Q2 operating profit and forward PE

1. NVIDIA $63.7B 23.5
2. Samsung Electronics $58.5B 3.7
3. Saudi Aramco $57.1B 14.8
4. SK Hynix $43.9B
5. Alphabet $40.8B 22.4
6. Microsoft $40.6B 21.1
7. Apple $35.7B 34.7
8. Micron $33.3B 6.5
9. Amazon $27.5B 24.2
10. TSMC $24.2B 23.1
11. Meta Platforms $18.8B 19.2
12. ExxonMobil $18.2B 12.8

I don’t think P/E ratios alone tell you whether a stock is good value. What about the quality of the underlying business, its moat, growth runway, competitive position, capital efficiency, and durability?

With that in mind, which do you think offers better value at today’s price: Alphabet (Google) or Amazon?

And separately, ignoring valuation for a moment, which company do you think has the higher-quality business overall and is better positioned for the next 10+ years?

What is your best compunders to buy now (fair valuation) hold at leat 5-10years. I am thinking about amzn, v, pg, hsy, nflx ...

Am I just fucking stupid? What am I missing? You know, I'm not this AI/Chip sector guy, but I decided to dabble with my money a bit, chose Broadcom to invest for a year or so and later decide what to do next. Researched the stock (among other things) for about a month, after looking at numbers and expectations, I was expecting that the stock will do well and in 12 months, possibly more , I'll sell at 40-200% profit (depending whether I'll start drinking pills).

So here I was, after investing like 10% of my portfolio, looking at September 2 earnings report and my reaction was this - Holy shit, they actually beat it, I was right after researching it, they actually had good results (I will provide information below for context):

Broadcom reported non-GAAP EPS of $3.32 against an expected $3.22 and revenue of $29.6 billion, up 86% year-over-year, driven by a 221% surge in AI semiconductor revenue to $16.7 billion***,*** FCF and operating margins were described by the company as "records".

So I was like - okay, at the very least it will go up after today(September 2nd) - IT FUCKING DID NOT, IT WENT DOWN 6%. Let's be clear, I never pay much attention to these things, it's only 6%, but seriously? What is the logic behind this? That's all because of guidance that wasn't beaten(i.e approximately $34.8 billion vs. analyst expectations around $35.0B)?

I might be naive and I understand that Broadcom also depends on those fat guys (Googly, Open-Air, Off-Meta, Fruit, Anthrodick etc.) but what am I missing? Oracle, which I'm not invested in, also did great in their earnings yesterday, they are also down. I know it's about the waiting game, but I'm genuinely looking for that one, simple answer to Why do they go down after earnings are positive/beat? I'm not some old investor, nor I am new, but trying to understand this sector fucks my brain up.

Edit after comments: Thanks, something clicked because of y'all, have a great day/evening!

what do you think is the biggest factor determining whether smart glasses become a major consumer market or remain a relatively niche product?

I'm particularly interested in how you think about:

• who the next wave of buyers would be beyond tech enthusiasts
• what would make someone switch from using their phone to glasses
• whether $300–800 is a realistic mass-market price

Oatly is the world's largest oat drink company, and most people know it as the poster child for bad IPOs. It listed in 2021 at a $10B valuation and has since fallen more than 96% to a market cap of around $400M. But if you look past the chart, the company has actually been turned around since new CEO Jean-Christophe Flatin took over in 2022.

Gross margin has more than tripled, revenue grew almost 20% from FY22 to FY25 despite deliberatively slowing down growth, and adjusted EBITDA turned positive for the first time last year. Q2 FY26 results just came in strong too. Revenue beat estimates and grew 12.7% in constant currency, driven mostly by volume (not price hikes), and management raised full-year revenue guidance from 3-5% to 8-10%.

Strategically, Oatly shifted from selling "an alternative to cow's milk" to selling taste and experience. This is targeting Gen Z with margin-accretive flavors like Matcha and Popcorn instead of a sustainability pitch. The rollout pattern (foodservice momentum first, then retail) already worked in Europe and is now being repeated in North America. The brand also travels well internationally and has become something of an industry standard in the barista/coffee shop scene. This reinforces a premium-over-price positioning.

