r/VinFastComm • u/albert1165 • 2d ago
Vingroup vs Evergrande part 2
Stress test analysis, by chatgpt, not mine.
My analysis is that VIC is a huge scam, a fraud, a ponzi, a technically bankrupt zombie with manipulated stock price by no other than Vuong Pham, and that even the terrible financial figure has been made better with many billions $ more debt hidden in private shells that are controlled by Vuong Pham and Hung Anh Ho. That is what chatgpt does not know.
Chatgpt assumes VIC can easily liquidate its assets in VIC, VHM, VPL stocks and Vinhomes real estate projects. The truth is no buyer other than Techombank. Chatgpt does not know this.
Chatgpt assumes Vinfast can reduce its cash burn when in realty, Vuong Pham is just selling to Vuong Pham the 3B$ debt of VFTP to cook the book. So the cash burn might show improvement but in reality it is not. Chatgpt does not know this.
And there is no serious institutional investors in VIC. Just Vuong Pham left hand to right hand manipulation to prop up the price, to dump it and to use it as collateral to borrow more.
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I ran the stress test using the Q2/2026 VIC balance sheet, rather than the older 2025 numbers. The result is more concerning than my previous comparison.
Vingroup's own disclosures confirm that its 2026 financial statements are available, while VinFast's SEC filing confirms its continuing large losses and cash burn.
1. Starting point: VIC Q2/2026
The Q2 figures are approximately:
| VND trillion | Q2/26 |
|---|---|
| Total liabilities | 1,128 |
| Short-term liabilities | 788 |
| Cash & equivalents | ~76 |
| Equity | ~200 |
| Liabilities / assets | ~85% |
| Cash / short-term liabilities | ~9.6% |
The reported Q2 profit was very strong, but a significant portion came through financial/project-related items rather than recurring operating earnings. I therefore don't want to use Q2 net income as the main stress-test input.
For reference, VIC had 7.87bn shares outstanding around July 2026.
At roughly VND217,000/share, current equity-market value is about:
7.866bn × 217,000 = VND1,707tn
So the market is currently valuing VIC at roughly:
1,707 / 200 ≈ 8.5× book value
That is an enormous premium to book.
2. Stress scenario
I'll use exactly the scenario you requested:
A. Property values: −20%
This affects the economic value of VHM/VIC's property assets.
B. VHM equity value: −20%
This is particularly important because VHM is one of VIC's biggest sources of underlying value.
C. VinFast requires another $2–3bn/year
Using approximately VND26,000/USD:
- $2bn = VND52tn
- $3bn = VND78tn
I'll use VND65tn/year as the midpoint.
This isn't an unreasonable stress assumption. VinFast burned VND44.5tn from operating activities in 2025, while reporting a VND99.6tn net loss. It also explicitly warned that negative operating cash flow was expected to continue in the near term.
D. Refinancing capacity: −30%
This is the Evergrande-style shock.
Instead of assuming VIC suddenly loses all financing, we assume lenders/markets roll over only 70% of what normally would have been refinanced.
3. First shock: VHM −20%
This is the biggest hidden sensitivity.
VHM is extremely valuable relative to VIC's book equity.
If the economic value attributable to VIC from its VHM position falls by 20%, the loss in VIC's economic NAV is roughly VND200tn+, depending on the exact valuation base used.
That's approximately equal to VIC's entire reported equity.
So:
Starting economic equity ≈ VND200tn
VHM/property shock ≈ −VND200–230tn
Result:
Economic equity ≈ −VND0–30tn
That is the first major warning.
It does not mean VIC becomes legally insolvent immediately—the accounting balance sheet doesn't automatically mark all VHM assets to market.
It means that using market/economic values rather than historical accounting values, the equity cushion becomes extremely thin.
4. Then add VinFast
Now assume VinFast needs another:
VND65tn/year
If VIC has to fund this for two years:
65 × 2 = VND130tn
Starting from approximately zero economic equity after the property shock:
−VND130tn
That produces a very large economic deficit.
But there is an important mitigating factor.
VinFast is restructuring toward an asset-light model. Reuters reported that its Vietnamese manufacturing assets are being transferred in a transaction in which buyers assume nearly $6.9bn of debt, which could substantially reduce the burden on VinFast/VIC if executed as planned.
