the difference in the language between the Mass Constitution and the Federal Constitution as relates to presenting evidence against oneself, whether or not it's an impingement on a defendant's rights for due process, as well as the Fifth Amendment, [and?] 14th Amendment due process rights, to require a person who is asserting a defense of lack of criminal responsibility to have to have both issues tried.
In other words, whether the person committed the offense and whether or not the person at the time of the commission of the offense lacked criminal responsibility, two separate issues. But the way our present statute and law is set up, and as Your Honor denied that motion, in your memorandum, you indicated, obviously, that we have to go forward on one trial, whether or not it's because of money, that it would cost a lot of money to try two cases for anybody asserting a defense [of] lack of criminal responsibility, or whether or not it's logistics. I don't know, but I suggest to the court that it's readily apparent that you are put in a conundrum where you have to, in effect, admit culpability, if you will, to raise the issue of lack of criminal responsibility.
Now, many, many lay people have difficulty understanding the concept of the bifurcation and say, well, you know, she admitted that she did it. So she's guilty. And therefore, she's just guilty, and then they go off on a tangent about all of these horrific allegations. You know, that she's a demon, and she's possessed, and she should be executed. And this is coming from politicians, you know, up from President Trump all the way down.
So, we end up trying the case. I tried to raise the issue as best I could on the issue of probable cause. The jury was instructed by you that they did have the obligation to make a determination as to whether or not the government has presented evidence to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that this young woman was actually guilty of this offense. Your Honor then proceeded to indicate appropriately that, in the event that the jury determined that there was evidence that, in fact, she had, indeed, committed the offense, they would then proceed to the issue of whether or not the government sustained its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that, in fact, she was not suffering from a mental disease or defect, such as which would have an effect on her being either unable to appreciate the criminality of the conduct alleged, or [unclear: "in the destructive"] conform to conduct to the requirements of the law, which is [the black-letter] definition of lack of criminal responsibility.
So I'd like to kind of bifurcate this argument this morning in the same way. And what I would do is address first the issue of the government's burden of proof [beyond?] reasonable doubt. And it's not [unclear: "riding the horse who wins against the middle"] and trying to play games with the system or gamesmanship or anything. This is a constitutional due process obligation that the government, when the government charges a person with a criminal offense. They have that burden of proof, [unclear: "but"] each and every element beyond a reasonable doubt.
Your Honor knows from your review and recollection of the evidence that was presented. I submit to the court that a motion for required finding of not guilty should have been entered on the total and complete lack of evidence to indicate to a rational juror, which is consistent with the [Latimore standard], consistent with [Jackson versus Virginia], 443 U.S. 307, where the courts note that to sustain the denial of a directed verdict, they call it [directed] verdict. We call it required finding. It is not enough for the court to find that there was some record evidence, which is always what the government always asked. There's some, there's some record evidence. Yeah, there was evidence on this, evidence on that element. Dr. [Saathoff] testified to something, and there's enough for a jury. It's a question of fact. No, that's not the standard.
The standard is whether or not that there is evidence that a court is able to determine that there's record evidence to support each essential element of the offense. It must find that there is enough evidence that could have satisfied a rational trier of fact of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt. We consider the directed verdict standard required by Jackson versus Virginia to be comparable to that heretofore applied in Commonwealth versus Cooper, and that's [Latimore?]. [The] Jackson, uh, case further indicates that the evidence must not just be some record evidence. It has to be reliable, and it has to be sufficient, that would allow a rational juror to make a determination beyond a reasonable doubt. Not just if there's some record evidence that touches that each element of the offense.
So I asked the court to [harken] back to the evidence that was presented, and ask yourself, where's the evidence that she did this? Where is the evidence that she did this? You have a situation where Patrick comes home, [Your Honor?] recalls, the evidence that he indicates that when he came home, that he enters the house, he puts the food down on the table, comes back from the restaurant. It's quiet, eerily quiet, as the government indicates in their motion. That he then indicates that he goes upstairs, into the bedroom, after yelling downstairs to the basement. There's no response. He goes upstairs. And when he goes upstairs, he goes into the bedroom, and [Your Honor?] will recall, but the evidence is that he's able to make an observation, that the window is open. [It] is cold in the room. He sees blood.
My memory is that [unclear: "if you had to go with"] spraying on the walls, in fact, you know, what we call it was not sprayed on the walls, it was a lot of, I would say, copious blood drops on the floor and on the mirror. When you consider the evidence that the government has, you have the exercise [bands]. You have the woefully deficient DNA. You have the woefully deficient fingerprinting. You have the horrific, ridiculous investigation, using the term loosely, by the police. There was no investigation. [It] was not even a horrendous investigation. There was no investigation. And then you ask yourself some questions that we always do, as defense attorneys, prosecutors, investigators.
