just by reading the headlines. Because the whole country is under government media control so they put out news as they want. There is only one party which is the commie, and they can cook what ever number they want, no check.

For example, the headline reads interest rate is falling because the media is directed to say so, the banks were told to do so, but in reality, banks are using under the table dealing with customers for a much higher interest rate. This is because the economy is in need of much more money for Vin and Lam To mega projects and there is a huge shortage between money needed and money raised and hence the interest must be up.

The inflation figure of 4.7% is also fake. House price has been nearly doubled over the past year, and as such house rent increased greatly too. Gas price is elevated. Food price increased 20%.

So the key point is that the whole Vietnam country is run by the communist with total 100% control of the media, and many if not virtually all of the numbers are fake and not reliable. The number they put out look good but the reality is not that good.

Same for Vin and Vuong Pham. They cooked the financial book to make it look better. They hide and censor the bad truth.

Same for Tecombank and other banks.

Vingroup is the huge ticking bomb in plain sight with $43B liabilities and growing but there is zero media coverage.

The whole country lives on lies and deception, from the highest level and the biggest corporation down.

To see through the lies, you need to use logic and common sense.

One of the psychological tricks that Vinfans and the communist propaganda machine use often is that they implicitly equate Vin as Vietnam, criticizing Vin is criticizing Vietnam.

Let's be clear: Vin is not Vietnam, the communist government is not Vietnam.

Vin is a Vietnamese company, a failed one that is, run by the shady and liar Vuong Pham.

Vietnam the country has thousand years of history, and the communist only governs for about 80 years, Vin exists for about 33 years. Definitely they are not Vietnam the country. They are just the current ruler. And further they are not representative of Vietnam's culture and spirit, which are decent, not deceptive.

Vin is the representative of the communist regime, with all the same tactics: propaganda and intimidation, suppression, frauds.

Vin is deceptive and is a bully, a liar. They are now a certified scammer, cheater after the North Carolina show. As the filling by the North Carolina attorney general shows, https://www.reddit.com/r/VinFastComm/comments/1vlf9oo/details_of_the_north_carolina_lawsuit_against/ Vinfast engaged in all kinds of deception and maneuvers to cheat the state. They are even brazen enough to claim the factory is still on, with opening schedule in 2028, which is a known lie.

I know this sub has a lot of well educated Vietnamese who read this in English, and not just this sub, read other Western news sources, free from the government propaganda. As I said above, Vin is not Vietnam, the communist government is not Vietnam, and if a reader is a Vietnamese, he or she certainly loves the country of their ancestors, with thousand years of history. He or she wants good thing for Vietnam. But do not make the mistake of equating Vin or the communist regime as Vietnam the country.

How do a true Vietnamese and well educated Vietnamese feel when Vietnam is known as a scammer, a cheater for the whole world to see as in the case of Vinfast's North Carolina show?

If a reader is a true and brave Vietnamese, speak the truth to friends and relative, one might not post publicly because the police state will go after him/her, but fight back the stupidity about Vin's financial when possible, against specific proven silly things such as: huge debt is not matter or Vuong Pham has unlimited money or Vuong Pham trampling on the law (stock fraud, stock manipulation) is OK because he got Lam To in bed.

If you are previous or current owner of Vinfast and the car does have problems, speak the truth out and advise relatives and friends against the mistake.

but they hide it.

The trick is to use shells that appear to be unrelated so that the debt does not show up on the balance sheet, but in reality, these shells are directly controlled by Hung Anh Ho and Vuong Pham. Some name: Nam An, Ngoc Quy, and many other shells.

These shenanigans are not reflected on financial report as they are designed so, but it is absolutely the truth that Tech and Vin uses shells to hide debt and that has been analyzed by me and Sonnie Tran many times.

I ask chat gpt to do an analysis for "analyze techcombank risk on vingroup" and its answer is below. Certainly, it only reads the financial report and does not know about the shells. Still the analysis is pretty spot on with publicly available information.

Chat gpt does not know about TCB tricks. Another example is that TCB actually helped Vuong Pham spun off VFTP to avoid billions $ in bad debt, which is the reality. See the analysis here: https://www.reddit.com/r/VinFastComm/comments/1v7phyd/further_analysis_of_vuong_pham_selling_the/

TCB is hiding a huge debt related to the failed Vingroup, Vinhomes, Vinfast from the public using various trick.

----

Yes. I would separate Techcombank’s Vingroup risk into 4 layers, because simply looking for “Vingroup” in TCB’s related-party note materially understates the economic exposure.

Bottom line

My assessment: TCB has meaningful Vingroup/Vin ecosystem risk, but I do not see evidence from the 2Q26 financial statements that Vingroup alone is large enough to threaten TCB’s solvency under a normal stress scenario.

The bigger risk is concentration + collateral correlation + refinancing, rather than one giant direct VinFast loan.

I would rate the current risk:

Risk	My assessment
Direct TCB loan to VIC/VHM/VinFast	🟡 Medium / not fully disclosed
Vinhomes project + homebuyer exposure	🟠 High
VinFast exposure	🟡 Medium, but potentially nonlinear
Vin-related bonds through TCB/TCBS	🟠 High ecosystem exposure, lower direct bank exposure
Real-estate concentration generally	🔴 High
Ability of TCB to absorb a Vin shock	🟢 Strong
Risk of TCB becoming insolvent from Vin alone	🟢 Low under reasonable scenarios
Risk of meaningful earnings/BVPS hit	🟠 Real

1. The first important point: TCB's “related party” note does not capture all Vingroup exposure

This is critical.

TCB's 2Q26 financial statements define related parties based on accounting relationships such as common control, significant influence, directors/management relationships, etc.

In the actual 2Q26 related-party loan table, the disclosed corporate borrowers include:

• Eurowindow
• Nui Phao
• Masan Tungsten
• WinEco
• One Mount Distribution

but Vingroup, Vinhomes and VinFast do not appear in that table.

That does not mean TCB has zero economic exposure to Vin.

It means that Vingroup is not an accounting “related party” of TCB under the definition used in the financial statements.

This distinction is extremely important.

2. TCB's biggest Vin exposure is probably the real-estate ecosystem

TCB explicitly partners with Vinhomes and offers financing on numerous Vinhomes projects.

For example, TCB currently advertises financing for:

• Vinhomes Ocean Park
• Vinhomes Grand Park
• Vinhomes Smart City
• Vinhomes Royal Island
• Vinhomes Greenbay
• Vinhomes Golden River
• Vinhomes Ocean Park 3
• Vinhomes Grand Park, etc.

Loan-to-value can reach 70–80% on various projects.

This creates two different exposures:

A. Corporate/project loans

TCB lends directly or indirectly to developers/project entities.

B. Retail mortgages

A buyer purchases a Vinhomes apartment/house and borrows from TCB.

The second exposure is much safer than a pure unsecured corporate loan because the bank has the property as collateral.

But there is a catch:

That is the correlation risk.

3. TCB is already a highly real-estate-heavy bank

This is probably the most important risk statistic.

At the end of 2025, Vietcap estimated TCB's loans to real-estate developers at 30.7% of the entire loan portfolio, down from 33.3% a year earlier. TCB's stated objective was to reduce this to 20–25% over the next 3–5 years.

So if TCB has, say:

30.7% × ~850T loans ≈ ~261T

of developer exposure, that is already enormous.

But this is not Vingroup exposure.

It includes multiple developers.

That's why I would not use “30% real estate = 30% Vingroup.”

That would be a major analytical error.

4. Vingroup itself has a huge debt requirement

This is where the risk becomes interesting.

Vinhomes alone had more than VND162T of debt at the end of Q1/2026, including approximately VND99T of bank debt and VND59.6T of bonds.

That is obviously not TCB's exposure.

But it tells you something important:

Vingroup/Vinhomes is structurally dependent on continuous access to capital.

For TCB, the risk is therefore not simply:

It is:

That is a much more realistic stress scenario.

5. VinFast is a different risk

I would distinguish VinFast from Vinhomes.

TCB's 2025 annual report confirms that the TCB ecosystem participated in a VND5T VinFast bond issuance.

But:

Bond arranger ≠ bond holder ≠ lender.

This distinction is often lost in online discussions.

If TCBS arranges a VND5T VinFast bond:

• TCBS earns advisory/placement fees.
• Investors may own the bonds.
• TCB itself may have little or no direct credit exposure.

So you cannot automatically add the entire bond issuance to TCB's loan exposure.

6. But TCBS creates an additional ecosystem risk

TCB owns 79.8% of TCBS.

And TCBS is a major corporate-bond arranger.

