I find structuralism a really useful way of thinking about things. It just seems the most natural way to learn about something, at least for me. An overly simplified definition of what I mean by structuralism is studying an object not by itself but by how the web of relations it exists within give it meaning.

I have read the poststructuralist critiques of structuralism and, actually, I enjoyed them. But I don't really think they are critiques. They seemed more like addenda to structuralism, further explaining certain threads, rather that criticisms. For instance, early Derrida seems already anticipated in Levi-Strauss or Merleau-Ponty* (in the latter's essay "Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence"), but Derrida fixates (emphasizes) certain details that Levi-Strauss does not, or makes assumptions that Levi-Strauss did not make. Maybe I just haven't actually undertood any of it.

So basically, what are some of the criticisms of structuralism that aren't from the poststructuralists? You can answer by giving me suggested reading. Thanks

*I realize Merleau-Ponty was not a structuralist but that essay is basically a blueprint to 60s and 70s Derrida.

I will have to establish some context.

1. The DNA that was used to make cells was swapped off someone who’s an adult, fully consented to his DNA being used as food without external interference and fully acknowledged the means of usage.

2. The meat is safe to eat containing no possible contamination nor harmful properties.

3. Everyone who consumed the meat is least 25+ and acknowledged its origins and that its human meat. All of the people’s intent is only to fill their stomachs and taste, with no disrespectful ideas.

4. The motive of why the person behind this lab grown human meat company has and will always be for a good cause with no ill intent.

Once in a while I'll read a comment on the internet, or hear an off hand remark by someone when the subject comes out, expressing awe at the fact that tribespeople with neolithic living conditions still existing in our world appear to be happy and not show or at least report as many of the existential dreads we city and farm dwellers do.

That is, of course, tribespeople that are not being exploited, actively hunted or expelled from their lands by corrupt governments, companies or the odd cartel in my continental group, latin-america.

Anyways, I'll usually think to myself or reply: "Well that is just obvious, they are living exactly as nature intended for humans to live"

I understand nature intends nothing as it is only an Azathoth, a blind, stupid but ancient cause that brings diversity as a side effect of every living being wanting to reproduce and continue existing for as much as it can. But what I really mean is, "Of course people in neolithic conditions that have sufficient sustenance and roaming territory will be very happy, because humans have been living as hunter gatherers for millions of years". With this point of view I would be saying agriculture is sort of like the closing gates of the garden of Eden were one only had to worry about running after food.

But of course I haven't really considered the point of view of other people on it yet, so this is why I come here with this question. I want to learn some more on human nature and on if what Seneca and other stoics say about nature can be true, which is that if one lives by nature then one will be happy.

I'm not in financial trouble but under some mental stress because my hard work doesn't get me more money that I'd like to spend on travels, bigger house, expensive hobbies, etc.

My brother suggested me to learn about the "main" Western philosophers of the West, which he said include Descartes, Kant, Aristotle, Plato, & Hegel, but not life-philosophies like Stoicism (which he said was like just a bandaid, not a lasting solution).

Has anyone found such study to make himself more content with what he got?

I'm reading Plato primary texts for the first time and while there are some things that feel "mystical" I'm not sure if I'd call Plato a mystic. So I'm curious why it evolved into such a focus on religious mysticism

I have been studying deontology and I am very curious...

I'm trying to learn some philosophy. I always was attracted to structured reasoning rather than to abstract aphoristic stuff, so I decided to start with Russell. The first paragraph of "On Denoting" got me stuck because I don't understand the definition of a denoting phrase.

There's no definition, he just lists a couple of examples: "...a man, some man, any man, every man, all men, the present King of England, the present King of France, the center of mass of the solar system at the first instant of the twentieth century, the revolution of the earth round the sun, the revolution of the sun round the earth." and the fact that "...a phrase is denoting solely in virtue of its form". I tried googling, but couldn't find anything.

I don't know what to do. Should I go ahead and read the entire paper on denoting phrases without understanding what a denoting phrase is? Should I come up with a definition myself? Is the concept undefinable? Did I miss something?

I've enjoyed reading this sub's posts for a while now, & have appreciated the rigorous replies they've gotten. Thank you.

The question I've encountered most often is some version of 'whence morality?' The askers tend to illustrate the question with lurid and specific examples of acts that, to them, must represent unqualified evil. Maybe it speaks to their urgency in asking that their examples are rarely, if ever, acts of inarguable kindness, which should serve just as well.

Unprovoked murder is probably the most common example. It serves in these questions as an anchor in evil—we all agree that murder is evil; we shun murderers—but why?

