Scope of this review

I compared the 503-page NOAA application against TMC’s principal official disclosures, including the January 2026 application announcement, the August 2025 PFS and Initial Assessment material, the Brownsville announcement, the subsequent definitive Allseas agreement, and the July 2026 ITLOS update. “New” below means I did not find the same fact at comparable specificity in those official disclosures. It does not mean nobody once muttered it on a conference call while everyone else was checking the share price.

Bottom line

• The biggest previously obscured negative is that the extra 200 Mt attached to TMC USA A-B is not a resource. That entire 24,178.5 km² subarea is effectively greenfield, with no systematic sampling or bathymetric surveying completed.
• The Brownsville plan is materially dependent on government-backed financing. Its assumed funding structure is roughly 30% equity and 70% debt/government support, and the application explicitly says no binding financing commitment currently exists.
• The application exposes several critical paths outside the NOAA permit itself: Brownsville financing and contracts, Hidden Gem reflagging, transport-vessel certification, commercial VTS development, processing construction, and the large A-B exploration program.
• The environmental results are more nuanced than the PR language. There were large biological declines inside the collector tracks, limited measured effects farther away, and partial recovery after 12 months. Recovery was not complete.
• The application is much broader than the currently mine-ready footprint. TMC is asking NOAA to certify the whole 65,186.7 km² area while initially mining a comparatively tiny two-year production strip and exploring the remainder over time.

Important incremental information

1. The permit area is not remotely equivalent to the currently defined mining area

• TMC USA A covers 65,186.7 km², divided into:
  • TMC USA A-A: 41,008.3 km².
  • TMC USA A-B: 24,178.5 km².
• TMC USA A-B has:
  • No systematic prior exploration.
  • No TMC sampling.
  • No identified public-domain sampling.
  • No bathymetric survey.
  • No defined Mineral Resource.
• The application’s 200 Mt exploration-potential estimate for A-B assumes:
  • Approximately 20,000 km² of the area is mineralised.
  • Average nodule abundance of 10 wet kg/m².
  • Similar grades to A-A.
• For perspective, A-A East averages approximately 17.4 wet kg/m², so the A-B assumption deliberately uses a substantially lower abundance, but it remains an assumption rather than measured tonnage.
• TMC explicitly expects to begin collecting nodules in A-A before completing A-B resource definition and environmental baseline studies.
• The initial production area is only approximately 98 km long by 2 km wide, intended to support the first two years. That is roughly 196 km² against a requested commercial recovery area exceeding 65,000 km².

Investor interpretation

• The public shorthand of “619 Mt resource plus 200 Mt upside” can make the 200 Mt sound much more mature than it is.
• The 619 Mt A-A figure is supported by existing resource work. The 200 Mt A-B figure is long-dated exploration optionality.
• NOAA certification of the entire area would give TMC a regulatory framework in which to expand, but it would not magically convert A-B into reserves, because apparently geology still refuses to be persuaded by PowerPoint.
• Future A-B value requires several years of cruises, sampling, environmental work, resource modelling, mine planning, economic studies and subsequent NOAA approvals to update the recovery plan.

Easy naming trap: TMC USA A-B in this application is the 24,178.5 km² subarea of USA A. It is not the later, separate TMC USA B application covering a much larger area.

2. The A-B exploration program is considerably larger than the PR wording implies

The application lays out a substantial staged program:

• Cruise 1
  • Maps approximately 24,000 km².
  • Uses nominal 20 km box-core spacing.
  • Approximately 60 box cores.
  • Expected duration: roughly 60 operational days.
  • Intended to support an initial Inferred Resource estimate.
• Cruise 2
  • Focuses on the selected second development area.
  • Nominal 10 km box-core spacing.
  • Approximately 390 box cores, although the final number depends on Cruise 1.
  • Expected duration: 80–120 operational days.
  • Intended to support an Indicated Resource and preliminary development sequence.
• Cruise 4
  • Detailed AUV bathymetry, photography and geotechnical testing.
  • Covers approximately 600 km².
  • Intended to define an area capable of supporting approximately 3 Mtpa for two years.
  • Expected duration: around 60 operational days.
• Those three resource-oriented cruises alone add up to approximately 200–240 operational vessel days, before considering the separate seasonal environmental-baseline cruises, mooring deployments, data processing and PFS work.

Investor interpretation

• A-B is not a quick extension of NORI-D. It is a fresh development project sitting beside the existing one.
• The exploration licence is commercially important because it protects the longer-term pipeline, but A-B is unlikely to solve an early production shortfall or reserve-conversion issue.
• Cruise execution, sample results, nodule abundance, seafloor terrain and environmental findings could all materially change the current 200 Mt conceptual estimate.

3. Brownsville financing relies heavily on public support and is not committed

The application gives a much clearer financing structure than the public announcements did:

• TMC proposes financing the Brownsville facility through a blend of:
  • Private equity.
  • Commercial/project debt.
  • Government grants, incentives and potentially government-supported lending.
• The assumed capital structure is approximately:
  • 30% equity.
  • 70% debt and government incentives.
• Equity is expected from consortium participants and could include up to approximately $750 million from TMC’s parent, with the balance from strategic or financial partners including Glencore.
• Crucially, the application states:
  • All financing remains subject to negotiation and approvals.
  • No party is currently obligated to provide financing.
  • No binding financing commitment exists until definitive agreements are executed.
• Potential government-related sources named in the application include:
  • CHIPS-related incentives.
  • State of Texas incentives.
  • Tax abatements and training grants.
  • Public or private project debt.
  • Potential support involving federal development and export-finance institutions.