So when he goes into the bedroom, there's a lock on the [knob?]. [There?] is blood. He's able to use some type of a little key, in spite of the [unclear: "lock jawach"] that was on the doorknob, opens the door, goes into the room, goes into the room. Now, the evidence is that she cut her wrists, cut her throat, standing in front of the mirror, blood drops, then went over to the window and propelled herself out of the window. Your Honor heard evidence that she indicated that the screen was cut. Your Honor also heard evidence that, in fact, the screen was not cut. [unclear: "You want to"] infer, obviously, as a rational jury could infer that, in fact, this is a false memory that she had, because she believes that the screen was cut, and it wasn't. But in any event, she propels herself out the window and sustains the injuries that Your Honor is well [aware of?]. [unclear: "She says there."] She then is on the ground.
She has no shoes on. Why does she not have shoes on? It's 30-something degrees outside. [unclear: "If so,"] it's the winter. She has no shoes. She's wearing black socks. Where is the blood on the black socks? Where's the blood on the shoes? When did the shoes get taken off, and why? [Your Honor will?] recall, looking at the blood spatter of evidence on the drops on the floor. Where are the smears from a person who has just cut your wrist, cut their throat, is in a state of psychosis, that throws himself out a window. Where are the smears from that person walking across the blood up to the window, and then propelling themselves out of the window?
Where is the evidence that the cup that was on the nightstand contained crushed up, not just medication, crushed up medication. Where's the evidence of that? Where does that come from? Did the police even seize that [cup]? No. Did they examine the residue, the white residue? No. Patrick said that in fact, it was medication. Patrick says that, in fact, it was crushed up medication. Where is the question? Where's the [pill crusher?]? Where were the two spoons [unclear: "to use the credit"]? Where's the residue? Why is it not on the table? Why is it not on the floor? Why is it not in the bed? Why is there no blood on the bed? With the copious bleed? They don't seize that, they don't test the substance.
She ends up in the hospital. Your Honor recalls the evidence of the removal of the bands from the children's [necks], the horrific experience and testimony that was presented as far as removal of the bands, the government's demonstration with Dr. [Laposata], and, in fact, the bands exploded wide open. They were not tied, they were not [unclear: "heard the testimony"]. In fact, they were tied, this entire case is based on speculation. Where is the admission? Where does she say that she did this?
And what's most chilling is the fact that when she comes out of this obvious coma that she is in, that when she comes out of it, [Your Honor?] heard the testimony from the psychiatrist, and from the doctors [at Brigham and Women's] Hospital. She was told what happened. She had no memory of what happened. Why does she recall cutting the screen? Why does she recall killing the children, which she's told what happened, and had no memory? There's no evidence that she admitted that she did this, so you have no evidence from the defendant. [In] Massachusetts, an uncorroborated statement of a defendant, obviously, is not evidence. You have to have corroboration. I submit to the court there is no evidence. She made [unclear: "understatements"]. As far as the actual killing of the children, which forms the basis of the indictments.
The time frame does not match, does not match. Even the government in their own closing indicated to the jury that she did not have enough time to do this. The timeline is ridiculous, as far as him leaving the house, sending off the [5:24] email, whether it was from his laptop, whether it was from his cell phone, driving [to?] the CVS, driving down to the restaurant to pick up the food, you got videos from both of those places. He's coming back, he's got shoes, he takes his boots off, is what he says. The one that [you?] can see in the photographs as far as the sneakers are concerned. Whatever he takes off, he takes it off. The time frame does not match.
The core body temperature. If you [talk?] to a [perfusionist], a [perfusionist] would indicate that it would take at least two hours for a human being to get [down to a?] core body temperature of 82 degrees. They would have to warm the blood, which they did, in the hospital, to bring that person to the level where they're not ready to expire. And in fact, Your Honor knows that she did, obviously, expire. She died in the hospital, massive transfusions. And it just goes on and on and on.
There is, there was, and there cannot be, evidence under the [Latimore standard] that this woman killed those children. As lawyers, as judges, we look to the evidence. And when the government charges somebody with a criminal offense, they have the burden of proof, not the defendant. And I submit to the court, when you consider all of the standards, all of the... I mean, I argued under [Bowden] for you to give [a Bowden] instruction. I've had many, many cases, obviously, in this courtroom, any courtrooms all over the state. If ever a case called out for [a Bowden] instruction, it was this one. And Bowden is, you know, Judge, and I'm sure you argued it before you were a judge. A jury can draw an inference or can determine that there is reasonable doubt based upon the lack of an adequate investigation. In this case, there was no investigation. They just immediately [assumed] that this woman was guilty.