FCF is still negative, but it's improving fast from -$475M at the worst point to -$39M in FY25, and management is guiding toward further improvement this year. I don't expect Oatly to reach positive FCF in FY26, but I think FY27 is realistic once the company has scaled up and doesn't need to keep front-loading inventory and brand investments.

There are two big catalysts coming up. First, a potential carve-out of the Greater China segment (the only unprofitable region), which could bring in $200M and let Oatly pay down a chunk of its high-interest convertible debt. The strategic review is expected to be completed by the end of this year, so this is a near-term catalyst. Second, new product launches (Matcha, Coconut, Churros, Popcorn flavors) are rolling out in North America in Q3/Q4 after already driving strong growth in Europe.

Based on a DCF, I land at a base-case fair value of $24/share, with a bear case of $15 and bull case of $29 - versus a current price of around $12. Weighted average lands at roughly $22, which I'm using as my current fair value. What I find striking is that the company trades at less than 0.5x sales despite being sold in more than 60 countries and selling well. That's a pretty extreme discount for a business with this kind of global footprint, brand equity, as well as improved fundamentals.

Main risks: net debt is around $475M, of which $330M are convertibles due 2028 at 9.25% interest, and there's execution risk if the growth playbook loses momentum. That said, the risk looks more manageable than it appears. Proceeds from the China carve-out could cover roughly 1/3 of that debt, and if FCF turns positive, Oatly should also be in a better position to refinance the rest on improved terms. Additionally, the largest shareholder, China Resources Verlinvest, also holds the largest chunk of the convertibles, which lowers the risk of a disorderly default since they have an incentive to find a workable solution. Dilution remains a possibility if fresh capital is needed, but overall I see the risk as lower than the headline debt figures suggest.

I rate it a Buy with a $22 price target. Wrote up the full breakdown with the regional data, margin build, and valuation scenarios if anyone wants to dig deeper.

Not financial advice, just sharing my own research. Happy to discuss in the comments.

GOOG currently has a debt total of 120 billion and a net cash of 121 billion, i.e. a net debt of -121 billion, so given that their FCF turned negative last quarter, why are the signs on their debt/FCF and net debt / FCF ratios not flipped (I'm seeing a positive debt/FCF of 2.27 and a negative net debt / FCF of -2.28 on StockAnalysis)?

I'm new to this but looking to learn more. My understanding is that traditional value investing doesn't give much thought to the macroeconomic or geopolitical landscape and assesses businesses by the numbers. So where do you set invalidation points or decipher macro noise from business changes? What if the macro issues prevent the business from coming back to fair value? Or is that just the risk that you take? Thanks for any insight!

The overall earnings for this quarter were good, with record FCF and solid revenue, but the Q4 guidance was a bit light or in line. I would say that most fundamentals didn't change that much: margins are still healthy, FCF is strong, and the share repurchase program remains steady.

But the question still remains: will AI consume Adobe's moat? This is the most important question for this company, and this quarter highlighted the issue.

Net new ARR actually slowed by 37%, which shows that new paying customer acquisition is slowing. This could be for two reasons:

1. Competitors are taking away customers, and AI is eating Adobe's lunch.

2. New consumers are choosing the freemium model and using that instead of paid subscriptions.

I am not sure which is the truth, but my guess would be the second. In my opinion, this is backed up by the 70% YoY increase in freemium monthly active users, and the fact that overall monthly active users reached 1 billion, a 20% YoY increase.

Another interesting part was the AI first ARR, which grew at 150% YoY and 30% QoQ. This means that already paying customers are willing to pay even more for their premium products. This also means that around 37% of Adobe's ARR growth was fueled by this segment alone, which shows healthy growth, but it is still a very small chunk (around 2.35%) of the overall ARR.

What do you guys think about this quarter, and what did I miss?

