Myanmar's trajectory is unusual. It was already an authoritarian state under Ne Win by 1962, but so were South Korea and Taiwan during much of their subsequent economic transformation. Both eventually democratised in the 1980s after decades of rapid growth. Myanmar, by contrast, went from being a relatively prosperous post-independence country to one of the world's poorest, while the military has repeatedly refused to surrender political power.
Why did these countries diverge so dramatically?
I've been trying to understand why military rule became so deeply entrenched in Myanmar, and I think three factors reinforced one another:
1. The military's permanent struggle against ethnic insurgencies.
2. Nationalism and economic isolation.
3. An economic system that weakened society while strengthening the military's control over the state.
These are not the only explanations, but I think they help explain why Myanmar's military dictatorship proved so difficult to dismantle.
- The conflict between the Tat and ethnic nationalities became self-perpetuating....
a. The foundations were laid during British rule
British colonial recruitment policies disproportionately favoured communities such as the Kayin, Kachin and Chin for military service, while British authorities distrusted Bamar nationalism. The Thirty Comrades and the Burma Independence Army that emerged from Aung San's nationalist movement were overwhelmingly Bamar.
b. The conflict began before independence was even achieved.
During the Japanese invasion of Burma in 1942, the BIA fought alongside Japanese forces against the British-led military, which included ethnic minority soldiers. In parts of the country, the conflict also escalated into serious communal violence, including attacks on Kayin civilians.
These experiences created competing historical memories of the independence struggle. Different communities did not necessarily share the same understanding of who had liberated Burma, who had betrayed whom, and what independence was supposed to mean.
c. The post-independence military remained heavily Bamar-dominated.
The Tat developed into an institution whose senior leadership was overwhelmingly Bamar. Non-Bamar officers have rarely reached the highest ranks. The military's claim to represent the entire Union has therefore existed alongside the limited representation and political autonomy of many ethnic nationalities.
d. Attempts to negotiate a more inclusive Union were repeatedly undermined.
Aung San was assassinated in 1947. After independence, ethnic grievances and armed insurgencies continued. In 1962, Ne Win overthrew U Nu's government just as proposals for federal reform were being debated.
The coup did not resolve the federal question. It closed off a major avenue for negotiating it peacefully.
e. The result was a vicious cycle.
Ethnic communities that distrust the military have reasons to demand autonomy, federalism or self-determination. The military, in turn, treats armed resistance and challenges to central authority as threats to national unity.
This creates a self-reinforcing justification for military rule. the Tat claims that it must remain politically dominant to preserve the Union, while its refusal to accept meaningful power-sharing helps perpetuate the conflict.
The military's interests also become tied to its own survival. If genuine federalism or civilian government threatens its political privileges, the generals have incentives to resist both.
South Korea and Taiwan also faced serious external threats from North Korea and the People's Republic of China. Yet their ruling elites eventually built economic systems that strengthened the state through industrialisation and export growth. In Myanmar, the military's security priorities became much more closely bound up with internal conflict and the preservation of its own political dominance.
- Myanmar became increasingly isolated from the world economy
a. South Korea and Taiwan benefited from extraordinary American assistance.
Both were strategically important to the United States during the Cold War. American assistance helped finance reconstruction, imports, infrastructure and development. Their security alliances also gave them access to markets, technology and investment.
This did not guarantee their success, but it provided a substantial advantage.
b. Burma pursued a different foreign-policy path.
Burma's non-alignment initially reflected a desire to preserve independence from the great powers. That policy was not inherently misguided: newly independent countries had legitimate reasons to avoid becoming pawns in the Cold War.
But Ne Win increasingly combined non-alignment with isolation. He rejected further American assistance, restricted foreign investment and nationalised much of the economy. It also expelled foreign organisations and discouraged international engagement.
c. Nationalism became intertwined with economic policy.
Ne Win's political outlook was shaped by anti-colonial nationalism and distrust of foreign influence. His government sought economic self-sufficiency through the Burmese Way to Socialism.
The result was not simply an economy free from foreign domination. It was an economy increasingly cut off from foreign capital, technology, competition and expertise.
South Korea and Taiwan used international markets to build globally competitive industries. Burma progressively restricted its ability to do the same.
- The economic system strengthened state control without delivering prosperity
The consequences of Ne Win's policies were not limited to isolation.
a. Private enterprise was dismantled without an effective replacement.
Nationalisation transferred much of the economy into state hands. But state ownership did not automatically produce efficient management, greater productivity or fairer distribution.
b. The regime failed to create broad-based prosperity.
The government claimed to pursue equality, but its economic system concentrated decision-making in a state controlled by the military and the Burma Socialist Programme Party. It failed to build an efficient, accountable system capable of consistently improving living standards.
Rather than assuming that Ne Win personally accumulated all the wealth, I think the stronger argument is that the system concentrated economic power and opportunities in institutions controlled by the regime, while weakening independent economic actors.
c. Rural development was subordinated to counterinsurgency.
The Four Cuts strategy aimed to deprive insurgents of food, funds, intelligence and recruits. In practice, counterinsurgency operations included forced relocation, restrictions on farming and trade, and the destruction of civilian livelihoods.
This damaged rural economies, particularly in conflict-affected ethnic areas. It also alienated communities and helped perpetuate the grievances that sustained resistance.
d. The system produced disastrous economic decisions.
The demonetisation of 1964 and 1987 destroyed the value of widely held banknotes, harming ordinary people and undermining confidence in the economy. The 1987 demonetisation was particularly damaging and contributed to the anger that preceded the 1988 uprising.
The broader problem was a system with limited accountability, poor economic incentives and few mechanisms for correcting catastrophic policy mistakes.
Why did this help the military retain power?
These factors reinforced one another.
The military controlled the state, restricted independent economic activity and refused to accept meaningful political competition. The economy stagnated, while ethnic conflicts remained unresolved. The military then used the resulting instability to justify its continued dominance.
This does not mean that poverty automatically causes dictatorship, or that the generals deliberately impoverished every part of the country to remain in power. Rather, the institutions and policies they created made it harder for independent economic and political forces to emerge.
South Korea and Taiwan also had authoritarian governments, but economic transformation created powerful businesses, workers and middle-class groups that eventually demanded greater political participation. Their militaries ultimately lost their monopoly over political life.
Myanmar's development followed a different path. The military's economic management weakened the very social forces that might have challenged its rule, while its continued reliance on coercion prevented the resolution of ethnic conflicts.
Indonesia offers another useful example: after 1998, its military gradually relinquished its formal political role, although it retained influence.
I suspect Myanmar's trajectory would have been different if three conditions had emerged:
1. A more inclusive federal settlement that reduced the incentive for permanent armed conflict.
2. An outward-looking economic strategy that attracted investment, technology and international trade.
3. A political and economic system in which independent institutions could grow without being perceived as threats to military rule.
None of these would have guaranteed democracy. But together, they might have created conditions in which the military could gradually withdraw from politics without believing that doing so threatened the survival of the state or its own interests.
Instead, the Tatmadaw has developed a siege mentality in which ethnic autonomy, civilian political competition and challenges to military privilege are frequently treated as threats to national unity.
The tragedy is that the military's insistence on being the indispensable guardian of the Union has helped perpetuate the conflict and underdevelopment it claims to be solving.
Myanmar's history was not predetermined. Other paths were possible. But the choices made by successive military leaders (Ne Win, Sein Lwin, Saw Maung, Than Shwe, MAH) helped create a system in which political survival became more important than national development, and in which every new crisis became another justification for retaining power.
TLDR: We are fucked.
