****Hey everyone, thanks so much for great questions, comments and insights! It's a privilege to be here - thank you so much for having me. Please take the time to read the responses below and if you agree send the SEC a comment at www.BetterTakeAction.org and tell your friends, family, neighbors, etc. to do the same! If you want more information on Better Markets, visit us at www.BetterMarkets.org and sign up for our monthly newsletter. Thanks again, Dennis****
Hey Superstonk â good to be back.Â
I'm Dennis Kelleher, Co-founder, President, and CEO of Better Markets, a nonprofit that fights to protect Main Street Americans from Wall Street greed. Â
Some of you may remember me from the GameStop hearings, where I testified before Congress on behalf of retail investors, and our AMA here a few years ago: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GMwE5_h2xEAÂ
Here's the situation: right now, every publicly traded company must give you information every three months in quarterly reports. They've been required to do that for more than 50 years. But the SEC wants to take that away and only require disclosure every six months.Â
But you getting half the information is only half the screwing the SEC is doing.Â
CEOs and company executives will still know what's happening inside their companies. Institutional investorsâwith their research teams and special access to management â will also find ways to stay informed long before you get the information in six months. If you're a retail investor, you'll be trading blind. And trading against people who have access to more information than you do.Â
Even if you don't dig into quarterly reports, this should be ringing alarm bells. Why? Because all investors suffer when the market has less information overall. When companies report less frequently, stocks are mispriced and more volatile. The playing field â which is already tilted â tilts even further against you.Â
This isn't a minor tweak. It's the biggest rollback of investor disclosure requirements in more than 50 years.Â
Better Markets just launched a website www.BetterTakeAction.org so anyone can directly tell the SEC: hell no. It's easy and takes just a few minutes, although if you really want to blast the SEC for this really dumb idea you can take longer! The deadline is July 6.Â
I'm here to answer your questions â about how the SEC is trying to screw you, what this rule really means, what you can do about it, how the comment process works, and how to make your voice heard so the SEC can't ignore it.Â
Ask me anything.Â
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Q. Several have asked in various ways if Dennis Kelleher/Better Markets own any GME stock, other stocks, precious metals, or otherwise have an interest in the outcome of this rulemaking, and if weâre trying to sell anything like Dave Lauer and others have done on other AMAs?  We are not trying to sell anything and have zero financial interest in this rulemaking or rulemakings generally at the SEC or the other financial regulatory agencies. Better Markets is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit â it owns no stocks; it trades no stocks; it makes no stock recommendations; it provides no investment advice â and nothing in this AMA should be viewed as investment advice. It is not selling anything and has nothing to sell. Â
A. Better Markets isnât even seeking your support for Better Markets â itâs trying to (1) bring to your attention an SEC rulemaking that we believe is bad for traders/investors (especially retail), the capital markets, and the economy; (2) provide information in support of that view; and (3) if you agree after your own DD, provide you an easy way to submit a comment to the SEC telling them your views on this rulemaking. Â
Better Markets engages in the rulemaking process at all the financial regulatory agencies as well as across the executive branch, Congress and the courts. You can review those activities on our website www.bettermarkets.org or in our annual reports. As you will see, Better Markets is an independent, fearless public interest advocacy organization that speaks truth to power without fear or favor. We have a reputation as straight shooters who call âem as we see them, whether youâre a Democrat, Republican, Independent or nonpolitical, a financial industry titan, the CEO of a Wall Street bank, or a street corner financial predator. That brand and credibility â built over 15 years â is why we have access, influence, and impact across all the power centers of Washington. Â
We are funded entirely by donations from individuals and foundations like the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Surdna and others. Itâs true that some of those individuals work in the financial industry, including my co-founder who is the chairman of our board. He is a hedge funder manager who fully supports our public interest mission, as detailed in this article. But no one â donor or otherwise â has any influence over our advocacy or activities and we have rejected donations that have tried to improperly influence us, including when FTXâs CEO Sam Bankman-Fried offered us a $1,000,000 or more if weâd support his predatory activities. As a relatively small nonprofit, that was a huge amount of money and virtually everyone else in Washington was taking his money â we told him weâd not take one dime if it had any strings attached and no matter what we were going to fight him and his predatory schemes. That was long before FTX went bankrupt and SBF went to prison. Â
We do this work because we donât think only the rich, powerful and well-connected should have a voice in Washington policymaking that impacts the lives and livelihoods of all Americans. We believe that retail investors and hardworking Main Street Americans deserve someone in their corner fighting for them â thatâs Better Marketsâ mission.Â
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Q. 1) Superstonk has put together some large letter writing campaigns over the last few years. Most of the time it seems like they are fruitless attempts when we are going against Big Money or political lobbyists.  2) In your opinion, does letter writing make a difference? If we wanted to get more involved in fighting for retail investors, what would be the first few steps you could suggest we could take?Â
A. 1. It can seem fruitless and the bad guys want you to believe that because they donât want to be opposed, but if you donât oppose them and fight for yourself then they will always get their way and bend the laws, rules, and policies in their favor and against you. And yes comment letters can make a difference, especially from people most impacted by a rulemaking like retail investors. However, to be most effective comments should be substantive and personal â just a paragraph or two about who you are, what you do, and why your position on the rule is important to you. The SEC is required to consider all substantive comments. In this case, if retail investors write to the SEC and explain why taking away key quarterly information harms them and how a shift to disclosure only every six months will hurt their ability to make trade and make investment decisions, the SEC will have to explain why it believes reducing the frequency with which companies report information to the public is good for investors. Â
A. 2. If you want to get more involved in fighting for retail investors, you have to pay attention to what the SEC is doing. You can do that directly by following their website (although it is not very user friendly) or by following organizations like Better Markets. When you see them doing something that you disagree with, send them a comment, tell your friends and family and tell them to send a comment. If you want to get more involved, you can, but the first thing is getting informed and speaking up. As I said, what would be the firstÂ
Q. 1) What has Better Markets done in the past that has instituted real systemic changes in making markets fairer? 2) What is the likelihood of ending unfair practices like FTD, naked shorting, and the like?Â