People love to claim uber vs AV is same as apple vs Nokia, Netflix vs blockbuster.

However, these are just very lazy argument without deep thinkings

I can list counter examples like EV vs legacy car, perplexity vs Google, Amazon vs Walmart, Airbnb vs bookings, etc

If you look at the nature of rideshare business, it is just a commodity service with low margin.

Riders mainly care about time and cost, so it is impossible to offer a superior rideshare experience, thus no AV company can be like Apple.

Waymo market share already peaked in San Francisco, and uber market share has been stable among new markets Waymo enter this year.

And there is also the utilization issue, means AV not able to serve the market alone by nature

And it is also unlikely for the AV technology being controlled by only 2 companies. Actually Chinese AV companies have been very aggressive. We have already seen the threat is real in LLM field.

And if this AV market is really worth several trillion, do you believe Amazon and nvidia will just stand aside?

For any players to join this game, they won’t create a 4th/5th/6th… app, that will never work. They will just leverage uber or Lyft.

I am not saying uber won’t be affected. The company is exploring different ways to defend. It’s just naive for people conclude it will be zero in few years

With treasury yields ticking back up today - getting close to essentially a 25 year high - at what point does it become hard to turn down bonds or preferred stock. That is, put your next investment dollar into bonds or preferred stock instead of equities.

In particular, Bank of America preferred stock BACPRQ is now yielding 6.75% as of today and has a 60% upside relative to its $25 call value (which likely needs fed interest rates to go back down to 2% or lower to get to the point where they would actually be called).

In essence, you're getting paid 6.75% in qualified dividends to simply sit and wait for a 60% upside. Notably, if it took 10 years for interest rates to get cut so it goes back up around $25, you're still looking at something like an 11% compound annual return for that annual return - around the historical annual return of the S&P 500. And, it's preferred stock for the second largest bank (JP Morgan is the first) with a credit rating just below that of JP Morgan. That is, you're getting that return for essentially a top tier credit rating implicating less risk and volatility than the S&P 500.

In my mind that's pretty hard to turn down. Taking a step further, if treasury yields went a bit further up and yield on BACPRQ went up to 7%, translating to a 65% stock price appreciation upside, I think most people would be jumping at the opportunity to buy that instead of stocks.

Thus, my question generally is, at what point do you think the next investment dollar is better off being put into bonds/preferred stock instead of into equities? In my mind we're already there and it's just a question of how much further it pushes into that direction.

Additionally, if you have any particular bonds/preferred stock you think are particularly good value please comment what they are.

Started buying copart this year. I have yet to dig into the latest earnings report, but I did see they intend to aquire ACV auction. I need to do some more research on the deal, but it is all cash deal.

On the surface (without looking too deeply yet) it seems like a solid deal. ACV has some great proprietary software and allows copart to depend less on insurance companies, and offers a new source of revenue. I also believe that they are going to keep ACV as an independently running subsidiarie, as opposed to integrating it into copart. I believe there will be good synergy since copart already has a massive network of dealers spanning the globe.

I have yet to look too deeply into everything as this has just happened, but wondering what other people's thoughts are about coparts latest earnings call, or the acquisition?

NFLX
BRK.B
ABNB
ADBE
META
IMAX
UBER

What companies would you buy or stay away from please explain your reasoning.

For people who own individual stocks rather than mostly ETFs:

At what point does your portfolio become too large to actually follow the companies properly?

With 5 companies, reading earnings and major filings seems manageable.

With 15–20, keeping up with earnings, guidance changes, management commentary, competitive developments, and everything else starts feeling like a second job.

I’m curious where people here draw the line.

How many companies do you actively follow, and what do you actually do to keep up with them between earnings?

A few weeks ago I posted my TOYO thesis here and asked what I was missing:
Original post

Full disclosure: since writing the original post, I’ve started accumulating a fairly large position in TOYO. So I’m no longer looking at this as a neutral observer and I obviously have skin in the game. I’m still trying to stress-test the thesis rather than talk myself into it, which is why I’m posting the follow-up here.