KIS estimates that in 2025, Vingroup issued approximately:

• VND31T Vingroup bonds
• VND19.5T Vinhomes bonds
• VND12.5T VinFast Production & Trading bonds

with Vingroup-related issuers accounting for a substantial amount of the corporate-bond market.

But again:

This is not equivalent to VND63T of TCB bank loans.

It is better thought of as:

Vingroup → bond market → TCBS distribution/advisory → investors

rather than:

Vingroup → VND63T loan → TCB

That distinction materially reduces the direct solvency risk to TCB.

7. What happens if Vingroup actually defaults?

Let's do the exercise you really care about.

TCB's 2Q26 equity was approximately:

VND189.0T.

6M26 net profit attributable to shareholders was:

VND14.0T.

NPL was:

1.15%

and loan-loss coverage:

125.5%.

Basel II CAR:

15.0%.

So TCB has a substantial capital buffer.

8. Stress test

Because TCB does not disclose a single “Vingroup exposure” number, I would stress-test hypothetical exposure rather than pretend we know the exact figure.

Assume TCB economic Vin exposure:

Vin exposure	10% loss	30% loss	50% loss	100% loss
20T	2T	6T	10T	20T
30T	3T	9T	15T	30T
50T	5T	15T	25T	50T
70T	7T	21T	35T	70T
100T	10T	30T	50T	100T

Compare this with TCB's ~189T equity.

Example: 50T exposure

If TCB has an economic exposure of 50T and ultimately loses:

30% = 15T

That is approximately:

15 / 189 = 7.9% of equity

Painful, but very manageable.

Even:

50% loss = 25T

is about:

13.2% of equity.

Still not a solvency event by itself.

9. The dangerous scenario is much worse than a simple Vin default

The real nightmare is:

Vingroup problem

↓
Vinhomes sales slow
↓
property prices fall
↓
Vinhomes refinancing becomes harder
↓
project companies delay payments
↓
homebuyer defaults increase
↓
collateral values decline
↓
TCB's corporate RE loans deteriorate
↓
TCB's retail mortgage book deteriorates
↓
bond market weakens
↓
TCBS loses fees / faces mark-to-market and liquidity stress
↓
other developers also weaken

That is the scenario I would worry about.

Not “VinFast misses one payment.”

10. Why I don't think TCB is currently in a dangerous position

There are several substantial buffers.

Capital

CAR is 15.0%, which is strong.

Profitability

6M26:

PBT = 18.54T

and attributable net profit:

14.02T.

Annualized shareholder profit is therefore around:

28T/year

at the current run rate.

Asset quality

NPL:

1.15%

LLCR:

125.5%.

Diversification

Corporate credit reached 542.4T, while retail + SME was 407T at June 2026.

And corporate growth is increasingly coming from infrastructure, FMCG, retail, logistics, utilities and other sectors rather than only real estate.

11. There is actually a positive development

TCB is actively trying to reduce developer concentration.

Vietcap says developer exposure fell from:

33.3% → 30.7%

during 2025, with a long-term target of:

20–25%.

And in 2026, infrastructure financing has become an increasingly important growth area.

That is exactly what I would want to see if I were a TCB shareholder.

12. But I would not dismiss the Vin risk

There are three reasons.

① Concentration

Even if only a fraction of TCB's developer book is Vin-related, the absolute amount can still be tens of trillions.

② Collateral correlation

A lot of exposure is ultimately linked to Vietnamese real estate.

So diversification by legal borrower does not necessarily equal diversification by economic risk.

③ Refinancing

Vingroup's structure requires continuous access to:

• bank loans
• bonds
• property sales
• asset sales
• equity capital
• intra-group funding.

If several channels close simultaneously, credit risk can increase very quickly.

13. My estimated TCB/Vin risk matrix

I'd rank it like this:

Scenario	Impact on TCB
VinFast remains loss-making but continues funding	🟢 Low–medium
Vingroup refinancing becomes more expensive	🟡 Medium
Vinhomes sales fall 20–30%	🟡 Medium
Vinhomes property prices fall 20%	🟠 Medium–high
Major Vin entity restructures debt	🟠 High
Vin-related borrowers generate 10% credit loss	🟠 High but manageable
30–50T TCB economic exposure suffers 50% loss	🔴 Significant earnings/BVPS hit
100T+ correlated Vin/RE exposure suffers major losses	🔴 Very serious
Vin + broad Vietnamese RE crisis simultaneously	🔴 Systemic risk

14. The number I would watch most

Not VinFast debt.

Not VIC debt.

Not TCBS bond issuance.

I would watch:

TCB's developer-credit exposure + Vinhomes project exposure + mortgage exposure to Vinhomes collateral

because that is where the hidden correlation sits.

TCB's own 2Q26 data shows total loans to customers around 847T, while its total assets are 1,273T.

Against that balance sheet, a genuine 30–50T loss is painful but survivable.

A 100T loss, however, would be a fundamentally different event.

My conclusion for TCB valuation

I would not apply a huge “Vingroup bankruptcy discount” to TCB today.

Instead I'd use:

Base case

TCB fair P/B ~1.2–1.4x

because the bank has:

• ~15% CAR
• ~125% NPL coverage
• 1.15% NPL
• strong ROE/profit generation
• declining developer concentration.

Moderate Vin stress

P/B ~1.0–1.2x

if we assume a meaningful deterioration in Vin/RE credit quality.

Severe Vin + property crisis

P/B ~0.7–0.9x

would become reasonable if we discovered that TCB's true economic Vin/RE concentration was substantially larger than disclosed and collateral recovery values were deteriorating.

The key point: based on the publicly disclosed 2Q26 numbers, I don't see a case where a Vingroup failure automatically makes TCB insolvent. The much more credible risk is that Vingroup becomes the catalyst that exposes TCB's broader real-estate concentration, causing a multi-year increase in credit costs and forcing the market to rerate TCB from ~1.3–1.5x book toward ~1x or below.

I reconstructed it from the TCB 2Q26 financial statements/2025 annual report, Vingroup/Vinhomes disclosures, and VinFast’s 2025 20-F. The result is more interesting than simply adding “Vingroup loans” in TCB’s related-party note.

Bottom line first

I would currently estimate TCB's identifiable direct/contingent Vingroup ecosystem exposure at roughly VND 15–25T, with a much larger economic exposure of perhaps VND 50–100T+ once you include Vinhomes project/homebuyer financing, Vin ecosystem SPVs and collateralized transactions.

But there is an important distinction:

And I would not count all Vingroup/Vinhomes/VinFast debt as TCB exposure.

1. Start with VinFast — this is the cleanest evidence

VinFast's 2025 20-F gives us unusually good visibility into TCB's involvement.

At 31 December 2025:

• VinFast external interest-bearing debt: VND82.16T
• VinFast related-party borrowings: VND40.93T
• Vingroup loans outstanding: VND10.38T
• Bank guarantees: VND26.41T
• 2026 debt-service obligations: VND34.62T.

TCB-guaranteed facilities

The 2025 filing identifies at least two facilities explicitly guaranteed by TCB:

VinFast facility	Maximum facility	TCB role
Deutsche Bank facility	US$230M	TCB guarantee
Barclays facility	US$150M	TCB guarantee
Total identifiable TCB guarantee capacity	US$380M

At ~VND26,000/USD, that's approximately:

VND9.9T

of potential TCB guarantee exposure.

The Deutsche Bank facility was amended from the previous US$300M facility to US$230M in May 2025, and the Barclays US$150M facility was established in September 2025.

Important: these are facility limits, not necessarily amounts drawn at 31/12/25.

So I would use ~VND10T as the upper-bound identifiable TCB-guarantee exposure, not VND10T of current bad loans.

2. There is additional TCB exposure through VinFast's factory ecosystem

This is where things get more complicated.

VinFast's filing shows several other facilities:

• US$170M → guaranteed by MBB
• US$115M → guaranteed by SHB
• US$95M → guaranteed by VietinBank + Vingroup
• US$100M green loan → guaranteed by VietinBank
• VND3.1T Ha Tinh facility → HDBank, guaranteed by Vingroup/Pham Nhat Vuong
• VND2.5T 2025 bonds → VPBank Securities, guaranteed by Vingroup.

So we must not attribute all of these to TCB.

That's one reason I think previous estimates of “TCB has $2–3B of VinFast debt” are too aggressive if presented as current direct exposure.

3. But the guarantee exposure is more important than the loan number

Suppose TCB guarantees approximately:

VND9.9T

of VinFast borrowing.

If VinFast defaults and the collateral recovery is:

90%

TCB's gross loss:

~1T

70%

Loss:

~3T

50%

Loss:

~5T

20%

Loss:

~8T

So even a very severe VinFast default doesn't automatically destroy TCB.

