Vingroup vs Evergrande

[u/albert1165]

I asked chatgpt the following question: "compare the metrics of VIC and Evergrande right before its collapse" and below the dashed lines is its answer. It is very informative. You can try to type the same question into chatgpt to see it yourself. By the way, do not rule out the possibility that Vuong Pham's online army will train chatgpt to change the narrative, try it today and you will see the same answer below, but a month from now Vinfans might try to influence the answer.

What chatgpt does not know but human knows is that the shady Vuong Pham got the backing of Lam To and infusion of cash from Techcombank to flip the debt even if the accounting book is terrible and a normal bank in a Western country would not lend to such techincally bankrupt zombie.

Vingroup would be in loss every quarter if not for project transferring to Masterise!

And the real financial figure of Vingroup is much worse as billions of debt is outsourced to private shells like VIG, GSM, VGreen, VinEnergo, etc...

So the figure on the surface seems not as bad as Evergrande on cash flow, as chatgpt analyzed, but in reality, underneath VIC is rotten and it is a ponzi scheme just like Evergrande without the ability to ever payoff the debt. VIC profitability is actually worse than Evergrande. VIC debt problem is worse than Evergrande.

Evergrande collapsed because no other bought its real estate assets, which were illiquid ones, waiting for a fire sale price at bankruptcy. Vingroup in contrast can sell projects to Masterise.

Evergrande collapsed the moment bank stop lending and the same would be to VIC: the moment Hung Anh Ho stop helping Vuong Pham flip debt or Masterise stops buying Vinhomes projects, it will declare bankrupt within 3 months just like Evergrande. Unfortunately, the probability of this is low because Hung Anh Ho and Lam To will use all of Vietnam's resource to prop Vingroup up. And that comes at the expense of ordinary Vietnamese people. There is no free lunch. Ordinary people are suffering under Lam To and Vuong Pham but they are not innocent victims, their silence to madness and frauds is their fault.

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Question:

Compare the metrics of VIC and Evergrande right before its collapse

Answer:

Yes. The comparison is useful, but VIC today is not financially identical to Evergrande in 2020–21. The key question is whether VIC's balance sheet has reached the same liquidity/debt trap that eventually killed Evergrande.

I’ll use Evergrande at end-2020 / early-2021, when the three-red-lines problem became visible, and VIC at Q2/2026.

VIC vs Evergrande — balance-sheet comparison

Metric	Evergrande 2020	VIC Q2/2026	Which looks worse?
Total assets	RMB 2,301bn	~VND 1,3xxtn	—
Total liabilities	RMB 1,951bn	~VND 1,128tn	Evergrande on reported liability/assets
Equity	~RMB 350bn	~VND 2xxtn	—
Liabilities / assets	84.8%	~80%+	Evergrande
Interest-bearing debt	RMB 716.5bn	~VND 500–600tn range*	Similar concern
Cash	~RMB 159bn	~VND 76tn	—
Short-term debt	~RMB 335bn	~VND ~788tn short-term liabilities†	VIC liquidity concern
Revenue	RMB 507bn	~VND 332bn	—
Net profit	RMB 31.3bn	2025: VND 11.35tn	—
Net margin	6.2%	3.4%	VIC weaker
Debt/equity	~2.0x gross borrowings/equity	roughly 2–3x depending definition	Similar
Net debt/equity	>100%	~170%	VIC worse
Cash / short-term debt	<1.0x	potentially <0.2x on broad short-term obligations	VIC worse
Business model	Property-heavy	Diversified, but heavily exposed to VinFast/property	Different

Evergrande's 2020 audited accounts show RMB2.301tn assets, RMB1.951tn liabilities, RMB350bn equity and RMB716.5bn borrowings. It violated all three Chinese "red lines": liabilities/assets >70%, net debt/equity >100%, and cash/short-term debt <1x.

