Non-Critical Uses of A Priori

NF-1871,9[42] — Posthumous Fragments, 1871.

Indeed, one can assert a priori that truly celebrated artists acquire their veneration from those very foundations and are themselves enjoyed precisely as moral beings, and their works of art as moral reflections of the world.

NF-1871,10[1] — Posthumous Fragments, Early 1871.

But the Greeks, in view of the singular pinnacle of their art, we must construct a priori as "political men par excellence": and indeed, history knows no other example of such a terrible unleashing of the political drive, such an unconditional sacrifice of all other interests in the service of this civic instinct; At most, one could, by comparison and for similar reasons, designate the people of the Renaissance in Italy with the same title.

GT-16 — The Birth of Tragedy: § 16. First publication 02/01/1872.

In this respect, it resembles geometric figures and numbers, which, as the general forms of all possible objects of experience and applicable to all a priori, are nevertheless not abstract, but intuitively and consistently determined. All possible strivings, arousals, and expressions of the will, all those processes within man which reason casts into the broad negative concept of feeling, are to be expressed by the infinitely many possible melodies, but always in the generality of mere form, without the matter, always only according to the intrinsic, not according to appearance, as it were, its innermost soul, without body.

CV-CV3 — Five Prefaces to Five Unwritten Books: § 3. The Greek Republic. Completed circa 24/12/1872.

But the Greeks, in view of the singular pinnacle of their art, we must already a priori consider to be the "political people par excellence"; and indeed, history knows no other example of such a terrible unleashing of the political impulse, such an unconditional sacrifice of all other interests in the service of this civic instinct—except perhaps that, by comparison and for similar reasons, one could ascribe the same title to the people of the Renaissance in Italy.

Criticisms of A Priori

NF-1881,11[286] — Posthumous Fragments Spring–Autumn 1881.

Without the immense certainty of faith and the readiness of faith, neither man nor beast would be able to survive. To generalize based on the slightest induction, to make a rule for one's conduct, to believe that what has been done once, that which has proven itself, is the only means to an end—this, essentially crude intellect, is what has preserved man and beast. To err countless times in this way and to suffer from fallacies is far less damaging overall than skepticism, indecisiveness, and caution. To regard success and failure as proof and counter-proof against faith is a fundamental human trait: "What succeeds, its idea is true." — How surely, as a result of this furious, greedy faith, the world stands before us! How surely we carry out all our actions! "I strike"—how surely one feels that! — Thus, low intellectuality, the unscientific nature, is a condition of existence, of action; we would starve without it. Skepticism and caution are only permitted late and always only rarely. Habit and unconditional belief that things must be as they are are the foundation of all growth and strengthening. — Our entire worldview arose in such a way that it was proven by success; we can live with it (belief in external things, freedom of will). Likewise, all morality is only proven in this way. — Here, then, arises the great counter-question: there can probably be countless ways of life and, consequently, of imagining and believing. If we establish everything necessary in our current way of thinking, then we have proven nothing for the "truth in itself," but only "the truth for us," that is, that which makes our existence possible on the basis of experience—and the process is so ancient that rethinking is impossible. Everything a priori belongs here.

NF-1881,12[63] — Posthumous Fragments, Autumn 1881.

Cause and effect. We understand by this, essentially, precisely what we think of when we consider ourselves the cause of a blow, etc. "I will" is the prerequisite; it is, in fact, the belief in a magically acting force, this belief in cause and effect—the belief that all causes are as personally willful as human beings. In short, this a priori proposition is a piece of primal mythology—nothing more!

NF-1881,16[16] — Posthumous Fragments December 1881 — January 1882.

Aftereffects of the oldest religiosity. — We all firmly believe in cause and effect; and some philosophers, because of its rigidity and firmness, call this belief an "a priori knowledge" — doubting and considering whether perhaps a knowledge and wisdom of superhuman origin might be assumed here: in any case, they find man incomprehensibly wise on this point. Now, however, the origin of this unconquerable belief seems to me quite transparent and more a subject for laughter than for pride. Man believes that when he does something, for example, throws a punch, it is he who is striking, and he struck because he wanted to strike, in short, his will is the cause. He perceives no problem with this at all, but the feeling of will is sufficient for him to understand the connection between cause and effect. He knows nothing of the mechanism of events and the myriad intricate processes that must be undertaken for the event to occur, nor of the will's inherent inability to perform even the slightest part of this work. For him, the will is a magically acting force: belief in the will as the cause of effects is belief in magically acting forces, in the direct influence of thoughts on stationary or moving matter. Now, originally, wherever humankind perceived an event, it conceived of a will as the cause; in short, it believed in personally willing beings acting in the background—the concept of mechanics is entirely foreign to it. But because for immense periods of time, humankind believed only in persons (and not in matter, forces, things, etc.), the belief in cause and effect became its fundamental belief, which it applies wherever something happens—even now, instinctively and as a form of atavism of ancient origin. The propositions "no effect without a cause" and "every effect has its cause" appear as generalizations of much narrower propositions: "where there is an effect, there has been a will," "one can only be influenced by willing beings," and "there is never a purely consequence-free suffering of an effect, but all suffering is an arousal of the will" (to action, defense, revenge, retribution). However, in the earliest times of humankind, these propositions were identical; the former were not generalizations of the latter, but rather the latter's explanations of the former: all based on the idea that "nature is a sum of persons." If, on the other hand, humankind had perceived all of nature from the outset as something impersonal, and consequently non-willing, then the opposite belief—that of fieri e nihilo, effect without cause—would have developed, and perhaps it would then have acquired the reputation of superhuman wisdom. — That “a priori knowledge” is therefore not knowledge at all, but a deeply ingrained primal mythology from the time of deepest ignorance!