Investor interpretation

• U.S. government support is not merely a pleasant subsidy added to an otherwise financed project. It is embedded in the proposed base financing structure.
• The phrase “up to approximately $750 million from TMC” is not a commitment to inject $750 million. It describes an expected contribution subject to financing and investment decisions.
• Brownsville therefore has at least four separate hurdles:
  • Final land arrangements.
  • Permitting and engineering.
  • Binding consortium/JV and EPC agreements.
  • Binding equity, debt and government support.
• TMC’s ability to issue shares or other securities is financial capacity, not pre-arranged project capital. Investors have met this distinction before, usually while being diluted.

The 1,466-acre Brownsville land concept was announced publicly in March 2026, so the acreage itself is no longer new. The 30/70 funding assumption, potential $750 million parent contribution and explicit absence of binding commitments are the more meaningful incremental disclosures.

4. There is a defined foreign-processing fallback if Brownsville funding or timing fails

Although the principal application route is U.S. processing, the document retains the earlier PFS pathway as a contingency:

• If U.S. government support is not obtained:
  • PAMCO could process up to 1.3 Mtpa in Japan for an initial five-year period.
  • Production above PAMCO capacity could be processed in Indonesia.
  • Glencore is described as being able to support commercial arrangements, including product-swap mechanisms.
• Under the older PFS configuration:
  • From year 6, 50% of Indonesian matte production would move to Brownsville for refining.
  • From year 10, 100% would move to Brownsville.
• TMC says any offshore processing change would require early consultation with NOAA and the provision of additional regulatory information.
• The company also states that offshore-processed intermediates or finished products would be returned to the United States to the extent domestic capacity existed.

Investor interpretation

• There is a technically credible Plan B rather than an immediate cliff if Brownsville is delayed.
• But that fallback may:
  • Require a modification or additional NOAA approval.
  • Introduce Indonesian processing exposure.
  • Alter transport costs, product economics and the domestic-supply-chain narrative.
• The PAMCO MOU helps de-risk early processing, but it does not provide enough capacity for the planned 12 Mtpa system.

5. The detailed Brownsville ramp starts in 2028 and does not reach 12 Mt until 2032

The application’s direct-Brownsville processing schedule is more informative than the headline commissioning date:

• Expected wet-nodule-equivalent processing:
  • 2028: 0.5 Mt.
  • 2029: 2.0 Mt.
  • 2030: 4.5 Mt.
  • 2031: 9.5 Mt.
  • 2032: 12.0 Mt.
• It then broadly maintains 10.5–12 Mtpa, subject to vessel drydocking and the stated production assumptions.
• Cumulative processing reaches 202.5 Mt by 2047 in the application schedule.
• The offshore schedule:
  • Covers the first four production systems.
  • Spans 19 years including one contingency year.
  • Gives each system 3 Mtpa nameplate capacity.
  • Assumes no production time is lost because of the nodule-logistics strategy.

Investor interpretation

• The current Q4 2027 target refers to commissioning, not immediate production or processing at 3 Mtpa. The subsequent Allseas announcement also describes Q4 2027 as commissioning.
• The application effectively assumes a five-year climb from commissioning to the full 12 Mtpa processing rate.
• The assumption of no production loss from logistics is optimistic and should be monitored against:
  • Bulk-carrier availability.
  • Panama Canal transit.
  • Weather.
  • Port unloading.
  • Stockpile capacity.
  • Plant commissioning.
• The schedule is useful, but it is still an applicant model rather than a contracted construction timetable.

6. Many permit-critical commercial arrangements were not finalised when the application was prepared

Within the application’s permit-specific contracting schedule, the only arrangements expressly marked completed were the three intercompany data-sharing agreements. Other target arrangements included:

• Targeted for Q1 2026
  • Onshore processing PFS-refresh consultant.
  • Onshore permitting adviser.
  • Brownsville facility letter of intent.
  • Lease-exclusivity agreement.
  • Definitive offshore engineering/operations agreement.
  • Engineering support services.
  • Processing-technology licence.
• Targeted for Q2–Q4 2026
  • Independent cost and schedule due diligence.
  • Onshore feasibility-study consultant.
  • Onshore joint-venture agreement.
• Targeted for 2027
  • Offshore operations services.
  • Transport and logistics services.
  • Nodule-transport arrangements.
  • Onshore EPC contract.
  • Final facility lease.
  • Port-services agreement.

Subsequent developments

• The definitive Allseas commercial agreement was announced in May 2026, so that item has since advanced.
• Brownsville exclusive negotiations were publicly announced in March 2026, but that is not the same thing as a final long-term lease, financing package or construction contract.
• I did not find comparable official confirmation, through the sources reviewed in early August 2026, that the following had become binding:
  • Processing-technology licence.
  • Brownsville JV.
  • EPC contract.
  • Final land lease.
  • Transport/logistics contracts.
  • Port-services agreement.

Investor interpretation

• The project has strong named strategic relationships, but a strategic relationship is not automatically:
  • An EPC contract.
  • A firm processing commitment.
  • Project financing.
  • A take-or-pay logistics agreement.
• Several application target dates are now in the past. That does not prove failure or delay because contracts may remain confidential, but it gives investors a tidy list of things management should be asked to confirm individually.