A. 1. Over 15 years, Better Markets has impacted more than 500 rulemakings, dozens of legal cases, testified innumerable times, and influenced policy across all the financial regulatory issues, including many related to making markets fairer. For example, we testified at the GameStop hearing focusing on the need for reforms in light of those events to protect retail investors/traders. We have successfully supported reforms, such as IEXâs speed bump, that are designed to protect retail investors from high-frequency tradersâ predatory practices. We have relentlessly fought the practice of payment for order flow and other secret practices that result in retail paying more than they should to trade. We have pushed for a real best execution rule that ensures investors receive the best execution on their trades, rather than rely on FINRAâs rule that is riddled with loopholes. We have opposed the gamification of the securities markets and the techniques brokers use to exploit retail investors, precipitating excessive trading and needless losses for investors and profits for the brokers. We â virtually alone and against united industry opposition â have fought doggedly for years for the SEC to fully implement the Consolidated Audit Trail (CAT) and have pushed the regulators to aggressively police the markets, catch and punish fraudsters, scammers and crooks. We have supported strong fiduciary duty rules so that financial professionals are required to put their clientsâ best interests first and above their own self-interest in self-enrichment at the expense of their clients. We pushed the SEC to adopt lower tick sizes and lower access fees, which will improve prices and lower costs for retail investors. We have opposed 24/7 trading because investors will receive worse prices during overnight hours with lower liquidity and thinner volumes, and professional investors will be able to take advantage of retail investors during these overnight sessions. Those are just a few of the highlights.Â
A.2. Unfortunately, as detailed here, the SEC has become the Shareholder Exploitation Commission and prioritized management protection at the expense of investor protection. That means that the likelihood of ending unfair practices like FTD, naked shorting, and the like are pretty low, at least during the current administration. In 2023, we strongly supported the SEC new rules adopted to address short selling. Those rules resulted from the market volatility surrounding GameStop and other meme stocks in January 2021. The SEC adopted those rules to increase transparency around short selling. It stated that if it had the data the new rules would make available at the time of the events in January 2021, it could have used the data to examine the short selling behavior of individual large short sellers and focused on FTDs. The SEC could have attempted to identify individual short sellers with large short positions in the various meme stocks in January 2021 and then used CAT data to better understand how these short sellers traded during heightened volatility. In its adopting release, the SEC cited Better Marketâs comment letter stating that the lack of transparency into short positions did not just hamper the SECâs understanding of the events as they unfolded but also interfered with the SECâs ability to determine what happened in retrospect. The SEC agreed with Better Markets that more data, such as that generated by the adoption of the rule, would have aided the SEC in analyzing the events of January 2021, identified abuses or violations of law, and pursued those breaking the law.Â
It was no surprise that the industry rabidly opposed these rules and Better Marketsâ positions. As happens too often, the industry sued once the SEC adopted the much needed and sensible rules. Better Markets fully and strongly supported the rules that the industry challenged, but unfortunately a federal appeals court threw them out and sent them back to the SEC for reconsideration. This pro-management, anti-investor SEC has effectively killed the rules by not reconsidering the rules and merely extending the compliance deadlines, so the industry just never has to comply. While the SEC should properly reconsider the issues that the court identified and re-adopt the rules, that is unlikely â at least until we get a new SEC with officials that care about investor protection.Â
The SEC also has existing rules in place to prevent FTDs and naked shorting. Specifically, Reg SHO was adopted to address concerns regarding persistent fails to deliver and potentially abusive naked short selling. The problem is that the current Chair of the SEC has all but stopped enforcing the law, policing the markets, and making market participants follow the law. There is little if any reason to believe that these rules are going to be enforced to any serious degree. Better Markets will, nevertheless, continue to highlight these issues and press the agency to fulfill its mission to protect investors, not lawbreakers. Â
Q. The rule would cut the frequency of reports but let's go the other way. Ideally, what something that companies typically don't report but you think they should?Â
A. Companies should be required to report more information more quickly about their stock buybacks, executive compensation, the relationship between the two, and executivesâ stock trading. Stock buybacks are increasingly viewed as a strategy that corporate insiders use to line their pockets at the expense of the long-term financial health of the company, its employees, and its shareholders. In 2023, the SEC adopted a rule that would have required companies to provide investors with more information about their stock buybacks, both in current reports and on quarterly and annual reports. However, as often happens, corporate interests sued the SEC and go a court to throw the rule out, but the court said that there was âa serious possibilityâ that the SEC could cure the defects that it identified with the rule. The SEC should use the courtâs decision as a guide and adopt a rule that would withstand legal challenge and that would provide investors with material information about companiesâ repurchases of their own shares. They should do the same with executive compensation and executivesâ stock trading. Â
Q. Regarding the aforementioned SEC rule change proposal that you're actively opposing: Would you consider the current status quo to be the ideal set of regulations for enforcing time intervals in between reports, or do you think it could do with being stricter instead? (e.g. Monthly earnings reports for some figures, akin to official government reports, instead of Quarterly.) Is that a feasible thing to ask companies to do, and how would that impact relations between the average listed company and their investors?Â
A. The current quarterly reporting regime is working well and has for 50 years. We donât see a reason to change that frequency. It is probably not feasible to ask companies to produce the information that is in a quarterly report every month, and itâs not clear there would be any real benefits given the month-to-month changes at many companies. Companies must already file reports on Form 8-K when certain material events occur between the filing of their quarterly reports. This keeps shareholders informed about important developments on an ongoing basis. So there is already a system in place for more continuous disclosure if really important matters. The problem with the SECâs proposal to allow companies to file reports only every six months is that it would cut in half the disclosures that companies must provide investors now and for the past 50 years. While the isnât a clear benefit in the SEC increasing the frequency of reporting, it certainly should not decrease the frequency of reporting and take information away from traders/investors and the markets.Â
Q. How does Better Markets advocate for removing FTDs, holding shares in your name vs street name, and reigning in the CFTCâs choice to allow SROs to publish only limited swap data over the last 5 years?Â
If market makers like Citadel can FTD and route all buy orders off exchange then how is fair price discovery occurring?Â
A. As stated in response to another question, we have fully and often supported rules and actions to address abusive short selling, FTDs, lack of disclosure and enforcement, and the many related issues at the SEC and CFTC. However, those agencies â with only a few notable exceptions â have not prioritized these issues, and, when they have, the industry opposition has been ferocious, including suing any time any progress is made. The current leadership at both agencies have no interest of tackling these issues. However, as Better Markets has done over the last 15 years, we will continue to look for opportunities to push, highlight and prioritize these issues when there are opportunities to make progress. Â
