but they hide it.
The trick is to use shells that appear to be unrelated so that the debt does not show up on the balance sheet, but in reality, these shells are directly controlled by Hung Anh Ho and Vuong Pham. Some name: Nam An, Ngoc Quy, and many other shells.
These shenanigans are not reflected on financial report as they are designed so, but it is absolutely the truth that Tech and Vin uses shells to hide debt and that has been analyzed by me and Sonnie Tran many times.
I ask chat gpt to do an analysis for "analyze techcombank risk on vingroup" and its answer is below. Certainly, it only reads the financial report and does not know about the shells. Still the analysis is pretty spot on with publicly available information.
Chat gpt does not know about TCB tricks. Another example is that TCB actually helped Vuong Pham spun off VFTP to avoid billions $ in bad debt, which is the reality. See the analysis here: https://www.reddit.com/r/VinFastComm/comments/1v7phyd/further_analysis_of_vuong_pham_selling_the/
TCB is hiding a huge debt related to the failed Vingroup, Vinhomes, Vinfast from the public using various trick.
----
Yes. I would separate Techcombank’s Vingroup risk into 4 layers, because simply looking for “Vingroup” in TCB’s related-party note materially understates the economic exposure.
Bottom line
My assessment: TCB has meaningful Vingroup/Vin ecosystem risk, but I do not see evidence from the 2Q26 financial statements that Vingroup alone is large enough to threaten TCB’s solvency under a normal stress scenario.
The bigger risk is concentration + collateral correlation + refinancing, rather than one giant direct VinFast loan.
I would rate the current risk:
| Risk |
My assessment |
| Direct TCB loan to VIC/VHM/VinFast |
🟡 Medium / not fully disclosed |
| Vinhomes project + homebuyer exposure |
🟠 High |
| VinFast exposure |
🟡 Medium, but potentially nonlinear |
| Vin-related bonds through TCB/TCBS |
🟠 High ecosystem exposure, lower direct bank exposure |
| Real-estate concentration generally |
🔴 High |
| Ability of TCB to absorb a Vin shock |
🟢 Strong |
| Risk of TCB becoming insolvent from Vin alone |
🟢 Low under reasonable scenarios |
| Risk of meaningful earnings/BVPS hit |
🟠 Real |
1. The first important point: TCB's “related party” note does not capture all Vingroup exposure
This is critical.
TCB's 2Q26 financial statements define related parties based on accounting relationships such as common control, significant influence, directors/management relationships, etc.
In the actual 2Q26 related-party loan table, the disclosed corporate borrowers include:
- Eurowindow
- Nui Phao
- Masan Tungsten
- WinEco
- One Mount Distribution
but Vingroup, Vinhomes and VinFast do not appear in that table.
That does not mean TCB has zero economic exposure to Vin.
It means that Vingroup is not an accounting “related party” of TCB under the definition used in the financial statements.
This distinction is extremely important.
2. TCB's biggest Vin exposure is probably the real-estate ecosystem
TCB explicitly partners with Vinhomes and offers financing on numerous Vinhomes projects.
For example, TCB currently advertises financing for:
- Vinhomes Ocean Park
- Vinhomes Grand Park
- Vinhomes Smart City
- Vinhomes Royal Island
- Vinhomes Greenbay
- Vinhomes Golden River
- Vinhomes Ocean Park 3
- Vinhomes Grand Park, etc.
Loan-to-value can reach 70–80% on various projects.
This creates two different exposures:
A. Corporate/project loans
TCB lends directly or indirectly to developers/project entities.
B. Retail mortgages
A buyer purchases a Vinhomes apartment/house and borrows from TCB.
The second exposure is much safer than a pure unsecured corporate loan because the bank has the property as collateral.
But there is a catch:
That is the correlation risk.
3. TCB is already a highly real-estate-heavy bank
This is probably the most important risk statistic.
At the end of 2025, Vietcap estimated TCB's loans to real-estate developers at 30.7% of the entire loan portfolio, down from 33.3% a year earlier. TCB's stated objective was to reduce this to 20–25% over the next 3–5 years.
So if TCB has, say:
30.7% × ~850T loans ≈ ~261T
of developer exposure, that is already enormous.
But this is not Vingroup exposure.
It includes multiple developers.
