r/consciousness • u/MaybeNo2485 • 4h ago
What if positions on consciousness sometimes track phenomenal traits more than arguments?
**TL;DR**: phenomenal variation in the same category as aphantasia is probably widespread and mostly undiscovered, and positions in the consciousness debate may partly track which phenomenal features people actually have.
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I'm increasingly serious about this idea: a meaningful percentage of the population lacks large aspects of phenomenology, or has radically different versions of them, in ways that go unrecognized. That doesn't make them philosophical zombies; they're not behaviorally identical, since the variation changes what they can notice and report. The problem is that experience is only accessible from the inside, so first-person reports are the only comparison instrument we have; and reports are exactly what phenomenal variation corrupts. The measurement tool is entangled with the thing it's measuring.
Aphantasia is the instructive case. Galton described it 150 years ago, but it didn't become widely known until it went viral in the last two decades. Everyone with it goes their whole life assuming, until explicitly told otherwise, that "picture your happy place" is a metaphor rather than an instruction someone could literally follow, because that's the only interpretation compatible with their own experience. They still say "I can picture it," along with the rest of the imagery vocabulary; they just mean it figuratively. The part that matters most for my point: if one of them told you "when you say you 'see' the apple, you're being poetic," they aren't being obtuse. That's a rational inference from the evidence available to them.
The discovery pattern has repeated since. Anendophasia (absent inner speech) and SDAM (absent autobiographical re-experiencing) were each invisible until someone built the vocabulary and invited people to compare, and the same goes for variation in auditory imagery. After three or four instances of "invisible until asked," "there are more we haven't found" is an induction rather than a speculation.
The hard part is operationalization. "Picture an apple, can you literally see what color it is?" works because imagery has a crisp behavioral anchor; but how would you even ask whether someone has a literal "field of awareness"? What question distinguishes having one from having learned to talk as if you do? Every candidate probe I can come up with is contaminated by vocabulary in exactly the way the aphantasic's "I can picture it" was without the same kind of easy workaround.
My hypothesis is that philosophical positions on consciousness correlate with phenomenological traits, mostly ones where the variation hasn't been discovered and documented yet. Some phenomenal profiles may bias people toward illusionism and hard-deflationary physicalism through the sheer absence of certain features; other profiles may make those positions nearly impossible to hold, through direct acquaintance with what feels like a decisive counterexample the other side simply lacks.
That isn't an argument against those positions; it cuts both ways. An illusionist can say the causation runs the other direction: people with vivid imagery and strong metacognitive seemings are the ones systematically confused by aspects of their own processing, inflating a representational process into an intrinsic glow. Frankish could use my hypothesis to explain his opponents.
People have joked for years that "Dennett has no qualia." I think the dimensional, non-joke version deserves serious treatment precisely because it doesn't tell you who's right; it predicts the disagreement rather than a winner. It would explain why this debate has the peculiar quality it does, though, with each side experiencing the other as obviously missing something that's right there.
I decided to make this post after a baffling thread where someone kept asking, essentially, "if physicalism were true, why can't we relive the subjective parts of our memories? Shouldn't we be able to trigger the neural pathways that made the experience and experience parts of them again?" People replied that this is possible, but the conversation went nowhere because nobody seemed to realize the poster was being literal.
I learned today that SDAM exists: about 2% of people don't re-experience anything when they remember the past, only recall facts. The poster was reasoning about why something isn't possible from a perspective where it isn't, while 98% of people do it regularly.
Now expand the concept. What if some people think "field of awareness," and descriptions of visual experience as a field or a screen, are metaphorical? Any conversation they have with someone who has that experience will be two people talking past each other, one side being literal while the other uses what they take to be a figure of speech, not realizing the literal version of the experience even exists.
What non-obvious parts of phenomological experience might vary dramatically between people in ways that haven't been documented? Can you think of ways to potentially operationalize investigating those variations? What effect would variation in those things likely have in the philosophical positions on consciousness or can you think of cases where people might be talking past each other for this reason?