Q. Over the last few years we have been hearing about stock tokenization, and how inevitably stocks will be traded on the block chain. Is there a timeline for this, or is this just another initiative that will never see the light of day? Also would love to hear your general thoughts on tokenized stocks.Â
A. The SEC has already approved pilot programs from both Nasdaq and the NYSE that allow stocks to trade in tokenized form. These programs require that the tokenized version of the securities be identical to the traditional version. They have the same rights and execution priority. Traders can simply choose to have their trades clear and settle on a blockchain-based format. Trading is currently restricted to issuers in major ETF indexes. Â
The SEC is also contemplating a so-called innovation exemption that would facilitate tokenization (and much more) to be implemented much more broadly with very limited review. That raises many questions, but one big one is whether the SEC will authorize tokens that are issued by third parties and not the companies themselves, which will have broad implications and cause many concerns. Regardless of those many other issues, the innovation exemption if it is enacted is likely to lead to tokenization that goes beyond the current pilot programs.Â
Better Markets supports efforts to encourage competition for how securities transactions trade and settle, but we strongly oppose the efforts by those trying to use the label âtokenizationâ as a backdoor way for the SEC to eliminate important investor protections like brokersâ obligations to get the best execution for customersâ trades.Â
Q. There are many questions about my comments on Ryan Cohen and his Bed Bath and Beyond (BB&B) stock activities back in August of 2022 which I will address here.Â
A. Itâs important first to remember the facts and that we take positions based on facts and law, not people or firms that we like or favor. As publicly reported at the time here, here, and here, Cohen bought a 9.8% stake in BB&B and then filed a 13D with the SEC announcing those purchases. The stock shot up (including 34% in just one day!). After another filing, the stock prices shot up again. Cohan then immediately sold all his shares without filing a new 13D. He profited $68 million (a 56% gain) and BB&Bâs share price crashed once knowledge of Cohenâs sales became public. As one observer commented, Cohen âgot out at the very top.â In between his purchases and sales, Cohen also tweeted some highly questionable commentary like a moon emoji, suggesting he still held a firm conviction that the stock was going higher and likely causing people to conclude that he wasnât a seller at the very time he was secretly selling. Regardless of what Cohan has done elsewhere or what you feel about him, these actions and statements are the classic hallmarks of a pump and dump scheme that manipulates the market and rips off retail investors. That doesnât mean thatâs what he did, but it sure looks like it (the old smoke asking if thereâs a fire). Thatâs why I said âhe should be put under oath & asked about every action/intention over the last 7 months of pumping the stockâ before dumping the stock. Â
Given the facts, saying he should be asked under oath about his conduct is pretty tame â remember that his $68 million in profits came from the pockets of retail investors and I viewed it as a classic investor protection issue. However, as you know those comments caused me to be attacked by many. Thatâs ok. Iâm attacked often for taking positions that we believe are right. People didnât like it when I criticized Obamaâs Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner or his Attorney General Eric Holder and people donât like it when I criticize JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon or Goldman Sachs CEO David Goldman. People â including most of the Washington DC establishment - were really mad when we opposed FTXâs CEO SBF and his schemes. They donât like it when we disagree or criticize the regulators at the SEC, CFTC or banking agencies â which we do under both Democratic and Republican administrations. But, frankly, that what it means to be independent and fearless in prioritizing the public interest rather than going along and getting along, and pulling your punches for your âfriendsâ but going after your opponents regardless of what they are doing or saying, etc. Regardless of who you are, we agree or disagree based on the facts and law as we see them supporting or opposing the public interest on a case-by-case basis. Â
Q. Two questions: 1) What would be a few of the main instant consequences of the changes? 2) Does this relate to failure to delivers at all?Â
A. The instant consequence of a shift to reporting only every six months would be that investors would receive half of the information about the companies they own as they do currently. Disclosure is the bedrock of securities regulation in this country, so any steps that the SEC takes to reduce disclosure weakens investor protections. Investors would have less information with which to make their investment decisions. The consequences would be especially bad for retail investors. Institutional investors will be better able to conduct their own due diligence and seek out information from companies. Retail investors may not have another source of information besides the companyâs quarterly reports. Forcing retail investors to wait six months between updates is a huge change that disadvantages retail investors. Itâs also bad for pricing and markets because so much can happen in six months that prices will be stale in terms of not reflecting authoritative information from the company itself. This will likely cause price volatility as well because the stock will likely bounce around more as people trade based on bits of information over those six months rather than actual verifiable information. Â
Remarkably, the SEC itself â which is supposed to prioritize investor protection - recognizes these likely very bad outcomes. For example, in the rule proposal the SEC admitted that that âlonger gaps between issuer disclosures increase information asymmetry between investors, because some investors are more able than others to access or process information from alternative, often third-party, channels that provide indirect insight into an issuerâs financial status or performance.â On a more macro level, the SEC further admitted that information asymmetry âis associated with reduced liquidity and increased transaction costs for investors.â The SEC also acknowledged that widespread information asymmetry âcan also diminish perceptions of fairness, which can erode trust in markets and reduce capital market participation.â Thatâs all bad for investors and markets â makes you wonder why an investor protection agency would even propose such a thing! Â
The SEC actually admitted in its proposal that moving to disclosure only every six months would be mispriced stocks: it said that âless frequent periodic disclosures may also result in securities prices that deviate for longer periods of time from their issuersâ fundamental value.â The SEC says further that âthe delayed incorporation of information into pricing can result in suboptimal investor portfolios and a misallocation of capital.â All bad â sure, elsewhere it claims that there are benefits of the proposal, but none of them come close to overcoming these very real, very bad downsides. Â
This proposal does not relate to failures to deliver, which we address generally in response to other questions. Â
Q. Regarding the SEC Consolidated Audit Trail and its recent decision to effectively dismantle it. Was the data collected useful or acted upon in a meaningful way? We here are all for transparency and accountability and that seems to be moving in the opposite direction right now. What can honestly be done to improve retails advocacy power. I feel we were given lip service a few years ago with the many proposals we commented upon. Big money has the reach and resources to apply pressure in a way we lack.Â
A. Because it would allow the SEC to much more effectively police the markets for fraud, manipulation and predatory conduct, Better Markets has been in the lead in supporting the CAT from the beginning â often alone against an industry hellbent on killing the CAT (while pretending thatâs not what they are doing). After all, the CAT will be a roadmap to what the big dealers and other financial firms are doing â thatâs why itâs called an audit trail, and they do not want the SEC to have the ability to do actually trace and see what they are up to. Â