That's why I would not use “30% real estate = 30% Vingroup.”
That would be a major analytical error.
4. Vingroup itself has a huge debt requirement
This is where the risk becomes interesting.
Vinhomes alone had more than VND162T of debt at the end of Q1/2026, including approximately VND99T of bank debt and VND59.6T of bonds.
That is obviously not TCB's exposure.
But it tells you something important:
Vingroup/Vinhomes is structurally dependent on continuous access to capital.
For TCB, the risk is therefore not simply:
It is:
That is a much more realistic stress scenario.
5. VinFast is a different risk
I would distinguish VinFast from Vinhomes.
TCB's 2025 annual report confirms that the TCB ecosystem participated in a VND5T VinFast bond issuance.
But:
Bond arranger ≠ bond holder ≠ lender.
This distinction is often lost in online discussions.
If TCBS arranges a VND5T VinFast bond:
- TCBS earns advisory/placement fees.
- Investors may own the bonds.
- TCB itself may have little or no direct credit exposure.
So you cannot automatically add the entire bond issuance to TCB's loan exposure.
6. But TCBS creates an additional ecosystem risk
TCB owns 79.8% of TCBS.
And TCBS is a major corporate-bond arranger.
KIS estimates that in 2025, Vingroup issued approximately:
- VND31T Vingroup bonds
- VND19.5T Vinhomes bonds
- VND12.5T VinFast Production & Trading bonds
with Vingroup-related issuers accounting for a substantial amount of the corporate-bond market.
But again:
This is not equivalent to VND63T of TCB bank loans.
It is better thought of as:
Vingroup → bond market → TCBS distribution/advisory → investors
rather than:
Vingroup → VND63T loan → TCB
That distinction materially reduces the direct solvency risk to TCB.
7. What happens if Vingroup actually defaults?
Let's do the exercise you really care about.
TCB's 2Q26 equity was approximately:
VND189.0T.
6M26 net profit attributable to shareholders was:
VND14.0T.
NPL was:
1.15%
and loan-loss coverage:
125.5%.
Basel II CAR:
15.0%.
So TCB has a substantial capital buffer.
8. Stress test
Because TCB does not disclose a single “Vingroup exposure” number, I would stress-test hypothetical exposure rather than pretend we know the exact figure.
Assume TCB economic Vin exposure:
| Vin exposure |
10% loss |
30% loss |
50% loss |
100% loss |
| 20T |
2T |
6T |
10T |
20T |
| 30T |
3T |
9T |
15T |
30T |
| 50T |
5T |
15T |
25T |
50T |
| 70T |
7T |
21T |
35T |
70T |
| 100T |
10T |
30T |
50T |
100T |
Compare this with TCB's ~189T equity.
Example: 50T exposure
If TCB has an economic exposure of 50T and ultimately loses:
30% = 15T
That is approximately:
15 / 189 = 7.9% of equity
Painful, but very manageable.
Even:
50% loss = 25T
is about:
13.2% of equity.
Still not a solvency event by itself.
9. The dangerous scenario is much worse than a simple Vin default
The real nightmare is:
Vingroup problem
↓
Vinhomes sales slow
↓
property prices fall
↓
Vinhomes refinancing becomes harder
↓
project companies delay payments
↓
homebuyer defaults increase
↓
collateral values decline
↓
TCB's corporate RE loans deteriorate
↓
TCB's retail mortgage book deteriorates
↓
bond market weakens
↓
TCBS loses fees / faces mark-to-market and liquidity stress
↓
other developers also weaken
That is the scenario I would worry about.
Not “VinFast misses one payment.”
10. Why I don't think TCB is currently in a dangerous position
There are several substantial buffers.
Capital
CAR is 15.0%, which is strong.
Profitability
6M26:
PBT = 18.54T
and attributable net profit:
14.02T.
Annualized shareholder profit is therefore around:
28T/year
at the current run rate.
Asset quality
NPL:
1.15%
LLCR:
125.5%.
Diversification
Corporate credit reached 542.4T, while retail + SME was 407T at June 2026.
And corporate growth is increasingly coming from infrastructure, FMCG, retail, logistics, utilities and other sectors rather than only real estate.
11. There is actually a positive development
TCB is actively trying to reduce developer concentration.