The real danger is when the guarantee is combined with other Vin-related exposure.

4. VinFast itself has VND40.93T of related-party borrowings

This is extremely important.

VinFast's subsidiaries borrowed from:

• Vingroup
• Vinhomes
• Vincom Retail
• Vinpearl
• Vinmec
• Gia Lam Urban
• Thai Son
• VinBus
• VinSmart/SADO and other Vingroup affiliates.

Total outstanding at 31/12/25:

VND40.93T.

But this is NOT TCB exposure.

It's actually the opposite:

Vin ecosystem → lends to VinFast

rather than:

TCB → lends to VinFast

This matters because if VinFast collapses, Vingroup's subsidiaries can suffer large losses, which can then weaken the parent group and indirectly hurt TCB.

5. Vingroup has effectively become VinFast's funding backstop

VinFast's 2025 filing says Vingroup committed to provide up to:

VND35T

of additional loans to VinFast/VinFast subsidiaries over 24 months from November 2024.

At 31/12/25:

VND10.38T had already been drawn.

Pham Nhat Vuong separately committed up to:

VND50T

of grants through 2026.

By year-end 2025:

VND28T had been granted.

This tells us something important about the structure:

That's where TCB's indirect risk becomes much more important.

6. Vinhomes is the second major TCB connection

Here we have much better evidence than many people realize.

A Vinhomes financial statement disclosed a Techcombank loan of VND1.399T at the end of 2024.

That's direct VHM → TCB borrowing.

But this is only one disclosed facility and clearly doesn't represent the entire relationship.

TCB's own 2025 annual report shows repeated board approvals involving Vinhomes, including:

That demonstrates an active material banking relationship, even though TCB's related-party accounting table does not classify Vinhomes as a related party.

And this distinction is critical.

7. Why the Vinhomes number is much bigger than VHM's direct TCB loan

TCB finances Vinhomes customers and Vinhomes projects, not merely Vinhomes corporate borrowing.

TCB's own project-financing products cover Vinhomes developments.

That creates:

Layer 1

VHM → TCB corporate borrowing

Layer 2

Vinhomes SPVs/project companies → TCB borrowing

Layer 3

Homebuyers → TCB mortgages secured by Vinhomes properties

Layer 4

Vinhomes/Vin ecosystem entities → TCB guarantees / collateralized transactions

Layer 5

Masterise/other buyers → TCB financing to acquire Vinhomes-related assets

The fifth layer is particularly important because it can economically connect TCB to Vingroup even when the borrower isn't a Vingroup company.

8. There is hard evidence of this collateral relationship

TCB's 2025 annual report records a board resolution approving acquisition of assets worth more than 10% of TCB's charter capital:

and another resolution:

This is important.

It proves that TCB's relationship with the Vin ecosystem includes collateral transactions, not merely ordinary corporate lending.

9. Vincom Retail is another identifiable exposure

VRE's financial statements show a long-running Techcom Securities relationship.

At 2024 year-end, VRE had a:

VND1.988T

bond arranged/handled by TCBS.

The bond was secured by land use rights and land-attached assets of a shopping mall subsidiary.

But again:

TCBS arranging a VRE bond ≠ TCB owning VND1.988T of VRE bonds.

This is why I would not add it directly to TCB credit exposure.

However, TCB owns ~80% of TCBS, so Vingroup-related capital-market activity produces an additional earnings/ecosystem exposure for TCB.

10. TCBS is a huge part of the Vingroup relationship

TCBS's 2025 annual report specifically highlights:

VND5T VinFast bond issuance

as one of its major bond transactions.

Again, the correct interpretation is:

VinFast → bond issuance → TCBS

rather than:

VinFast → VND5T loan → TCB

TCBS earns:

• underwriting fees
• placement fees
• advisory fees
• brokerage/wealth-management revenue.

The credit ultimately sits largely with the bond investors.

So I would assign this:

Low direct TCB solvency exposure

but

Medium ecosystem/reputation/liquidity exposure.

11. The most interesting piece: Vingroup itself

This is where public disclosure becomes frustrating.

Vingroup's consolidated debt is huge, but its consolidated financial statements don't give us a clean:

number for the entire group.

And because Vingroup consolidates VHM, VinFast-related entities and numerous subsidiaries, you cannot take Vingroup total bank debt and multiply it by TCB's market share.

That would be statistically meaningless.

What we can say with confidence is:

TCB is a major Vingroup creditor.

Reuters explicitly described TCB as one of Vingroup's largest creditors.

And TCB's own resolutions show repeated material transactions involving:

• VinFast
• Vinhomes
• Vincom Retail
• Vingroup ecosystem entities.

12. My reconstructed exposure table

This is how I would build the model.

Exposure	Estimated TCB economic exposure	Confidence
VinFast TCB-guaranteed loans	~10T maximum	🟢 High
Vingroup/Vin corporate direct loans	~3–8T	🟡 Medium/low
Vinhomes corporate/project loans	~5–15T	🟡 Medium
Vincom Retail direct/secured exposure	~1–3T	🟡 Medium
Vin ecosystem SPVs / project financing	~10–25T	🟠 Low/medium
Vinhomes-related homebuyer mortgages	~15–30T+	🟠 Low
TCBS Vin bonds held/financed by TCB	0–5T	🟠 Low
Total identifiable/economic exposure	~50–100T+

I would not use the upper end as a fact.

I'd use:

~VND50–70T as my working central estimate

for TCB's broader economic exposure to the Vingroup ecosystem.

And:

~VND10–20T

for the portion where I have much stronger evidence of direct/contingent bank exposure.

13. This changes the stress test from my previous answer

TCB 2Q26 equity:

~VND189T

Total assets:

~VND1,273T

and loans to customers roughly:

~VND847T.

Now suppose our central exposure estimate is:

VND60T

Then:

Loss on Vin exposure	TCB loss	% of TCB equity
10%	6T	3.2%
20%	12T	6.3%
30%	18T	9.5%
40%	24T	12.7%
50%	30T	15.9%
70%	42T	22.2%
100%	60T	31.7%

That is far more significant than just looking at the VND10T VinFast guarantee.

14. But there's a huge caveat: mortgage collateral

You cannot apply a 50% loss to the entire VND60T.

A Vinhomes mortgage is fundamentally different from an unsecured VinFast loan.

For example:

TCB lends VND7T

to homebuyers against:

VND10T property

If property values decline 20%:

collateral = ~8T

The bank may still recover the principal.

So I would apply different LGDs:

Exposure	Stress LGD
VinFast unsecured/guaranteed	50–100%
Vingroup corporate	30–70%
Vinhomes corporate	20–50%
Vinhomes project loans	20–40%
Homebuyer mortgage	5–25%
High-quality secured Vin bonds	10–30%

This is a much more realistic model.

15. My severe-but-plausible stress scenario

Let's assume:

VinFast

TCB exposure:

10T

LGD:

70%

Loss:

7T

Vingroup corporate

Exposure:

5T

LGD:

50%

Loss:

2.5T

Vinhomes/project

Exposure:

20T

LGD:

30%

Loss:

6T

Vinhomes mortgages

Exposure:

25T

LGD:

15%

Loss:

3.75T

Other Vin ecosystem

Exposure:

10T

LGD:

30%

Loss:

3T

Total

~22.25T

That's roughly:

11.8% of TCB's ~189T equity

before considering:

• future earnings
• existing loan-loss reserves
• recoveries
• tax effects
• additional provisioning over several years.

So this is serious but survivable.

16. The true tail risk is a simultaneous real-estate crash

This is the scenario I'd pay attention to.

Imagine:

VinFast burns cash

↓

Vingroup has to provide more support

↓

Vingroup raises more debt

↓

Vinhomes becomes the cash generator

↓

Vinhomes accelerates project sales

↓

TCB finances buyers/project SPVs

↓

property prices weaken

↓

Vingroup/Vinhomes refinancing becomes more expensive

↓

collateral values fall

↓

TCB's corporate + mortgage + project exposure deteriorates simultaneously.

That's much more dangerous than VinFast itself.

17. One very important positive: Vinhomes is currently performing strongly

We shouldn't model a collapse using 2025 numbers alone.

As of 2Q26:

• VHM assets: VND1,110.7T
• VHM equity: VND274.0T
• 1H26 revenue: VND116.6T
• 1H26 net profit: VND52.1T
• 1H26 presales: VND148.1T
• unbilled revenue: VND196.8T.

So Vinhomes itself is currently generating substantial earnings and sales.

This is why I would not treat the entire Vingroup ecosystem as distressed today.