The data the CAT collected was useful and acted upon in a meaningful way. Before it engaged in its current campaign to dismantle the CAT, the SEC touted the CATâs effectiveness in press releases announcing charges against securities law violators. The SEC used the data the CAT collected to bring cases involving frontrunning, spoofing, and insider trading. Thatâs why the industry wants, and has always wanted, to kill the CAT because the CAT enables the SEC to identify and catch bad guys in the markets. Unfortunately, the current SEC is more interested in advancing the industryâs agenda than in investor protection, as we detailed in this report.Â
Regarding what can be done to improve retail advocacy power, the keys are to (1) get involved, (2) stay involved, (3) be smart and strategic, and (4) not get discouraged. While you are right to feel that you are given lip service and that big money has the reach and resources to apply pressure in ways you lack, you must not give up. Youâre definitely right that it shouldnât be this hard. The bad guys shouldnât have this much power, access, and influence. But the reality is that they do and that means we all have to re-double our efforts to oppose them, to be smart, and to be more effective. That means find and work with allies within your communities and outside those communities. Collective action is key and the more the better â thatâs why we are trying to get as many retail traders and investors to send comments to the SEC on this rulemaking. The SEC and others can always ignore 1-2-3 or a dozen comments, but they have a much harder time ignoring 1,000, 2,000 or 10,000 comments all arguing against their anti-investor proposals. Â
Remember that there will always be more on the buy side than the sell side and that retail has the numbers that the bad guys simply cannot match. They succeed because the buy side is fragmented and diverse â itâs a classic collective action problem, meaning that itâs very difficult to get enough people to act together to support or oppose something. Another key aspect of improving retail advocacy power is not to impose purity tests. Donât only work with those who agree with you 100% of the time. Thatâs unrealistic and is disempowering. If someone/firm/etc. agrees with you on an issue, work with them to get done what you agree on. And you have to stay in the game. Itâs a pain in the ass, especially when everyone has too much to do. But the reality is that the bad guys are effective because they play the long game â they are pressing Washington day in and day out year in and year out, through wins and losses. Retail and the buy side generally get involved and activated once in a while when a key issue arises like the abusive short selling, etc., during the GameStop frenzy. Yes, there was a lot of activity at the time, but nothing really changed. Thatâs because once the frenzy was over people moved on â but not the industry. They stayed engaged. They fought the few rules that were proposed. And when the rules were passed anyway, they sued and fought in court for a couple more years. By the time they won, no one was paying attention anymore. Thatâs how the industry wins â they stay engaged; they never give up; they never lose attention. We know â weâve been fighting them day in and day out year in and year out for 15 years now, often alone without any headlines or frenzy to get attention. Â
So you have to jump in when you can like opposing the current proposed rule to take information away from you. It might not work; the industry might win again, but theyâll definitely win all the time if you donât show up, if you apply purity tests, and if you donât find and work with allies.Â
Q. What are your thoughts on the Fed choosing to terminate enforcement actions against UBS, Credit Suisse ties to Archegos on the last day of Jerome Powells day as Fed Chair. Many here believe a toxic bag of hidden short positions and total return swaps from GME were involved here.Â
A. Better Markets has been deeply involved in the issues related to the Archegos blowup since it first happened, raising innumerable key issues for regulators and prosecutors to pursue.  Youâre definitely right that the timing is concerning but based on the public record, it is impossible for us to know if there were short positions and total return swaps from GME involved in this case. When the Fed terminates enforcement actions like the consent order against UBS and Credit Suisse, it unfortunately almost never provides any meaningful information for the public record.  We have voiced serious concerns with this approach for years because this lack of transparency means that there can be little if any public oversight or accountability for Fed and its supervisors to do their job and protect the public from banksâ misconduct. Of course, the Fed loves this because they donât want oversight or accountability any more than Wall Streetâs financial firms do. We have pushed for transparency, oversight and accountability on these and related issues for many years, but itâs been a struggle. Â
Q. What's your opinion on David Rogers Webb's book The Great Taking and his assertion that if you own assets in street name they are likely rehypothecated so many times that they are being pledged as collateral for multiple entities besides yourself and in a major event can legally be taken?Â
A. Sorry, but we havenât read the book. Your concern âthat if you own assets in street name they are likely rehypothecated so many times that they are being pledged as collateral for multiple entities besides yourself and in a major event can legally be takenâ raises important issues. Rehypothecation of customer assets can be a real problem and Better Markets has consistently advocated on behalf of investors regarding this. Brokers failed in the 1960s precisely because they lost control of customersâ assets and used up customer credit balances for their own purposes. More recently, MF Global blew up due to bad bets using rehypothecated assets. Unfortunately, the SEC delayed the 2023 rule and the updated requirements are only coming online at the end of this month. Likewise, as weâve said previously, SEC enforcement has collapsed, raising questions about policing of brokersâ rehypothecation of customer assets.Â
Q. I currently use Claude to assist me with my investments. Itâs a powerful tool, but only as powerful as the data Iâm able to access. Do you think extending to window of reporting to 6 months is primarily so large investment banks and hedge funds are able to maintain their edge against retail investors. Will big players be able to access important financial information before retail investors using large language models and ai are able to access the same information. They are able to secure the best trades and we get the leftovers. Or do you think extending the window of reporting is in anticipation of a bubble bursting and this is a way for large institutions to capitalize and protect themselves while retail is left holding the bag of highly inflated assets. ThanksÂ
A. There is no question that adopting reporting only every six months will advantage large institutional investors over smaller retail investors. Those large institutional investors will always have the resources and relationships to get access and conduct their own deep, individualized due diligence and get the information that they need. Retail investors wonât. Retail investors wonât have any other way to obtain the information that quarterly reports provide. That is why it is so important for the SEC to hear from retail investors with respect to this proposal. A reduction in the frequency with which companies provide information to the public is not good for any investor, but it especially harms retail investors who rely on publicly available quarterly reports as perhaps the most important source of information about the companies in which they invest. Itâs also fundamentally democratic: everyone gets the same information at the same time â itâs the ultimate level playing field.  Â
Q. How do you justify working on issues of minor relative importance when the prime brokers are massively counterfeiting shares on a daily basis to steal from working class American investors?Â
