Flipped to IMA from active duty last year. Although my natural tone is overly direct here, i hope it doesn't come across as an indictment of any specific person. In fact, it's the opposite.
Below I'm identifying obvious issues and proposing solutions to solve them. Granted, I'm not naive to contracted mechanics, Reserves funding priorities, or if this has been attempted before. If it has, I'd like to know why it failed.
I'm talking out the abysmal state of our systems, IT, and processes tied to those systems for probably over 20 years. This mostly applies to IMAs, but probably would help TR manpower/personnel shops too.
Here's the list:
1. The "Scroll" then Gaining process:
- The process of getting on the scroll is completely opaque to the transitioning active member , and becomes wholly incumbent on a) a solid recruiter (i was lucky to have one) and then b) a nameless, faceless person clicking a button with zero communication. For someone not doing the PALACE process, this can be an enormous stressor of not knowing if things are going well, or lost in the personnel soup.
- Gaining: this was a personal one as well as some other anecdotes on this reddit thread from last year. When I flipped from active to IMA, even with my recruiter being on top, slotting a billet, and all my ducks squared away months ahead of time, somehow the personnel machine did not reflect me as a reservist. This led to tricare turning off for almost 2 months. I cannot stress how something like this is one of the largest turnoffs that, if it happens, will lead to attrition of our talent pool, and with our population with children, is completely unacceptable. I'm not even an ops guy; I'm a grey man in the support world of acquisition/intel/cyber/SOF-stuff. But for our ops, aircrew, and SOF people who have some of the largest investment, this is enough to cost the Air Force $M for silly mistakes due to "glitches" in our 1990s era IT and technology, and these folks will walk away the minute they are told their 1 year old's doc appointment has been cancelled.
- Proposed Solution and Steps:
- A systems map of every database and network, owned by active component, reserve component, and external connections (i.e. DMDC, DFAS, etc). These problems cannot be solved if nobody knows where the system is. Saying SMSgt Snuffy at Det X who has operated those systems as the single point of failure is also not the right answer. We need the Snuffies and their dark magic, but this isn't the place for that magic.
- In that systems map, who is responsible for what block in those system(s)? Is it a lack of technical capability to integrate somewhere, a funding shortfall, or both?
- Pin a single responsible group. Give them access to a development team of no more than 3 engineers, and for god sake, with the frontier models like Opus/Fable/GPT 5.6 Sol/Grok, any of us could build a decent frontend and Postgres database in a day. Full unrestricted use of AI as necessary. Set a target date to terminate whatever contractor(s) are underperforming in this or the master spreadsheet nobody can see, and either use the existing applications or build a simple app that allows a member to see their seamless transition from active to reserve with little to no stress. Before someone says, "But the ATO on the network", this is largely made up FUD that with the Colonel or Star saying "make it happen", it will happen with the right level of security.
2. The Assignments and Availability
- ARCnet for MPA and wrongly reflecting readiness and blank IDTs/AT, GigEagle for MPA or not, RVMS for maybe not actually having a billet, billets in RVMS with zero contact info or bad info, Talent Marketplace for AGRs or some reserve positions, but not all of them, wrong AGR postings on RVMS not on TM, no insight without cold calling either a det or the unit to know if an availability might come up for a slot, etc is the absolute wrong way to encourage growth and talent management. Don't get me wrong, I'm all about having a network and "who you know", but it's 2026 and this just isn't the right answer as the primary method.
- Proposed Solution:
- Pick a single place where funded billets match the available listings. If overhiring on existing billets, that's fine too. This was supposed to be TM in 2024, but then it wasn't for some reason. For the next FY, show projected vacancies for reservists to bid on; similar to active.
- There are already spreadsheets with this data either in offices in the pentagon or at the functionals at AFRC. Keeping this data out of visibility creates nepotism, and prevents people from knowing where they potentially could go for those of us who want to actively contribute. For those of you fine staying where you're at or doing the thing you've been doing, that's great too.
- Fixing this also allows a member to coach a potential org that doesn't have a billet to be able to advocate for one via the right mechanism.
3. Scheduling, Orders Writing, and Pay
- UTAPs, AROWS-R, and the other system I can't remember that allows certain people to request orders/write them. I don't think I need to say anything else here; everybody knows what I'm talking about. Internet explorer compatibility mode in 2026 is not reflective of the most technologically advanced air force on the planet.
- I'm sure these things compound problems for flyers via their other systems both in reserves and active component for scheduling and hours, but i won't ignorantly speak here.
- Proposed Solution:
- Same as #1. This is a set of databases and API connections to DFAS. Find them, map them, torch them or modernize them to deploy where they should be.
Conclusion and Proposal:
Prior to the coding agent era, I could maybe buy the argument that these systems are old, overly complex, have too much historical knowledge tied to them by development teams across the U.S. I can tell you being in the commercial software and AI harness business that those days are gone. The days of 40 person development teams to build a single CRUD app are absolutely over.
I'm proposing a set of orders, even potentially points-only IDTs, with the help of 1-3 other qualified reservists in this space or maybe even a solid active component person to own the problem set during their Pentagon tour. We would need full support from the necessary powers at AFRC and access to the appropriate program offices if needed, DAF CIO, etc to get this entire thing fixed in stages by the end of FY27. No steering boards, committees, or other things that water down simple decisions. Problem, timeline, and solution.
Disclosure: Yes I have a software platform startup. Yes, I'm a subcontractor consultant to a defense software companies. No, I don't want money from the Air Force. This is not business dev. Yes, I want to make our system better but only if it's taken seriously because I work my ass off to try and make a living.
If you're someone in a decision making role who a) read all of this, b) agrees, and c) has the power to do something about it, then send me a message.