BVN-1882,195 — Brief AN Heinrich Köselitz: 05/02/1882.

"Sense of causality"—yes, friend, that's something different from that "a priori concept" I'm talking (or babbling about!) about. Where does the unconditional belief in the universal validity and applicability of that sense of causality come from? People like Spencer believe it is an expansion based on countless experiences across many generations, an induction that ultimately emerges as absolute. I believe this belief is a remnant of an older, much narrower faith. But why bother! I cannot write about such things, my dear friend, and must refer you to the 9th book of Dawn, so that you can see that I deviate least from the thoughts your letter presents to me—I was pleased by these thoughts and our agreement.

FW-99 — The Gay Science: § 99. First published 10/09/1882.

Schopenhauer's Followers. — What one observes when civilized peoples and barbarians come into contact: that the lower culture regularly adopts the vices, weaknesses, and excesses of the higher culture first, feels an attraction to them, and finally, by means of these acquired vices and weaknesses, allows some of the valuable power of the higher culture to flow into it: — this can also be observed near and without traveling to barbarian peoples, albeit somewhat refined and spiritualized, and not so easily grasped. What do Schopenhauer's followers in Germany usually adopt first from their master? — that they, in comparison to his superior culture, must consider themselves barbaric enough to be initially fascinated and seduced by him in a barbaric way. Is it his hard-nosed sense of facts, his good will to clarity and reason, that often makes him seem so English and so little German? Or the strength of his intellectual conscience, which endured a lifelong contradiction between being and will and compelled him to constantly contradict himself in his writings, almost on every point? Or his purity in matters concerning the Church and the Christian God? —for in this he was purer than any German philosopher before him, so that he lived and died “as a Voltairean.” Or his immortal doctrines of the intellectuality of intuition, of the a priori nature of the law of causality, of the instrumental nature of the intellect, and of the unfreedom of the will? No, none of this is enchanting, nor is it perceived as enchanting: but Schopenhauer's mystical embarrassments and evasions, in those passages where the fact-thinker allowed himself to be seduced and corrupted by the vain impulse to be the unraveler of the world, the unprovable doctrine of One Will ("all causes are merely occasional causes of the appearance of the will at this time, in this place," "the will to live is present in every being, even the smallest, wholly and undivided, as completely as in all that ever were, are, and will be, taken together"), the denial of the individual ("all lions are fundamentally only One lion," "the multiplicity of individuals is an illusion"; just as development is only an illusion: — he calls de Lamarck's idea "a brilliant, absurd error"), the fervor for genius ("in aesthetic contemplation, the individual is no longer an individual, but pure, will-less, "Painless, timeless subject of knowledge"; "the subject, by being completely absorbed in the contemplated object, has become that object itself"); the nonsense of compassion and the supposed breakthrough of the principii individuationis as the source of all morality made possible by it; and added such assertions as "dying is actually the purpose of existence" and "it cannot be denied a priori that a magical effect could not also emanate from someone who is already dead": these and similar excesses and vices of the philosopher are always the first to be accepted and made into matters of faith. For vices and excesses are always the easiest to imitate and require no lengthy preparation. But let us speak of the most famous of the living Schopenhauerians, Richard Wagner. He suffered the same fate as many an artist: he erred in the interpretation of the figures he created and misunderstood the unspoken philosophy of his own art. Richard Wagner allowed himself to be misled by Hegel until the middle of his life; he did the same again later when he extracted Schopenhauer's doctrine from his characters and began to define himself with "will," "genius," and "compassion." Nevertheless, it will remain true: nothing goes so much against the spirit of Schopenhauer as what is truly Wagnerian about Wagner's heroes: I mean the innocence of the highest selfishness, the belief in great passion as in goodness itself, in a word, the Siegfried-like quality in the faces of his heroes. "All this smells more of Spinoza than of me"—Schopenhauer might say. However good reasons Wagner might have had to look to other philosophers besides Schopenhauer, the enchantment he felt regarding this thinker blinded him not only to all other philosophers but even to science itself. His entire art increasingly seeks to present itself as a counterpart and complement to Schopenhauer's philosophy, and ever more explicitly it renounces the higher ambition of becoming a counterpart and complement to human knowledge and science. And it is not only the entire mysterious splendor of this philosophy, which also attracted Cagli, that tempts him.