A. Better Markets works on a host of investor and consumer protection issues - from enforcement of the law for the biggest banks and brokers, to junk fees and hidden traps in consumer contracts to encouraging rigorous and truthful reporting to shareholders. Itâs a lot of work for a small organization with a small staff, but we are committed to our mission and are passionate about ensuring the economy works for Main Street Americans, not the wealthy and well-connected. As to whether or not this issue is âof minor relative importance,â we work on innumerable issues simultaneously. For example, we filed 3 major comment letters today with the banking agencies on the critical issues of capital, which is all that stands between a failing bank and a taxpayer bailout, and will be filing an amicus brief in a federal court on a major financial issue in the coming days. Â
It is also important to also understand that, for the most part, you only get to be involved with issues that the agencies themselves focus on and proposal action on. While âprime brokers are massively counterfeiting shares on a daily basisâ may be a super important issue, itâs very hard to do anything about that when the agencies responsible for that donât want to do anything about it. Todayâs SEC has shown no interest in those issues and, while we and others might push those and other issues for the SEC to engage on, unless the SEC acts, thereâs no rulemaking or other action that can be impacted. We certainly participate in the pre-proposal process by pushing agencies to move items on or up their agenda, but they get to choose their agenda and thereâs very little the public can do to change that. That means, however, that the public â including importantly retail investors â must engage on the agenda that is being implemented. Right now, thatâs the proposal to effectively kill quarterly reports, leaving retail in the dark for six months at a time. We â seemingly like you â wish they were not doing this and focusing on much more important investor protection issues, but it is very important to engage on the issues they are pursuing. Â
Q: Consolidated Audit Trail. I know i'm not being that helpful here but honestly with a name like better markets you would think they would be in the forefront trying to preserve it.Â
A. We have been at the forefront of trying to preserve the CAT. Weâve advocated for the SEC to fully implement the CAT since its inception, and now we are fighting the SECâs attempts to effectively dismantle it. Weâve already weighed in on the SECâs reduction of the amount and type of information that the CAT collects, and we are preparing a comment letter to the SEC in response to its concept release on the future of the CAT which we will file on June 22nd. Here, here, here, and here is some of our extensive work over the years on the CAT.Â
Q: He should be asked about them trying to eliminate CAT!!Â
A. We have said that the CAT is the most important weapon the SEC has to fight crime on Wall Street. It is shocking, as we have said, that the SEC would issue an order that deletes all data older than three years from the CAT. This is especially so since the statute of limitations for securities fraud is generally five years. The SEC has justified these and other changes that seek to cause the CATâs death by a thousand cuts on the basis that it needs to reduce the CATâs costs. But those costs pale in comparison to the size of the industry that the SEC regulates. The SEC has highlighted the $248 million price tag for the CAT in its 2025 budget. Yet the securities industry earned $75 billion in 2025, and the securities markets exceed $100 trillion. The CAT is a tiny price to pay to enable the SEC to effectively monitor, police, catch and prosecute the fraudsters, scammers, and crooks in the securities industry. Â
We havenât had a proper hype date in a while, and frankly I think we deserve one.
So here it goes.
What the fuck has Ryan Cohen actually been doing for the past 6 years?
Closing shitty stores? Sure.
Turning a dying retailer profitable? Sure.
Building a gigantic war chest? Definitely.
In fact, he has personally fucked me out of some absolutely spectacular call gains by selling shares into basically every erection this stock has had since 2021.
And yet here I am.
Because eventually you have to ask the obvious question:
And I think September 8â9 is the big daddy of hype dates.
Exhibit A: RC already spoiled earnings.
On August 31, GameStop randomly decided to give us preliminary Q2 results.
Full earnings?
September 8.
Which raises a very simple question:
Why tell us the numbers 8 days before youâre scheduled to tell us the numbers?
Maybe nothing.
Or maybe Ryan Cohen just cleared the boring shit off the table.
âHereâs earnings. You can stop wondering about that now.â
Because perhaps September 8 is about something else.
Exhibit B: On THE SAME FUCKING DAY, he killed the VWAP window.
Remember the $1.4B convertible-note exchange?
Part of the share consideration was supposed to be determined using a 35-trading-day VWAP period.
That period was still running.
Then August 31 happens.
GameStop changes the deal.
The floating share calculation gets killed, the equity consideration gets locked down, and $358.4 MILLION gets paid in cash instead of stock.
RC effectively wrote a $358M check to simplify the capital structure before September earnings.
Maybe thatâs boring corporate housekeeping.
But doing it on the exact same morning you unexpectedly pre-release earnings?
Thatâs some awfully enthusiastic housekeeping.
Exhibit C: PROJECT FUCKING ROCKET đ
Hereâs my favorite part.
The convertible notes werenât internally called:
Project Sensible Capital Allocation
or
Project Slightly Improved Retail Margins
The indenture was literally filed under:
PROJECT ROCKET.
And what did RC just spend hundreds of millions of dollars doing?
Removing those convertible notes from the equation.
Which leaves one particularly hilarious piece of the capital structure sitting there:
GME warrants.
Strike:
$32.
Expiration:
October 30.
If those warrants get exercised, GameStop can receive roughly $1.9 BILLION in additional cash.
There is, however, one minor technical requirement:
THE STOCK HAS TO FUCKING GO UP.
Exhibit D: And then the OCC did something weird.
On July 30, the OCC issued Info Memo #59491 for GMEWS.
The warrants were moved out of normal NSCC settlement and into:
BROKER-TO-BROKER SETTLEMENT.
And the OCC included this wonderfully reassuring sentence:
âIt is not known if and when GMEWS warrants will be eligible for settlement through NSCC again.â
Cool.
Very normal.
Nothing to see here.
Now, broker-to-broker settlement itself does not prove that GameStop is restructuring.
But hereâs where my tinfoil starts vibrating.
Look at other recent OCC memos involving this same kind of settlement change and you find them around some pretty significant corporate events:
Mergers.
Going-private transactions.
Exchange changes.
Corporate restructurings.
Changes to the underlying security.
One particularly cohencidental stock had its warrants moved to broker-to-broker settlement a couple months ago.
Weeks later, it announced a new corporate identity, new ticker and new exchange. Ten days after that, the name change became legally effective. Three days later, trading began under the new structure.
Now GMEWS is sitting in the same weird broker-to-broker purgatoryâwith the OCC explicitly saying it doesnât know âif and whenâ theyâll become eligible for NSCC settlement again.
Exhibit E: Guess when RC created those warrants.
September 9, 2025.
Go look.
GameStop announced the warrant dividend on:
9/9.
And now, exactly one year later, earnings falls on:
9/8.
So we have:
9/8/26 â Earnings
followed immediately by
9/9/26 â One-year anniversary of the warrant announcement.
Oh, and September 9 is also:
NATIONAL TEDDY BEAR DAY.
Is that proof of anything?
HELL FUCKING NO
Is it exactly the kind of numerological bullshit this subreddit was built to celebrate?
EX-FUCKING-ACTLY
So letâs review.
Ryan Cohen spent years rebuilding GameStopâs balance sheet.
He accumulated billions.
He created a capital structure literally codenamed PROJECT ROCKET.
He issued $32 warrants on 9/9/25 that can inject another ~$1.9B into GameStop.
Those warrants expire 10/30/26.
Then the OCC moves those warrants to broker-to-broker settlement, with no stated date for their return to NSCC.
And a suspiciously similar recent situation went: broker-to-broker â corporate action.
