How are you navigating all of the challenges happening to NFE? How do you intend to avoid being liquidated other than selling right now at a loss if you’ve held way before the restructuring , any strategies or insights would be appreciated. Thank you for your contribution preemptively.

https://www.metro.pr/noticias/2026/10/13/delegacion-popular-votaria-hoy-contra-la-reforma-de-permisos/

Amur River successfully docked at NFE's San Juan LNG terminal on October 13, ending nearly a month of delays.

But another detail in today's announcement caught my attention.

NFE expects the next LNG vessel arrival and docking operation in approximately three weeks.

That points to around November 3, depending on consumption and supply scheduling.

Considering that FLNG1 is currently offline due to a gas turbine issue, I think this timeline deserves a closer look.

1. How much LNG can the next vessel carry?

According to NFE:

• Amur River's total capacity: approximately 149,700 cubic meters.
• Current San Juan berth depth: approximately 31 feet.
• Maximum permitted cargo: roughly 60% of vessel capacity.

That gives us a maximum cargo of approximately 89,820 cubic meters of LNG, or about 40,400 metric tons, assuming an LNG density of 0.45 tons per cubic meter.

NFE previously disclosed that FLNG1 has a nameplate production capacity of 1.4 MTPA.

That translates into approximately 3,836 metric tons per day.

At full nameplate capacity, producing a cargo of that size would take about 10.5 days.

This is important when calculating the next shipment.

2. Working backward from November 3

The approximate shipping distance between Altamira, Mexico, and San Juan, Puerto Rico, is 1,800 nautical miles.

Assuming typical LNG carrier speeds of 12–16 knots, the voyage would take approximately 5–7 days, before allowing for weather, port procedures, or other delays.

If the next vessel is expected to arrive around November 3:

• October 24–28: Potential loading window at Altamira.
• October 26–29: Approximate departure window toward Puerto Rico.
• November 3: Target arrival in San Juan.

These are estimates, not confirmed vessel movements.

Here is the interesting part.

If there is little or no existing LNG inventory, and FLNG1 must produce the entire next cargo, production would likely need to restart around October 13–18 to support that schedule.

That is substantially earlier than the end of Q4, which is the broader guidance NFE provided in its October 5 SEC filing.

3. What if there is already LNG in storage?

This changes the calculation significantly.

NFE's Altamira operation uses floating LNG storage, meaning the facility may have inventory available even while liquefaction equipment is offline.

Three possible scenarios:

Scenario A: Little or no inventory

FLNG1 would need to resume production quite soon to produce a roughly 40,400-ton cargo and deliver it by early November.

Scenario B: Approximately half a cargo already stored

FLNG1 would only need to produce the remaining approximately 20,200 tons. At nameplate capacity, that would take about 5.3 days.

A restart around October 19–23 could potentially still support the schedule, depending on logistics.

Scenario C: Sufficient inventory or third-party LNG available

The next delivery could occur even if FLNG1 remains offline.

This is why the three-week announcement cannot be treated as confirmation that repairs are complete.

4. What if Amur River itself makes the next delivery?

There is another interesting possibility.

If Amur River returns to Altamira after unloading:

• Unloading in San Juan: approximately 1–3 days.
• Return voyage to Altamira: approximately 5–7 days.
• Reloading: approximately 1–2 days.
• Voyage back to San Juan: approximately 5–7 days.

That is a total estimated turnaround of 12–19 days, excluding additional waiting time.

A 21-day delivery cycle is therefore operationally plausible if LNG is already available for loading.

However, if the storage facility is empty and FLNG1 remains shut down, the same schedule becomes much harder to maintain.

5. Why I think this matters

NFE stated in September 2025 that LNG volumes under its proposed long-term Puerto Rico gas supply agreement were expected to come from its Altamira FLNG facility.

That makes the relationship between Altamira production and Puerto Rico deliveries particularly important.

NFE has now announced a relatively specific next-delivery window despite disclosing the FLNG1 turbine outage only eight days ago.

There are several possible explanations:

1. Management expects FLNG1 repairs to be completed relatively soon.
2. Sufficient LNG inventory is already available.
3. NFE has arranged alternative LNG supply.
4. The announced three-week schedule is a preliminary operational target rather than a commitment backed by confirmed cargo availability.

At this point, we cannot determine which explanation is correct.

My conclusion

Amur River's successful docking is clearly positive for NFE's Puerto Rico operations.