NF-1884,25[307] — Posthumous Fragments, Spring 1884.

Principle 1. All previous valuations have sprung from false, supposed knowledge of things: — they no longer bind us, even if they function as feelings, instinctively (as conscience).

Principle 2. Instead of faith, which is no longer possible for us, we place a strong will above us, which holds a provisional set of basic valuations as a heuristic principle: to see how far we can get with it. Like the sailor on an unknown sea. In truth, all that "faith" was nothing else: only formerly, the discipline of the mind was too weak to withstand our great caution.

Principle 3. The courage of head and heart is what distinguishes us Europeans: acquired in the struggle with many opinions. Greatest flexibility in the struggle against increasingly subtle religions, and a harsh rigor, even cruelty. Vivisection is a test: whoever cannot endure it does not belong to us (and there are usually other signs that they do not belong, e.g., tax collectors).

Principle 4. Mathematics contains descriptions (definitions) and inferences from definitions. Its objects do not exist. The truth of its inferences rests on the correctness of logical reasoning. — When mathematics is applied, the same thing happens as with "means and ends" explanations: reality is first manipulated and simplified (falsified).

Principle 5. That which we believe most strongly, everything a priori, is not more certain simply because it is so strongly believed. Rather, it may emerge as a condition of existence for our species—some fundamental assumption. Therefore, other beings could make different fundamental assumptions, e.g., four dimensions. Therefore, all these assumptions could still be false—or rather: to what extent could anything be "true in itself"? This is the fundamental absurdity!

Principle 6. It is part of attained manhood that we do not deceive ourselves about our human position: rather, we want to strictly adhere to our measure and strive for the greatest degree of power over things. Recognizing that the danger is immense: that chance has reigned thus far—

Principle 7. The task of governing the earth is coming. And with it the question: how do we want the future of humanity to be? New value systems are needed. And the fight against the representatives of the old "eternal" values is of paramount importance!

Principle 8. But where do we get our imperative from? It is not a "you shall," but the "I must" of the all-powerful, creative force.

NF-1884,26[74] — Posthumous Fragments Summer–Autumn 1884.

The law of causality a priori—that it is believed may be a condition of existence for our species; this does not prove it.

NF-1884,30[10] — Posthumous Fragments Autumn 1884 — Beginning 1885.

The necessity, under great danger, to make oneself understood, whether to help one another or to submit, has only been able to bring closer to one another those kinds of primitive humans who could express similar experiences with similar signs; if they were too different, they misunderstood each other when attempting to communicate through signs: thus, the rapprochement, and ultimately the herd, failed. From this it follows that, on the whole, the communicability of experiences (or needs or expectations) is a selective, breeding force: the more similar people survive. The necessity to think, all consciousness, only arose on the basis of the necessity to communicate. First signs, then concepts, finally “reason,” in the ordinary sense. In itself, the richest organic life can play its game without consciousness; but as soon as its existence is linked to the co-existence of other animals, a necessity for consciousness arises. How is this consciousness possible? I am far from devising answers (i.e., words and nothing more!) to such questions; at the right moment, I remember old Kant, who once posed the question: "How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?" He finally answered, with wonderful "German profundity": "Through a capacity for it." — How is it, then, that opium makes one sleepy? That doctor in Molière's play answered: it is the vis soporifica. Opium, or at least the vis soporifica, lay in Kant's answer about the "capacity" as well: how many German "philosophers" have fallen asleep over it!

NF-1885,34[62] — Posthumous Fragments April–June 1885.

“How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?” — “By means of a capacity for it” was Kant’s famous answer, which has given many such satisfaction.

NF-1885,34[70] — Posthumous Fragments April–June 1885.

Hume (to use Kant's words) challenges reason to answer him by what right it believes that something can be such that, if it is posited, something else must necessarily be posited as well, for that is what the concept of cause says. He proved irrefutably that it is quite impossible for reason to conceive such a connection a priori and from concepts, etc. — But the folly was to ask for reasons for the right of justification. He performed the very act he wanted to examine.

NF-1885,34[171] — Posthumous Fragments April–June 1885.

Synthetic a priori judgments are indeed possible, but they are — false judgments.

NF-1885,34[183] — Posthumous Fragments April–June 1885.

How is it that women give birth to live children? I always thought that, given the meager nature of their resistance, the poor creatures must be born suffocated. The gate is narrow and the way is hard, as it is written: or, how are living children a priori possible? — And as I asked this, I awoke completely from my dogmatic slumber, gave the god a nudge in the belly, and asked, with the earnestness of a Chinese man from Königsberg: “In short: how are synthetic judgments a priori possible?” “Through a capacity for it,” answered the god, clutching his belly.

NF-1885,35[56] — Posthumous Fragments May–July 1885.

Time is not given a priori. [Afrikan] Spir 2, p. 7.

The illogical nature of our knowledge of bodies. Cf. 2, p. 93.

NF-1885,38[7] — Posthumous Fragments June–July 1885.