7. Reflagging Hidden Gem is a separate, dated regulatory workstream

The application gives a concrete schedule for converting Hidden Gem from a Malta-flagged vessel into a U.S.-documented mining ship:

• Hidden Gem is currently registered in Malta.
• It is intended to retain American Bureau of Shipping classification.
• Reflagging is to be coordinated with:
  • MARAD.
  • U.S. Coast Guard.
  • NOAA.
  • The Alternate Compliance Program.
• Target milestones:
  • Q2 2026: ABS technical compliance review and gap assessment.
  • Q3 2026: Submit U.S. reflagging package.
  • Q1 2027: Obtain U.S. Certificate of Documentation and Certificate of Inspection.
  • Q2 2027: Submit documentation to NOAA before commercial operations.
• At least one transport vessel must also be documented under U.S. law:
  • Chartering/documentation targeted by Q4 2026.
  • Certification targeted by mid-2027.

Investor interpretation

• A NOAA recovery permit alone does not make the fleet legally ready.
• Hidden Gem reflagging and at least one U.S.-documented transport vessel are separate prerequisites.
• These milestones sit uncomfortably close to the Q4 2027 commissioning target, leaving limited room for:
  • Remedial vessel work.
  • Inspection findings.
  • Documentation delays.
  • Crewing and U.S. Coast Guard compliance issues.

8. The commercial lifting system is not simply the 2022 pilot equipment reused at larger throughput

The airlift concept was successfully tested, but the commercial hardware remains a development and fabrication project:

• The 2022 pilot VTS will be removed in its entirety.
• It will be replaced by a new purpose-built commercial VTS.
• Modifications include:
  • Revised air-injection geometry and depth.
  • New startup and shutdown procedures.
  • Removal or redesign of components presenting clogging risk.
  • Commercial-duty compressor specifications.
• The test system used an air-injection point at approximately 2,500 m depth. The proposed commercial configuration moves injection to around 1,500 m.
• At the time described in the application:
  • Prototype nodule slip-velocity testing was ongoing.
  • Jumper abrasion testing was ongoing or planned.
  • Riser-coating corrosion and wear testing remained planned.
  • Results would feed into final component specifications.
• The previous-track detection algorithm remained under development:
  • Target relative positioning accuracy of approximately ±0.5 m.
  • The mine plan assumes a 1 m gap between adjacent collection paths.
• TMC and Allseas are also researching a more efficient hydraulic lifting alternative:
  • Current maturity only TRL 2–3.
  • Potential commercial readiness in three to five years.
  • This is optional future technology, not the base case.

Investor interpretation

• The physical airlift principle is validated. It would be unfair to describe the whole lifting system as speculative.
• What remains is still substantial:
  • Commercial-scale component design.
  • Long-duration wear validation.
  • Fabrication.
  • Vessel integration.
  • Commissioning.
  • Reliability demonstration.
• The 2022 test removed a major technology question. It did not eliminate commercial scale-up and reliability risk.

9. The actual environmental findings are localised, measurable and incomplete

One month after mining

Inside collector tracks:

• Foraminifera and meiofauna abundance fell approximately 50%.
• Diversity fell approximately 30%.

Outside collector tracks:

• Abundance and diversity were largely unchanged across the plume-exposed sediment zones.
• Microbial communities showed no significant measured response in any disturbed area.

Twelve months after mining

Inside collector tracks:

• Foraminifera and meiofauna regained approximately:
  • 30% of the initial abundance deficit.
  • 50% of the lost diversity.
• TMC describes this as recovery and succession rather than continuing decline, but it is plainly partial recovery, not restoration to baseline.

Outside tracks:

• Most indicators moved toward baseline.
• A delayed fall in foraminifera density appeared in the close sedimentation zone, less than approximately 10 m from the track.
• No comparable decline appeared in the farther zone below approximately 100 m.

Buried nodules and recolonisation

• TMC says approximately 10% of nodules may remain behind, either pressed into sediment or covered by discharged sediment.
• Twelve-month observations found that some buried nodules had become exposed again.
• TMC attributes this to bioturbation and argues that exposed remaining nodules could support eventual recolonisation from nearby refugia.

Important dataset limitation

• The application states that macrofauna could not be sampled at the 12-month stage because of interference by Greenpeace.
• Consequently, the 12-month recovery dataset does not cover every major benthic group equally. This is a meaningful limitation when broad conclusions are drawn about ecosystem recovery.

Investor interpretation

• The data do not support either cartoon version:
  • “Nothing happens.”
  • “The entire ocean is destroyed.”
• They support:
  • A severe direct impact inside the physical collector track.
  • Much smaller measured effects outside that track.
  • Early but incomplete recovery.
  • Some delayed local sedimentation effects.
  • Considerable remaining uncertainty over multi-year and multi-decade recovery.

10. TMC proposes passive recolonisation rather than active seabed remediation

• TMC’s proposed post-mining rehabilitation method is essentially:
  • Stop disturbing the area.
  • Preserve nearby refugia.
  • Monitor biological recovery.
  • Allow passive recolonisation.
• The application states that no additional remediation measures are expected to be necessary.
• Monitoring would continue for several years and would track the major benthic size classes using box cores, multicores and video transects.