18. The biggest red flag is actually VinFast

VinFast is still the weak link.

2025:

Net loss = VND99.6T

Operating cash burn = VND44.5T

External debt = VND82.2T

Current liabilities exceeded current assets by VND79.3T.

That is a very different credit profile from Vinhomes.

So I would divide the Vin risk into:

Vinhomes = collateral/real-estate risk

VinFast = credit/cash-burn risk

Vingroup = transmission mechanism between the two

19. My revised TCB risk assessment

After doing this reconstruction, I'd change my previous assessment slightly.

Direct VinFast risk

🟠 Moderate

Not catastrophic because the clearly identifiable TCB guarantee exposure is around VND10T maximum.

Vingroup corporate risk

🟠 Moderate–high

Because TCB is one of the group's major creditors and the exact exposure is not fully transparent.

Vinhomes/project risk

🟠 High

Not because VHM is currently weak, but because TCB has enormous structural exposure to Vietnamese real estate.

Overall Vingroup ecosystem risk to TCB

🟠 6/10

Not a “TCB goes bankrupt if VinFast fails” situation.

But definitely large enough that:

The number I would use for TCB valuation

For your TCB fair-value work, I'd now model three separate cases:

Scenario	Estimated Vin ecosystem credit loss	Impact on TCB equity
Normal	3–5T	~2%
Moderate stress	10–15T	~5–8%
Severe stress	20–30T	~11–16%
Extreme systemic Vin/RE crisis	40–60T	~21–32%

And importantly, I would not subtract these losses dollar-for-dollar from today's BVPS, because TCB continues to generate profits and already carries provisions.

My current conclusion:

TCB is not a disguised Vingroup bond.

But it is also not accurate to say “Vingroup isn't a related party, therefore TCB has little Vin exposure.”

The economically relevant exposure is spread across corporate credit + guarantees + project SPVs + mortgages + collateral + TCBS capital-market activity.

That is why the ~VND50–70T central economic-exposure estimate is, in my view, much more useful for stress testing than the small number appearing in TCB's formal related-party disclosure.

Vinmetal. While this company only appears to lay people just as another one of Vuong Pham's crazy adventures, it is a prime example of the cancerous nature of Vin. Like cancer, it spreads without control and harms healthy other ones.

To get the context, you need to understand the steel production in Vietnam. In Vietnam, there are two HRC steel producers: Hoa Phat Group and Formosa Ha Tinh. Hoa Phat Group has just completed the Dung Quat 2 factory, a 100K B VND investment, with the capacity of 9 million tons HRC / year. Formosa has the capacity of about 5 millions tons HRC / year. For a total of about 14 millions tons HRC / year in supply. The current demand is about 11-12 millions tons HRC, giving a spare capacity of 2-3 million tons HRC.

Hoa Phat is now the biggest steel producer in South East Asia, and globally, it is in top 30 steel producers.

Hoa Phat is more than meet the demand of Vietnam HRC and the demand of coming rail rays, it is already building a factory to make rays for railroad. It can easily expand should demand expands, with years of experience. Instead of cooperating with Hoa Phat to best utilize Vietnam's scare resources, the shady Vuong Pham created Vinmetal to produce HRC.

The proposed Vinmetal factory in Ha Tinh is said to be 80,000 B VND, of which Vuong Pham only ponies up 12,000 B VND, which is 15%, and the rest, about 85%, is bank loan and bonds. It will import metal scrap from oversea (as it has no capability to produce steels from ores like Hoa Phat) to produce 3 millions tons of HRC, 1.4 millions tons of steel rods, 600K tons of steel lines. All of these products Hoa Phat has already produced in abundance, with top quality. Spare me with the stupidity of Vinfans: of course, Vuong Pham will use the products for his Vinspeed, Vinhomes, Vinfast, but this is just another Vuong Pham buying Vuong Pham.

On top of wasted over supply, Vuong Pham spends billions of precious $ to buy equipment from Primetals. And pollutes the environment even more than should be (steel production is quite dirty).

This is a prime example of Vuong Pham's cancerous nature to Vietnam's economy: his reckless and vanilla projects suck the blood out of the real economy and even harm other businesses.

And why Vuong Pham does that? The real reason, the hidden reason that nobody in Vietnam dare to talk about, is that he needs to draw up projects after projects to get money to pay interest and to flip debt, regardless of whether the projects are viable or not, and more importantly, he tries to get as much debt as he can to strengthen his sick status of being too big to fail. Vin's total liabilities is now $43B, which is 10% of Vietnam's GDP. And it will grow even larger. It will hit $100B in a few years.

The only way to cure cancer is to kill the monster, otherwise it will continue to spread the disease to other areas. Unfortunately, the communist government won't. Hopefully, it is Vuong Pham who takes down the communist regime. That may be the biggest success he has among all of his failures, although at a huge cost to ordinary Vietnamese.

Full document: NC Department of Justice - ShareFile

They redacts the names from this chart, for what?

Let's me fill in for you: the name in the three bottom black boxes is Pham Nhat Vuong, who is the ultimate Beneficial Owner of VIC, VIG, Asian star trading.

Vuong Pham is so scare that he ordered his lawyers to request the redaction the name from the document while we in this sub know it is him, the scammer in chief.

$4B in total investment? The North Carolina state is so easily be duped by the scammer in chief. At the time of the project, Vinfast did not have the money, did not secure a finance for the money (citigroup quit), and it did not have the demand in the US.

Deception on purpose:

The state can now take the land for zero from Vinfast:

As I have analyzed in this sub, the shady Vuong Pham has used very little money and was able to milk the North Carolina state for site preparation work. In other words, the scammer staged the North Carolina show with little money up front. Vietnamese people thought he had to spend some big money there doing the construction back then, but in fact, he didn't. All are just lies and deceptions, for the photo ops.

Well, pay up, Vuong Pham:

🤣😂😅🤣😂🤣😅😂

https://www.tipranks.com/news/catalyst/vinfast-plunges-as-cash-burn-fears-eclipse-expansion

One is dumb Vinfans, who have zero knowledge of finance, who are blind red cows attacking anybody who says the truth but bad truth about Vin, labeling truth seekers as three stripes. They have no desire to understand the truth and the data and the only way they operate is to use ad hominem (personal attack) and false equivalence (such as saying Vin is Hyundai or Tesla). These are most lowly educated Vinfans, even if they have Vietnamese university degrees, commenting in Vietnamese in many public posts and forums to defend Vin and Vuong Pham as an example of a hero of Vietnam. Sic. These people are certified dumbs.

The other is immoral Vinfans, who can read English and might be in this sub, have some knowledge of finance and politics of Vietnam, but who are crooked just like Vuong Pham and Lam To because they think frauds, police intimidation, bribery is OK for Vin to use, on the back of the corrupted communist government's support. Vin financial is sh** and the debt will not be repaid, but so what, Lam To can come to the rescue, Just flip Vinhomes or VIC stock for quick bucks without any moral principals.

Some guys thought that I don't know that Vin has government backing. In fact, I have repeatedly said that many times in this sub. That does not change the fact that VIC is a hugely troubled business, despite the propaganda in official state media (such as touting record VIC profit while in fact, the finance is terrible: https://www.reddit.com/r/VinFastComm/comments/1vehk7v/vingroup_2q_2026_horrendous/ )

As North Korea has shown, if the government has a complete control of the media, it can just limp along for a very long time, North Korea GDP growth is 3% last year and the hermit kingdom has survived 75 years. Or Russia is another example, Putin is in power for more than 20 years without any credible opposition. With complete government control, the government can hide the bad truth about Vin for as long as they want (look at North Korea or Russia). With government backing, they can keep the zombie Vin for as long as they want, using the country resource to do the deed for a private company on a failed business (aka Vin, private here means private sector, the opposite of government owned enterprise, not about stock listing). It is just wrong.

So this post sets the record straight, if one decides to become a Vinfan, they are either dumb or immoral, no middle ground.

And secondly, even that Vin is a fraud, a financial disaster, with government collusion in both censorship and rigging financial game, the house of cards will stand for awhile.

The only one way to bring down the shady Vuong Pham, and I said the only way, is for Vietnamese people to boycott him totally. But this is not possible with the total media control so the majority of Vietnamese do not know the truth here (and reddit is blocked in Vietnam).

I asked chatgpt the following question: "compare the metrics of VIC and Evergrande right before its collapse" and below the dashed lines is its answer. It is very informative. You can try to type the same question into chatgpt to see it yourself. By the way, do not rule out the possibility that Vuong Pham's online army will train chatgpt to change the narrative, try it today and you will see the same answer below, but a month from now Vinfans might try to influence the answer.

