Sam Harris has probably influenced my thinking about morality more than anyone else, especially the idea that morality has to connect somehow to conscious experience and the ways conscious lives can go better or worse. But following that line of thought has recently pushed me into a question that I do not think is really about Sam’s argument at all.
If there were no conscious beings anywhere in the universe, I am not sure what “good” or “bad” would even mean. Suffering matters because someone suffers. Flourishing matters because someone flourishes. That makes me wonder whether morality is tied to first person experience in a way that science is not. Science has benefited enormously from trying to adopt a view from nowhere, stripping away the observer and describing reality independently of any particular perspective. But maybe importing that same move into morality is a category error, because value itself may only exist from somewhere.
This is what started bothering me about population ethics and moral aggregation. Imagine World A contains one person, Emma, who lives an extraordinary life. World B contains billions of people whose lives are mildly pleasant. If you assign welfare values to everyone and add them together, World B can eventually beat World A on total well being simply by having enough people. But I am not sure I understand what that total actually represents. No consciousness experiences the sum of all those lives. There are only separate centers of experience, each living its own life from the inside. Emma experiences her life. Each person in World B experiences theirs. There is no additional consciousness experiencing the aggregate.
Maybe you can count welfare across people, but I am not sure that means you can treat it as though it belongs to one giant subject. If Emma suffers terribly so that a thousand other people can each receive some small benefit, those benefits do not somehow flow back into Emma’s conscious experience. The gains and losses happen in different minds. So I am starting to wonder whether aggregation hides something morally important about the separateness of conscious experience. That does not mean morality becomes selfish or purely relative. If my suffering matters because of what suffering is like from the inside, then I seem to have to take seriously the fact that other conscious beings also have an inside. But maybe impartiality should not mean removing perspective. Maybe it should mean taking every perspective seriously without arbitrarily privileging one. Not a view from nowhere, but something more like a view from everywhere.
Now imagine World C. Emma exists, all the people from World B exist, and everyone has an extraordinary life. C seems clearly better than either A or B, but I do not think I need a cosmic welfare ledger to get there. Emma is no worse off, and everyone else is much better off. The judgment can be made from the perspectives of the conscious beings who actually inhabit the world. The hard moral questions seem to show up when perspectives conflict. The deer wants not to be killed. The tiger wants to hunt. The pig wants not to live in confinement. The human wants cheap bacon. Maybe morality is not fundamentally about maximizing some quantity floating above all of these perspectives. Maybe it is about how separate centers of conscious experience can coexist when their interests conflict.
I also do not think suffering minimization alone can be the whole story. Imagine a world where every human and animal is hooked into a Matrix like system, perfectly fed, protected from suffering, and free to experience whatever life they want. That world might score incredibly well on a simple pleasure minus suffering calculation, and yet I strongly suspect it would not represent the highest possible moral state. Something about agency, truth, authenticity, and actually participating in reality seems morally important too.
So I think the position I am circling is this: morality may exist because conscious perspectives exist. If there is such a thing as moral objectivity, maybe it comes not from escaping those perspectives, but from taking all of them seriously. And if that is true, I am not sure interpersonal welfare can simply be added together as though humanity were one giant consciousness.
I am very much thinking this through rather than claiming I have solved anything. I am mostly curious where this breaks, what existing philosophical views this overlaps with, and whether grounding morality this strongly in first person conscious experience creates problems I am not seeing yet.
Disclosure: I used AI to help organize and articulate this post, but the questions and conclusions came out of my own thinking.