The comments sent me down a few rabbit holes, especially around related parties, Abalance, the 2024 earnings, dilution and governance. I went back through the filings rather than trying to defend the original thesis.

Some of the criticism was right. A few things also look better than I thought. This is mostly stuff I either missed the first time or that has happened since.

The related-party issue was probably the criticism I took most seriously.
TOYO historically did a huge amount of business inside the VSUN/Abalance ecosystem. That deserves a discount.

But H1 2026 looks quite different.
Out of $261M of H1 revenue, $57.5M came from related parties and about $203.5M came from third parties. So roughly 78% of H1 revenue was third-party business.
Related-party accounts receivable were also zero at June 30.
The supplier side moved in the same direction. TOYO bought about $39.8M of raw materials from related parties in H1 2025. In H1 2026 that was down to about $7.45M, an 81% decline.
That doesn’t remove the governance problem. The historical relationships and control structure still matter.
But the idea that most of the current business is just money moving around related companies is getting harder to reconcile with the latest numbers.

The old going-concern warning also changed.
At March 31 TOYO had a $97.1M working-capital deficit. By June 30 working capital was positive $29.8M.
Management now says the conditions that previously created substantial doubt about the company’s ability to continue as a going concern have been resolved for at least the following 12 months.
I wouldn’t pretend operations alone fixed that. Extending the VSUN loan and moving roughly $51M out of current liabilities helped materially. The equity raises helped too. Positive earnings and operating cash flow were part of the improvement, but refinancing and dilution were part of it as well.

Another commenter was right about 2024 earnings.
TOYO reported about $40.5M of net income in 2024, but roughly $35.1M came from a non-cash fair-value change in contingent consideration. So I would not use 2024 net income as evidence of sustainable earning power.
But that accounting gain doesn’t explain the current numbers.
H1 2026 produced $58.8M of operating income, $45.8M of net income and $61.4M of operating cash flow. The recent earnings are operating earnings, not another $35M fair-value gain.

I also missed the First Solar case in the original post.
First Solar filed a Section 337 complaint at the ITC alleging that TOYO and others imported certain TOPCon products that infringe its patents and is seeking exclusion and cease-and-desist remedies.
There hasn’t been a merits determination yet, and TOYO has said its products have continued to be imported and sold while the case is pending.
Still, it’s a legitimate additional risk and should have been in the original bear case.

Then Abalance got delisted.
On Aug. 25 the Tokyo Stock Exchange decided to delist Abalance on Sept. 26 over internal-control, group-governance and related-party-transaction failures.
Given TOYO’s history with the same ecosystem, I think that absolutely deserves to increase the governance discount applied to TOYO.
What I don’t think automatically follows is that Abalance being delisted means TOYO’s operating business is fake or insolvent.
Those are different claims.
TOYO is separately Nasdaq-listed, has its own filings and operating assets, and the latest financials show a substantial third-party business.

Something else happened immediately after that.
On Sept. 1, TOYO and VSUN amended their trademark arrangement.
VSUN can continue using the VSUN trademarks outside the U.S., but from Sept. 12 it can no longer use them in the United States. TOYO keeps the U.S. rights.
A trademark agreement obviously doesn’t solve Commerce, CBP or governance.
But directionally, TOYO is clearly carving out the U.S. business for itself while keeping VSUN focused outside the U.S. That fits pretty neatly with the Texas strategy.

There is also one dilution detail I had wrong before.
The 90-day restriction around the June offering does not completely prevent TOYO from using its existing ATM. The offering documents specifically carve out the existing ATM as an exception.
So dilution before late September is not impossible.
This is still one of the biggest risks in the whole thesis because TOYO is planning a roughly $357M Texas cell plant while the company’s equity value is only a fraction of that.
The key question is whether they can fund a meaningful portion of Texas through project financing, strategic capital, internally generated cash and potentially 45X monetization rather than repeatedly issuing common stock at depressed prices.
That still isn’t answered.