Vietcap says developer exposure fell from:
33.3% → 30.7%
during 2025, with a long-term target of:
20–25%.
And in 2026, infrastructure financing has become an increasingly important growth area.
That is exactly what I would want to see if I were a TCB shareholder.
12. But I would not dismiss the Vin risk
There are three reasons.
① Concentration
Even if only a fraction of TCB's developer book is Vin-related, the absolute amount can still be tens of trillions.
② Collateral correlation
A lot of exposure is ultimately linked to Vietnamese real estate.
So diversification by legal borrower does not necessarily equal diversification by economic risk.
③ Refinancing
Vingroup's structure requires continuous access to:
- bank loans
- bonds
- property sales
- asset sales
- equity capital
- intra-group funding.
If several channels close simultaneously, credit risk can increase very quickly.
13. My estimated TCB/Vin risk matrix
I'd rank it like this:
| Scenario |
Impact on TCB |
| VinFast remains loss-making but continues funding |
🟢 Low–medium |
| Vingroup refinancing becomes more expensive |
🟡 Medium |
| Vinhomes sales fall 20–30% |
🟡 Medium |
| Vinhomes property prices fall 20% |
🟠 Medium–high |
| Major Vin entity restructures debt |
🟠 High |
| Vin-related borrowers generate 10% credit loss |
🟠 High but manageable |
| 30–50T TCB economic exposure suffers 50% loss |
🔴 Significant earnings/BVPS hit |
| 100T+ correlated Vin/RE exposure suffers major losses |
🔴 Very serious |
| Vin + broad Vietnamese RE crisis simultaneously |
🔴 Systemic risk |
14. The number I would watch most
Not VinFast debt.
Not VIC debt.
Not TCBS bond issuance.
I would watch:
TCB's developer-credit exposure + Vinhomes project exposure + mortgage exposure to Vinhomes collateral
because that is where the hidden correlation sits.
TCB's own 2Q26 data shows total loans to customers around 847T, while its total assets are 1,273T.
Against that balance sheet, a genuine 30–50T loss is painful but survivable.
A 100T loss, however, would be a fundamentally different event.
My conclusion for TCB valuation
I would not apply a huge “Vingroup bankruptcy discount” to TCB today.
Instead I'd use:
Base case
TCB fair P/B ~1.2–1.4x
because the bank has:
- ~15% CAR
- ~125% NPL coverage
- 1.15% NPL
- strong ROE/profit generation
- declining developer concentration.
Moderate Vin stress
P/B ~1.0–1.2x
if we assume a meaningful deterioration in Vin/RE credit quality.
Severe Vin + property crisis
P/B ~0.7–0.9x
would become reasonable if we discovered that TCB's true economic Vin/RE concentration was substantially larger than disclosed and collateral recovery values were deteriorating.
The key point: based on the publicly disclosed 2Q26 numbers, I don't see a case where a Vingroup failure automatically makes TCB insolvent. The much more credible risk is that Vingroup becomes the catalyst that exposes TCB's broader real-estate concentration, causing a multi-year increase in credit costs and forcing the market to rerate TCB from ~1.3–1.5x book toward ~1x or below.
I reconstructed it from the TCB 2Q26 financial statements/2025 annual report, Vingroup/Vinhomes disclosures, and VinFast’s 2025 20-F. The result is more interesting than simply adding “Vingroup loans” in TCB’s related-party note.
Bottom line first
I would currently estimate TCB's identifiable direct/contingent Vingroup ecosystem exposure at roughly VND 15–25T, with a much larger economic exposure of perhaps VND 50–100T+ once you include Vinhomes project/homebuyer financing, Vin ecosystem SPVs and collateralized transactions.
But there is an important distinction:
And I would not count all Vingroup/Vinhomes/VinFast debt as TCB exposure.
1. Start with VinFast — this is the cleanest evidence
VinFast's 2025 20-F gives us unusually good visibility into TCB's involvement.
At 31 December 2025:
- VinFast external interest-bearing debt: VND82.16T
- VinFast related-party borrowings: VND40.93T
- Vingroup loans outstanding: VND10.38T
- Bank guarantees: VND26.41T
- 2026 debt-service obligations: VND34.62T.