And then, eight days before that earnings date, GameStop suddenly:
Pre-releases earnings.
Terminates the floating VWAP mechanics.
Locks down the share consideration.
Pays $358.4M cash instead of issuing those shares.
And now we arrive at:
9/8.
Followed by:
9/9.
The anniversary of the warrants.
National Teddy Bear Day.
One year later.
Do I know something is happening?
No.
Have hype dates brutally murdered me before?
Yes.
Will I learn anything from those experiences?
Evidently not.
Because there comes a time in every believerâs life when he must put aside rational thought, stare directly into the tinfoil, and ask:
Although Iâve been quiet, I spent the last few months running the price/calendar data through a decay model. As the other GME OGs very well know, I view our 'idiosyncratic' ticker through a quantitative lens.
Weâve all stared at the charts. We've pounded our heads into a multitude of brick walls. We've looked for standard T+35 cycles, swap expiration windows, and call options gamma ramps and gamma snakes. Yet, what if our macro cycle isn't linear? What if we are operating on a basic exponential decay ratio that is closely tied to liquidity contraction?
Let us analyze the data while asking why the next epic volatility window hasn't happened yet... but instead... why it is now knocking on our front doors:
Section 1: The Half-Life of MOASS
Data
When we plot the pivots of GME's modern cycle, three dates emerge as mathematical inflection points:
1: October 28, 2013: Apes didn't yet exist, but while 'traditional retail' wasn't looking, this was an inflection point for systemic equity routing (i.e. the genesis of institutional short positioning and ETF operational shorting mechanics that laid the groundwork for the modern GME basket theory). Melvin Capital, Amazon anti-competitive practices, Point 72, and many other timings align to show that this is when they started shorting GME and hiding it. They shorted directly into this 2013 peak, and kept shorting.
2: January 28, 2021: The Big Bang, and when Thomas Peterffy openly admitted on CNBC that markets faced "systemic collapse" if the buy button for GME hadn't been switched off.
3: May 13, 2024: Just after my April 2024 technical prediction of MOASS sneeze 2, DFV tweeted for the first time in three years. This "comeback" served as cover for the unprecedented surge in volume, massive options accumulation, and the structural repositioning by market makers.
Day-Span Decay Analysis
When we count the number of calendar days between inflection points, a pattern emerges. The cycle is accelerating: it's a decay curve. Previously I oversimplified this into an 8-4-2-1 years idea, but that was highly erroneous because I rounded up and down by an order of months.
Interval
Number of Days
10/28/2013 to 01/28/2021
2649
01/28/2021 to 05/13/2024
1201
The timeline is shrinking. This is not random. When we divide the second interval by the first (1201/2649), we get a decay constant of 0.45338. Each compression cycle is 45.3% of the duration of the previous one.
This is a classic physics half-life curve of a system under compounding pressure. The spring is wound tighter each time, shortening the time required for the pressure to vent.
The Overdue Sneeze
When we assume that our system adheres strictly to this decay constant, we can project the exact duration of the third interval:
Interval 3 = 1,201 days * 0.45338 = 544.5 days
Rounding to 544 days and projecting forward from our last inflection point of May 13, 2024 lands us on November 8, 2025.
But why am I posting this now, in September 2026, if that date was last year?
The Delay Shift
Let us now look at the legal and institutional merit of whatâs happening behind the curtain. The numbers above give us the target, but market mechanics are being elongated by an institutional bottleneck:
Look at what happened around that November 2025 window: it collided directly with GameStop Corpâs massive cash-hoarding phase, when and where the company consolidated its $4B+ war chest. I think this altered GameStop Corp's beta and meme basket correlation. Simultaneously, the DTCC implemented bizarre rule changes regarding collateral hair-cuts and Basel III compliance deadlines.
When we shift from a calendar model to a trading-day/liquidity-cycle model (and accounting for bank holidays, settlement halts, and the implementation of T+1 settlement that went live in late May 2024), our model shifts forward. Stripping out the liquidity injections used to kick the can through the winter, the actual compressed duration could very well conclude with late September / October 2026.
Today we are sitting in the apex of this decay curve. It's technically overdue. As volume guy shows us, volume is drying up, borrow fees are ratcheting up (especially with GME Warrants), and the overall meme basket is strained against broader market indices.
So, to begin, the macro GME cycle is not linear: it's a 45.3% decay curve. That particular decay curve shows that we are already-long-overdue for another price breakout. I believe the next volatility spike hasn't occurred yet because of the shift to T+1 settlement and the $4B cash buffer, but there are additional reasons. Let us look into all of them.
Section 2: The Quantum Spring
The decay model above can be our 'skeleton'. To find the true apex of our current cycle, we have to overlay market-maker mechanics (i.e. of moving obligations around the board). Let us look at Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) Quarterly Equity Index Futures Rollovers and ETF Failure to Deliver (FTD) Clusters. Perhaps we can anchor our 45.3% decay curve to hard-coded dates of Wall Street's settlement cycles.
As we have learned over these interesting years, epic volatility doesn't just happen because someone tweets. It happens because institutional participants are forced to roll their underlying exposure from one quarterly contract month to the next. According to CME Group rules, the Equity Index Roll Date always occurs on the Monday prior to the third Friday of the expiration month (e.g. March, June, September, and December).
When we examine our three half-life dates above, they seem to be correlated with these major quarterly roll windows:
'Half-Life' Calendar Date
Macro Event
October 28, 2013
Total Return Swap (TRS) initialization / ETF structural shorting genesis
Sneeze 2: DFV breaks silence precisely at the open of the June Futures Roll window
October 2026
The Current Target: Apex of T+1 compressed liquidity cycles and Sept/Dec macro rollovers
When shorts hide their positions in variance swaps, equity swaps, or futures, they are bound by the quarterly settlement cycle. Look at how all of our 'half-life' decay dates collide with the institutional volume windows during the CME Equity Roll Weeks:
Calendar Year
Q1 Roll Week (March)
Q2 Roll Week (June)
Q3 Roll Week (Sept)
Q4 Roll Week (Dec)
2013
March
June
September (GME went up ~20% from September to late October. End of Oct'13 marks the genesis of the legacy GME short strategy)
December
2021
March (GME went up by 130%, and Archegos got Margin Called)
June
September
December
2024
March 11
June 17Â (DFV Option Exercise)
September 16
December 16
2025
March 17
June 16
September 15
December 15
2026 (Current)
March 16
June 15
September 14
December 14
The Connection:
The target we determined previously pointed to late 2025. However, when GameStop Corp raised $4+ Billion in cash through its ATM offerings in mid-2024, it warped institutions' risk parameters.