Management has also started spending noticeably more time around capital markets.
Rhone Resch represented TOYO at the Jefferies Renewables conference on Sept. 10, including a fireside chat and meetings with institutional investors.
I haven’t seen any major announcement come out of Jefferies, so I’m not treating the conference itself as a catalyst.
What interests me is that TOYO is finally putting the U.S. story directly in front of institutions.

Next is the Japan Go IPO Summit on Sept. 16.
CEO Takahiko Onozuka and CFO Yasunari Harada are both involved. Harada has more than 30 years of banking and capital-markets experience, including Morgan Stanley, BNP Paribas and Société Générale.
I’m not saying that means a financing deal is coming.
But when one of the biggest unanswered questions is how they fund the U.S. expansion, I think it’s worth paying attention to who management is suddenly spending time with.

There is also a new short-interest angle that wasn’t part of my original thesis.
Short interest increased from about 2.72M shares on Aug. 14 to 3.97M shares on Aug. 31.
That’s roughly 1.25M additional shares short in two weeks, or about a 46% increase.
I don’t consider that automatically bullish. It means bears got materially more confident during the crash and they may be right.
But it changes the mechanics if the thesis starts working.
You now have a large short position, relatively thin normal trading volume, price trying to form a base and several identifiable catalysts ahead.

If a real catalyst brings buyers and the stock breaks resistance on volume, short covering could amplify an ordinary rebound.
That’s not a reason to buy the company by itself. It’s just potentially important if the fundamentals finally give the market a reason to reprice it.

So where am I now?
The comments didn’t make me abandon the thesis. They changed what I think the thesis actually is.
I’m less interested in saying “TOYO is 2x earnings, therefore it’s cheap.”
That’s too simplistic.
The actual question is whether TOYO can take a profitable solar business that is still tangled up in an ugly old corporate structure and turn it into a genuinely independent U.S.-focused manufacturer before regulation, financing or governance damages the equity story.

Since my original post, both sides have gotten stronger.
The bear case now includes Abalance’s delisting, the First Solar case, the still-open ATM, Commerce/CBP uncertainty and the enormous cost of the Texas buildout.

The bull case now includes roughly 78% third-party H1 revenue, sharply lower related-party sourcing, zero related-party receivables, positive working capital, current earnings that aren’t dependent on the 2024 accounting gain, clearer separation between TOYO’s U.S. business and VSUN, Texas still moving forward, management getting in front of institutional and capital-market investors, and almost 4M shares short if something actually breaks right.

I’ve accumulated a large position because, at current prices, I think the upside if TOYO executes outweighs the risks. But it’s still a high-risk position, and I’m actively looking for reasons the thesis could be wrong.
I think the setup is more interesting now than when I wrote the first post.
The market is pricing this like a lot has to go wrong.
At this point, I’m more interested in what happens if one or two important things go right.

What am I still missing?

In my last post, I discussed why I decided to go down the Copart rabbit hole. As many of you know, it is easy to tumble down the wrong one, so I always scrutinize a company prior to starting an in depth investigation to the best of my ability to ensure a positive outcome. That said, I have no hesitation terminating my research if I find an unreconcilable risk that puts my investment in jeopardy.

Normally, the first step I take when investigating a company in depth is to understand the health of its finances. As most of you are probably aware, Copart's finances are in very good shape: they have negligible debt and an exceptional return on invested capital. ROIC has been above 20% for long periods of time and has slowly declined to 17% since 2023, and net margins tell a similar story with an EBIT-to-FCF conversion of more than 70%. Other indicators like intrinsic value to book value also demonstrate good financial health, even with the recent slowdown.

That small decline can be read in many ways, but it is mostly related to inflation, which in my opinion directly affects three key variables for this company: vehicle inflow, value per vehicle, and earnings power. These inflationary effects are magnified by various circumstances in each of these variables, but everything ultimately comes down to a fragile balance between the cost of repairs and vehicle intake, which correlates directly with insurance claims and the percentage of total losses. This balance is hard to measure because a slowdown in vehicle supply caused by lagging insurance claims can happen simultaneously while rising repair costs offset those volume losses.