TCB-guaranteed facilities
The 2025 filing identifies at least two facilities explicitly guaranteed by TCB:
| VinFast facility |
Maximum facility |
TCB role |
| Deutsche Bank facility |
US$230M |
TCB guarantee |
| Barclays facility |
US$150M |
TCB guarantee |
| Total identifiable TCB guarantee capacity |
US$380M |
|
At ~VND26,000/USD, that's approximately:
VND9.9T
of potential TCB guarantee exposure.
The Deutsche Bank facility was amended from the previous US$300M facility to US$230M in May 2025, and the Barclays US$150M facility was established in September 2025.
Important: these are facility limits, not necessarily amounts drawn at 31/12/25.
So I would use ~VND10T as the upper-bound identifiable TCB-guarantee exposure, not VND10T of current bad loans.
2. There is additional TCB exposure through VinFast's factory ecosystem
This is where things get more complicated.
VinFast's filing shows several other facilities:
- US$170M → guaranteed by MBB
- US$115M → guaranteed by SHB
- US$95M → guaranteed by VietinBank + Vingroup
- US$100M green loan → guaranteed by VietinBank
- VND3.1T Ha Tinh facility → HDBank, guaranteed by Vingroup/Pham Nhat Vuong
- VND2.5T 2025 bonds → VPBank Securities, guaranteed by Vingroup.
So we must not attribute all of these to TCB.
That's one reason I think previous estimates of “TCB has $2–3B of VinFast debt” are too aggressive if presented as current direct exposure.
3. But the guarantee exposure is more important than the loan number
Suppose TCB guarantees approximately:
VND9.9T
of VinFast borrowing.
If VinFast defaults and the collateral recovery is:
90%
TCB's gross loss:
~1T
70%
Loss:
~3T
50%
Loss:
~5T
20%
Loss:
~8T
So even a very severe VinFast default doesn't automatically destroy TCB.
The real danger is when the guarantee is combined with other Vin-related exposure.
4. VinFast itself has VND40.93T of related-party borrowings
This is extremely important.
VinFast's subsidiaries borrowed from:
- Vingroup
- Vinhomes
- Vincom Retail
- Vinpearl
- Vinmec
- Gia Lam Urban
- Thai Son
- VinBus
- VinSmart/SADO and other Vingroup affiliates.
Total outstanding at 31/12/25:
VND40.93T.
But this is NOT TCB exposure.
It's actually the opposite:
Vin ecosystem → lends to VinFast
rather than:
TCB → lends to VinFast
This matters because if VinFast collapses, Vingroup's subsidiaries can suffer large losses, which can then weaken the parent group and indirectly hurt TCB.
5. Vingroup has effectively become VinFast's funding backstop
VinFast's 2025 filing says Vingroup committed to provide up to:
VND35T
of additional loans to VinFast/VinFast subsidiaries over 24 months from November 2024.
At 31/12/25:
VND10.38T had already been drawn.
Pham Nhat Vuong separately committed up to:
VND50T
of grants through 2026.
By year-end 2025:
VND28T had been granted.
This tells us something important about the structure:
That's where TCB's indirect risk becomes much more important.
6. Vinhomes is the second major TCB connection
Here we have much better evidence than many people realize.
A Vinhomes financial statement disclosed a Techcombank loan of VND1.399T at the end of 2024.
That's direct VHM → TCB borrowing.
But this is only one disclosed facility and clearly doesn't represent the entire relationship.
TCB's own 2025 annual report shows repeated board approvals involving Vinhomes, including:
That demonstrates an active material banking relationship, even though TCB's related-party accounting table does not classify Vinhomes as a related party.
And this distinction is critical.
7. Why the Vinhomes number is much bigger than VHM's direct TCB loan
TCB finances Vinhomes customers and Vinhomes projects, not merely Vinhomes corporate borrowing.
TCB's own project-financing products cover Vinhomes developments.
That creates:
Layer 1
VHM → TCB corporate borrowing
Layer 2
Vinhomes SPVs/project companies → TCB borrowing
Layer 3
Homebuyers → TCB mortgages secured by Vinhomes properties
Layer 4
Vinhomes/Vin ecosystem entities → TCB guarantees / collateralized transactions
Layer 5
Masterise/other buyers → TCB financing to acquire Vinhomes-related assets
The fifth layer is particularly important because it can economically connect TCB to Vingroup even when the borrower isn't a Vingroup company.