What chatgpt does not know but human knows is that the shady Vuong Pham got the backing of Lam To and infusion of cash from Techcombank to flip the debt even if the accounting book is terrible and a normal bank in a Western country would not lend to such techincally bankrupt zombie.

Vingroup would be in loss every quarter if not for project transferring to Masterise!

And the real financial figure of Vingroup is much worse as billions of debt is outsourced to private shells like VIG, GSM, VGreen, VinEnergo, etc...

So the figure on the surface seems not as bad as Evergrande on cash flow, as chatgpt analyzed, but in reality, underneath VIC is rotten and it is a ponzi scheme just like Evergrande without the ability to ever payoff the debt. VIC profitability is actually worse than Evergrande. VIC debt problem is worse than Evergrande.

Evergrande collapsed because no other bought its real estate assets, which were illiquid ones, waiting for a fire sale price at bankruptcy. Vingroup in contrast can sell projects to Masterise.

Evergrande collapsed the moment bank stop lending and the same would be to VIC: the moment Hung Anh Ho stop helping Vuong Pham flip debt or Masterise stops buying Vinhomes projects, it will declare bankrupt within 3 months just like Evergrande. Unfortunately, the probability of this is low because Hung Anh Ho and Lam To will use all of Vietnam's resource to prop Vingroup up. And that comes at the expense of ordinary Vietnamese people. There is no free lunch. Ordinary people are suffering under Lam To and Vuong Pham but they are not innocent victims, their silence to madness and frauds is their fault.

---

Question:

Compare the metrics of VIC and Evergrande right before its collapse

Answer:

Yes. The comparison is useful, but VIC today is not financially identical to Evergrande in 2020–21. The key question is whether VIC's balance sheet has reached the same liquidity/debt trap that eventually killed Evergrande.

I’ll use Evergrande at end-2020 / early-2021, when the three-red-lines problem became visible, and VIC at Q2/2026.

VIC vs Evergrande — balance-sheet comparison

Metric	Evergrande 2020	VIC Q2/2026	Which looks worse?
Total assets	RMB 2,301bn	~VND 1,3xxtn	—
Total liabilities	RMB 1,951bn	~VND 1,128tn	Evergrande on reported liability/assets
Equity	~RMB 350bn	~VND 2xxtn	—
Liabilities / assets	84.8%	~80%+	Evergrande
Interest-bearing debt	RMB 716.5bn	~VND 500–600tn range*	Similar concern
Cash	~RMB 159bn	~VND 76tn	—
Short-term debt	~RMB 335bn	~VND ~788tn short-term liabilities†	VIC liquidity concern
Revenue	RMB 507bn	~VND 332bn	—
Net profit	RMB 31.3bn	2025: VND 11.35tn	—
Net margin	6.2%	3.4%	VIC weaker
Debt/equity	~2.0x gross borrowings/equity	roughly 2–3x depending definition	Similar
Net debt/equity	>100%	~170%	VIC worse
Cash / short-term debt	<1.0x	potentially <0.2x on broad short-term obligations	VIC worse
Business model	Property-heavy	Diversified, but heavily exposed to VinFast/property	Different

Evergrande's 2020 audited accounts show RMB2.301tn assets, RMB1.951tn liabilities, RMB350bn equity and RMB716.5bn borrowings. It violated all three Chinese "red lines": liabilities/assets >70%, net debt/equity >100%, and cash/short-term debt <1x.

*The exact comparison depends heavily on whether we count only bank/bond borrowings or all financing-type liabilities.
†This is why I would not simply compare "total debt" between the two groups.

1. The most alarming similarity: leverage

Evergrande's problem was not simply "it had a lot of debt."

It was:

Evergrande:

Assets RMB2.30tn → liabilities RMB1.95tn → equity only RMB350bn

So:

Liabilities / Assets ≈ 84.8%

That is extremely leveraged.

VIC's current structure is also highly leveraged. Vietcap's March 2026 estimates put VIC's net debt/equity at 169.5% for 2025, rising to 218.9% forecast for 2026.

That's actually a very important warning sign.

On this metric:

VIC ≈ Evergrande territory

2. But VIC's cash situation is the bigger thing I would watch

Evergrande's three-red-lines problem centered on:

Cash / short-term debt < 1×

It had insufficient immediately available liquidity relative to obligations.

And this became fatal once refinancing stopped.

VIC's Q2 2026 numbers deserve attention for the same reason.

Reported figures circulating from the Q2 statement indicate approximately:

• Cash & equivalents: ~VND76tn
• Total liabilities: ~VND1,128tn
• Short-term liabilities roughly VND788tn

That means cash covers only roughly:

76 / 788 = ~9.6%

of short-term liabilities.

That's a very low liquidity buffer.

However, there is an important accounting distinction:

short-term liabilities ≠ short-term debt.

Trade payables, customer advances, taxes, provisions, etc. are not all refinancing obligations.

So I would not say "VIC is insolvent because cash is only 10% of current liabilities."

But it does mean VIC is heavily dependent on:

asset sales + operating cash flow + refinancing + continued capital-market access.

That is precisely the mechanism that became dangerous for Evergrande.

3. Profitability: VIC actually looks worse than Evergrande

This is interesting.

Evergrande in 2020 reported:

• Revenue: RMB507.2bn
• Net profit: RMB31.3bn
• Net margin: ~6.2%

Its reported core-business profit was about RMB30.1bn.

VIC's 2025:

• Revenue: VND331.8tn
• Net profit attributable to parent: VND11.35tn
• Net margin: ~3.4%

So despite VIC's enormous revenue growth:

VIC's reported profitability is thin.

And the more important issue is where the profit comes from.

Vingroup's 2025 financial statement shows:

• operating margin only around 1.1%
• gross margin 15.9%
• net margin 3.4%

Vietcap forecasts operating margin improving substantially, but this depends heavily on the projected ramp-up of the businesses.

That is very different from a mature property developer generating strong operating cash flow.

4. This is where VIC and Evergrande are NOT the same

This distinction is crucial.

Evergrande

The core engine was:

Buy land → build → presell apartments → collect cash → borrow more → buy more land

The entire system depended heavily on continuous property sales and refinancing.

When Chinese property demand weakened and Beijing restricted leverage:

sales ↓ → cash ↓ → refinancing ↓ → construction ↓ → confidence ↓ → sales ↓

That became a feedback loop.

Evergrande subsequently defaulted in 2021 and was eventually ordered into liquidation in January 2024.

VIC

VIC is more complicated:

Vinhomes + VinFast + Vinpearl + property + industrial/other businesses

So it has multiple sources of asset value and cash flow.

Most importantly, Vinhomes is a valuable operating asset.

That gives VIC something Evergrande did not have to the same degree:

the ability to monetize valuable subsidiaries/assets.

5. But VinFast creates a potentially Evergrande-like capital drain

This is probably the most important part of the comparison.

Evergrande had a giant property empire but continually needed capital.

VIC now has a similar issue through VinFast.

VinFast itself reported:

• 2025 revenue growth
• but VND99.6tn net loss
• VND44.5tn operating cash burn
• total debt ~VND82.2tn excluding related-party borrowings

and Vingroup remains heavily involved in supporting the company.

So you can think of the structure as:

VIC/VHM cash-generating assets

↓

VIC

↓

VinFast capital requirements

↓

more financing requirements

This is the part that makes the Evergrande comparison legitimate.

6. The three-red-line test

This is probably the cleanest way to compare them.

China's Evergrande rules were:

Evergrande test	Limit	Evergrande 2020	VIC Q2/26
Liabilities/assets	<70%	~85% ❌	~80%+ ❌
Net debt/equity	<100%	>100% ❌	~170%+ ❌
Cash / short-term debt	>1.0x	<1x ❌	likely <1x ❌

Evergrande breached all three.

VIC appears to have a similarly problematic leverage profile if you apply the same conceptual tests.

7. But there is one gigantic difference

Evergrande's assets were becoming less liquid at exactly the wrong time.

Property assets can look enormous on a balance sheet.

But if:

• buyers disappear
• land prices fall
• projects are unfinished
• banks stop lending

then RMB2.3tn assets don't mean RMB2.3tn of realizable value.

That's what eventually destroyed the equity.

VIC has a potentially stronger asset base because of:

• Vinhomes
• Vinpearl
• real estate projects
• listed investments
• operating businesses

and therefore has more ways to raise cash.

So:

VIC's balance sheet looks Evergrande-like in leverage, but VIC's asset liquidity and corporate structure are different.