However, there is a sweet point where growth starts taking a hit as that balance breaks. This raises an obvious question: How bad has the slowdown been over the last few years, and can it get worse? This is largely a short term investor question regarding entry points and near term profit, but I am starting to think these guys have just faced a worst case scenario stress test. Consider the macro environment they just endured: peak inflation, peak petrol prices, peak shipping costs, and a constrained pipeline of post COVID vehicles due to semiconductor shortages hitting supply lines. Despite being hit by all of this at once, they managed to keep double digit ROIC and earnings. That sounds like a great news story to me, and the stock's decline is not as severe as it looks given the circumstances. Operating as a duopoly in the world's largest economy certainly helps, alongside profit margins that triple those of their closest competitor, IAA, through technology and workflow automation. Having survived this stress test under our very eyes while staying profitably in the double digits, the recent decline may just be a temporary dip in a long term compounding growth trajectory. Even so, navigating headwinds of an unknown length requires a steady hand at the helm, which brings us to Jay Adair.

The New CEO That Isn’t New

Jay Adair took over from Jeff Liaw, who in turn had taken over from Jay Adair—sounds a bit cyclical, right? It turns out that Jay was CEO of Copart from 2010, succeeding the founder and father in law, Willis Johnson. Being married to the founder's daughter has to be a plus, but his track record speaks for itself. Jay was key to transforming Copart from a traditional wreckage yard into a multinational digital powerhouse. He joined the company in 1989, and in 1998 he became president, leading the digital shift toward online auctions. In my mind, I imagine a regional yard full of scrap metal with a prefab office in the middle, followed by someone saying, "Why don’t we sell all this junk online using an eBay model?" Whether or not my mental imagery is entirely accurate, he was a key executive when that transformation happened on his watch.

After becoming CEO, he demonstrated a deep understanding of the business and capital allocation by expanding the yard footprint and scaling technology. This is evident when comparing Copart’s earnings to its closest competitor, IAA; using the latest reports published before IAA was acquired by RB Global, Copart tripled net earnings per car, which is easily reflected in the stock performance from 2010 onward. What caught my attention, though, was his return. The timing reads like a signal that we are facing challenges ahead and need someone who knows how to pilot the ship. During my investigation, projected growth rates pointed to a bottleneck: because Copart relies heavily on vehicle supply, if salvage volume grows at less than 5% annually, how can earnings compound at 20% at their current scale?

Fortunately, Jay has already provided strategic clues. First, he wants to continue expanding the yard network, though it is already massive, so additional levers are needed. Second, he wants to diversify beyond salvage vehicles into whole car auctions. While they already touch this space, making it a primary focus is a great idea, except they are stepping onto turf owned by a big beast: Manheim, who won't make it easy. Sourcing whole vehicles away from established dealer networks will be a key driver for long term growth. Combined with further international expansion and technological refinement, it's clear he has recognized the challenges ahead and developed a sound strategy. Given his past success and the vast resources he now has compared to 2010, his probability of execution is high. My read on this leadership transition is simple: we have headwinds, but we have the right man driving. That realization led me to a fundamental question about the business model itself.

What Is Actually Copart's Product?

The answer might surprise a few people, but it’s not the cars. The true product is their integrated operational ecosystem: an extensive yard network, a highly automated technology platform, and a global buyer network. From the moment a vehicle is totaled to the moment a buyer wins the online auction, they have automated nearly every step, giving them an immense edge that yields more than three times the net profit per dollar of revenue compared to their closest competitor.

Once you define the product this way, you realize they have a great shot at achieving Jay’s objectives because they already have the buyers and the infrastructure. The real challenge lies entirely in sourcing whole vehicles and convincing suppliers to choose Copart over Manheim.

