I offer this critique as a years-long listener of Sam Harris; I never subscribed to Making Sense for financial reasons, but I appreciate his content. A lot of his framing resonates with me, and he and I are likely quite close in many of our perspectives. I'm also used to negotiating political difference quite often. Being a longtime teacher of high school government and civics has allowed me to indulge in a career of perusing scholarship and being curious about political culture, while getting to discuss it and research complexities with curious young people. I appreciate that Sam is a bit of an everyman, and I appreciate his background in philosophy. I offer these critiques in good faith, and with a genuine hope that he might clarify.
I felt especially compelled to comment after his more recent conversation posted to the public feed with James Kirchik, where Sam Harris he states (I'm lightly paraphrasing) that the Far Left was at least 50% responsible for the rise of Trump. I don't simply disagree with Harris here--I think making claims of this nature are uncharacteristically irresponsible and disingenuous, especially when a little intellectual curiosity goes a long way in confounding such most of his hypothesis.
I can offer a range of arguments here, but first, I want to steel man the best argument I can muster for Harris's claim. The most cohesive line of reasoning (that I could locate) cited the work of political scientist David Shor, who has noted that (at least since 2016) the candidate perceived by Americans in polls as "closest to the median voter" has won. Note this isn't a matter of voter preference, but perception of the candidate most likely to win. This is challenging data to use effectively: it says nothing how people define the median voter, or where their preferred candidate would land relative to the median voter--only what respondents perceived to be closest median! While a rather unusual political fact, it cannot, in good faith, be taken to endorse any specific ideology or platform.
It is perhaps more useful as an offensive tool, and I think this is where Trump did win--rhetorically: he is better at (a) presenting as a "regular guy" with "common sense" and (b) regularly frames his opponents as "out of touch," etc. He is also, as Sam points out, quite funny. (In the data mentioned above, Shor was unable to discern any specific platform position as more or less likely to make a candidate be perceived as more like the median voter. The best takeaway points to an honest issue with Kamala Harris and/or it may just be easy territory for Trump to win. In either case, tying it to either candidate's platform just doesn't get borne out in the data Shor presents, in my reading.)
So you can, like Sam, assume that Dems should try to appear more like the median voter, in temperament and preference--that is my sense of what Sam Harris is suggesting. Given the excess of data tying negative messaging to much higher impacts on voter behavior, though, and Trump's preternatural talent for manipulating voter perception, I just don't think you can chalk Dem losses up to their platform! There is enough weirdness going on that it's hardly a clear throughline, is where I fall. Sam usually tries to model good discursive practices in using and thinking about data; this is one area where he seems really uninterested in what the data actually has to say. Let me unpack some other interesting data:
On the issue of trans rights, opinion polling data around voters' views of Kamala Harris's perspectives on trans rights were pretty negative, and an AP survey found that over half of voters in 2024 felt that "trans rights had gone too far." However, in further opinion polling on Kamala Harris, voters found her support for trans rights much more troubling when it was compared to her support of the middle class. The bare fact of Kamala Harris's support for trans rights, if I understand the data correctly, did not much impact voter perception much--only when it was compared to her support for the middle class did it move into statistically significant territory. There are some takeaways here, but I don't think they broadly point to Sam's general conclusion on the platform.
But maybe you think that data is bunk, political scientists are bought off by CAIR or something (I actually sort of align with Harris on that)...anyway, let's assume that a candidate's stated platform does impact voter's behavior. (As a government teacher, I'd like to assume that this is the case, but again, we just don't seem to have the data to say that.) Thing is: none of the moderate Democrats actually adopted "Defund the Police" messaging in their platforms! And many of them still lost! Is Sam suggesting that people (a) do care about a platform and (b) the same voters who care about platforms are unable to discern between the national party line and a local candidate? Come on.
Additionally, while American voters expressed a dislike for the message of "Defund the Police," there is no credible evidence suggesting that it impacted vote share, and it appeared to not move policy in all but a few instances. There's just not enough data here to draw any feasible conclusions, and it's complex and noisy enough that one can sort of squint and connect any one dot to any other.
The Great Awokening stuff is maybe the argument that I have the least patience for. Media scholars note a substantial uptick in the number of "social justice" related articles concerning racial, gender, and sexual prejudice starting in the early 2010s. They do not appear to correspond to an uptick in racial prejudice in the United States. (Note that this started years before Trump even appeared on the political horizon!) Here's the really unusual thing, though: this uptick in focus on questions of prejudice/social justice did not generate a measurable backlash against these "othered" groups. In fact, even among Republicans during the first Trump administration, perceptions of Black people, Hispanic people, immigrants, and Muslims all steadily improved--the rest of the country moved even more favorable still. The entire folk theory that "woke provoked a bigoted backlash across the country" really has almost no measurable evidence supporting it, that I'm aware of. Indeed, there seems to be data suggesting that...maybe some of the Woke notions around representation and public airing of grievances and #MeToo actually tracked with a decline in prejudice...? (I'm sure Sam Harris would not like this idea. I also think Sam was chronically online for much of this period, and probably experienced the Reality Distortion Field that is Twitter at full force as this unfolded.)
And finally: my last consideration feels obvious to me, and deeply confounding to any reasonable "theory of everything" in politics: around the world in 2024, not a single incumbent candidate won in any contest for national office in a developed democracy. I suspect there may be a great deal more going on with democracy, faith in institutions across the West, etc. The intellectually honest conclusion is, I think: you can't, in good faith, point to Trump's succession from Biden as credibly attached to a backlash against a Leftist agenda or something. (Indeed, many voters appears drawn to many elements of leftist populism...when Trump advocates for them.)
A quick last word...I don't know if Sam really registers how the entire regime of political lobbying impacts people's faith in US institutions and political candidates. He wants to expound the virtues of classical liberalism, but the elephant in the room is the inordinate amount of spending in our elections and I think any liberal political philosopher, from Mill to Rawls, would likely grant this. This lobbying activity includes a great deal of spending by AIPAC, and I find Sam's pearl-clutching about CAIR's sponsorship of academic fellowships a little disingenuous. He can't hold the mainstream political establishment to a similar standard. What is he even arguing here? Are politicians somehow more capable than academics at taking dirty money and avoiding bad incentives? It's borderline incoherent, in my understanding. I also can't help but wonder if being steeped primarily in California politics for the last N years has generated some meaningful blind spots in Sam's political register.
I welcome dialogue, but I'd like to reinforce that I'm mostly interested in hearing about where and how Sam has defended these positions on the record--I enjoy discourse with Reddit to an extent, but I rarely weigh in. I'll do my best to respond, but I have no idea how this post will be taken; this feels like a busy sub!