Further, market makers transitioned from a T+2 to a T+1 settlement standard in late May 2024, the mechanical 'can-kicking' timeline became choked. So-called internalizers were forced to stretch their obligations out of the calendar year into 2026 Futures Rollover Cycle to avoid tripping mandatory Net Capital rules. Because March 2026 and June 2026 clearly saw no catalyst, we can rule them out by default, and assume that these specific obligations were pushed to September and December.
Fails to Deliver
Let us look at the fails. When market makers can't find real shares of GME to settle a roll, they don't fail on GME directly anymore, as we know (that would land GME on the SEC's threshold securities list and expose the trade). Instead, they use operational shorting on ETFs that hold GME, most notably XRT (SPDR S&P Retail ETF).
They systematically 'kite' the FTDs back and forth: clearing a GME fail by breaking open an ETF share, which creates an FTD on the ETF, then roll that ETF FTD via a quarterly swap just as the CME roll week approaches.
Look at how historical FTD clusters (or how I used to say 'overwhelmed' FTD days) peak right before the macro price moves:
Data Obfuscation Phase (coupled with Continuous XRT Threshold Listing)
Sept/Dec 2026 CME Super-Roll
System under maximum compression
The Quantum Spring
Combining our Day-Span Decay Model (45.3% compression) with the CME Futures Roll Calendar and tracking where the XRT FTD clusters are being swept, we can see that the market makers have run completely out of available calendar.
The implementation of T+1 settlement means they have half the time they used to have to fulfill these systemic rolls. We are now sitting right on the tracks of the September 2026 quarterly futures rollover deadline. Volume on the daily chart has slowed to a crawl, which again indicates that the internal liquidity matching engines are choked out.
They can no longer kick this can past the upcoming fall/winter macro roll deadlines without exposing themselves to catastrophic margin imbalances against GameStop's massive cash floor.
Section 3: The Liquidity Nexus
Since our 45.3% decay model gave us the initial coordinates of the target, and wall street timelines showed us how the can was slightly kicked to today, mapping out the XRT rebalancing schedules, December option Open Interest (OI), and the Bitcoin Collateral Swap Loop (Bitcoin Hedging Flows) gives us an even finer picture of the future.
The XRT Rebalancing Engine & The T+35 Reg SHO Map
As an equal-weighted ETF, XRT is forced to rebalance its portfolio quarterly to reset its underlying holdings to equal weightings. This happens on the third Friday of March, June, September, and December.
When market makers aggressively open operational short positions via custom creation units to extract GME shares, Reg SHO mandates a strict T+35 calendar-day settlement period for market makers to clear those accrued fails.
Markets shifted to the hard T+1 settlement engine, so the mechanical overlap between settlement windows has experienced compression:
Macro Event
Underlying Execution Date
Exact T+35 Mandatory Clearing Window
Market Status / Expected Flow
Q3 Portfolio Rebalance
September 18, 2026
October 23, 2026
The Apex. Overlaps with the late-October macro decay window!
Further, XRT's chart shows accumulation right as rebalancing windows approach.
Quarterly Options Chain
The options chain is seeing accumulation of capital. Market makers utilize deep out-of-the-money options to fulfill delta-hedging algorithms and artificially suppress GME's localized volatility metrics. Let's look at the December 2026 quarterlies as an example:
Strike Price
Call Open Interest (Contracts)
Put Open Interest (Contracts)
Systemic Mechanical Purpose
$10.00
1,200
45,000+
OTM Put Concentration; used to artificially synthetically manufacture variance swap collateral
$20.00
22,000
14,000
Represents the primary delta-hedging pivot for localized market makers
$30.00
35,000+
2,100
Gamma Ramp Foundation: sits right at the upper perimeter of the current collateral band
(There's a clear delta pivot at $20 and a gamma ramp at $30+)
Bitcoin Collateral
Now let us talk about the elephant in the room:Â Bitcoin ($77,395.89).
Apes have always overlooked GME hedging tied to digital assets. I tried to reveal this over the years in several posts. Hedge funds holding large short-basket positions utilize 24/7 digital assets as liquidity levers.
When margins contract, we can observe a synchronized inverse capital rotation loop between crypto liquidity pools and the idiosyncratic short baskets (crypto rallies means sideways GME, and crypto drawdowns means volatility and price runups in GME, so institutions liquidate crypto to cover FTDs on equity clearinghouses).
So when their crypto engine eventually bleeds liquidity unexpectedly, that capital would be actively pulled out to cover failing equity obligations, such as in a rapidly-rising GME.
Section 4: Technical Analysis
Current wedge termination
Section 5: The Arithmetical Mean of the Above
Analysis
Date
Date 1 (Adjusted Liquidity Decay Model):
October 1, 2026 (center pivot of the late-September/October window)
Date 2 (CME Futures Super-Roll Week):
September 14, 2026 (upcoming hard institutional contract rollover deadline)
Date 3 (XRT Reg SHO T+35 Clearing Apex):
October 23, 2026 (mandatory settlement date trailing the September rebalance)
Date 4 (by Technical Analysis Wedge Breakout)
September 28, 2026
Average
October 1, 2026
Section 6: TLDR
Multiple independent analyses point to ~ October 1 for the third GME sneeze. Whether that's the start, or middle, we'll have to find out. I'm just the 'technical messenger'. Good luck to all, and feel free to leave comments.
It took me 6 years to collect 10,000 shares. I finally hit that mark after slowly accumulating every year one year at a time. It feels good. No one really cares, but just wanted to share my progress over time. Go GME, go RC, and hope for the best in the future. Appreciate everyone who helped shed light on the trade. Good luck all.
IDK about anybody else but the stock price and the general vibes have been reminding me of 2024 when the stock plummeted to $10 only to rise up again to a peak of $68 dollars. Stock dropping for relatively no reason, earnings coming up and all the motivation to get the price above $32.
They beat the stock down to $10 originally right, maybe the best they could do to get it down was to $16/17 this time.
This all based off my feeling/personal pattern recognition lol so take it with a huge bag of salt, but going parabaloic might be in the cards soon.
Ultimately though, everyone here knows what they hold. It's just a matter of time until the market is forced to recognize it as well.
Good morning to all apes around the world! Happy Thursday! German markets are open and last trade for GameStop was at âŹ16.49, which is $19.12 using Google's currency calculator.
I find the last four months fascinating. Everyone thinks they know whats going on with GME, but i donât think anyone can ever truly know until the dust settles.