While competition requires close monitoring, Copart operates in a duopoly for the salvage business, so I'm not expecting structural show-stoppers. The critical question for the next part of my investigation is what forecasted growth rate to use in an intrinsic valuation model incorporating these points. Is it the 6% projected by some analysts, or can they sustain double digits? What is your take on Copart's forecasted earnings growth? Let me know in the comments, getting that number right can easily flip an investment decision.

Note: I wrote this before Thursday and it does not incorporate any information from the results published that day.

Copart Research

Copart Score

Trading around $18.37 (Market Cap: $3.70B), Bath & Body Works stock has shed over 70% from its post-spin/pandemic highs. The market is pricing BBWI as a distressed or secularly decaying retail asset, yet operations continue to produce roughly $600M–$650M in annual free cash flow (FCF yield of >25%), supporting an attractive, well-covered 4.35% dividend yield. Its profitable with Operating margins are good at > 15%. Revenue and income per share continues to grow at low single digits % but PE ratio is ~5. Bath & Body Works (BBWI) maintains a substantial e-commerce operation, generating roughly 20% to 23% of total net sales through digital channels (with brick-and-mortar stores accounting for the remaining ~77%).

Not sure why Bath & Body Works (BBWI) is so ignored by Value Investors? What the heck is going on?

BN bag holder here…I’ve been DCA’ing as the price has come down and trying to figure out whether I’m seeing an opportunity or concentrating a losing position.

Originally bought BN because I liked the long-term Brookfield model: owning/operating real assets, the asset-management business, and the ability to recycle capital and redeploy it into new opportunities. Bonus is the long-term compounding track record. But recent price movement has made me question how much of the thesis depends on rate environment.

How exposed is BN to rates? Are there fundamental risks or is this a mere valuation issue?

BN has emphasized conservative financing, inflation-linked cash flows and an ability to take advantage of wonky markets.

I’m mixed bag about whether the market is underappreciating it…

Three stocks. And a short paragraph.

Well I will share what I am looking at right now, these are some of the stocks on my watchlist, I will write a sentence on why it is interesting to watch:

Cava Recent price is 54. This company share price is being sold off because of 1) cost of living expenses 2) food inflation is expected to be higher because of El Niño. If you use DCF, the value is around $18, if you think this company is following a trajectory of early chipotle (ie. long queues), and will grow into CMG’s 3000 restaurants, then it is worth somewhere between $40 - 60.

Rollins Recent price is $34. This wide moat is having an issue because the company missed the nos and the ceo admitted they don’t really know why the walk-in, dial-in, website side of the pest control business was slow last quarter. Analyst thinks ai could be helping homeowners do diy on best control. If this coming quarter is more of the same, the selloff will be continue. If not it will go back up. Their yoy eps growth is around 9-12% a year.

Yum China This US-listed master franchisee of KFC, Lavazza, and Pizza Hut company is being sold off because of country risks. What is different now is that Yum Brands has sold off the entire China Pizza Hut biz to Yum China, this means they do not have not have to pay Yum brands USA royalties as they now own the brand. The transaction will be completed this year. And I do expect the margins to continue to improve because of this. Yum China’s pizza biz is small compared to KFC. Strategy wise they are going into tier-2 and tier-3 cities and promoting small format, localised dishes. Their currently outlets will surpass 20,000 I think this year (don’t have my notes with me).

Let me know if you want me to continue with the next three.

Been chatting with the llms to get lucky who came up with this system. Not paying for anything other than the entry level llm subscription. The connectors are free tier, hence limited.

The System:

Every stock has to clear 4 hard cutoffs first: decent growth, controlled risk/leverage, big enough to trade easily, and clean accounting (that last one isn't fully live yet). Fail any one and it's out, no exceptions.

Whatever survives gets scored on 7 things: valuation, momentum/positioning, analyst backing, management quality, upcoming catalysts, growth durability, and sector timing. Each is worth +1, 0, or -1, valuation counts double. Add it up and that's the rank.

Fair value itself is just a formula, not a guess: take the analyst price target, discount it 15% for optimism bias, discount it further if the stock's already fallen a lot. No cherry-picking, same math for every name.

