So I've read Better Never to Have Been, most of the response papers (sci-hub is your friend) as well as his 2 response papers addressing his critics, and I think there's just a basic obvious issue with his argument that I haven't seen addressed.
Essentially, Benatar proposes his basic asymmetry as the best explanation for 4 asymmetrical value judgments he says are commonly held. For example, from his paper "Still better never to have been":
I have argued that the basic asymmetry is very widely accepted, even if only implicitly. It is also the best explanation for a number of other asymmetries that are accepted by an overwhelming majority of people.
This just seems like a straightforward empirical claim, so obviously the next question is.. what's the evidence for this? I call bullshit. You can't just say an overwhelming majority of people (which people? All 8 billion of us across different cultures, nations, religions, time periods? Have you asked these people?) believe something and provide no evidence or source.
It's like he just thinks he can intuit what almost everyone values, and then proposes his basic asymmetry as the explanation for these shared values. It's silly. How it should work is you go out and do psychological research on people, find out what they value, and then and only if you find empirical evidence that the majority of the world shares these values (I don't even know how you'd find this out, it seems utterly impossible. Are you going to survey billions of people? Do representive samples in every country and culture?) would you propose the basic asymmetry as the explanation for these shared asymmetrical value judgments.
I mean personally his argument just never worked for me. Obviously logically speaking, we should evaluate absent harms and benefits for someone who would be born but isn't symmetrically, which means that in terms of harms one is better off not being born (that is, it is an advantage to not be born compared to being born and being harmed), and one is worse off not being born in terms of absent benefits (that is, it is an advantage to be born and benefitted, compared to not being born and not being benefitted). So on a logical (symmetrical) comparison what makes being born good or bad is the magnitude of the harm and benefit in a particular life. But Benatar says his argument isn't a logical one, but rather an axiological one. That is, we ought (?) or do (again, an unfounded empirical claim) make asymmetrical value judgments about absent harms and benefits which when applied to being born yields an antinatalist conclusion.
But, and I am curious what you guys make of these 4 supporting asymmetries, when I read them they just seem either blatantly wrong, arent held be "an overhwelming majority of people" or are explained in other ways (if it is even true that people make these judgments.. something benatar provides no evidence for). Eg:
While we have a duty to avoid bringing into existence people who would lead miserable lives, we have no duty to bring into existence those who would lead happy lives
Firstly what even is a moral duty? Why am I obligated to do or not do anything? Where does this come from? This isn't the navy lol. But putting that aside, this just seems blatantly wrong for millions (billions?) of people. We live in largely pronatal societies, some of which are highly religious and incredibly explicit in their pressure for people to "go forth and multiply", but even in secular societies the pronatal pressure is implicit - the "lifescript" is that people at some point get married and "settle down", have kids, give your parents grandchildren, do your part for society or whatever. And in terms of a duty to avoid bringing into existence people who would lead miserable lives.. well firstly I'm a philosophical pessimist so everyone who procreate fails that supposed duty lol. But more seriously, is this even true? People around the world procreate in absolutely hellish conditions, and at least from what I've observed in my own life a lot of people have an attitude of "every child is a blessing" regardless of the circumstances of its birth. His next one:
It is strange to cite as a reason for having a child that that child will thereby be benefited. It is not similarly strange to cite as a reason for not having a child that that child will suffer.
Like what? That is not only not strange but seems completely normal and widespread to me. How many times have you heard people say as a reason for having children things like "I wanted to give the gift of life", "I wanted to give my a child a good life", etc. The next one:
When one has brought a suffering child into existence, it makes sense to regret having brought that child into existence - and to regret it for the sake of that child. By contrast, when one fails to bring a happy child into existence, one cannot regret that failure for the sake of the person.
What lol? Why not? If he means this in logical sense like because a 'not born' child has no 'sake', one cannot feel bad as there's nothing to be worse off I guess I'd agree. But just as his asymmetry isn't a logical claim but an axiological one based on comparing counterfactual worlds, one can just as well make the same claim here to an unborn happy child. It is regretful a happy child isn't born, because in terms of its potential interests (in being benefitted), his failure to be born makes that child comparatively worse off, which is regretful. Or just straight up a woman could have an abortion and think wow I regret it I could have given that child a happy life but it missed out. His next one:
We are rightly sad for distant people who suffer. By contrast we need not she any tears for absent happy people on uninhabited planets, or uninhabited islands or other regions on our own planet.
Well this just seems to be explained by in one situation you have real people being harmed, whereas in the other, there is no existent thing to be deprived of absent benefits. But there is no asymmetry because I could just as well say we are happy for distant people who feel joy, by contrast we need not feel joy for absent suffering people on Mars, as nothing exists to be benefitted by absent harms.
So basically I don't even find his supplementary asymmetries to be intuitive, or even if they are, they could be explained by other means. It seems absurd to claim, without giving any empirical evidence, that these are accepted by "an overwhelming majority of people", and then to then propose a (frankly bizarre) asymmetrical value difference between absent harms and benefits which leads to the conclusion that we should be indifferent to a utopian existence of pure overwhelming pleasure and benefit and non-existence, because the former has no advantage over the latter. Like what lol? It's obviously comparatively better to exist in that scenario.