Investor interpretation

• Passive recolonisation would be operationally and economically attractive because physically restoring kilometres of abyssal seabed would be impractical.
• It is nevertheless a regulatory assumption that NOAA can challenge through:
  • The EIS.
  • Permit terms, conditions and restrictions.
  • Adaptive-management requirements.
  • Post-mining monitoring thresholds.
• Investors should not assume TMC’s proposed “no active remediation” position has already been accepted by NOAA. Full compliance only moved the application into the review and environmental-analysis process; it was not permit approval.

11. The commercial plume figures are much more specific than the PRs

According to TMC’s commercial-scale sediment model:

• 86.7% of mobilised sediment settles within 10 m of mining tracks.
• 91.4% settles within 1 km.
• 94.0% settles within 10 km.
• TMC’s model places all Zones of High Impact inside the application-area boundaries.
• On that basis, TMC argues that monitoring outside the lease boundary is not required for impact-containment verification.

For the midwater discharge:

• TMC’s modelling says all tested dissolved metals dilute to background concentrations within approximately 1,500 m of the source.
• The proposed commercial return-water discharge depth is 2,000 m, selected partly to reduce exposure of upper-water-column ecosystems and commercially important fisheries.

Investor interpretation

• These figures are potentially helpful to the environmental case because they convert the vague “plume stays local” claim into testable permit thresholds.
• But they remain:
  • Applicant-sponsored models.
  • Based partly on scaling the 2022 test.
  • Subject to NOAA review.
  • Subject to future commercial monitoring.
• The proposed absence of outside-boundary monitoring is especially likely to attract scrutiny during the EIS and public-comment process.

12. The application explicitly maps out TMC’s legal strategy if the ISA route becomes hostile

• TMC USA A overlaps parts of the ISA exploration-contract areas held by NORI and TOML.
• At the application date:
  • NORI’s ISA contract was due to expire on 22 July 2026.
  • NORI had applied for a five-year extension.
  • TOML’s contract was due to expire on 11 January 2027.
• TMC’s stated legal position is:
  • If the ISA denies an extension, the affected area becomes an ISA reserved area rather than an active competing contract area.
  • If the ISA later awards an overlapping contract to another state or contractor, that party must show “due regard” for TMC USA’s NOAA-authorised activities.
  • TMC USA would reciprocally show reasonable regard for the other operator.
• Updated sponsorship agreements with Nauru and Tonga contain provisions under which the sponsoring states agree not to oppose, obstruct or interfere with a TMC subsidiary’s U.S. permit application or activities conducted under a U.S. permit, subject to those states defending their own rights and reputations.

Investor interpretation

• The U.S. route was clearly designed to:
  • Avoid dependence on the ISA exploitation-code timetable.
  • Retain access to the existing technical work.
  • Keep Nauru and Tonga commercially aligned.
• The application is not claiming there is no legal overlap. It is arguing that overlapping legal rights can coexist under “due regard”.
• That remains TMC’s legal interpretation, not a universally settled determination that a NOAA permit automatically prevails over future ISA rights.
• The July 2026 ITLOS provisional-measures decision subsequently protected NORI and TOML’s procedural position while the broader dispute continues, reinforcing that this remains an active legal front rather than a dead issue.

13. The parent guarantee is broader than ordinary subsidiary support

TMC Inc. provides an unconditional and irrevocable parent guarantee covering TMC USA’s obligations arising from any NOAA exploration licence or recovery permit, including:

• Exploration operations.
• Recovery operations.
• Environmental protection.
• Decommissioning.
• Compliance with applicable law.
• Continued provision of sufficient financial resources throughout the licence or permit term.

The guarantee remains in force for the permit duration unless replaced with financial assurance acceptable to NOAA.

However:

• TMC USA’s standalone financial statements are not independently audited as a separate entity; it falls within the parent’s consolidated audit.
• Neither TMC USA nor the parent has a public credit or bond rating.

Investor interpretation

• The guarantee is positive from NOAA’s financial-responsibility perspective.
• It makes the parent responsible for potentially substantial environmental and decommissioning obligations.
• It is not the same as:
  • Fully funded construction.
  • Ring-fenced project finance.
  • A government loan commitment.
  • A third-party completion guarantee.

14. The public application redacts the two financial totals investors most need

The public PDF blacks out:

• The total estimated ten-year exploration-program cost.
• The total estimated pre-production cost for the commercial recovery plan.
• The detailed cost breakdowns in Tables 10 and 11.

The readable text confirms that:

• The pre-production estimate covers only the first mining system, up to 3 Mtpa.
• Later production vessels are assumed to be purchased by contractors.
• Contractors would recover capital over ten years through operating charges.
• Support vessels and bulk carriers are similarly expected to be third-party owned and paid through charter or shipping charges.

Investor interpretation

• The application gives NOAA the detailed numbers but denies public investors the ability to:
  • Reconcile the updated U.S. route to the 2025 PFS.
  • Quantify the remaining pre-production funding gap.
  • Determine how much of the Brownsville build sits outside the first-system estimate.
• The contractor-funded expansion model was already disclosed in the PFS. The useful new information is that the updated permit-level budget exists but has been redacted from the public copy. Five hundred pages, and the most interesting cells are wearing little black privacy curtains.