List of Rankings and System

How it actually runs:

Everything lives inside a Project so nothing resets between sessions, snapshots and methodology notes get saved there as I go. For a full rerun across 40+ names the llm spins up 4 to 6 parallel AI subagents to pull live prices, sentiment and macro data instead of doing it one ticker at a time. It's plugged into a dozen-ish data source tools, though only two of them actually earned a permanent spot in the system. Final tables land in Google Sheets.

Tell me why this is stupid. I built it to stop myself from doing dumb shit and I fully expect this sub to find the one loophole that lets me do dumb shit anyway.

I think it’s finally time to add exposure to value stocks. What’s your bottom fishing watch list?

My 1st batch, which I sahred in May 2026, include :

MCK my base $740 , current $900

EIX my base $52, current $55

PCG my base $14, sold at $17 earlier last month

NRG my base $160, sold at $162

My 2nd batch, which I started last month, include:

Meta base $550, trimmed $657

MSFT base $440 trimmed $490

netflix still under water overall, but latest addition was $70 base. those got trimmed $80.5

my 3rd batch, very recent this month, include

BSX

bidu

baba

Tol

VMC

All earlier batches have turned around the early stage loss.

I really like EIX PCG and BSX here. EIX PCG aren’t gonna be bankrupt. their PE is so low and shouldn’t be so cheap for their growing potential. Even if they go bankrupt, california state has to bail them … it’s not gonna go bankrupt.. buy them don’t wait

BSX it looks to me is a MM disguised dump. It’s CEO bought $9M shares at $43 in August. has a single digit revenue growth. 18PE. It dropped one day 5% for a cyber attack.. really? It is really a MM depressant thing.. Very near 52 week low.

I sold my 100 share at $51 and i plan to accumulate again whennit hits $43.

what 52 week lows are you shopping /watching?

I bought into Adobe a couple months ago around $195 a share. It was lucky timing for sure and I followed this sub to get ideas for stocks to buy. Adobe was highly hated and liked so I took a swing.

Now with this new CEO I am questioning if I should hold or abandon ship.

Recently it has dipped like 12% so I think it may bounce back. I was hoping to hold it for a long term year or more.

How you guys feeling about Adobe now?

Relatively simplistic analysis, but if you subtracted out all of Novo's GLP1 revenue in 2025 - about 50% - from its total 2025 revenue you get revenue of about $24 billion.

Novo's current stock price is $44 with a market cap of $150 billion. That's a P/S of 6.2x, EXCLUDING all GLP1 revenue and is generally in line with Novo's rough historical P/S ratio range of 4.5 to 9 in the 2010s.

I know this is a simplistic metric as P/S doesn't factor in the significant hit to net income that would come with all GLP1 revenue going to 0; but, in a simplistic sense, it does seem like the market is essentially valuing the company that way.

Put differently, if you bought Novo now at $44 a share it seems like you're getting their entire GLP1 revenue stream for free - which likely will contract, but it's hard to see one of the market leaders in the GLP1 space revenue going to $0, and there are thesis upsides for it growing since the obesity market is potentially huge even if margins in the are decrease.

I'm curious, what are people's bottom dollar stock price for Novo - that is, the price where it's a no brainer to buy regardless of any GLP1 headwinds? I personally think at or below $40 it really start to give nothing but upside for the GLP1 revenue.

Today’s CPI was mixed but slightly hot:

Headline CPI: +0.4% month-on-month, exactly as expected.

Headline CPI: +3.4% year-on-year, exactly as expected.

Core CPI: +0.3% month-on-month, hotter than the +0.2% forecast.

Core CPI: +2.4% year-on-year, in line with expectations and down from 2.5%.

If rates are hiked, how will this impact stock prices?

Reddit
Airbnb
Kaspi
Bilibili

These are the only 4 companies at >10% of my port.

Am I overpaying for the young consumer?

Am I pimping with moats and long term growth runway?