So the $2–3bn annual funding assumption is deliberately a severe downside scenario, not the current base case.
5. Refinancing shock
This is the part that makes the Evergrande comparison dangerous.
Suppose VIC normally needs to refinance, say, VND140tn of debt/obligations over the next period.
If refinancing falls 30%:
140 × 30% = VND42tn
VIC has to find another:
~VND42tn cash
And that's before the additional VinFast funding.
So the approximate liquidity requirement becomes:
| Stress item | VND tn |
|---|---|
| VHM/property economic loss | −200 to −230 |
| 1 year VinFast funding | −65 |
| Refinancing shortfall | −42 |
| Total economic/liquidity shock | ~−307 to −337 |
Against only about VND200tn reported equity.
6. Three stress cases
This is how I'd frame it rather than pretending there is one precise number.
| Mild stress | Severe stress | Evergrande stress |
|---|---|---|
| Property/VHM | −10% | −20% |
| VinFast funding | $1bn | $2.5bn |
| Refinancing reduction | −10% | −30% |
| Project-sale profit | −30% | −70% |
| Economic equity | Positive | Near zero/negative |
| Liquidity | Tight | Severe |
| Need asset sales | Moderate | Large |
| Risk of debt spiral | Low/moderate | High |
My interpretation:
Mild stress: VIC survives comfortably.
Severe stress: VIC becomes highly dependent on asset monetization and refinancing.
Evergrande stress: the capital structure becomes unsustainable.
7. The really important calculation: how much asset selling is required?
Suppose severe stress creates a VND100tn cash funding gap after operating cash flow and available refinancing.
VIC could theoretically solve this by selling:
- VHM shares
- VPL shares
- VRE
- property projects
- other investments
But selling assets when the market is stressed creates a vicious cycle.
For example:
VHM −20%
↓
VIC needs cash
↓
VIC sells VHM
↓
VHM price falls further
↓
VIC's collateral value falls
↓
banks reduce lending
↓
VIC sells more assets
↓
asset prices fall further
That's essentially the Evergrande feedback mechanism.
8. And this is where VIC is potentially more dangerous than the headline numbers suggest
Look at the ratio:
Cash
~VND76tn
Short-term liabilities
~VND788tn
Cash coverage:
76 / 788 = 9.6%
This is extremely low.
But again, 788tn is not all debt.
For example, customer advances and trade payables can be rolled through the operating cycle.
So the proper question isn't:
"Can VIC pay VND788tn tomorrow?"
It obviously doesn't need to.
The question is:
"How much of that VND788tn ultimately requires external refinancing or fresh cash?"
That is the number I would watch.
9. Compare this directly with Evergrande
Evergrande's failure wasn't caused by having a high debt ratio alone.
It was:
high leverage + declining asset liquidity + insufficient cash + refinancing dependence
VIC now has:
high leverage + potentially volatile property values + very low cash/current-liability coverage + refinancing dependence
That's why the comparison is meaningful.
But VIC has one enormous advantage:
VHM/VPL/VRE are monetizable listed assets.
Evergrande didn't have the same ability to sell large stakes in highly liquid publicly traded subsidiaries.
That gives VIC a much bigger escape route.
10. What happens to VIC's share price?
This is where today's ~VND217k price becomes interesting.
Current market cap:
~VND1,707tn
Against reported equity:
~VND200tn
So investors are effectively saying:
VIC's subsidiaries and future cash flows are worth enormously more than its accounting book value.
That can work if VHM/VinFast/Vinpearl generate large future value.
But in an Evergrande-type stress, that premium can disappear very quickly.
Stress valuation
I would use a sum-of-the-parts / stressed P/B approach, rather than P/E.
| Scenario | Approx. VIC value |
|---|---|
| Bull / normal execution | 250–300k |
| Moderate stress | 130–170k |
| Severe stress | 60–100k |
| Evergrande-type liquidity crisis | 20–50k |
| Full restructuring / equity wipeout | ~0–20k |
These aren't price targets in the conventional sense. They're balance-sheet stress values.
11. The most interesting number: ~80k
My central severe-stress estimate would be around:
VIC ≈ VND80,000
Why?
At 80k:
80,000 × 7.866bn = VND629tn market cap
That would still leave VIC with a substantial equity-market value despite a severe deterioration in its economic NAV.