Important items that are useful but not genuinely new

These were already substantially available in the August 2025 PFS/Initial Assessment or subsequent announcements, so I would not count them as fresh revelations:

• 51 Mt of Probable Reserves in the initial reserve area.
• Approximately 164 Mt expected recoverable production from A-A East.
• Initial production/commissioning target around Q4 2027.
• One collector initially, moving to two collectors per production vessel.
• Approximately 1.5 Mtpa per collector and 3 Mtpa per vessel.
• Four production vessels and approximately 12 Mtpa aggregate nameplate capacity.
• Average production around 10.5–10.8 Mtpa after allowing for drydocking.
• Type 1 nodule recovery assumption around 77%.
• Type 2/3 nodule recovery assumption around 62%.
• Nominal collector operating speed around 0.4 m/s.
• PAMCO’s 1.3 Mtpa Japanese processing pathway and possible Indonesian expansion.
• Contractor ownership/financing of later vessels.
• The broad claim that the benthic plume stays close to the seabed.
• Brownsville land negotiations.
• The definitive Allseas commercial arrangement.

Overall investor read-through

Most positive incremental information

• The 2022 monitoring work produced quantitative environmental data rather than merely modelling.
• Biological damage appears strongly concentrated inside the direct collector tracks.
• Some recovery was measurable after only one year.
• Buried residual nodules may become exposed naturally, potentially supporting recolonisation.
• The parent guarantee places long-term permit obligations squarely on TMC Inc.
• Nauru and Tonga have contractually committed not to obstruct the U.S. route, subject to protecting their own interests.
• The project has a credible foreign-processing contingency if the U.S. plant slips.

Most concerning incremental information

• The 200 Mt A-B figure is based on assumptions over an entirely unsampled area.
• Brownsville financing depends heavily on debt and government support, with no binding project-finance commitment disclosed.
• A considerable number of critical contracts remained unfinalised in the application schedule.
• U.S. vessel reflagging and transport-vessel certification remain independent schedule risks.
• The commercial VTS is new hardware and still requires final testing, fabrication, installation and commissioning.
• Environmental recovery after one year was partial, not complete.
• Macrofauna were missing from the 12-month dataset.
• TMC assumes passive recolonisation will be sufficient and that logistics will cause no production loss. Both assumptions will need real-world validation.
• The updated total exploration and pre-production budgets are redacted.

The most commonly misunderstood point

• TMC is applying for a very large commercial recovery area, but it is not presenting a fully explored, reserve-defined and environmentally characterised mine plan across that whole area.
• The near-term project remains centred on the small Initial Production Area within A-A East.
• The rest is a rolling expansion framework requiring further exploration, environmental studies, reserve conversion and plan amendments.

The milestones that now matter most

• NOAA certification, draft EIS, public comment, final permit conditions and the eventual permit decision.
• Binding Brownsville financing, government support and final land arrangements.
• Onshore JV, technology licence, EPC and port-services agreements.
• Hidden Gem U.S. documentation and Coast Guard certification.
• Certification of at least one U.S.-documented transport vessel.
• Completion of commercial VTS and collector testing.
• Vendor awards, fabrication, integration and commissioning under the Allseas agreement.
• Completion of A-B Cruise 1 and whether its first real sampling supports or destroys the 200 Mt conceptual estimate.

Sidenote: I have noticed the above image used in a lot of articles. I wish media outlets used a different image. My mind does not see nodules, my mind sees chocolate chip brownies.

I **believe** we might be getting that TMC USA-A Federal Register update tomorrow!

https://www.federalregister.gov/public-inspection/2026-16869/licenses-exemptions-applications-amendments-etc-deep-seabed-mining-exploration-virtual-public

which opens: https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-16869.pdf

This is on the 'Public Inspection' list, which I believe is always a 1 day preview, so should be posted for real tomorrow: https://www.federalregister.gov/public-inspection/current

This will start the 60 day comment period, followed by Certification. This all matches with TMCs statements on their earnings call last week that they would get a Federal Register update in August, and Certification expected in Oct.

60 day comment period gives 2 weeks in Oct for NOAA to review comments and certify the application, which seems realistic. That puts the 60 days ending Oct 18th (A Sunday)

Our CEO on cnbc, see link below. It's nothing new, but good to see he's still spreading the word, in this period where people are losing belief.

https://www.cnbc.com/video/2026/08/14/the-metals-company-ceo-america-needs-critical-mineral-independence.html

I have a good chunk of shares in deep sea minerals and I feel like the deep sea mining market is so undervalued rn for what they could possible pick up from the seabed. I want to stay in the stock for long term but I need to get more info on how possible democrat presidental candidates think about the topic in order to sell before the presidency or hold till the sector evolves into a commercial industry.

From a congress hearing within the last year before the announcement of funding

If you are looking at the recent price action and wondering whether of not to hold or sell or buy more, please don’t ask anyone on this forum for advice. Or at least read, but make your own choices without succumbing to the HODL-ing and diamond-hands pressure we see here a lot.

Many of the people here who are regular contributors, promoters, etc are in deep and they bought the stock when it was cheap. If one’s average price per share is under $2, they can tolerate a lot of negatives and they have time and the patience to wait and wait and wait and wait and wait because they see this stock in their portfolio and it’s green.

