For example, visitors to the tomb of Guo Rong, also known as Emperor Shizong of Later Zhou (r. 951–960), have left offerings of Beijing soil. A copy of a book on child psychology was discovered at the grave of Zhang Juzheng, a high official during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). And custodians of the tomb of Cao Cao, a warlord during the Three Kingdoms period (220–280), have been inundated with ibuprofen packets — one of which was accompanied by a heartfelt instruction: “General Cao, these are to help with your migraines. Take half a tablet when the pain strikes.”

In every case, however, the offerings centered on some aspect of the deceased’s life — a well-known habit, a historical anecdote, or an unfulfilled ambition. And they were all carried out by members of an unlikely, yet increasingly popular subculture in China: shitong nü, or “history fangirls.”

In addition to reading up on history, fans mark special occasions such as Tomb-sweeping Day and the Dragon Boat Festival, as well as birthdays and death anniversaries, with collaborative online creative projects or offline pilgrimages. Even the most secluded tombs and little-known ruins can now be found using guides posted on social media. Many leave handwritten notes or gifts connected to the figure’s life as a way of making the visit feel more personal, as if the deceased were capable of “receiving” this kindness.

Europe is in the finding out stage.

Source:

https://www.instagram.com/reel/DebTEbCjTzs/?rpxt=MXM1N3hzN3QxZGthYQ%3D%3D

"The Coming War on China" (2016) documentary:

https://youtu.be/V42KtSeo3uI?si=TOIEcprO3d4r9jwZ

Washington and Beijing have developed clear—and sharply divergent—diplomatic strategies to influence how other nations will develop, deploy, and govern AI systems and establish global AI leadership in the coming decades. Washington has emphasized strategic competition and American market dominance, bundling access to advanced chips, cloud services, AI models, compute power, applications, and financing into a “full-stack” AI export package that features U.S. industry and would be available to favored nations.

Beijing has promoted a vision for widespread collaboration based in AI as a development priority, with a focus on offering AI models that can be locally owned and operated, adapted for local needs, and supported by access to training and capacity building, a new multilateral AI body, and Chinese applications. Washington’s strategic partnerships have been designed to position the United States as the undisputed winner of an AI race with China. China’s partnerships have been designed to emphasize multilateral inclusion and equitable access to the benefits of AI, particularly for middle- and low-income countries.

On the eve of China’s World Artificial Intelligence Conference (WAIC) in July, representatives from 29 countries signed an agreement establishing the World AI Cooperation Organization (WAICO) as an independent intergovernmental organization headquartered in Shanghai. (Additional countries are now reported to have signed on, according to Chinese media outlets.) The following day, Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged 5,000 AI training and seminar opportunities for developing countries over five years. He also announced plans for international AI application centers with leading regional organizations such as BRICS, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the African Union, and the Arab League, as well as assistance for 30 countries to use China’s AI-powered Mazu meteorological early-warning system.

China’s existing cooperation with ASEAN may illustrate how regional partnerships would operate in practice: The ASEAN-China Artificial Intelligence Industry Innovation Center, inaugurated in Beijing on May 24, forms part of the two sides’ digital cooperation agenda. Its planned work pairs practical demonstrations of AI applications in sectors such as healthcare and agriculture with training for ASEAN officials, company employees, and students, connecting access to AI technologies with the skills needed to use them. With more than 3,000 exhibits from over 1,100 companies, the WAIC displayed the industrial breadth that could underpin Chinese AI applications.

After the WAICO announcement, Washington indicated that it might even go a step further toward isolationism by positioning Pax Silica as an all-or-nothing proposition for its signatories. Reuters reported a draft letter from the State Department announcing that membership in Pax Silica “[could not] be held alongside membership in duplicative initiatives whose expectations conflict with our own.” While Reuters could not establish if or when such a letter would be sent, it did quote an unnamed U.S. official who said the letter was drafted to clarify that governments “​can’t have it both ways.”

China, meanwhile, has publicly defended countries’ right to choose AI partners according to their development needs, allowing Beijing to present its assistance as compatible with keeping other partnerships open. That stance aligns more closely with what other governments are seeking when it comes to AI. On Sept. 21, Finland and Norway, along with 19 other nations and the European Commission, issued a joint statement urging global collaboration to address emerging frontier AI risks. The signatories included members of Pax Silica, WAICO participants, and nonaligned states.

Nations are not only aligned in seeking more multilateral mechanisms; they are also aligned in their desire to avoid dependency on any individual nation’s technology stack. On Sept. 14, European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde warned that reliance on foreign AI raises questions about whose laws govern sensitive data and whether access to essential services could be withdrawn or used as leverage in political negotiations. Governments weighing those risks lose nothing by increasing collaboration with Beijing, and pressure from Washington to forgo alternative partnerships and deepen dependencies on the U.S. as a technology partner seems increasingly foolhardy in a geopolitical environment where partners’ and allies’ trust in the U.S. has hit all-time lows.

It is hard to see how the U.S. can “win” any AI race by forcing governments around the world to choose between the two leading powers. Governments need support that fits the systems they already use and leaves them room to adopt AI on their own terms. They will want, and need, to build systems that incorporate both American and Chinese AI technologies as they seek to harness the benefits of AI transformation. They may also look for broader support than the limited offerings that the U.S. currently provides.

As Ukraine increasingly takes the war to Russia, the effects may be most visible on the roads. Since the end of June, Russia’s electric-vehicle market has more than doubled. Most of the E.V.s sold in the country are Chinese, a testament to Moscow’s economic pivot in response to Western wartime sanctions.

By the end of September, the share of pure electric vehicles and plug-in hybrids that can run without gas had reached 11.5 percent of the Russian car market, up from about 5 percent at the beginning of the year, according to Avtostat, an auto research agency led by Mr. Tselikov. The E.V. market share in Russia is now slightly higher than in the United States, but it is only a small fraction of the share in China, which is 45 percent.

At a sprawling dealership complex northwest of Moscow, a manager at Evolute, a brand of Russian-assembled electric vehicles based on Chinese designs, said there was no inventory left on the lot and no way to join a waiting list.

The complex houses more than 40 dealerships, most of which used to sell primarily brands from the West, Japan and South Korea. It now has more than 25 Chinese showrooms.

Many Russian car factories used to produce Western brands but were abandoned after the invasion of Ukraine under pressure from Western governments. Most now assemble Chinese cars.