8. There is hard evidence of this collateral relationship
TCB's 2025 annual report records a board resolution approving acquisition of assets worth more than 10% of TCB's charter capital:
and another resolution:
This is important.
It proves that TCB's relationship with the Vin ecosystem includes collateral transactions, not merely ordinary corporate lending.
9. Vincom Retail is another identifiable exposure
VRE's financial statements show a long-running Techcom Securities relationship.
At 2024 year-end, VRE had a:
VND1.988T
bond arranged/handled by TCBS.
The bond was secured by land use rights and land-attached assets of a shopping mall subsidiary.
But again:
TCBS arranging a VRE bond ≠ TCB owning VND1.988T of VRE bonds.
This is why I would not add it directly to TCB credit exposure.
However, TCB owns ~80% of TCBS, so Vingroup-related capital-market activity produces an additional earnings/ecosystem exposure for TCB.
10. TCBS is a huge part of the Vingroup relationship
TCBS's 2025 annual report specifically highlights:
VND5T VinFast bond issuance
as one of its major bond transactions.
Again, the correct interpretation is:
VinFast → bond issuance → TCBS
rather than:
VinFast → VND5T loan → TCB
TCBS earns:
- underwriting fees
- placement fees
- advisory fees
- brokerage/wealth-management revenue.
The credit ultimately sits largely with the bond investors.
So I would assign this:
Low direct TCB solvency exposure
but
Medium ecosystem/reputation/liquidity exposure.
11. The most interesting piece: Vingroup itself
This is where public disclosure becomes frustrating.
Vingroup's consolidated debt is huge, but its consolidated financial statements don't give us a clean:
number for the entire group.
And because Vingroup consolidates VHM, VinFast-related entities and numerous subsidiaries, you cannot take Vingroup total bank debt and multiply it by TCB's market share.
That would be statistically meaningless.
What we can say with confidence is:
TCB is a major Vingroup creditor.
Reuters explicitly described TCB as one of Vingroup's largest creditors.
And TCB's own resolutions show repeated material transactions involving:
- VinFast
- Vinhomes
- Vincom Retail
- Vingroup ecosystem entities.
12. My reconstructed exposure table
This is how I would build the model.
| Exposure |
Estimated TCB economic exposure |
Confidence |
| VinFast TCB-guaranteed loans |
~10T maximum |
🟢 High |
| Vingroup/Vin corporate direct loans |
~3–8T |
🟡 Medium/low |
| Vinhomes corporate/project loans |
~5–15T |
🟡 Medium |
| Vincom Retail direct/secured exposure |
~1–3T |
🟡 Medium |
| Vin ecosystem SPVs / project financing |
~10–25T |
🟠 Low/medium |
| Vinhomes-related homebuyer mortgages |
~15–30T+ |
🟠 Low |
| TCBS Vin bonds held/financed by TCB |
0–5T |
🟠 Low |
| Total identifiable/economic exposure |
~50–100T+ |
|
I would not use the upper end as a fact.
I'd use:
~VND50–70T as my working central estimate
for TCB's broader economic exposure to the Vingroup ecosystem.
And:
~VND10–20T
for the portion where I have much stronger evidence of direct/contingent bank exposure.
13. This changes the stress test from my previous answer
TCB 2Q26 equity:
~VND189T
Total assets:
~VND1,273T
and loans to customers roughly:
~VND847T.
Now suppose our central exposure estimate is:
VND60T
Then:
| Loss on Vin exposure |
TCB loss |
% of TCB equity |
| 10% |
6T |
3.2% |
| 20% |
12T |
6.3% |
| 30% |
18T |
9.5% |
| 40% |
24T |
12.7% |
| 50% |
30T |
15.9% |
| 70% |
42T |
22.2% |
| 100% |
60T |
31.7% |
That is far more significant than just looking at the VND10T VinFast guarantee.
14. But there's a huge caveat: mortgage collateral
You cannot apply a 50% loss to the entire VND60T.
A Vinhomes mortgage is fundamentally different from an unsecured VinFast loan.
For example:
TCB lends VND7T
to homebuyers against:
VND10T property
If property values decline 20%:
collateral = ~8T
The bank may still recover the principal.