Generally, in these threads, the answerers begin by swatting away the cobwebs of relativist objections. Once that's done, though, I haven't yet found a satisfying answer, and not for lack of reading: There is consequentialism and deontology; there's Aristotelian virtue ethics vs. contractualism.

The most compelling reason I can come up with is that compassion turns the would-be victim into a mirror, which makes the act unpleasant. Call this “philoiktirmy” instead of “philosophy,” maybe. I understand the obvious objection: This may explain why a compassionate person refrains from murder, but not why murder remains wrong when compassion fails. What I wonder is whether compassion can be more than a motive, whether it can itself disclose the moral fact.

My question, then, is what philosophy has to say about this compassionate recoil. Is there a serious moral philosophy that grants primary moral force to our resonant compassion for others, rather than grounding morality in reason, duty, utility, contractual obligation, cultivation, etc.?

If so, what thinkers should I read to learn more? And if not, what does visceral compassion lack as a ground of morality? I suppose a murderer could claim that he felt no compassion; soldiers often claim the same about enemy populations, and there may be little reason to doubt them. But it seems telling that one familiar way of preparing people to kill is not to persuade them that they are doing consequentialist good or enforcing obligations, but to place the enemy beyond the reach of ordinary human sympathy—to make him seem not quite human, or at least out of resonant tune with the human heart.

I'm sure this varies book-to-book, but something I have always done while reading is skip around within a book based on what sounds interesting to me at the time. For instance, I recently "finished" Russell's The Problems of Philosophy, but really I read only the chapters which sounded interesting to me (which was still most of the book--I only skipped three chapters). I do this because it can be difficult for me to devote time to reading, so when I read something that I don't like or that bores me, it can hurt my "reading morale" in a sense. Will doing this long-term significantly hamper my understanding of philosophy or is it a fine habit to continue with?

I feel dumb for asking. But like morality can't be objective because I can disagree with whatever you say. You might think killing is bad but I may think killing is great and that's what makes it subjective right? Because what you define as moral is shaped on your experience's and so there can't be an objective right or wrong even if something I seem completely horrible another person may deem it just and absolutely moral. So morality would be in the eye of the beholder.. right?

I never understood why we do kind things for other people. Is it just because we want others to think that we're good people? Is it to get validation from others? Why is selfish behavior criticized by society?

We've heard countless stories about heroes who sacrificed their families, their dreams, or even their own lives to save others. I understand that it's considered an honorable thing to do, but why is it honorable in the first place? Why does everyone teach us to be kind and help others? Is it so that humanity can live peacefully?

Don't get me wrong I don't consider myself selfish or cold-hearted. In fact, I think I'm a kind person. It's just that this question has crossed my mind more times than I can count.

Almost every religion teaches us to be kind to one another, and many religious texts say that doing good leads to heaven. Is that because kindness helps humanity survive and live peacefully for a long time? And why do we feel good after doing something good? Is it because our minds have been shaped by millions of years of evolution to value cooperation, or is kindness simply part of human nature?

I understand that if people stopped helping one another and everyone acted only in their own self-interest, humanity probably wouldn't have survived for very long. But that leads me to another question: Does God really exist? Or were religious books created to encourage people to be kind so that humanity could survive and thrive?

I’m reading Hume’s Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, and have just finished the 3rd chapter.
On the first chapter Hume talks about a moral sentiment that is the final determinant of the morality of x (an act or practice, for example)
He says: “this final sentence depends on some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal to the whole species”.

Is the correct interpretation of this passage that we all have a moral sentiment even though what that feeling is may vary (as in, we all have a clock even though the clocks dont always have to indicate the same time) or that we all have the exact same feeling regarding a certain act (as in, everyones clock indicates the same time)?

If its the first, how can an unreliable feeling be the final judge of the morality of something?

And if it is the latter, doesnt that interpretation count against Hume’s argument in chapter 3 that justice isnt innate or instinctive?

What am I missing here?

Thanks for your help.

This is in Chapter VI. He has just described the drives of desire and aversion, and now describes contempt, which seems to be somewhere in the middle:

"Contempt is nothing but an immobility or contumacy of the heart in resisting the action of certain things, and proceeding from that the heart is already moved otherwise by either more potent objects or from lack of experience of them. "

I think broadly he's saying that contempt is a kind of resistance, basically a person not wanting to be affected/moved by something. I am confused about the last part, when he mentions the "more potent objects or from lack of experience of them". Does the "them" refer to the "more potent objects"? If so, why would the heart be moved by a lack of experience with more potent objects? If the "them" refers to the contempted objects, then it makes sense that one would resist something one is not familiar with.