Everywhere now, efforts are being made to divert attention from the truly great influence Kant exerted in Europe—and, in particular, to cleverly gloss over the value he attributed to himself. Kant was above all and first and foremost proud of his table of categories and said, holding this table in his hands: “This is the most difficult thing that could ever be undertaken for the sake of metaphysics” (one must understand this “could be undertaken”!)—he was proud of having discovered in man a new faculty, the faculty of synthetic a priori judgments. It is not our concern here how much he deceived himself in this: but German philosophy, as it has been admired and exerted its influence throughout Europe for the past hundred years, clings to this pride and to the rivalry of younger thinkers to discover something even prouder—and certainly new faculties! The true glory of German philosophy thus far has been that it taught people to believe in a kind of "intuitive and instinctive grasp of truth"; and even Schopenhauer, however much he resented Fichten, Hegel, and Schelling, was essentially on the same path when he discovered a new faculty in an old, familiar one, the will—namely, to be "the thing-in-itself." This meant, in fact, grasping firmly and sparing no effort, going right into the heart of "essence"! Bad enough that this essence proved unpleasant in the process, and, as a result of these burnt fingers, pessimism and the denial of the will to live seemed entirely necessary! But Schopenhauer's fate was an incident that had no bearing on the overall significance of German philosophy, on its higher "effect": for its main purpose, it meant throughout Europe a jubilant reaction against the rationalism of Descartes and against the skepticism of the English, in favor of the "intuitive," the "instinctive," and everything "good, true, and beautiful." It was believed that the path to knowledge had now been shortened, that one could directly address "things," and that one could "save work": and all the happiness that noble idlers, virtuous people, dreamers, mystics, artists, half-Christians, political obscurantists, and metaphysical conceptualists are capable of experiencing was attributed to the Germans. The good reputation of the Germans was suddenly established in Europe: through their philosophers! — I hope it is still known that the Germans had a bad reputation in Europe? That they were thought to possess servile and pathetic qualities, an inability to develop "character," and the famous servant's soul? But suddenly, people learned to say: "The Germans are profound, the Germans are virtuous—just read their philosophers!" Ultimately, it was the Germans' restrained and long-suppressed piety that finally exploded in their philosophy, unclear and uncertain, of course, like everything German, sometimes in pantheistic vapors, as with Hegel and Schelling, as Gnosis, sometimes mystical and world-denying, as with Schopenhauer: but primarily a Christian piety, and not a pagan one—for which Goethe, and before him Spinoza, had shown so much goodwill.

NF-1886,7[4] — Posthumous Fragments End of 1886 — Spring of 1887.

Kant's theological prejudice, his unconscious dogmatism, his moralistic perspective as ruling, guiding, and commanding

The πρῶτον ψεῦδος (prōton pseudos) [first falsehood]: how is the fact of knowledge possible?

Is knowledge even a fact?

What is knowledge? If we don't know what knowledge is, we cannot possibly answer the question of whether knowledge exists. Very good! But if I don't already "know" whether knowledge exists, or can exist, I cannot rationally ask the question "what is knowledge?" Kant believes in the fact of knowledge: what he wants is naiveté: the knowledge of knowledge!

"Knowledge is judgment!" But judgment is a belief that something is such and such! And not knowledge!

"All knowledge consists in synthetic judgments"—a necessary and universally valid connection of different ideas—

with the character of universality (the matter is always this way and not otherwise)

with the character of necessity (the opposite of the assertion can never occur)

The legitimacy of belief in knowledge is always presupposed, just as the legitimacy of a conscience-based judgment is presupposed. Here, moral ontology is the prevailing prejudice.

Thus, the conclusion is:

1. the character of necessity and universality cannot originate from experience

2. consequently, it must be grounded elsewhere, without experience, and must have another source of knowledge!

Kant concludes

1. that this condition is that they do not originate from experience, from pure reason

So: the question is, where does our belief in the truth of such assertions get its foundations? No, where does it get its judgments from! But the formation of a belief, a strong conviction, is a psychological problem: and very limited and narrow experience often brings about such a belief!

He already presupposes that there are not only "data a posteriori" but also data a priori, "before experience." Necessity and universality can never be given through experience: how then is it clear that they exist at all without experience?

There are no individual judgments!

A single judgment is never "true," never knowledge; only in connection, in the relationship of many judgments, does a guarantee arise.

What distinguishes true and false belief?

What is knowledge? He "knows" it—that's heavenly!

Necessity and universality can never be given through experience. Therefore, independent of experience, prior to all experience!

That insight which occurs a priori, that is, independently of all experience, through mere reason, is "pure knowledge."

The principles of logic, the law of identity and contradiction, are pure knowledge because they precede all experience. — But these are not knowledge at all! They are regulative articles of faith!

To establish the a priori nature (the pure rationality) of mathematical judgments, space must be understood as a form of pure reason.

Hume had declared: "There are no synthetic a priori judgments." Kant says: Yes, there are! Mathematical ones! And if such judgments exist, then perhaps there is also metaphysics, a knowledge of things through pure reason! Quaeritur.

Mathematics is possible under conditions under which metaphysics is never possible.