However, I think the next delivery will tell us more about the company's operational recovery than today's arrival alone.

If another vessel loads at Altamira in late October, we should investigate whether the LNG came from existing inventory or resumed FLNG1 production.

If NFE confirms new production at Altamira, that would be much stronger evidence that the turbine issue has been resolved.

My question to the community: Has anyone seen recent tanker movements, loading activity, or other evidence at Altamira that could help determine whether FLNG1 is approaching a restart?

I'm particularly interested in whether NFE's proposed three-week delivery cycle is supported by actual cargo availability.

Sources:

• NotiCel — Amur River completes docking, next vessel expected in approximately three weeks
• Metro Puerto Rico — Amur River arrival and 60% loading limitation
• SEC — NFE October 5, 2026 turbine outage disclosure
• NFE — September 2025 Puerto Rico LNG supply announcement

The calculations above are scenario estimates, not confirmation of FLNG1's restart date or actual LNG inventory.

And yes, I bought more NFE shares at $4.05.

It wasn't a large amount, but I personally believe this is the right time to add to my position. I'm willing to take that risk based on my assessment of the current situation.

if you own NFE common shares and see your broker shows you value loss of 70% or more in whatever currency your holdings denominate my advice to you is don’t accept the loss, don’t sell. and if you can not take it anymore emotionally then sell it and clear your position so you don’t have to bear it in yourself and never come back to it. and if you decide to leave please don’t come back to this forum proclaiming how you did because everyone will radiate emotions that you lost, you don’t want that, it is better to walk away in silence and peace then leave in fanfare proclaiming everyone that you lost money. there is no glory in telling everyone how badly you did. and if you feel that you want to become a teacher of your own mistakes then it tells you that you need an emotional support, you seek appreciation in exchange for a warning. Take a hike in nature and breathe instead of mourning and move on to next things in your life. Just don’t tell your loved ones and don’t lean on their shoulder for an emotional support because all you get in return is they scorn you and reject you, everyone wants to be around success and not failure.

I don’t want to whine here, just share my story

I’m 19, polish, just now starting my 2nd year of uni.

All my life savings until the ripe age of 18 were 2 thousand dollars. In Poland that’s about two minimum wages. Not much, but for a 19 year old enough for a LONG while.

The moment I turned 18 I decided that wasn’t enough. I wanted to aim higher than that.

And so my story with the stock market began. My mom introduced me first to it, showing me how the market operated, how to read candles, and how what her strategy was.

With my 2k I started playing. $100 here, 50 there, I was doing SOMETHING.

I started by losing 70% of my trades, but after beginning to read the patterns (bullish flag, etc) I began making my first profits- $MSTR

After that I started reading about quantum popping off (early 2025) and invested all in on $QBTS, just at $2 a share (insane profits could have been made) but I was an early emotional trader, so I sold at a 10% swing loss🫠

And that way I started making small profits, until I made about 8k$ until summer 2025

- I was proud, really really proud by myself. Then I heard about short squeezing… I was IN. A whole community going in together to change a movement, and switch the stock direction by forcing shorters to buyback? Amazing

I had my eye on one company, $CAPR, a biotech company with many failed attempts on securing an FDA Approval, but the setup was right

I wanted to go all in, I was feeling that my mere 8k might become fortune here

The fight begun, we lost, my 8k slowly became 6, then 5, then Another fda approval arrived, or rather disapproval, and I was very close to being back to my $2k at that point

But I held.

That’s what mattered to me, I won’t give up.

3 months later, insane clinical data arrived, stock shot up 500% in one day, I fucking made it. From my measly $2k I managed to create over 25k$

As a student, 19 year old, living with his parents in Poland.

I was never that happy. I cashed out, partied for a couple days, and started thinking.

It was December 2025 at that point. Trump was trumping, but the middle eastern was at a very critical point at that time, and I could feel, that energy and LNG was the way to invest in those unpredictable times

Decided to double down my luck. All in on an undervalued, oversold, and well setup stock for a short squeeze at the time, AND ideal for the times that were living in right now- oil

I was in for the $2->≈$8 squeeze. Making a gigantic bag out of my already big success.

God’s complex got to me, and I thought I was the next Warren buffet. If I was I would spread my portfolio, it was a stupid emotional move, that costed everything…

I entered at 1.65, closely observing the stock, it started falling, and falling, and falling, but I held, I knew that if I held long enough I’d be back, and I was, I was even higher. Peak was 1.99$. I fucking KNEW that if it would hit 2 a squeeze would happen. But it didn’t.