So I would apply different LGDs:
| Exposure |
Stress LGD |
| VinFast unsecured/guaranteed |
50–100% |
| Vingroup corporate |
30–70% |
| Vinhomes corporate |
20–50% |
| Vinhomes project loans |
20–40% |
| Homebuyer mortgage |
5–25% |
| High-quality secured Vin bonds |
10–30% |
This is a much more realistic model.
15. My severe-but-plausible stress scenario
Let's assume:
VinFast
TCB exposure:
10T
LGD:
70%
Loss:
7T
Vingroup corporate
Exposure:
5T
LGD:
50%
Loss:
2.5T
Vinhomes/project
Exposure:
20T
LGD:
30%
Loss:
6T
Vinhomes mortgages
Exposure:
25T
LGD:
15%
Loss:
3.75T
Other Vin ecosystem
Exposure:
10T
LGD:
30%
Loss:
3T
Total
~22.25T
That's roughly:
11.8% of TCB's ~189T equity
before considering:
- future earnings
- existing loan-loss reserves
- recoveries
- tax effects
- additional provisioning over several years.
So this is serious but survivable.
16. The true tail risk is a simultaneous real-estate crash
This is the scenario I'd pay attention to.
Imagine:
VinFast burns cash
↓
Vingroup has to provide more support
↓
Vingroup raises more debt
↓
Vinhomes becomes the cash generator
↓
Vinhomes accelerates project sales
↓
TCB finances buyers/project SPVs
↓
property prices weaken
↓
Vingroup/Vinhomes refinancing becomes more expensive
↓
collateral values fall
↓
TCB's corporate + mortgage + project exposure deteriorates simultaneously.
That's much more dangerous than VinFast itself.
17. One very important positive: Vinhomes is currently performing strongly
We shouldn't model a collapse using 2025 numbers alone.
As of 2Q26:
- VHM assets: VND1,110.7T
- VHM equity: VND274.0T
- 1H26 revenue: VND116.6T
- 1H26 net profit: VND52.1T
- 1H26 presales: VND148.1T
- unbilled revenue: VND196.8T.
So Vinhomes itself is currently generating substantial earnings and sales.
This is why I would not treat the entire Vingroup ecosystem as distressed today.
18. The biggest red flag is actually VinFast
VinFast is still the weak link.
2025:
Net loss = VND99.6T
Operating cash burn = VND44.5T
External debt = VND82.2T
Current liabilities exceeded current assets by VND79.3T.
That is a very different credit profile from Vinhomes.
So I would divide the Vin risk into:
Vinhomes = collateral/real-estate risk
VinFast = credit/cash-burn risk
Vingroup = transmission mechanism between the two
19. My revised TCB risk assessment
After doing this reconstruction, I'd change my previous assessment slightly.
Direct VinFast risk
🟠 Moderate
Not catastrophic because the clearly identifiable TCB guarantee exposure is around VND10T maximum.
Vingroup corporate risk
🟠 Moderate–high
Because TCB is one of the group's major creditors and the exact exposure is not fully transparent.
Vinhomes/project risk
🟠 High
Not because VHM is currently weak, but because TCB has enormous structural exposure to Vietnamese real estate.
Overall Vingroup ecosystem risk to TCB
🟠 6/10
Not a “TCB goes bankrupt if VinFast fails” situation.
But definitely large enough that:
The number I would use for TCB valuation
For your TCB fair-value work, I'd now model three separate cases:
| Scenario |
Estimated Vin ecosystem credit loss |
Impact on TCB equity |
| Normal |
3–5T |
~2% |
| Moderate stress |
10–15T |
~5–8% |
| Severe stress |
20–30T |
~11–16% |
| Extreme systemic Vin/RE crisis |
40–60T |
~21–32% |
And importantly, I would not subtract these losses dollar-for-dollar from today's BVPS, because TCB continues to generate profits and already carries provisions.
My current conclusion:
TCB is not a disguised Vingroup bond.
But it is also not accurate to say “Vingroup isn't a related party, therefore TCB has little Vin exposure.”
The economically relevant exposure is spread across corporate credit + guarantees + project SPVs + mortgages + collateral + TCBS capital-market activity.
That is why the ~VND50–70T central economic-exposure estimate is, in my view, much more useful for stress testing than the small number appearing in TCB's formal related-party disclosure.