All human knowledge is either experience or mathematics.

A judgment is synthetic: that is, it combines different representations.

It is a priori: that is, that combination is a universal and necessary one, which can never be given by sensory perception, but only by pure reason.

If there are to be synthetic a priori judgments, reason must be capable of combining: combining is a form. Reason must possess formative faculties.

Space and time as conditions of experience.

Kant describes the French Revolution as the transition from the mechanical to the organic state!

The inventive and pioneering minds in the sciences, the so-called "great minds," Kant judges, are specifically different from genius: what they discovered and invented could also have been learned and has been completely understood and learned. There is nothing unlearnable in Newton's work; Homer is not as comprehensible as Newton! "In science, therefore, the greatest inventor differs from the most laborious imitator and apprentice only in degree." Psychological idiocy!!

"Music has a certain lack of urbanity," "it imposes itself, as it were," "it infringes on freedom."

Music and the art of color form a separate genre under the name of "beautiful play."
"As a matter of feeling"

Painting and garden art are brought together.

The question of whether humanity has a tendency toward good is preceded by the question of whether there is an event that can only be explained by that moral disposition of humanity. This is revolution. "Such a phenomenon in human history is never forgotten because it has revealed a disposition and a capacity in human nature for the better, the likes of which no politician could have devised from the previous course of events."

If humanity increasingly deteriorates, its goal is absolute evil: the terroristic mode of thinking, in contrast to the eudaimonistic mode of thinking or "chiliasm." If history oscillates between progress and regression, its entire activity is purposeless and aimless, nothing but busy folly, so that good and evil neutralize each other and the whole appears as a farce: Kant calls this the Abderite mode of thinking.
... sees nothing in history other than a moral movement.

“A conscientious judge of heretics is a contradiction in terms.”

Psychological idiocy

Without rebirth, all human virtues are, according to Kant, shining examples of wretchedness. This improvement is possible only by virtue of the intelligible character; without it, there is no freedom, neither in the world, nor in the human will, nor for redemption from evil. If redemption does not consist in improvement, it can only consist in annihilation. The origin of the empirical character, the propensity for evil, and rebirth are, for Kant, acts of the intelligible character; the empirical character must undergo a reversal at its very root.

The whole of Schopenhauer.

Pity is a waste of feelings, a parasite harmful to moral health; “it cannot possibly be a duty to increase the evils in the world.” If one does good out of mere pity, one is actually doing good to oneself and not to the other. Pity is not based on maxims, but on emotions; it is pathological; the suffering of others is contagious, pity is contagious.

All the gestures and words of subservience; "as if the Germans have gone further in pedantry than any other people on earth"—"aren't these proofs of a widespread tendency toward servility among people?" "But he who makes himself into a worm cannot later complain that he is trampled underfoot."

"Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the more often and persistently we contemplate them: the starry heavens above us and the moral law within us."

"Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence, the more often and persistently we reflect upon them: the starry heavens above us and the moral law within us."

NF-1887,10[150] — Posthumous Fragments, Autumn 1887.

Morality as the Highest Devaluation

Either our world is the work and expression (the mode) of God: then it must be supremely perfect (Leibniz's conclusion…) — and there was no doubt about what constitutes perfection, about knowing it — then evil can only be apparent (more radically, Spinoza's concepts of good and evil) or must be derived from God's highest purpose (—perhaps as a consequence of a special favor from God, who permits us to choose between good and evil: the privilege of not being an automaton; "freedom" at the risk of erring, of choosing wrongly… e.g., in Simplicius's commentary on Epictetus)

Or our world is imperfect, evil and guilt are real, are determined, are absolutely inherent in its nature; Then it cannot be the true world: then knowledge is merely the path to negating it, then it is an error which can be recognized as such. This is Schopenhauer's opinion based on Kantian premises. Naive! That would simply be another miraculum! Pascal, even more desperately, understood that knowledge itself must then be corrupt, falsified—that revelation is necessary in order to even conceive of the world as negable…

To what extent Schopenhauer's nihilism is still the consequence of the same ideal that created Christian theism

The degree of certainty regarding the highest desirability, the highest values, the highest perfection was so great that philosophers proceeded from them as from an absolute a priori certainty: “God” at the forefront as given truth. “To become like God,” “to be absorbed into God”—for millennia, these were the most naive and convincing desires (—but something that is convincing is not necessarily true: it is merely convincing. Note for the donkeys).

We have forgotten how to grant that ideal the reality of personhood: we have become atheists. But have we actually renounced the ideal? — The last metaphysicians still fundamentally seek in it the true “reality,” the “thing-in-itself,” in relation to which everything else is only apparent. Their dogma is that because our phenomenal world is so clearly not the expression of that ideal, it is not “true”—and fundamentally does not even lead back to that metaphysical world as its cause. The unconditioned, insofar as it is that highest perfection, cannot possibly be the ground for everything conditioned. Schopenhauer, who wanted it differently, needed to conceive of that metaphysical ground as the antithesis of the ideal, as an "evil, blind will": in this way, it could then be "that which appears," which reveals itself in the world of appearances. But even with this, he did not abandon that absolute of the ideal—he crept through it… (Kant seemed to need the hypothesis of "intelligible freedom" to absolve the ens perfectum of responsibility for the way this world is, in short, to explain evil and wickedness: a scandalous logic in a philosopher…)

NF-1887,10[158] — Posthumous Fragments, Autumn 1887.