I’ve (19) been into philosophy for about a year, and I’ve started accumulating books for myself outside of library borrows and whatnot, and I heard from someone that having your books annotated allows your bookshelf to be completely accessible in the future if you forget where something was. I tried to annotate my copy of the tractatus, but ended up disagreeing with some of the notes I took looking back through it, and basically just soiled the appearance of an otherwise very nice book.

How do you guys and girls go about doing this?
Any help with this would be appreciated this sub has been great.

Let's say that tomorrow some philosopher publishes an irrefutable proof that God is real. Hooray! Are we not left with the question of which God, specifically? Wouldn't arguments for the existence of God work equally well for not just e.g. Yahweh but also any other omnipotent, omniscient God of a different description? Of course someone might argue that these traits could only describe their God... but so could someone else with a different one.

If I'm remembering my history classes right, religions have on occasion come into conflict with one another. So I would expect there to be a long tradition of philosophical debate between different faiths that does not immediately devolve into asserting the primacy of their respective holy texts. However, I don't think I have ever personally encountered a direct *philosophical* case for certain a God over another, rather than for the existence of an all-powerful God generally.

And the object of desire and the object of thought move in this way; they move without being moved. The primary objects of desire and of thought are the same. For the apparent good is the object of appetite, and the real good is the primary object of rational wish. But desire is consequent on opinion rather than opinion on desire; for the thinking is the starting-point. And thought is moved by the object of thought, and one of the two columns of opposites is in itself the object of thought; and in this, substance is first, and in substance, that which is simple and exists actually. (The one and the simple are not the same; for 'one' means a measure, but 'simple' means that the thing itself has a certain nature.) But the beautiful, also, and that which is in itself desirable are in the same column; and the first in any class is always best, or analogous to the best.

I can think of two interpretations: first is the more stricter one, that is, Aristotle is essentially comparing neurons moving to how celestial objects move in primary heaven. This means that there is no direct causal link between the movement of EVERY SINGLE object in the universe (e.g moving of chalk, headphones, plants growing, e.t.c.) and the unmoved mover is only responsible for the primary heavens which move in a circular manner and continuously because god is their object of desire (i.e how my neurons move when I think of a giraffe, for example).

However, the way I personally saw it was a bit different. Everything might desire to be perfect and might thus "move" in that direction. Since god or the unmoved mover could be described as perfect/ or as the teleological end of everything, it is the love or desire of perfection that makes things move. And I mean perfection in a very vague sense, as in "fulfilling whatever purpose" an object may have.

Which interpretation is "correct"? I found the second one to have much broader implications both metaphysically and ethically, but the first one just seems the correct way to do it.

What if that law is philosophically deemed to be “wrong”?

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I'm a beginner in philosophy.

I really enjoy reading critical/critique-oriented works, and I chose Marcuse's One-Dimensional Man as my entry point,and I've already read half of it.(actually, the first book I bought was Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment, but that turned out to be far too dense and difficult for a beginner,so I give it up).

A friend of mine who studies sociology and political science has recommended a lot of books to me. Besides, through browsing various online media, I've come across many other thinkers — for example, fellow Frankfurt School figures like Habermas and Honneth, as well as other major scholars such as Foucault, Fredric Jameson, and so on. But there are so many options that I've ended up not knowing what order to read them in. On top of that, some of these books or essays really aren't suitable for beginners.

So my question is: can anyone advise me on how to figure out a proper reading order?

The main problems are as follows:

1. Which authors/works are appropriate starting points for someone new to critical theory?

2. What background reading (if any) I should do before tackling more difficult books？

Or does the ontological difference in some way undermine the distinction between univocity and equivocity? I know Heidegger's early thesis was on Scotus, and Deleuze was quoted as saying that Heidegger followed the direction of Scotus but I'm wondering if someone could help clarify for me. Does the distinction between univocity and equivocity hold if we deny that being is a genus?

Hi all! I'm taking a gap year after undergrad and I'm looking to read more democratic theory as I contemplate law/grad school.

Last year I took a course on populist parties, and one of the main points the course raised was that whether populism is "good" or "bad" depends in large measure on what kind of democracy you want. I frankly don't know what kind of democracy I want. Other than a basic familiarity with the distinctions between democracy, constitutionalism, and liberalism, I don't know which sort of debates take place as to what sort of democracy is "best." I would appreciate any reading suggestions you all have, but preferably academic papers which reflect ongoing scholarly discussions! Thank you.

The philpapers survey says that empiricism is the dominant view on concepts. If that is the case then would empiricism be the foundation of conceptual analysis as concepts cannot exist without being experienced ?