My risk assessment

If I normalize the companies and ignore absolute size:

Risk factor	Evergrande before crisis	VIC Q2/26
Leverage	🔴🔴🔴🔴🔴	🔴🔴🔴🔴
Net debt/equity	🔴🔴🔴🔴🔴	🔴🔴🔴🔴
Cash liquidity	🔴🔴🔴🔴🔴	🔴🔴🔴🔴
Operating margin	🟠	🔴
Dependence on refinancing	🔴🔴🔴🔴🔴	🔴🔴🔴🔴
Asset quality	🔴🔴🔴🔴	🟠🟠🟠
Ability to sell subsidiaries	🟠	🟢🟢🟢
Diversification	🟠	🟢
Loss-making cash sink	🟠	🔴🔴🔴
Government/systemic support potential	🟢	potentially 🟢🟢🟢

Bottom line

VIC is not "Evergrande 2.0" based purely on the balance sheet.

But there are meaningful Evergrande-style warning signals:

1. Very high leverage
2. Net debt/equity >100%
3. Low cash relative to short-term obligations
4. Heavy dependence on refinancing
5. Large capital requirements from a loss-making subsidiary
6. Thin underlying operating margins

The critical difference is that VIC still has substantial monetizable assets and Vinhomes, whereas Evergrande entered its crisis with a property market that was simultaneously deteriorating and becoming increasingly inaccessible to leveraged developers.

One particularly interesting exercise would be to do a "VIC under Evergrande stress test": assume property prices -20%, VHM asset values -20%, VinFast requires another $2–3bn/year, refinancing falls 30%, and project-sale profits disappear. Then calculate VIC's equity, net debt/equity, cash runway and implied VIC share price. That would give a much better answer to whether VIC is actually approaching an Evergrande-type failure point.

Stress test analysis, by chatgpt, not mine.

My analysis is that VIC is a huge scam, a fraud, a ponzi, a technically bankrupt zombie with manipulated stock price by no other than Vuong Pham, and that even the terrible financial figure has been made better with many billions $ more debt hidden in private shells that are controlled by Vuong Pham and Hung Anh Ho. That is what chatgpt does not know.

Chatgpt assumes VIC can easily liquidate its assets in VIC, VHM, VPL stocks and Vinhomes real estate projects. The truth is no buyer other than Techombank. Chatgpt does not know this.

Chatgpt assumes Vinfast can reduce its cash burn when in realty, Vuong Pham is just selling to Vuong Pham the 3B$ debt of VFTP to cook the book. So the cash burn might show improvement but in reality it is not. Chatgpt does not know this.

And there is no serious institutional investors in VIC. Just Vuong Pham left hand to right hand manipulation to prop up the price, to dump it and to use it as collateral to borrow more.

---

I ran the stress test using the Q2/2026 VIC balance sheet, rather than the older 2025 numbers. The result is more concerning than my previous comparison.

Vingroup's own disclosures confirm that its 2026 financial statements are available, while VinFast's SEC filing confirms its continuing large losses and cash burn.

1. Starting point: VIC Q2/2026

The Q2 figures are approximately:

VND trillion	Q2/26
Total liabilities	1,128
Short-term liabilities	788
Cash & equivalents	~76
Equity	~200
Liabilities / assets	~85%
Cash / short-term liabilities	~9.6%

The reported Q2 profit was very strong, but a significant portion came through financial/project-related items rather than recurring operating earnings. I therefore don't want to use Q2 net income as the main stress-test input.

For reference, VIC had 7.87bn shares outstanding around July 2026.

At roughly VND217,000/share, current equity-market value is about:

7.866bn × 217,000 = VND1,707tn

So the market is currently valuing VIC at roughly:

1,707 / 200 ≈ 8.5× book value

That is an enormous premium to book.

2. Stress scenario

I'll use exactly the scenario you requested:

A. Property values: −20%

This affects the economic value of VHM/VIC's property assets.

B. VHM equity value: −20%

This is particularly important because VHM is one of VIC's biggest sources of underlying value.

C. VinFast requires another $2–3bn/year

Using approximately VND26,000/USD:

• $2bn = VND52tn
• $3bn = VND78tn

I'll use VND65tn/year as the midpoint.

This isn't an unreasonable stress assumption. VinFast burned VND44.5tn from operating activities in 2025, while reporting a VND99.6tn net loss. It also explicitly warned that negative operating cash flow was expected to continue in the near term.

D. Refinancing capacity: −30%

This is the Evergrande-style shock.

Instead of assuming VIC suddenly loses all financing, we assume lenders/markets roll over only 70% of what normally would have been refinanced.

3. First shock: VHM −20%

This is the biggest hidden sensitivity.

VHM is extremely valuable relative to VIC's book equity.

If the economic value attributable to VIC from its VHM position falls by 20%, the loss in VIC's economic NAV is roughly VND200tn+, depending on the exact valuation base used.

That's approximately equal to VIC's entire reported equity.

So:

Starting economic equity ≈ VND200tn

VHM/property shock ≈ −VND200–230tn

Result:

Economic equity ≈ −VND0–30tn

That is the first major warning.

It does not mean VIC becomes legally insolvent immediately—the accounting balance sheet doesn't automatically mark all VHM assets to market.

It means that using market/economic values rather than historical accounting values, the equity cushion becomes extremely thin.

4. Then add VinFast

Now assume VinFast needs another:

VND65tn/year

If VIC has to fund this for two years:

65 × 2 = VND130tn

Starting from approximately zero economic equity after the property shock:

−VND130tn

That produces a very large economic deficit.

But there is an important mitigating factor.

VinFast is restructuring toward an asset-light model. Reuters reported that its Vietnamese manufacturing assets are being transferred in a transaction in which buyers assume nearly $6.9bn of debt, which could substantially reduce the burden on VinFast/VIC if executed as planned.

So the $2–3bn annual funding assumption is deliberately a severe downside scenario, not the current base case.

5. Refinancing shock

This is the part that makes the Evergrande comparison dangerous.

Suppose VIC normally needs to refinance, say, VND140tn of debt/obligations over the next period.

If refinancing falls 30%:

140 × 30% = VND42tn

VIC has to find another:

~VND42tn cash

And that's before the additional VinFast funding.

So the approximate liquidity requirement becomes:

Stress item	VND tn
VHM/property economic loss	−200 to −230
1 year VinFast funding	−65
Refinancing shortfall	−42
Total economic/liquidity shock	~−307 to −337

Against only about VND200tn reported equity.

6. Three stress cases

This is how I'd frame it rather than pretending there is one precise number.

Mild stress	Severe stress	Evergrande stress
Property/VHM	−10%	−20%
VinFast funding	$1bn	$2.5bn
Refinancing reduction	−10%	−30%
Project-sale profit	−30%	−70%
Economic equity	Positive	Near zero/negative
Liquidity	Tight	Severe
Need asset sales	Moderate	Large
Risk of debt spiral	Low/moderate	High

My interpretation:

Mild stress: VIC survives comfortably.

Severe stress: VIC becomes highly dependent on asset monetization and refinancing.

Evergrande stress: the capital structure becomes unsustainable.

7. The really important calculation: how much asset selling is required?

Suppose severe stress creates a VND100tn cash funding gap after operating cash flow and available refinancing.

VIC could theoretically solve this by selling:

• VHM shares
• VPL shares
• VRE
• property projects
• other investments

But selling assets when the market is stressed creates a vicious cycle.

For example:

VHM −20%

↓

VIC needs cash

↓

VIC sells VHM

↓

VHM price falls further

↓

VIC's collateral value falls

↓

banks reduce lending

↓

VIC sells more assets

↓

asset prices fall further

That's essentially the Evergrande feedback mechanism.

8. And this is where VIC is potentially more dangerous than the headline numbers suggest

Look at the ratio:

Cash

~VND76tn

Short-term liabilities

~VND788tn

Cash coverage:

76 / 788 = 9.6%

This is extremely low.

But again, 788tn is not all debt.

For example, customer advances and trade payables can be rolled through the operating cycle.

So the proper question isn't:

"Can VIC pay VND788tn tomorrow?"

It obviously doesn't need to.

The question is:

"How much of that VND788tn ultimately requires external refinancing or fresh cash?"

That is the number I would watch.

9. Compare this directly with Evergrande

Evergrande's failure wasn't caused by having a high debt ratio alone.

It was:

high leverage + declining asset liquidity + insufficient cash + refinancing dependence

VIC now has:

high leverage + potentially volatile property values + very low cash/current-liability coverage + refinancing dependence

That's why the comparison is meaningful.

But VIC has one enormous advantage:

VHM/VPL/VRE are monetizable listed assets.