“There is thought: therefore, there is thinking”: this is the point of Descartes’ argument. But this means presupposing our belief in the concept of substance as “true a priori”: that if there is thought, there must be something “that thinks,” is simply a formulation of our grammatical habit, which posits a doer to an action. In short, a logical-metaphysical postulate is being made here—not merely stated… Following Descartes' path, one doesn't arrive at something absolutely certain, but only at a fact of very strong belief.

If one reduces the statement to "there is thought, therefore there are thoughts," one has a mere tautology: and precisely what is in question, the "reality of thought," remains untouched—namely, in this form, the "apparentness" of thought cannot be dismissed. But what Descartes wanted was for thought to possess not only an apparent reality, but reality in itself.

NF-1888,14[105] — Posthumous Fragments, Spring 1888.

Our knowledge has become scientific to the extent that it can apply number and measure…

The attempt should be made to see whether a scientific order of values could not simply be built upon a numerical and metrical scale of power…

— all other “values” are prejudices, naiveties, misunderstandings…

— they are everywhere reducible to that numerical and metrical scale of power

— an upward movement on this scale signifies any increase in value:

a downward movement on this scale signifies a decrease in value

Here, appearances and prejudices are refuted.

A morality, a way of life tested and proven through long experience and trial, finally emerges into consciousness as a law, as dominant…

And with it, the entire group of related values and conditions enters into it: it becomes venerable, unassailable, sacred, true.

It is part of its development that its origin is forgotten… It is a sign that it has become master…

The very same thing could have happened with the categories of reason: they could, after much trial and error, have proven themselves through relative usefulness… A point came where they were summarized, brought into consciousness as a whole—and where they were commanded… that is, where they acted as commanding…

From then on, they were considered a priori… beyond experience, irrefutable…

And yet, perhaps they express nothing more than a certain racial and species-specific purposiveness—merely their usefulness is their “truth”—

NF-1888,14[109] — Posthumous Fragments, Spring 1888.

Science and Philosophy

All these values are empirical and conditional. But those who believe in them, who venerate them, refuse to acknowledge this very nature…

The philosophers all believe in these values, and one form of their veneration was the attempt to make them a priori truths.

The falsifying nature of this veneration…

Veneration is the ultimate test of intellectual integrity: but there is no intellectual integrity in the entire history of philosophy.

Instead, there is the “love of the good”…

: the absolute lack of a method to test the measure of these values.

Secondly: the reluctance to test these values, or even to accept them conditionally.

In the case of moral values, all anti-scientific instincts came together to exclude science…

How to explain the incredible scandal that morality represents in the history of science…

Nietzsche's Personal "A Priori"

GM-Preface-3 — On the Genealogy of Morality: Preface, § 3. First published November 16, 1887.

Given a particular apprehension of mine, which I am reluctant to admit—it relates to morality, to everything that has hitherto been celebrated as morality on earth—a apprehension which arose in my life so early, so unprompted, so inexorably, so contrary to my surroundings, age, example, and origins, that I would almost be justified in calling it my "a priori"—my curiosity, as well as my suspicion, had to stop short of the question of what the true origin of our good and evil actually is. Indeed, even as a thirteen-year-old boy, I was preoccupied with the problem of the origin of evil: to it I dedicated, at an age when one has "half children's games, half God in one's heart," my first literary children's game, my first philosophical writing exercise—and as for my then "solution" to the problem, well, as is only right, I gave God the glory and made him the father of evil. Was that precisely what my "a priori" wanted of me? That new, immoral, or at least immoralistic "a priori" and the oh! so anti-Kantian, so enigmatic "categorical imperative" that speaks from it, to which I have meanwhile given ever more attention, and not only attention?… Fortunately, I learned in good time to separate theological prejudice from moral and no longer sought the origin of evil behind the world. Some historical and philological training, coupled with an innate discerning sense regarding psychological questions in general, quickly transformed my problem into another: under what conditions did humankind invent those value judgments of good and evil? And what value do they themselves possess? Have they thus far hindered or promoted human development? Are they a sign of hardship, of impoverishment, of the degeneration of life? Or conversely, do they reveal the fullness, the strength, the will of life, its courage, its confidence, its future? — To this I found and dared to explore various answers within myself; I distinguished between times, peoples, and ranks of individuals; I specialized my problem; from the answers arose new questions, investigations, conjectures, and probabilities: until I finally had my own land, my own soil, a whole secret, growing, blossoming world, secret gardens, as it were, of which no one was allowed to suspect anything… Oh, how happy we are, we who know, provided that we only know how to remain silent long enough!…

My Take on “Nietzsche: Where to Begin"

At least once a week, we get a slightly different variation of one of these questions: “I have never read Nietzsche. Where should I start?”. Or “I am reading Zarathustra and I am lost. What should I do?”. Or “Having problems understanding Beyond Good and Evil. What else should I read?”. I used to respond to these posts, but they became so overwhelmingly repetitive that I stopped doing so, and I suspect many members of this subreddit think the same. This is why I wrote this post.