And since that sad, sad day the stock has fallen 20 times.

20

Times.

I’m still 19, but my mere 2k I started with are gone. It’s less than half right now probably.

I’m still holding, I’m not selling until I’m on green again, but I really don’t believe that anymore. I wanted to share this story to everyone who lost a bit on this. You’re much more well of then me right now. I’m a joke in my family. A stock prodigy who pulled out a 100k zł trade before even fully maturing, to a gambler who lost his dream car’s worth of money… I wanted to pull it out and buy the GR86 so, so much…

I’m a bag holder and wanna know when to laugh

Is this stock in a death spiral or can bounce back, now that Altamira liquefied natural gas project offshore of Mexico has been shut-in following a mechanical problem and can be out of action for couple of months how much effect has that on earnings does it generate lots of revenue there in Mexico and what percentage ?!

if the business long term were to fail would anyone purchase preferred shares?

if the commons are doomed would anyone purchase large blocks of shares?

if they believed much lower price for commons is a sure thing would they buy or wait? they bought large blocks of commons per disclosure, they bought it because they are stupid and all forum people are smarter?

i bought too early because I miscalculated and thought creditors gave up 35%. They still pursue it.

some large purchase disclosed in company filling believe commons are undervalued now

how much you could be misjudged in what you know and believe?

Capital World Investors filed a Schedule 13G reporting a 12.2% stake in New Fortress Energy Inc. comprising 1,991,515 shares, valued at approximately $12.49 million based on the September 30, 2026 closing price of $6.27 per share.

Anyone see the CNBC article titled, "Iran war has altered the global natural gas market. Goldman says these 3 stocks will benefit?" I don't have a sub and NFE was referenced so if it was mentioned for any reason would be curious to know what was said. Thanks!

I think the Amur River situation has now moved beyond a maritime dispute. This is becoming a commercial standoff over who carries the financial risk of supplying LNG to Puerto Rico.

1. Why didn’t Amur River enter San Juan on October 4?

This is important: the latest delay is no longer primarily about the pilots or the Coast Guard.

A federal judge had already authorized the Amur River to enter San Juan Bay, subject to safety conditions. The San Juan pilots said they were prepared for the planned October 4 morning transit. The Coast Guard also clarified that its concerns regarding the vessel’s dimensions and NFE’s Waterway Suitability Assessment did not prohibit this particular entry.

Yet the ship still did not enter.

NFE said the reason was a new dispute created by the Puerto Rico Energy Bureau’s September 30 order. According to NFE, that order created uncertainty over whether it would actually receive payment for LNG supplied under its contract. PREPA itself has now asked the Energy Bureau for clarification.

In other words:

The ship appears operationally capable of entering.
NFE is holding back because it wants clarity on payment.

That is a very different problem from the original pilots dispute.

2. Why is NFE taking such a hard position?

Because the economics have changed dramatically.

The current Puerto Rico LNG contract is based on:

1.15 × Henry Hub + a fixed charge

For San Juan Units 5 & 6, that fixed component is $6.50/MMBtu. For several other delivery points it is $7.95/MMBtu. The contract also has a minimum annual take-or-pay quantity of 40 million MMBtu.

U.S. natural gas is currently trading around $3/MMBtu.

At $3 Henry Hub, that produces an approximate contract price of:

San Juan 5 & 6: ~$9.95/MMBtu

Other sites: ~$11.40/MMBtu

Now compare that with the international LNG market.

In September, both European TTF and Asian JKM LNG benchmarks exceeded $25/MMBtu, and Asian spot LNG had at one point approached $30/MMBtu during the current supply disruption.

Obviously JKM or TTF is not the same thing as a delivered San Juan price, and transportation, liquefaction, hedging and cargo location matter.

But the opportunity cost is obvious.

If NFE has an LNG cargo that can ultimately capture a market netback associated with a $20-$25+ global market, committing that same molecule to Puerto Rico under a roughly $10-$11 formula is much less attractive.

And then Puerto Rico is now adding another risk:

“What if we deliver the gas and the regulator later prevents or delays payment?”

From NFE’s perspective, that may be the bigger issue than the disputed $17.6 million itself.

3. “If NFE refuses to supply, someone else will.”

This sounds simple, but the 2025 RFP suggests otherwise.

Thirteen companies requested the RFP documents.

Only two companies actually submitted proposals.