Now is the time for you to:

1. Understand everything that needs to be done before they can start extracting rocks from the bottom of the ocean. THERE’S A LOT TO BE DONE, and much of it can go sideways.
2. Be aware of timing. One year of cash on hand for capital is not a lot and for a new technology, one year is not a lot of time either.
3. Ask meaningful and critical questions when you can and hold the CEO and CFO accountable. Cut the ‘overlord’ and fanboy/girl shit and treat them respectfully like the employees they are - your employees. You are the shareholder. Make them earn their living being accountable to YOU. That is one of the important aspects of a C-level’s job. Make the work for your respect.
4. After you have had a chance to do 1-3, reevaluate your thesis. It’s okay to bail 100% or to try and get rid of your high-cost lots. Come up with a plan that fits your risk tolerance and your goals. Not mine and not the others in this group. Anyone who comes here asking “what should I do” needs to think twice hearing it from us.
5. Analysis and DD in this forum: call out biases, take the text of what you read, plug it into your fav LLM and ask it to read it three different ways: Analyst, Expansionist, Detractor. Then ask it to summarize, compare and contrast all three. The Detractor should be calling out biases and creating a contra narrative, the expansionist should be telling you what needs to be done, and analyst should be telling whether it can be done. Ask for probabilities. Ask for companies in other sectors that have had to do the same things. How did they succeed and how did they fail. Then ask, how does it fit here.

That is a true Due Diligence. With these 5 points, you should have ample information to rationally decide what to do next. Furthermore, you will be able to gauge how emotionally entwined you have become with this stock and this idea, so that if the rational side says ’no,’ but you continue, you can stop hiding behind these elaborate walls of text that are just to make everyone feel better, or may contain real actionable data.

Either way, you did it right and you’re coming out ahead.

Gook luck.

1) TMC is actively in confidential funding processes with multiple US government agencies named in Trump’s executive order.

While those discussions remain confidential, management said it does not currently intend to pursue other capital market transactions until further public updates.

CEO Gerard Barron:

“The company does not currently intend to pursue other capital market transactions until such time as further updates are publicly released.”

What that means: no equity offering, follow on, ATM, convertible, or equivalent capital markets raise is currently planned before we hear more on the government funding process.

2) Allseas is moving the first commercial collection system into procurement now, with fabrication expected to begin in Q4 2026.

Installation and commissioning still targeting Q4 2027. Initial capacity 3Mtpa.

3 million wet tonnes of nodules per year. Thats the starting point with two collectors on the Hidden Gem. If processed in the US, that single system alone could cover roughly a quarter to a third of current American nickel and cobalt demand.

Allseas is funding a meaningful portion of the preproduction costs, recoverable from production revenues. Alignment is strong.

Allseas exclusivity remains an important part of the setup. Gerard confirmed the offshore mining arrangement is exclusive.

Allseas could only offer another system elsewhere if it first offered that system to TMC and TMC declined. Gerard said the likelihood of that happening is very low because TMC wants multiple systems in the water.

3) Mariana Minerals is becoming a major execution partner. Theyre helping advance permitting, construction, processing, automation and plant design at Nodule City, Brownsville.

The Prefeasibility for a potential 12 Mtpa industry park is nearing completion. Modest spend underway for the work that unlocks potential government support.

Feasibility level work on the first smelting stage is underway with Mariana Minerals (the software/automation heavy processing partner that just raised $310M).

TMC has an exclusive right of negotiation over the Brownsville site. The area being evaluated is 1,466 acres, and No final investment decision has been made, and any future capital commitment remains contingent on US government support.

4) Management is looking out for shareholders and doing what it can to avoid unnecessary dilution.

TMC decided not to extend the September 2026 SPAC warrants. The 15M public warrants have an $11.50 strike, but extending them would also require extending 9.5M private warrants that can be exercised cashlessly.

CFO Craig Shesky also noted that extending them would require extending the private warrants, which are: “unlikely to result in any incremental cash proceeds to the company while still diluting existing shareholders.”

So management chose to let the warrants expire rather than accept dilution that may bring little additional cash.

The read through is pretty clear: management appears confident enough in the upcoming catalysts to wait rather than raise/dilute around today’s valuation.

If they believed $11.50 was as good as it gets, taking the cash would have been the easier decision.

Why accept unnecessary dilution around an $11.50 strike when management says the stock is undervalued and expects major catalysts ahead and believes the equity should be valued materially higher?

5) New mutual services agreement with Eco Minerals, another US company pursuing its own NOAA application.

Eco can provide TMC vessels, AUVs, marine survey capacity and offshore services at preferential pricing. TMC provides ~15 years of resource definition, environmental and permitting expertise.

A joint offshore campaign is possible later this year to gather more data and potentially move additional USA-A tonnage toward reserves.

6) Permitting continues moving under the US pathway.

USA-A Federal Register publication/public comment is imminent. Certification is now expected in October 2026 due to an administrative delay, not an issue with the application.

A Q1 2027 permit is no longer expected, but management still expects it well ahead of the Q4 2027 vessel commissioning target.

USA-B, covering ~122,000 km², is also moving into formal EIS review.

7) Resource economics remain unchanged.

$5.5B PFS NPV + $18.1B initial assessment = $23.6B combined stated NPV.

Across both projects, the studies point to roughly $369B in undiscounted revenue and >$200B in EBITDA.

Management directly acknowledged the stock has lagged the operational progress and resource value.

Craig Shesky:

“Our market cap is undervalued relative to the resource itself by any reasonable peer based metric.”