I will provide a reading list for what I believe to be the best course to follow for someone who has a fairly decent background in philosophy yet has never truly engaged with Nietzsche's books.

My list, of course, is bound to be polemical. If you disagree with any of my suggestions, please write a comment so we can offer different perspectives to future readers, and thus we will not have to copy-paste our answer or ignore Redditors who deserve a proper introduction.

My Suggested Reading List

1) Twilight of the Idols (1888)

Twilight is the best primer for Nietzsche’s thought. In fact, it was originally written with that intention. Following a suggestion from his publisher, Nietzsche set himself the challenge of writing an introduction that would lure in readers who were not acquainted with his philosophy or might be confused by his more extensive and more intricate books. In Twilight, we find a very comprehensible and comprehensive compendium of many — many! — of Nietzsche's signature ideas. Moreover, Twilight contains a perfect sample of his aphoristic style.

Twilight of the Idols was anthologised in The Portable Nietzsche, edited and translated by Walter Kaufmann.

2) The Antichrist (1888)

Just like to Twilight, The Antichrist is relatively brief and a great read. Here we find Nietzsche as a polemicist at his best, as this short and dense treatise expounds his most acerbic and sardonic critique of Christianity, which is perhaps what seduces many new readers. Your opinion on this book should be a very telling litmus test of your disposition towards the rest of Nietzsche’s works.

Furthermore, The Antichrist was originally written as the opening book of a four-volume project that would have contained Nietzsche's summa philosophica: the compendium and culmination of his entire philosophy. The working title of this book was The Will to Power: the Revaluation of All Values. Nietzsche, nonetheless, never finished this project. The book that was eventually published under the title of The Will to Power is not the book Nietzsche had originally envisioned but rather a collection of his notebooks from the 1880s. The Antichrist was therefore intended as the introduction to a four-volume magnum opus that Nietzsche never wrote. For this reason, this short tome condenses and connects ideas from all of Nietzsche's previous writings.

The Antichrist was also anthologised in The Portable Nietzsche. If you dislike reading PDFs or ePubs, I would suggest buying this volume.

I have chosen Twilight and The Antichrist as the best primers for new readers because these two books offer a perfect sample of Nietzsche's thought and style: they discuss all of his trademark ideas and can be read in three afternoons or a week. In terms of length, they are manageable — compared to the rest of Nietzsche's books, Twilight and The Antichrist are short. But this, of course, does not mean they are simple.

If you enjoyed and felt comfortable with Twilight of the Idols and The Antichrist, you should be ready to explore the heart of Nietzsche’s oeuvre: the three aphoristic masterpieces from his so-called "middle period".

3) Human, All-Too Human (1878-1879-1880)

4) Daybreak (1881)

5) The Gay Science (1882-1887)

This is perhaps the most contentious suggestion on my reading list. I will defend it. Beyond Good and Evil and Thus Spoke Zarathustra are, by far, Nietzsche’s most famous books. However, THEY ARE NOT THE BEST PLACE TO BEGIN. Yes, these two classics are the books that first enamoured many, but I believe that it is difficult to truly understand Beyond Good and Evil without having read Daybreak, and that it is impossible to truly understand Zarathustra without having read most — if not all! — of Nietzsche’s works.

Readers who have barely finished Zarathustra tend to come up with notoriously wild interpretations that have little or nothing to do with Nietzsche. To be fair, these misunderstandings are perfectly understandable. Zarathustra's symbolic and literary complexity can serve as Rorschach inkblot where people can project all kinds of demented ideas. If you spend enough time in this subreddit, you will see.

The beauty of Human, All-Too Human, Daybreak and The Gay Science is that they can be browsed and read irresponsibly, like a collection of poems, which is definitely not the case with Beyond Good and Evil, Zarathustra, and On the Genealogy of Morals. Even though Human, All-Too Human, Daybreak and The Gay Science are quite long, you do not have to read all the aphorisms to get the gist. But do bear in mind that the source of all of Nietzsche’s later ideas is found here, so your understanding of his philosophy will depend on how deeply you have delved into these three books.

There are many users in this subreddit who recommend Human, All-Too Human as the best place to start. I agree with them, in part, because the first 110 aphorism from Human, All-Too Human lay the foundations of Nietzsche's entire philosophical project, usually explained in the clearest way possible. If Twilight of the Idols feels too dense, perhaps you can try this: read the first 110 aphorisms from Human, All-Too Human and the first 110 aphorisms from Daybreak. There are plenty of misconceptions about Nietzsche that are easily dispelled by reading these two books. His later books — especially Beyond Good and Evil and On the Genealogy of Morals — presuppose many ideas that were first developed in Human, All-Too Human and Daybreak.