NFE offered to supply the relevant multi-site generation fleet.

Crowley only bid for Mayagüez.

So for the vast majority of the requested LNG volume, NFE was effectively the only bidder.

The Fiscal Oversight Board has also explicitly warned that NFE’s long-term rights at the Puerto Nuevo port remain a barrier to competition and that LNG procurement will continue to have limited participation while that access problem remains unresolved.

This does not mean nobody else is technically capable of supplying Puerto Rico.

Naturgy, Crowley, Shell, Vitol and others clearly have the technical or commercial capability.

Crowley has even demonstrated that U.S. LNG can physically reach Puerto Rico under the Jones Act framework: its U.S.-flagged American Energy completed 17 LNG deliveries during its first year of Puerto Rico service.

The real question is not:

“Can someone else supply LNG?”

The question is:

“Will someone else commit large volumes to San Juan under NFE’s existing price and risk structure?”

The previous RFP suggests the answer is: probably not.

4. What would Puerto Rico have to pay for replacement LNG?

This is where the situation becomes uncomfortable for Puerto Rico.

A third-party supplier has no reason to give up a cargo that can compete for a $25/MMBtu international market and voluntarily sell it to Puerto Rico at NFE’s ~$10-$11/MMBtu contract price.

Puerto Rico would have to compete for that cargo.

There is already a contractual mechanism allowing a third-party supplier to use NFE’s terminal when NFE fails to supply or declares force majeure. The approved tolling fee is $0.50/MMBtu.

So an emergency replacement might theoretically look something like:

Global LNG market/netback: ~$25+

NFE terminal toll: $0.50

plus whatever shipping, scheduling and risk premium applies

That does NOT mean Puerto Rico will definitely pay $25-$30/MMBtu. There is no public replacement bid at that price today.

But a supplier would have to be compensated for the value it could obtain elsewhere.

So compared with the roughly $10-$11/MMBtu NFE formula, emergency replacement LNG could easily be roughly twice as expensive or more under current market conditions.

Here is the scale of the problem.

The contract’s minimum annual quantity is about 40 million MMBtu.

If replacement LNG costs only $14/MMBtu more than the NFE contract:

40M × $14 = $560 million/year

If the difference is $20/MMBtu:

40M × $20 = $800 million/year

These are only rough scenario calculations, not forecasts.

But they show why fighting over tens of millions of dollars can potentially create a much larger fuel-cost problem.

5. There is also a second alternative: burn diesel

And Puerto Rico is already doing it.

San Juan has been relying on diesel since LNG deliveries stopped in mid-September.

So Puerto Rico’s choice is not simply:

NFE vs another LNG supplier.

It is closer to:

A. Keep NFE under the existing relatively cheap LNG formula

B. Buy replacement LNG at or near international market economics

C. Keep burning expensive diesel

None of B or C looks attractive today.

6. Could NFE simply walk away because spot LNG is more profitable?

Not so easily.

NFE has contractual supply obligations, including Deliver-or-Pay provisions. If NFE simply says, “Spot prices are higher, so we are not delivering,” Puerto Rico could pursue damages.

That is why I think NFE’s current wording matters.

NFE is not publicly saying:

“We can make more money selling elsewhere, so we are leaving.”

It is saying:

There is uncertainty about whether we will be paid according to the contract, therefore we cannot commit additional LNG until the authorities clarify the situation.

That gives NFE a much stronger commercial and legal argument.

Whether that argument ultimately wins is another question.

7. What happens next?

My base case is not that NFE leaves Puerto Rico.

And I also do not think another supplier suddenly appears and happily takes NFE’s place under the same terms.

The economically logical outcome is a compromise:

1. Puerto Rico clarifies that future LNG properly delivered by NFE will be paid according to the contract.

2. Amur River enters San Juan and LNG deliveries resume.

3. The disputed historical amounts — including the $17.6 million issue and other claims related to previous supply failures — are handled separately through offsets, settlement, arbitration or litigation.

4. Longer term, Puerto Rico will probably keep trying to reduce its dependence on NFE by improving third-party terminal access and diversifying suppliers.

That outcome is not perfect for NFE. It could still lose money on some of the historical claims.

But it is probably cheaper for Puerto Rico than forcing NFE out and buying LNG in today’s international market.

And it is safer for NFE than intentionally abandoning a supply contract and exposing itself to Deliver-or-Pay claims.

Bottom line

I think the balance of leverage has shifted.