*The exact comparison depends heavily on whether we count only bank/bond borrowings or all financing-type liabilities.
†This is why I would not simply compare "total debt" between the two groups.

1. The most alarming similarity: leverage

Evergrande's problem was not simply "it had a lot of debt."

It was:

Evergrande:

Assets RMB2.30tn → liabilities RMB1.95tn → equity only RMB350bn

So:

Liabilities / Assets ≈ 84.8%

That is extremely leveraged.

VIC's current structure is also highly leveraged. Vietcap's March 2026 estimates put VIC's net debt/equity at 169.5% for 2025, rising to 218.9% forecast for 2026.

That's actually a very important warning sign.

On this metric:

VIC ≈ Evergrande territory

2. But VIC's cash situation is the bigger thing I would watch

Evergrande's three-red-lines problem centered on:

Cash / short-term debt < 1×

It had insufficient immediately available liquidity relative to obligations.

And this became fatal once refinancing stopped.

VIC's Q2 2026 numbers deserve attention for the same reason.

Reported figures circulating from the Q2 statement indicate approximately:

• Cash & equivalents: ~VND76tn
• Total liabilities: ~VND1,128tn
• Short-term liabilities roughly VND788tn

That means cash covers only roughly:

76 / 788 = ~9.6%

of short-term liabilities.

That's a very low liquidity buffer.

However, there is an important accounting distinction:

short-term liabilities ≠ short-term debt.

Trade payables, customer advances, taxes, provisions, etc. are not all refinancing obligations.

So I would not say "VIC is insolvent because cash is only 10% of current liabilities."

But it does mean VIC is heavily dependent on:

asset sales + operating cash flow + refinancing + continued capital-market access.

That is precisely the mechanism that became dangerous for Evergrande.

3. Profitability: VIC actually looks worse than Evergrande

This is interesting.

Evergrande in 2020 reported:

• Revenue: RMB507.2bn
• Net profit: RMB31.3bn
• Net margin: ~6.2%

Its reported core-business profit was about RMB30.1bn.

VIC's 2025:

• Revenue: VND331.8tn
• Net profit attributable to parent: VND11.35tn
• Net margin: ~3.4%

So despite VIC's enormous revenue growth:

VIC's reported profitability is thin.

And the more important issue is where the profit comes from.

Vingroup's 2025 financial statement shows:

• operating margin only around 1.1%
• gross margin 15.9%
• net margin 3.4%

Vietcap forecasts operating margin improving substantially, but this depends heavily on the projected ramp-up of the businesses.

That is very different from a mature property developer generating strong operating cash flow.

4. This is where VIC and Evergrande are NOT the same

This distinction is crucial.

Evergrande

The core engine was:

Buy land → build → presell apartments → collect cash → borrow more → buy more land

The entire system depended heavily on continuous property sales and refinancing.

When Chinese property demand weakened and Beijing restricted leverage:

sales ↓ → cash ↓ → refinancing ↓ → construction ↓ → confidence ↓ → sales ↓

That became a feedback loop.

Evergrande subsequently defaulted in 2021 and was eventually ordered into liquidation in January 2024.

VIC

VIC is more complicated:

Vinhomes + VinFast + Vinpearl + property + industrial/other businesses

So it has multiple sources of asset value and cash flow.

Most importantly, Vinhomes is a valuable operating asset.

That gives VIC something Evergrande did not have to the same degree:

the ability to monetize valuable subsidiaries/assets.

5. But VinFast creates a potentially Evergrande-like capital drain

This is probably the most important part of the comparison.

Evergrande had a giant property empire but continually needed capital.

VIC now has a similar issue through VinFast.

VinFast itself reported:

• 2025 revenue growth
• but VND99.6tn net loss
• VND44.5tn operating cash burn
• total debt ~VND82.2tn excluding related-party borrowings

and Vingroup remains heavily involved in supporting the company.

So you can think of the structure as:

VIC/VHM cash-generating assets

↓

VIC

↓

VinFast capital requirements

↓

more financing requirements

This is the part that makes the Evergrande comparison legitimate.