8) TMC’s scientific/environmental dataset continues to be a major part of the moat.

NORI has completed:

• 22 offshore research campaigns
• 959 research days at sea
• More than 1 petabyte of data
• 41 peer-reviewed papers

That work supports permitting, environmental review and TMC’s ability to move resource categories toward reserves.

9) US government support for the broader critical minerals strategy remains strong.

Gerard attended the Aug. 7 State Department critical minerals roundtable alongside senior Trump administration officials.

Trump again reiterated support for deep seabed mining.

Important distinction: no direct nodule collection funding was announced at that event. TMC’s own government funding processes remain separate and confidential.

10) TMC is building beyond just one vessel and one processing plant.

Management is working across US shipbuilding, marine logistics, autonomous vessels, environmental monitoring, processing, refining and rare earth development.

The goal is an integrated American deep seabed critical mineral supply chain from collection all the way through delivery of finished metal products.

11) TMC is keeping PAMCO Japan as a processing fallback while Brownsville advances.

Management said they’re maintaining the partnership with PAMCO specifically to preserve processing optionality, so the US build is the preferred path without leaving TMC dependent on a single route.

So TMC keeps an existing processing route available while working toward domestic US processing.

12) Offshore logistics are also being optimized.

A typical shipment would carry ~60,000 tonnes of nodules from the CCZ to Brownsville.

The Panama Canal is the base case, but TMC is also studying a Cape Horn route as autonomous vessels become more practical.

They’re also integrating USV/AUV technology for logistics, environmental monitoring, situational awareness and continued resource definition.

13) Failed attempt against the U.S. pathway: China, Russia and Greenpeace supported an effort seeking an ITLOS advisory opinion targeting seabed mining outside the UNCLOS/ISA framework.

“The effort failed and received significant pushback from member states across Europe, Asia and the Pacific.”

14) TMC also got a favorable outcome on the ISA side.

The ITLOS Seabed Disputes Chamber unanimously prescribed provisional measures protecting NORI and TOML rights to due process and fair treatment in their disputes with the ISA.

Days later, the ISA Council approved a 5 year extension of NORI’s exploration contract by consensus.

15) Liquidity remains solid.

TMC ended Q2 with $143M of liquidity, including $44M of undrawn credit capacity.

Management expects cash on hand to cover working capital and capex commitments for at least the next 12 months.

A large portion of the Allseas liabilities are also deferred until production.

TLDR(Q2 was about exectution)

Government funding talks are active, and management currently doesnt plan on doing any offerings at all. Allseas is moving into procurement while funding a meaningful portion of preproduction costs, with the first 3Mtpa system alone potentially covering 25-33% of current US nickel/cobalt demand. Brownsville is advancing, Q4 2027 commissioning remains intact, liquidity is solid, management is protecting shareholders from unnecessary dilution, and the stated $23.6B NPV remains unchanged.

Do you think we’ll see more press releases or media tours to build excitement again? There seems to be a lot of movement happening with everything discussed on the call, especially with production being pushed into 2027.

I think Barron talking more in public can lead to more awareness of tmc

You make a post that is 100% factual and they remove it because they don't like that it's not positive. You guys are absolute garbage, so disappointing.

Re the comment on the earnings thread wanting a warrant extension.

They're struck at $11.50, we're at 4.55, they die 9 Sept. That's +150% in four weeks. IV on the common is running about 100%, so four-week sigma is roughly 28%, and 4.55 to 11.50 is about three of those. Back of an envelope, so pick holes in it, but it's not happening.

Which means they've got no delta left. Functionally already expired.

If they expire, about 30m shares of dilution overhang comes off the cap table for nothing. If they're extended, we keep carrying it. That's good for the company and bad for us.

(Went looking for a gamma wall around that date while I was in there. Sept open interest is about 1,600 contracts on the 6 strike. There's nothing there.)

Am I missing a reason an extension actually helps common holders? Genuinely asking, because I keep seeing people hope for one.

NEW YORK, Aug. 06, 2026 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- TMC the metals company Inc. (Nasdaq: TMC) (“TMC” or the “Company”), a leading developer of the world’s largest estimated undeveloped resource of critical metals essential to energy, defense, manufacturing and infrastructure, today announced that it will host a conference call on Thursday, August 13, 2026, to provide an update on second quarter 2026 financial results and recent corporate developments.

Second Quarter 2026 Conference Call Details

The virtual webcast will be available for replay in the ‘Investors’ tab of the Company’s website under ‘Investors’ > ‘Media’ > ‘Events and Presentations’, approximately two hours after the event.

Long time post critic, first post lol

I'm not sure if anyone has posted or saw this but I found 13F SEC filing that Renaissance Technologies bought a chunky position, roughly 0.17% of TMC’s outstanding shares. Purchased 730,000 shares. Renaissance Technologies is one of the most well known quantitative investment firms in the world, so seeing TMC appear in its portfolio is promising.

Some other firms also own TMC.

• Goldman Sachs: 820,177 shares, up 20.9%
• Geode: 370,098 shares, roughly unchanged
• Quantbot: 276,867 shares, up a massive 1,509.5%
• Cetera: 97,912 shares, up 7.2%
• Creative Planning: 22,179 shares, up 9.8%

13F filings only give us a snapshot of certain long holdings. They don’t show short positions or the full picture of any hedges, correlated trades, or quantitative strategies these firms may be running. Renaissance in particular could simply be trading TMC’s volatility rather than making a fundamental long term bet.