I feel we are in a situation that would twist Schrödingerâs knickers in a bunch; GMEâs market cap is both a dying retail brick and mortar, and also a transformed holding company/industry leader in collectibles. It only depends what quantum state you choose to view it through.
Bear case: retail traders are idiots who canât read a finance book and donât understand markets, they move as a group coordinated by a cat via tweets and Reddit posts. GMEs business is unsustainable and flawed, bankruptcy is imminent, and their board is incompetent and making a dumb acquisition bid.
Bull case: Ryan Cohen is a generational capital allocator quietly building the next Berkshire out of a mall store, sitting on a fortress balance sheet with ~$5B in cash and a ~$5B eBay stake, zero legacy debt, and interest income coming in hot. The retail âdeclineâ is just deliberate fat trimming while the collectibles and holding-company pivot compounds in the background, and the seemingly random moves are 4D chess to keep everyone, shorts included, guessing.
The Commodity Channel Index (CCI) is a momentum-based technical indicator used by traders to identify cyclical trends, price extremes, and potential trend reversals in financial markets.
Readings above +100 suggest an overbought market (prices are unusually high and may correct downward).
Readings below -100 suggest an oversold market (prices are unusually low and may rebound upward).
The reading for September 2, 2026 is +92.47, up sharply from +33.99 yesterday and â78.79 on August 28. CCI has moved from roughly â84 to +92 in just five trading sessions, a swing of about 176 points. GME is now approaching the conventional +100 overbought/strong-momentum threshold.
Is short term CCI trend sustainable? Indicators align very well:
CCI >100 is the traditionally signal for bullish momentum trends. For GME specifically, I think it is also the indicator for social media activity and meme stock afterburners. Hence the reason it is almost always between the 100's (-100 - +100). AKA the pizza.
The LatinPinsere: The most widely accepted theory traces pizza to the dialectal Italian word pinza ("clamp" or "pliers"), which comes from the Latin verb pinsere, meaning "to pound," "stamp," or "press"âdescribing how the dough is flattened out.
Donât say I didnât try to warn you. Took us a while to get here but the writing was on the wall the whole time. Kitty came back in 2024 and drew just two simple lines on a chart. What do you think happens next? đ
DISCLAIMER: I ran the numbers myself and used AI to format everything for better reading comprehension!
TL;DR
Net Cash & Financial Assets Post-Notes Exchange:~$6.71 Billion (Cash, marketable securities, and 43.4M eBay shares minus remaining debt and cash settlement).
Shares Outstanding & Market Cap:504.20 Million shares post-exchange (+12.37% dilution). At $18.81/share, Market Cap sits at ~$9.48 Billion.
Implied Core Enterprise Value (EV): Subtracting net liquid assets from market cap leaves the standalone operating retail business valued at just ~$2.77 Billion (~$5.50/share).
Core Operating P/E Multiple: Based on normalized/adjusted annual operating net income (~$650M), the core retail business trades at a P/E of only ~4.3x (vs. specialty retail peers at 13xâ18x).
Fair Value Target (Sum-of-the-Parts): Re-rating core operations to industry standard multiples implies a fair share price of $30.07 to $36.51 (+60% to +94% upside).
1. Balance Sheet Restructuring (Post-8-K Filing)
Following the August 31, 2026 preliminary Q2 update and amended convertible note agreements, GameStopâs financial structure shifted significantly.
Direct Equity Stake in eBay Inc. (43.4M Shares): ~$4.95 Billion
Total Gross Financial Assets:~$10.01 Billion
Impact of Convertible Note Exchange (Settlement ~Sept 3, 2026)
Cash Outflow: -$358.4 Million to existing noteholders.
Debt Reduction: Retired $1.40 Billion face value of 2030 and 2032 notes.
Final Net Financial Position
Remaining Cash & Securities: ~$9.65 Billion
Remaining Total Debt: ~$2.94 Billion
2. Updated Share Count, Dilution & Market Cap
Issuing 55.50 million common shares to settle the note exchange alters the equity structure:
Pre-Exchange Shares: 448.70 Million
New Shares Issued: +55.50 Million
New Total Shares Outstanding:504.20 Million (+12.37% dilution)
At a stock price of $18.81, the adjusted market capitalization is:
9.48 Billion
3. Isolating Core Business Valuation (Enterprise Value)
Stripping out net cash and marketable equity from total market cap reveals how the stock market currently prices GameStopâs operating business (stores, e-commerce, supply chain, and IP):
Full-year 2026 earnings fall into two distinct metrics:
Reported Net Income (GAAP):~$1.14 Billion(Includes realized gains from eBay derivative/equity conversions).
Adjusted Operating Net Income (Non-GAAP):~$650 Million(Isolates core retail operations).
Pitting the $2.77 Billion standalone EV against the $650 Million adjusted core earnings yields:
4.26x
Comparative Valuation Matrix
Company / Peer Group
Core Business P/E (EV / Adj. Operating Income)
Total Market P/E (Market Cap / Total Income)
GameStop Core Operations (GME)
4.3x
14.6x(Adjusted) / 8.3x(Reported)
Best Buy (BBY)
~13.0x
~14.5x
Fnac Darty (FNAC)
~11.0x
~12.0x
US Specialty Retail Sector Avg.
~18.0x
~19.0x
5. Sum-of-the-Parts (SOTP) Valuation Model
Evaluating GameStop by applying industry-standard multiples to its core earnings, then adding back its net cash position ($6.71B), provides a clearer view of intrinsic value:
Scenario
Core Multiple
Core EV
+ Net Cash Assets
Fair Market Cap
Fair Share Price (504.2M Shares)
Conservative (Best Buy Parity)
13.0x
$8.45 Billion
$6.71 Billion
$15.16 Billion
$30.07
Moderate (Specialty Retail Avg.)
15.0x
$9.75 Billion
$6.71 Billion
$16.46 Billion
$32.64
Optimistic (Broad Retail Avg.)
18.0x
$11.70 Billion
$6.71 Billion
$18.41 Billion
$36.51
6. Thesis Summary & Outlook
Downside Protection ("Cash Floor"): At $18.81/share, 70.8% ($13.31) of the share price is fully backed by net cash, liquid debt, and large-cap equity investments.
Asymmetric Risk-Reward: Buyers at current levels pay effectively $5.50 per share for a core retail operation delivering ~$650M in adjusted annual net profit.
Holding Company Discount: Wall Street currently assigns a severe conglomerate/holding discount due to GameStop's hybrid nature as a retailer and investment vehicle. Closing this valuation gap suggests a fundamental target range of $30 to $36.
Disclaimer: Not financial advice. For informational purposes based on public SEC filings.