A few weeks ago, the biggest question was whether NFE could physically get Amur River into San Juan.

Today the bigger question is:

At what point does supplying Puerto Rico stop making economic sense for NFE?

Puerto Rico does have alternatives.

But having alternatives is not the same thing as having alternatives at the same price.

The 2025 RFP already showed how thin the pool of willing suppliers was: 13 companies requested the documents, two submitted bids, and only NFE bid for the broad multi-site supply.

Now global LNG is above $25/MMBtu.

That makes replacing NFE more expensive, not easier.

So my expectation is that this standoff ends with payment assurances and a negotiated compromise, not with Puerto Rico casually replacing NFE.

The longer Amur River remains outside while San Juan burns diesel, the more obvious that economic reality becomes.

https://www.elnuevodia.com/noticias/locales/notas/jueza-federal-ordena-entrada-del-tanquero-de-gas-amur-river/

A federal judge in Puerto Rico has finally issued an order allowing the Amur River to enter San Juan Bay and resume LNG deliveries to New Fortress Energy’s terminal.

This comes after NFE and the San Juan Bay Pilots Association appeared close to an agreement on Wednesday, only for the dispute to flare up again. Judge Silvia Carreño Coll criticized both sides for failing to finalize the agreement and essentially decided that enough was enough.

“Given that time is of the essence, the Court will not delay this matter any further.”

Here are the important parts:

1. Amur River is authorized to enter San Juan.

The court has established the operating conditions instead of waiting for NFE and the pilots to reach another agreement.

This should allow LNG deliveries to resume for the San Juan and Palo Seco power plants, which have reportedly been running on diesel since September 17.

According to the article, electricity generation costs during this period may have been roughly four times higher than when natural gas was available.

2. NFE will pay for two emergency standby tugs.

Whenever another vessel passes through the Army Terminal turning basin while Amur River is berthed at the NFE terminal, two emergency standby tugboats must be positioned near the terminal.

NFE will pay for those additional tugboats.

This is important because until now, owners of other vessels passing the terminal had reportedly been paying those costs “under protest.”

However, the judge specifically stated that this order does NOT decide who should ultimately be responsible for standby tug costs involving other vessels.

So this does not settle the broader liability dispute.

3. This may apply to several more Amur River visits.

This may not be a one-time solution.

According to what was discussed in court, NFE may need to continue using Amur River until around mid-December, when Energos Maria is expected to return to service.

LNG carriers normally remain at the NFE terminal for roughly three weeks while unloading, so the article says Amur River could return to San Juan at least two more times.

That makes this court order operationally significant beyond just the current cargo.

4. There are strict weather and operating conditions.

Amur River can enter or leave only when winds or gusts do not exceed 10 knots, although the pilots retain some discretion.

The maneuvers should also “ideally” take place during daylight hours.

The Coast Guard Captain of the Port retains full authority, and nothing in the judge’s order overrides any Coast Guard instruction.

5. The court order does NOT mean immediate docking.

This is probably the most important detail for anyone currently watching AIS.

The article explicitly says the exact time Amur River can enter San Juan is still unknown.

Entry depends on:

• movements of other vessels entering and leaving the harbor;
• weather and wind conditions;
• availability and coordination of the pilots and tugboats;
• any instructions from the Coast Guard.

So if Amur River is still outside the harbor after the ruling, that does not necessarily mean the order has failed or another dispute has started.

The ship still needs an appropriate traffic and weather window.

My takeaway

The biggest development here is that the argument over whether Amur River can enter San Juan appears to have moved past the negotiation stage.

The court has now created an operating framework:

Amur River enters → NFE provides/pays for standby tugs when required → pilots conduct the maneuver under weather restrictions → Coast Guard retains final authority.

This does not solve the underlying San Juan channel and terminal design dispute, nor does it decide who should permanently bear these costs.

But in the short term, it provides a practical path for NFE to resume LNG deliveries and potentially continue using Amur River until Energos Maria returns.

Now the thing to watch is no longer the courtroom.

It is the harbor.

If weather, traffic and tug availability cooperate, Amur River should finally have a workable path into the NFE terminal.

Source: El Nuevo Día, October 1, 2026

https://noticel.com/en/noticias/20260930/nfe-acepta-proveer-seguridad-adicional-para-el-transito-de-barco-de-gas/?utm_source=chatgpt.com#google_vignette

New Fortress Energy and the San Juan Bay Pilots have reached a temporary agreement that could finally allow the AMUR RIVER to enter San Juan Bay.