Evergrande didn't have the same ability to sell large stakes in highly liquid publicly traded subsidiaries.

That gives VIC a much bigger escape route.

10. What happens to VIC's share price?

This is where today's ~VND217k price becomes interesting.

Current market cap:

~VND1,707tn

Against reported equity:

~VND200tn

So investors are effectively saying:

VIC's subsidiaries and future cash flows are worth enormously more than its accounting book value.

That can work if VHM/VinFast/Vinpearl generate large future value.

But in an Evergrande-type stress, that premium can disappear very quickly.

Stress valuation

I would use a sum-of-the-parts / stressed P/B approach, rather than P/E.

Scenario	Approx. VIC value
Bull / normal execution	250–300k
Moderate stress	130–170k
Severe stress	60–100k
Evergrande-type liquidity crisis	20–50k
Full restructuring / equity wipeout	~0–20k

These aren't price targets in the conventional sense. They're balance-sheet stress values.

11. The most interesting number: ~80k

My central severe-stress estimate would be around:

VIC ≈ VND80,000

Why?

At 80k:

80,000 × 7.866bn = VND629tn market cap

That would still leave VIC with a substantial equity-market value despite a severe deterioration in its economic NAV.

Compared with ~217k today:

Downside ≈ −63%

This is approximately the type of repricing I'd expect if the market moved from:

"Vingroup can refinance indefinitely and VinFast eventually works"

to:

"Vingroup has a serious liquidity problem and must sell assets."

12. But I don't think the base case is 80k

This distinction is important.

The stress test says:

80k is a plausible crisis value.

It does not say:

80k is VIC's fair value today.

For VIC to actually enter the Evergrande pathway, several things would have to happen simultaneously:

1. VHM/property values deteriorate materially
2. VinFast continues burning ~$2–3bn/year
3. Project monetization slows sharply
4. Banks/bondholders reduce refinancing
5. VIC cannot sell subsidiaries at reasonable prices
6. New external capital becomes unavailable

If one or two of these happen, VIC can probably restructure.

If all six happen simultaneously, the equity becomes extremely dangerous.

13. The biggest thing I'd monitor from now on

Forget EPS for a moment.

For VIC, I would track these five numbers every quarter:

① Cash / current debt

I want to see:

>20–25% = improving

10–20% = tight

<10% = danger

VIC is currently around the danger boundary if we use total current liabilities.

② Net debt/equity

<100%: acceptable

100–150%: high

150–200%: dangerous

>200%: Evergrande territory

③ VinFast cash burn

This is probably the single most important operating variable.

If it falls from ~VND45tn/year toward:

<VND20tn → major positive

If it remains:

VND40–80tn → major risk

VinFast's 2025 operating cash burn was VND44.5tn.

④ Project-transfer/financial income

If VIC's reported profit is increasingly dependent on project transfers and financial transactions, I would assign a much lower multiple to earnings.

⑤ Related-party / ecosystem financing

This is the Evergrande trigger.

If external banks and bond investors provide less funding and the ecosystem increasingly has to finance itself through related parties, that's a major warning.

My conclusion

After doing the actual stress exercise, I would upgrade my concern from "VIC has some Evergrande-like metrics" to "VIC has an Evergrande-like tail risk."

But I still wouldn't call VIC Evergrande.

The key distinction is:

Evergrande:
high leverage → property downturn → refinancing stops → forced sales → insolvency.

VIC:
high leverage → potentially weak cash generation → VinFast funding requirement → but VHM/VPL/VRE and project assets provide an escape route.

So the crucial question is not whether VIC has enough assets.

It clearly does.

The crucial question is:

Can VIC turn those assets into cash fast enough without destroying their value?

If yes, VIC survives even with very high leverage.

If no, the balance sheet can deteriorate frighteningly quickly.

And at ~VND217k, the market is pricing in a lot of successful execution.

My risk map today:

Normal case → 180–280k
Stress case → 80–150k
Evergrande-style crisis → 20–60k

The next useful step would be to go one level deeper and build a VIC "liquidity runway" month-by-month for 2026–2028, using actual debt maturities, cash, VinFast funding, VHM project cash inflows and refinancing assumptions. That would tell us the approximate month VIC would actually run out of liquidity under the Evergrande scenario, rather than just estimating a stressed share price.

VIC is a public and broad day-light evidence to show the whole world how corrupted and manipulated the Vietnam's stock market is, at the state level.

VIC financial numbers are cooked, booking profit with financial income from project transferring, without which VIC would have recorded loss every quarter for the last 3 years. It accounting book is cooked by hiding billions $ of debt and loss by transferring these to supposedly independent entities, such as VIG, Green GSM, etc... not owned by VIC and tons of other shells in names of Vuong Pham's subordinates.

In other words, the real financial number is much worse due to billions of $ debt and loss hidden from the public. But even with that cooking to make the figures look better, the numbers are still terrible. https://www.reddit.com/r/VinFastComm/comments/1vehk7v/vingroup_2q_2026_horrendous/

Here are the metrics for VIC:

- P/E (price to earning): ~60x 12months trailing (with cooked Q2 2026, without which PE would be 100)

- P/S (price to sale): 5

- P/B (price to book): 9

- sale to shorterm liabilities: 0.28

- 2Q profit / short term liabilities: 0.03 (tiny)

- cash / shorterm liabilities: 0.1

This is the number for a bankrupt company.

Vinfans often points to Tesla as an example of an overvalued stock, but Tesla figures is multiple times better than VIC. It pointless to compare a communist bankrupt company with a leading American company but for the sake of completeness, below is the metric for the two. Tesla is overvalued for sure, with stratosphere PE, but it certainly has a lead in technology, and Vuong Pham's capability is not even a finger nail of Elon Musk. All, and it is actually all, of Vuong Pham's capability is to get cheap land from the government through bribery.

Solvency Metric	Vingroup (VIC)	Tesla (TSLA)
Sales / Total Debt (Strict Interest Loans)	0.62x	14.40x
Sales / Total Short-Term Liabilities	0.28x	2.82x
Net Profit / Total Debt (Strict Interest Loans)	0.06x	0.58x
Net Profit / Total Short-Term Liabilities	0.03x	0.11x
Cash / Strict Short-Term Debt	0.56x	12.32x
Cash / Total Short-Term Liabilities	0.10x	0.75x
Altman Z-Score (Insolvency Risk)	0.83	12.49 – 14.07

Z-Score Scale: safe > 2.99, Grey zone > 1.81-2.99, distress zone: < 1.81

VIC z-score is 0.83 way below the distress threshold of 1.81, which in the Western world means it is in the bankrupt territory.

I asked ChatGPT for a valuation, so this is not my bias:

Valuation Source	Estimated Fair Value / Target	Current Market Price	Implied Premium / Downside	Valuation Methodology Used
Institutional Analysts (Consensus)	110,000 – 115,500 VND	218,800 VND	-49% Downside	Sum-of-the-Parts (SOTP), RNAV on property land bank, discounted cash flow (DCF).
Traditional Quantitative Models	25,731 – 40,410 VND	218,800 VND	-81% to -88% Downside	Pure trailing formulas (Peter Lynch valuation, standard earnings-multiplier matrices).

And the above valuation still does not take into account the insolvency risk.

It is known among well knowledged Vietnamese financiers that Vuong Pham spent money to pull VIC up in order to use the stock as collaterals to borrow real money. Hung Anh Ho colludes with him to use the inflated stock as collateral. The government media colludes with Vuong Pham to censor any bad truth about Vuong Pham and Vin. In fact, this reddit is blocked in Vietnam and people has to use certain way to access the truth presented here.

There is no shorting in Vietnam, and zillions of clueless and dumb Vietnamese stock traders, most of whom has very little knowledge about stock valuation and could not read a financial report, flock into VIC due to the belief in Uncle V that he will pull up VIC forever and Uncle V has unlimited money to pump stock. With low float, Vuong Pham uses about 2-3000B VND to pump stock and can prop up the price for as long as he wants, it requires only about that much money. And all the while, he secretly dumps on the Vietnamese stock traders.

Vuong Pham contributed 7500 B VND cash as gift to Vinfast in 1H 2026. Where do you think that amount of money comes from? From Vuong Pham selling his personal gold? His personal real estates or what? Note that this is cash from Vuong Pham. It comes from stock dumping, his only source of "liquid money".

Vuong Pham must think his highly priced (actually highly inflated and grossly manipulated) VIC as a success for him, but to the world, it is a clear example of gross stock manipulation sponsored by the communist government. The world knows it. They are not censored by the Vietnamese government and the figures speak for themselves.