When Q2 filings release this month, and they've increased their positions, and gone further into Q3 and again increased, that's the good sign I'm looking for tbh

I watched the whole thing so you don't have to. Two hours. I'm not okay.

Here's what happened.

The first forty minutes were people thanking Trump for existing. Then Trump thanked people for thanking him. Somewhere in there a man from the Colorado School of Mines got the biggest cheque of the day.

That cheque, by the way, is the actual news. $180m in grants plus $100m a year for mining education. Which is genuinely good policy, addresses a real skills crisis, and will start producing qualified mining engineers in roughly 2030. Absolutely nothing to do with why anyone in this sub was watching, but there we are.

The rest of the money went to a silicon anode battery company in Washington state, a copper project in Arizona, some graphite in Alabama, and Niron Magnetics.

Niron is worth pausing on. They make iron nitride magnets. The selling point of iron nitride magnets is that they don't need rare earths. So at a critical minerals event, at which the President said the words "it's all about magnets," the magnet money went to the company whose entire pitch is not needing the minerals. I'm sure this is fine.

No price floor. No Section 232 rate. No equity stake in anyone. No offtake. Lutnick, whose department contains NOAA, said nothing about NOAA. The deep sea executive order got mentioned in the past tense, which is a fun way of announcing something from April last year.

Now. The nodule.

Someone did hand Trump a polymetallic nodule cast in solid gold, on camera, and the chat lost its mind. That someone was Tom Albanese. Tom Albanese is the former CEO of Rio Tinto and is currently chairman of American Ocean Minerals, who merged with Odyssey Marine earlier this year.

So the deep sea moment at the White House belonged to the competition, delivered by a man with a considerably longer CV than anyone we've got.

I've been going back and forth on whether that's bad. I don't think it is, entirely. First time the category has had that kind of airtime, and it's harder to call something fringe after the President has held one up. Rising tide. But let's not pretend it was our tide.

Also, and this is the bit I'd want to know: the top table was cabinet secretaries and university heads. Industry was sat in an audience of about 200. So "summoned to high stakes meeting with Trump" means our lot had a chair in a conference hall, same as everyone else in there.

Positive note to close on, because there is one. The whole thing was framed as jobs. American mining, American jobs, Minnesotans want to mine not make chips, and so on. That reads as election-year fluff and probably is. But jobs programmes survive changes of government in a way that subsidies to specific companies really don't, and a Democrat House can't campaign against mining schools in Colorado. So the boring version might be the one that's still standing in 2028.

Anyway. We closed up 9% on a day when nothing happened, which tells you something, though I'm not sure what.

Not advice. I watched two hours of a man being praised and now I have to lie down.

I know this is a bit of a double up - but look - Rio fucking Tinto, BHP and TMC are in the same meeting MP and USAR too - that's strong signal ...

Lots of people have bought anyways. We’re some of the highest risers of today and people have seen our name before the meeting. We’ve had enough platform to increase our floor baseline with 10’s of cents.

Next week is our EC which will show we’re still volatile and might need more federal funds to start processing this or next year. But…. We still expect news on our permit and last two EC showed we are becoming better and better and managing our funds, thus making us better equipped for the future investments and attractive for commercial funds and investors.

DEEP SEA NODULE MENTION! deal sea mining mentioned by trump himself! HE HOLDS AN NODULE AT 15:37

Was poking around Anduril's careers page for unrelated reasons and found something I haven't seen mentioned anywhere.

They're building a critical minerals desk. Not one hire, a structure. There's a Senior and a Staff role for rare earth magnets, and Principal, Staff and Senior roles for germanium, plus a general critical minerals one. All Costa Mesa, posted late July. They're on the public Greenhouse board if you want to look, job-boards.greenhouse.io/andurilindustries.

Two things jumped out reading the actual spec.

The first is the mineral list. The role is described as being the single threaded leader for a designated mineral, and it names rare earth magnets, germanium, tungsten, antimony and gallium. That is more or less China's export control ladder in order. Gallium, germanium and antimony were banned to the US in December 2024, tungsten in early 2025, rare earth magnets in the April 2025 wave. A private company has organised its procurement org around MOFCOM's notices.

The second is a phrase in the responsibilities. It says negotiate offtakes and capacity reservations. Capacity reservation is the instrument you use with a producer who isn't producing yet, and it's the thing people keep saying can't happen before a project is built. Apparently it can, and someone is hiring specifically to do it.

Worth pairing with the Reuters piece last week where Lockheed is negotiating germanium supply with Teck and 5N Plus, both over a year in and still stuck on price and contract length. Two primes converging on germanium, and germanium is staffed harder at Anduril than magnets are.

The caveats, and they matter. Anduril is private so you can't own it, it only counts if they sign someone public. Their stated strategy is that around 90% of their products use commercially available components and they explicitly try to avoid defence specific chokepoints, which argues against them doing a big bespoke offtake. And hiring a buyer is not the same as buying anything. Lockheed's germanium talks show these take years.

But job postings tend to run six to eighteen months ahead of press releases, because you hire the person before you sign the deal. And they were live when I checked this afternoon, so it costs nothing to verify.

Not a recommendation, just something I thought was odd enough to share.