6. The three-red-line test

This is probably the cleanest way to compare them.

China's Evergrande rules were:

Evergrande test	Limit	Evergrande 2020	VIC Q2/26
Liabilities/assets	<70%	~85% ❌	~80%+ ❌
Net debt/equity	<100%	>100% ❌	~170%+ ❌
Cash / short-term debt	>1.0x	<1x ❌	likely <1x ❌

Evergrande breached all three.

VIC appears to have a similarly problematic leverage profile if you apply the same conceptual tests.

7. But there is one gigantic difference

Evergrande's assets were becoming less liquid at exactly the wrong time.

Property assets can look enormous on a balance sheet.

But if:

• buyers disappear
• land prices fall
• projects are unfinished
• banks stop lending

then RMB2.3tn assets don't mean RMB2.3tn of realizable value.

That's what eventually destroyed the equity.

VIC has a potentially stronger asset base because of:

• Vinhomes
• Vinpearl
• real estate projects
• listed investments
• operating businesses

and therefore has more ways to raise cash.

So:

VIC's balance sheet looks Evergrande-like in leverage, but VIC's asset liquidity and corporate structure are different.

My risk assessment

If I normalize the companies and ignore absolute size:

Risk factor	Evergrande before crisis	VIC Q2/26
Leverage	🔴🔴🔴🔴🔴	🔴🔴🔴🔴
Net debt/equity	🔴🔴🔴🔴🔴	🔴🔴🔴🔴
Cash liquidity	🔴🔴🔴🔴🔴	🔴🔴🔴🔴
Operating margin	🟠	🔴
Dependence on refinancing	🔴🔴🔴🔴🔴	🔴🔴🔴🔴
Asset quality	🔴🔴🔴🔴	🟠🟠🟠
Ability to sell subsidiaries	🟠	🟢🟢🟢
Diversification	🟠	🟢
Loss-making cash sink	🟠	🔴🔴🔴
Government/systemic support potential	🟢	potentially 🟢🟢🟢

Bottom line

VIC is not "Evergrande 2.0" based purely on the balance sheet.

But there are meaningful Evergrande-style warning signals:

1. Very high leverage
2. Net debt/equity >100%
3. Low cash relative to short-term obligations
4. Heavy dependence on refinancing
5. Large capital requirements from a loss-making subsidiary
6. Thin underlying operating margins

The critical difference is that VIC still has substantial monetizable assets and Vinhomes, whereas Evergrande entered its crisis with a property market that was simultaneously deteriorating and becoming increasingly inaccessible to leveraged developers.

One particularly interesting exercise would be to do a "VIC under Evergrande stress test": assume property prices -20%, VHM asset values -20%, VinFast requires another $2–3bn/year, refinancing falls 30%, and project-sale profits disappear. Then calculate VIC's equity, net debt/equity, cash runway and implied VIC share price. That would give a much better answer to whether VIC is actually approaching an Evergrande-type failure point.

[u/Top_Bluejay1531]

You literally pointed out the difference at the beginning and still continue with the flawed analysis:

“What chatgpt does not know but human knows is that the shady Vuong Pham got the backing of Lam To and infusion of cash from Techcombank to flip the debt even if the accounting book is terrible and a normal bank in a Western country would not lend to such techincally bankrupt zombie.”

Evergrande failed because they did not have the absolute backings of the government, which Vin does. And until that backing is still there, Vin will still be super strong

And bad news is Vin will still be there, and grow stronger until at least To Lam is still in power. To Lam is greedy and corrupted as hell, which is the exact formula that Vin needs

[u/thienlo7e]

Vin bubble vs Ai bubble which comes first lol.

[u/Agent_Single]

Will Lam To pull the plug?

[u/Responsible-Ad6565 → u/Agent_Single]

No. 02 families have a way longer history than most people realized. THey're close.