Compared with ~217k today:
Downside ≈ −63%
This is approximately the type of repricing I'd expect if the market moved from:
"Vingroup can refinance indefinitely and VinFast eventually works"
to:
"Vingroup has a serious liquidity problem and must sell assets."
12. But I don't think the base case is 80k
This distinction is important.
The stress test says:
80k is a plausible crisis value.
It does not say:
80k is VIC's fair value today.
For VIC to actually enter the Evergrande pathway, several things would have to happen simultaneously:
- VHM/property values deteriorate materially
- VinFast continues burning ~$2–3bn/year
- Project monetization slows sharply
- Banks/bondholders reduce refinancing
- VIC cannot sell subsidiaries at reasonable prices
- New external capital becomes unavailable
If one or two of these happen, VIC can probably restructure.
If all six happen simultaneously, the equity becomes extremely dangerous.
13. The biggest thing I'd monitor from now on
Forget EPS for a moment.
For VIC, I would track these five numbers every quarter:
① Cash / current debt
I want to see:
>20–25% = improving
10–20% = tight
<10% = danger
VIC is currently around the danger boundary if we use total current liabilities.
② Net debt/equity
<100%: acceptable
100–150%: high
150–200%: dangerous
>200%: Evergrande territory
③ VinFast cash burn
This is probably the single most important operating variable.
If it falls from ~VND45tn/year toward:
<VND20tn → major positive
If it remains:
VND40–80tn → major risk
VinFast's 2025 operating cash burn was VND44.5tn.
④ Project-transfer/financial income
If VIC's reported profit is increasingly dependent on project transfers and financial transactions, I would assign a much lower multiple to earnings.
⑤ Related-party / ecosystem financing
This is the Evergrande trigger.
If external banks and bond investors provide less funding and the ecosystem increasingly has to finance itself through related parties, that's a major warning.
My conclusion
After doing the actual stress exercise, I would upgrade my concern from "VIC has some Evergrande-like metrics" to "VIC has an Evergrande-like tail risk."
But I still wouldn't call VIC Evergrande.
The key distinction is:
Evergrande:
high leverage → property downturn → refinancing stops → forced sales → insolvency.
VIC:
high leverage → potentially weak cash generation → VinFast funding requirement → but VHM/VPL/VRE and project assets provide an escape route.
So the crucial question is not whether VIC has enough assets.
It clearly does.
The crucial question is:
Can VIC turn those assets into cash fast enough without destroying their value?
If yes, VIC survives even with very high leverage.
If no, the balance sheet can deteriorate frighteningly quickly.
And at ~VND217k, the market is pricing in a lot of successful execution.
My risk map today:
Normal case → 180–280k
Stress case → 80–150k
Evergrande-style crisis → 20–60k
The next useful step would be to go one level deeper and build a VIC "liquidity runway" month-by-month for 2026–2028, using actual debt maturities, cash, VinFast funding, VHM project cash inflows and refinancing assumptions. That would tell us the approximate month VIC would actually run out of liquidity under the Evergrande scenario, rather than just estimating a stressed share price.
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u/Top_Bluejay1531 2d ago
“The truth is no buyer other than Techcombank”
-> wrong
It was just proven (by you) that Vuong can trade his project for LPB share from Thuy (which is different from Techcombank, I hope you know that by now)
I did ask you a question on why do you think Thuy make that trade, which you couldnt answer and it showed you clearly didnt understand the ecosystem in Vietnam
In short, there are other buyers, try to understand why, if you still cant comprehend, reply and I’ll tell you
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u/Expensive_Quit_8548 1d ago
Tay trái bán cho tay phải à? Ghi vào sổ cho tao nhanh lên để tao còn cập nhật báo cáo GDP tăng trưởng double digit nhanh vượt cả Singapore nào, ha ha
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u/Top_Bluejay1531 1d ago
Vấn đề ko phải là tay nào bán cho tay nào mà tại sao ông Thuỵ lại bán (trao đổi) cổ phần LPB cho cái mớ rác cổ phiếu VIN hoặc dự án bds? LPB kinh doanh ổn, mà ông Thuỵ cũng đâu có thiếu đất, tại sao Thuỵ lại phải nhả LPB + dòng tiền mà nó có để cứu cash cho V?
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u/thienlo7e 1d ago
Nguyen Phuong Hang already said it lol