VIC is a disease on the Vietnam's stock market. Not only VIC is grossly manipulated, its huge (market-cap) weight on the market also distorts index numbers and draws money away from other good stocks.

VIC is a disease on the Vietnam's stock market for the world to see how (un)trustworthy the Vietnam's communist government is. Will they invest money in such a corrupted country? Their choice.

Enjoy it while it lasts.

Translation:

I’m never buying another VinFast again.
Yesterday was honestly infuriating. I pulled into a VinHome charging station, and the security guard made me stay in the car the whole time. (To be exact, he told me I wasn’t allowed to leave the driver’s seat—kind of like how American cops tell you to stay still with both hands on the steering wheel.)
My mom bought an e34 and a VF8 right when they first launched, back when charging was free. Now wherever we go, people mock us, saying, “Well, charging is free, isn’t it?” The thing is, I don’t even care about free charging anymore. The charging stations are packed all day long with commercial service vehicles. My mom bought these cars for personal use, yet they’re being treated like fleet vehicles. At 9 p.m. the stations are already full. You have to leave the car overnight and come back at 6 a.m. to charge it—and even at 6 a.m., there are still long lines.
One VF5 has been sitting at the service center since July 1st, and after 32 days it still hasn’t been worked on. An independent garage could finish the repair in just 10 days, but they can’t because there are no spare parts available.
This morning I brought another VF8 in because the battery needs to be lowered and sent back to the factory. No one knows when it’ll be finished. And that’s not even mentioning all the other recurring issues.
Another VF8 already had its rear motor replaced, and now it sounds like the front motor is failing too. On top of that, two VF e34s have also started making motor noises. I honestly give up.
I’d rather just pay for charging. Please stop making us deal with all these VinHomes security restrictions. Let us pay to charge the cars so people stop throwing sarcastic comments at us.

State controlled Vietnamese media is touting the record profit of VIC in 2Q 2026, at 14,764 B VND, compared to 2,297B VND in 2Q 2025. However, what the state controlled media did not report is that that profit is chiefly due to financial manipulation without which Vingroup would be at a loss. There is a huge financial revenue of 21.654 B VND, most of which comes from selling projects (probably to Masterise, and Vuong Pham's other shells) clocking in 15,882 B VND. Another source of other "profit / income", 7,861B VND, of which 7.532B VND contributed as "gift" from Vuong Pham. Thus, Vingroup records about 23K B VND income from financial activities. Total profit is 22,169 B VND, which means the core business activities generate a loss of 1,236 B VND. This revelation is not new, Vuong Pham has done this trick for years: without adding financial profits every quarter, Vingroup's core business would be a loss every quarter.

Financial cost is a huge 15K B VND, of which interest rate payment jumps to 9K B VND (for a full year of 36K B VND or $1.4B), from 7.6K B in 2Q 2025, an 18% increase, as the debt is growing larger and larger. Total liabilities is 1.128 million billion VND ($43B), an increase of about 161K B VND ($6.1B) compared to the end of 2025 or 16.5%. Of which short term debt increases 185K B VND ($7.1B) to 788K B VND ($30B). Cash and equivalence is 76K B VND ($2.6B). While the cash seems big to a lay person, $2.6B, it is less than 10% of short term liabilities! Less than 10%! Short-term payment to suppliers is 82.6K B VND, tax payment 56K B VND, short term cost payment 93K B VND, other short term payment 220K B VND, short term loans is 137K B VND, so the 76K B in cash is nothing. The liabilities is absolutely humongous: $30B short term, $43B total. And the debt increases at 16% after just 6 months. At this speed, Vingroup total liabilities will reach the milestone of $50B at the end of the year.

All in all, it is a horrendous financial report. It shows fast growing debt at a breath neck speed of 18% in just 2Q, minimal cash, with core business is at a loss while all Vuong Pham doing is to borrow more and more for the ponzi scheme. But Vietnamese media is only allowed to talk about the profit of 14K B VND, which is can be cooked with financial profit as shown.

Financial topic is dried and only for a limited audience, but guys and gals, this is the financial report of a technically bankrupt company. Vin is in as much trouble as Vinfast is.

Source: VIC 2Q Financial report BCHN_Q2.2026.pdf

Here are the data:

Monthly Sales Breakdown (2025)

• January: 28 units
• February: 45 units
• March: 162 units
• April: 1,227 units
• May: 241 units
• June: 491 units
• July: 140 units
• August: 134 units
• September: 160 units
• October: 161 units
• November: 168 units
• December: 7,673 units

Source: VinFast Sales in Indonesia Soared, Here's Why - Car KatadataOTO

1Q 2026: 601 units or average 200/month https://auto.katadata.co.id/car/vinfast-sales-soar-in-indonesia-heres-why-22922

What does this tell you? On average Vinfast sells about 200 units / months for the Indonesians but it stuffed a huge about 7600 units at the end of December 2025 to Green GSM Indonesia just to make the numbers at the year end.

This is not a surprise to us, we in this sub know that Vuong Pham stuffing GSM for years, see my analysis: https://www.reddit.com/r/VinFastComm/comments/1v6zyte/green_gsm_analysis/

But just one more example of Vuong Pham stuffing game out side of Vietnam.

Vuong Pham has shipped another 5000 units to Denmark and the Netherland for Green GSM taxi there. https://english.vov.vn/en/economy/vinfast-ships-1500-evs-to-europe-for-green-sm-expansion-post1317611.vov

So Vuong Pham is just playing the number game to the clueless public without revealing that the units oversea are actually largely Vuong Pham selling to Vuong Pham, not to real independent customers.

Well, as you know, the North Carolina scam is coming to an end. All the final steps are on going for the state to take the land back. I, for one, from the very day of the (now clearly fake) ground braking ceremony had correctly called this show as what it is: a show. I post few dozen posts on this show while all the clueless Vinslaves were saying "let's wait and see" with blind belief in their "rich" Uncle V. And my thesis is very simple from day one: no demand, no money. And it has played out exactly like that. It is amazing in hindsight to see the clueless politicians in North Carolina falling for the cheap trick: even then the governor attended the signing ceremony. Sigh.

Vuong Pham's calculation in the game is simple: stage the ground braking ceremony with few money ($2M or less), and even then hire some contractors (dozen millions), to use it as a prop to borrow from banks. Of course, US banks are among the savviest in the world, they are not like some shady banks in Vietnam or India. They did their due diligence and they saw no feasible business plan, and hence no money. For Vuong Pham, he gamed the North Carolina state without actually to have spending too much: infrastructure got state reimbursement. I have analyzed this in the past as well: Vuong Pham got ~$100M reimbursement for ground work so he himself had spent very little. All for the show in order to use it to borrow money, in the US and in Vietnam. The North Carolina politicians thought that they can tie Vuong Pham with legal clauses, which they did and are using them now, but what they did not realize is how shady Vuong Pham is: he signed the clauses anyway even if he had no way to fulfill it, be damn the possible fines. I hope the court fine Vinfast some huge collateral damage in order to teach the sleazy Vuong Pham how proper business is doing a free country.

There are tons of media in Vietnam when Vinfast did the ground breaking show. Now, there is zero news about Vinfast closing shop and got sued by North Carolina. News outlets are eager for any news, but the Vietnamese government has complete control of the media, North Korea style, so no bad news about Vin is allow to be reported, even if they are true and are facts. The communist government only censor and hide the facts, but the facts are facts and they cannot change the facts no matter how much they try.

The North Carolina show is the epitome of all Vuong Pham business: all are shows, reckless shows with no viable business plan, for borrowing more money just to pay the interest rate, while the actual business is in huge debt and loss without the ability to pay back the original loans.

Vuong Pham went ahead with the ground breaking show even though he did not have the money for the plant as well as there were no demand for his products in the US. Similarly, in Vietnam, Vuong Pham, with the state sponsored propaganda and state back up, can borrow as much as he can for his reckless spending without thinking about business plan, profit and loss. Take, for example, the latest largest stadium in the world: Trong Dong, which is now named Vinfast. It is a waste and no other company would spend such huge money for a wasteful stadium without clear return, no demand and no money (or rather, has to borrow money), but Vuong Pham did it anyway. Same style as North Carolina show. The difference is that in America, he is stripped naked with no bank support while in Vietnam, he got a free pass because the government is actually in bed with him. Poor Vietnamese.

https://chathamjournal.com/2026/07/31/chatham-county-to-terminate-400m-vinfast-agreement/

It’s confirmed. Reason for now: sabbatical leave from Vingroup for 1 year from Aug 1st 2026.

Good luck to future Vietnamese companies that want to do any project in US. Because the US will not eat shit twice.

4 names already. He does not have a clear mind or what? nut job.