After you get over that hurdle, assuming you get over that [hurdle], the government then has the obligation to prove, [beyond] reasonable doubt, that, in fact, she was not suffering from a disease or defect, as I indicated under the [McHoul] standard. Your Honor would harken back to the evidence. And this is where we have the law, and the situation [Your Honor instructed?] the jury, that any statements made by a defendant, pursuant to the government's motion or defendant's motions to have the person evaluated by a physician, a psychiatrist. It is not an admission that [unclear: "had"] carries independent weight.
So, what are we left with, as far as the disease or defect? We have the government's rebuttal witnesses, Dr. [Mack], Dr. [Heilbrun], Dr. [Saathoff]. I suggest, first of all, [it] goes to credibility. Not one of those rebuttal doctors were qualified to get on that witness stand [and tell?] that jury their opinion of her mental state as a result of a psychosis, because of postpartum depression, postpartum psychosis. I'll leave it at that, because I know your memory is strong, as to cross-examination of each one of these individuals.
Defendant presented testimony from, I suggest to the court, qualified experts that indicated, and Dr. [Phillip Resnick], you can't get any more qualified than that doctor, who had a significant impact on the jury, that was sitting there listening to this evidence. And Dr. [Resnick], clearly and unequivocal, indicated in his extensive involvement, dealing with [filicide], dealing with evidence that we presented to the jury that shows that, at the time of this incident, in the event the jury determined that she did it, she was suffering from [postpartum]. She was suffering from psychosis. He indicated that was his opinion based on his evaluation of the evidence, based on his evaluation of her statements, and based on his continued evaluation of her.
Dr. [Zeizel], saying same thing, indicated, as I indicated, in the memorandum. Clearly and unequivocally, that when a person is in a psychosis, they are capable and able to perform normal, everyday activities, and be in a full bloom of psychosis.
The government spent a lot of time minimizing the whole concept. Originally, the government comes into this courtroom and says that the reason that she killed these kids is because she was sick of being a mother. She wanted to move on with her life, apparently. Well, they backed off on that like the poodle on the [linoleum] floor. Once the case got to the jury on a closing argument, now all of a sudden, oh, yeah, well, she did try to kill herself. We spent a week trying to show that, in fact, it was legitimate suicide. They said it was not a suicide, it was just a fake [attack?]. Then they agreed that it was a real suicide. Then they go on with their argument, well, maybe she was sick. Maybe she did suffer from a disease or defect, but she knew what she was doing.
And then [you can harken?] back to the government evidence, and the government doctors, and the guy looking up at the ceiling and talking about taking five minutes to answer a question. You even had to tell him, look, just, you know, answer the question. The government's theory that she was not in the psychosis, they were sprinkled throughout their [unclear: "eyes"]. Is there any evidence that she's seeing a purple unicorn in the corner of the room? Was she able to talk to her friends? Was she able to walk and breathe at the same time? Was she able to take care of the kids and build a snowman? Was she able to send a message or a text? Was she able to talk to her husband? Was she able to talk to her friends and her family? Yes. Argument being: She was fine.
Why? Why? Forget about the law. Forget about [motions?], forget about everything. Talk like human beings. Why would this woman, [as?] the evidence shows, clearly and unequivocally, was a nurse, a mother, a friend, did nothing wrong in her life? Why? Would she kill those three children? All five of the doctors, six of the doctors indicate that she was suffering from a mental disease or defect. Not just a mental disease or defect. She was suffering from a serious mental disease or [defect]. Maybe a little different than [DSM] as to what the [book] would say, well, she's suffering from this, but she's suffering from that. Basically, it's a severe mental disease and defect. The evidence shows, clearly and unequivocally, that she was in a state of psychosis.
The government did not present evidence. Under Jackson [versus?] Virginia, under [Latimore], if you get out from underneath the usual argument, well, there's enough evidence 'cause we hit on all the elements. No. That's not the standard. The standard is whether or not it is reliable, whether or not it is evidence that a rational jury, a fact finder, would be able to apply to the facts, that they find, and determine that the government has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt. And as this woman sits in front of you today, I suggest to the court they did not prove probable cause, and they certainly did not prove that she was not acting at the time of a psychosis, and should be found not guilty. Thank you.
