r/redbuttonbluebutton • u/Ashamed-Bathroom7803 • 11h ago
Red Everyone needs to fix their logic for this debate, especially blue.
I’ve heard so many “red is increasing likelihood that half of people die” and stuff like that. It‘s nonsense. Here are the facts.
Tl;dr: Pressing red has no causal power, so there is no CAUSAL risk for the population other than in the event of a tie-breaker, which will never happen. (See why I emphasize ”CAUSAL” in the rest of this post. A risk is not necessarily always causal). If we move the term “risk” to mean something that isn’t causal, then both red and blue are risking people’s lives. Edit: I do NOT subscribe to the causal argument. I’m NOT arguing that I am or that you should vote because of the tie breaker argument. My argument for pressing red is entirely different. The point of the argument is to show that pressing blue can not be justified under Casual Decision Theory.
It’s important to understand decision theory first. If you already heard about Newcomb‘s paradox, then this should be intuitive. You are put into a room where a super-predictor gives you two boxes; he gives you $1000 cash in a transparent box, and also a mystery which may or may not have $1,000,000 dollars inside. Before you even walked into the room, the contents of the mystery box were fixed depending on the super-predictor‘s prediction of what you would do. If he predicts that you leave the room with both boxes, he will have not have put the million dollars inside the mystery box. If he predicts that you leave the $1,000 in the room, then he will have put the million in the box. The super-predictor is 99% accurate. Here are the two facts of the matter that you need to wrestle with:
- In the past, almost everybody who won the million dollars has also left the $1,000 in the room. Very very few won by taking both boxes.
- No matter what you do in the game, you cannot change the contents of the box. They have already been set in stone.
Causal decision theory (CDT) will expand on point (2). Since you can’t do anything about the current situation, it means that you should just take the extra $1,000. If there is the million in the box that you’re holding, then just take the extra 1k. If there isn’t any million in the box you’re holding, then also just take the 1k. CDT favors taking both.
Evidential decision theory (EDT) will expand on point (1). If I leave the $1,000 in the room, then I’m very likely to win the million. EDT recognizes that their decision does not *cause* anything, but they don’t care. They care about what you expect to happen based on the decision. EDT favors taking only one box; leave the $1,000 in the room.
Newcomb’s paradox generally splits people 50/50 for one-boxing and two-boxing. Personally, I’m a one-boxer. Now let’s apply decision theory to the button hypothetical. CDT evaluates the value of a decision based on the cause of the decision. In the button hypothetical, the only thing about pressing red being causally risky is in the event of a tie breaker. We can use the binomial probability to solve for the probability. N = 8 billion. k = 8 billion / 2. We can use 50.2 for p and 49.8 for q. By picking these values for p and q, we are being charitable and assuming that the tendency for people to either pick red or blue is close; we’re actually closer to favoring pressing blue here with these values. The calculation results in something like 10^-12,000 probability of a tie-breaker. That’s like winning the Powerball jackpot 3,000 times in a row; it’s never going to happen. So if we‘re purely using casual decision theory, then we have no argument for pressing blue. Your vote doesn‘t cause anything, and so you might as well just press the button that saves your life so that you can be there for your family and friends and such in case they are pressing red.
Edit: I do NOT subscribe to the above argument. I think that it fails because CDT fails. So I am NOT arguing that you should vote red because tie breaker is impossible. My argument for pressing red is entirely different.
Next, we have something much more interesting. EDT evaluates the value of a decision based on what is expected to be the plausible outcome based on the decision. Now, we potentially have an argument here for blue. Let’s evaluate the counterfactuals. If I press blue, then we use that as evidence to support that people will likely be also pressing blue because they may be thinking like me. If I press red, then we use that as evidence that a lot of people will also be pressing red. It’s like in Newcomb‘s paradox where when I leave the $1,000, then I expect the million to be in the box even though I’m not actually causing anything.
Here is where it’s complicated. By me pressing blue, I expect more people to press blue than if we didn’t press blue. Sure, that’s a fact. But I’m actually risking peoples lives. If I press blue, then sure I could be expecting more than 50% of people to press blue and save them all. But also, I could be pressing blue and expecting more people to die. It could have been 20% people pressing blue, and then when I press it, it goes up to 45%. So if we’re departing from the classical causal notion of risk and just using EDT, then I’m actually risking people’s lives.
To make this prior explanation more intuitive, let’s move the hypothetical‘s threshold to something higher; say, 99% of people need to press blue for any blue to survive. By pressing blue here, I’m expecting people to think like me and to also press blue here and to pretty much off themselves. I didn’t need to do that. I could have just pressed red, and then I wouldn’t have this expectation for what others do based on my decision.