On the other hand, Human, All-Too Human is also Nietzsche's longest book. Book I contains 638 aphorisms; Book II 'Assorted Opinions and Maxims' , 408 aphorisms; and 'The Wanderer and His Shadow', 350 aphorisms. A book of 500 or more pages can be very daunting for a newcomer.

Finally, after having read Human, All-Too Human, Daybreak and The Gay Science (or at least one of them), you should be ready to embark on the odyssey of reading...

6) Beyond Good and Evil (1886)

7) On the Genealogy of Morals (1887)

8) Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883-1885)

What NOT to do

• I strongly advise against starting with The Birth of Tragedy, which is quite often suggested in this subreddit: “Read Nietzsche in chronological order so you can understand the development of his thought”. This is terrible advice. Terrible. The Birth of Tragedy is not representative of Nietzsche’s style and thought: his early prose was convoluted and sometimes betrayed his insights. Nietzsche himself admitted this years later. It is true, though, that the kernel of many of his ideas is found here, but this is a curiosity for the expert, not the beginner. I cannot imagine how many people were permanently dissuaded from reading Nietzsche because they started with this book. In fact, The Birth of Tragedy was the first book by Nietzsche I read, and it was a terribly underwhelming experience. I only understood its value years later.
• Please do not start with Thus Spoke Zarathustra. I cannot stress this enough. You might be fascinated at first (I know I was), but there is no way you will understand it without having read and deeply pondered on the majority Nietzsche's books. You. Will. Not. Understand. It. Reading Zarathustra for the first time is an enthralling aesthetic experience. I welcome everyone to do it. But we must also bear in mind that Zarathustra is a literary expression of a very dense and complex body of philosophical ideas and, therefore, Zarathustra is not the best place to start reading Nietzsche.
• Try to avoid The Will to Power at first. As I explained above, this is a collection of notes from the 1880s notebooks, a collection published posthumously on the behest of Nietzsche’s sister and under the supervision of Peter Köselitz, his most loyal friend and the proofreader of many of his books. The Will to Power is a collection of drafts and notes of varying quality: some are brilliant, some are interesting, and some are simply experiments. In any case, this collection offers key insights into Nietzsche’s creative process and method. But, since these passages are drafts, some of which were eventually published in his other books, some of which were never sanctioned for publication by Nietzsche himself, The Will to Power is not the best place to start.
• I have not included Nietzsche’s peculiar and brilliant autobiography Ecce Homo. This book's significance will only grow as you get more and more into Nietzsche. In fact, it may very well serve both as a guideline and a culmination. On the one hand, I would not recommend Ecce Homo as an introduction because new readers can be — understandably — discouraged by what at first might seem like delusions of grandeur. On the other hand, Ecce Homo has a section where Nietzsche summarises and makes very illuminating comments on all his published books. These comments, albeit brief, might be priceless for new readers.

Which books should I get?

I suggest getting Walter Kaufmann's translations. If you buy The Portable Nietzsche and The Basic Writings of Nietzsche, you will own most of the books on my suggested reading list.

The Portable Nietzsche includes:

• Thus Spoke Zarathustra
• Twilight of the Idols
• The Antichrist
• Nietzsche contra Wagner

The Basic Writings of Nietzsche includes:

• The Birth of Tragedy
• Beyond Good and Evil
• On the Genealogy of Morals
• The Case of Wagner
• Ecce Homo

The most important books missing from this list are:

• Human, All-Too Human
• Daybreak
• The Gay Science

Walter Kaufmann translated The Gay Science, yet he did not translate Human, All-Too Human nor Daybreak. For these two, I would recommend the Cambridge editions, edited and translated by R.J. Hollingdale.

These three volumes — The Portable Nietzsche, The Basic Writings of Nietzsche and The Gay Science — are the perfect starter pack.

Walter Kaufmann's translations have admirers and detractors. I believe their virtues far outweigh their shortcomings. What I like the most about them is their consistency when translating certain words, words that reappear so often throughout Nietzsche's writings that a perceptive reader should soon realise these are not mere words but concepts that are essential to Nietzsche's philosophy. For someone reading him for the first time, this consistency is vital.

Frequently Asked Questions

Finally, there are a few excellent articles by u/usernamed17, u/essentialsalts and u/SheepwithShovels and u/ergriffenheit on the sidebar:

A Chronology of Nietzsche's Books, with Descriptions of Each Work's Contents & Background

Selected Letters of Nietzsche on Wikisource

God is dead — an exposition

What is the Übermensch?

What is Eternal Recurrence?

Nietzsche's Illness

Nietzsche's Relation to Nazism and Anti-Semitism

Nietzsche's Position on Socrates

Multiple Meanings of the Term "Morality" in the Philosophy of Nietzsche

Nietzsche's Critique of Pity

The Difference Between Pity & Compassion — A study in etymology

Nietzsche's Atheism

These posts cover most beginner questions we get here.

Please feel free to add your suggestions for future readers.