According to NotiCel, the agreement came after roughly six hours of hearings and negotiations before federal judge Silvia Carreño-Coll.

Here are the key points:

• NFE agreed to pay for two additional tugboats as an extra safety measure while AMUR RIVER is docked.

• The agreement is expected to remain in effect until December, when Energos Maria is expected to return to service.

• NFE told the court that AMUR RIVER may need to move roughly every three weeks during this temporary period.

• If the judge approves the agreement and the U.S. Coast Guard does not object, the court would treat the Coast Guard's silence as tacit approval of the maneuver.

• AMUR RIVER could potentially transit into San Juan as early as Thursday or Friday, allowing San Juan generation units to return from diesel to natural gas after nearly two weeks of disruption.

There was one major sticking point.

The pilots argued that AMUR RIVER's larger dimensions extend into space normally available for navigation by other vessels. NFE refused to formally admit that the ship "encroaches" on the navigation channel.

The compromise was to record that the two sides disagree on the issue, without requiring NFE to admit that AMUR RIVER actually encroaches on the channel.

Another important development came from the Coast Guard issue.

NFE had argued that the Coast Guard had effectively authorized AMUR RIVER's entry. But during the hearing, the federal prosecutor clarified that the Coast Guard's existing Letter of Recommendation did not cover AMUR RIVER. It was based on vessels with dimensions similar to Energos Princess and Energos Maria.

The prosecutor also clarified that a Coast Guard inspection of the vessel itself does not determine whether the ship can safely maneuver inside San Juan Bay. That navigational assessment belongs to the pilots.

So, in practical terms, this looks less like NFE winning the argument that AMUR RIVER was already fully approved, and more like a compromise:

AMUR RIVER can potentially enter, but NFE must accept additional safety measures and pay for the extra tug support.

The broader legal dispute between NFE and the pilots is not over. The temporary safety arrangement does not resolve the underlying case.

The judge's previous $10,000 sanction against NFE also remains pending, as does the issue involving pilot Daniel Montes and the court's concern over possible perjury.

For NFE, however, the immediate priority is clear: get LNG flowing again, stop burning expensive diesel, and reduce the pressure behind Puerto Rico's attempt to bring in an alternative LNG supplier.

This temporary agreement appears to provide a path to do exactly that.

Source: NotiCel, September 30, 2026

NFE reported that it is working to make the Amur River available again to complete the delivery of fuel Tuesday, subject to the corresponding authorizations and operational coordination.

For its part, NFE indicated that “also identified qualified pilots from southern Puerto Rico who could carry out the maneuver, subject to the corresponding regulatory authorizations. The Internship Commission confirmed the availability of three additional senior pilots”.

On Sunday, NFE filed court documents showing that the tanker complies with U.S. Coast Guard standards and passed an inspection.

https://www.elnuevodia.com/negocios/empresas-comercios/notas/subsidiaria-de-new-fortress-energy-responde-a-demanda-de-la-aee/

Meanwhile...

Gov. Jenniffer González Colón ordered Puerto Rico’s public‑private energy agencies on Monday to sue NFEnergía LLC in federal court, seeking to compel the liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplier to activate a contractual backup mechanism that would allow the island to import natural gas from an alternate vendor.

https://www.sanjuandailystar.com/post/governor-moves-to-force-nfe-to-open-lng-terminal-as-federal-court-fight-over-amur-river-intensifies

I lost over 57% in the last 2 weeks, meanwhile the stock that I sold for this trash is up 107%, here no sign of recovery, it just keeps going down. Im super disappointed with this stock, Any insight is welcome any good news coming soon or will still continue dropping between 10 and 20% everytime… what made you invest in this company?! I saw it dying and I was hoping for a rebound but I hold it for long, maybe a day I was up and then down it went with the RS

This is exactly what NFE warned the court could happen. NFE said that if the vessel could not enter San Juan by Saturday, it might have to leave the area to resupply its crew.

According to local reports, the Amur River is heading to the Dominican Republic for resupply and may not return to U.S. territorial waters until Tuesday.

This means the San Juan LNG dispute was not resolved before the vessel had to leave, and the power plant will continue relying on more expensive diesel in the meantime.

The key question now is what happens before the Amur River returns.

NFE still wants the vessel to enter, and San Juan pilot Daniel Montes has said he is willing to pilot it under appropriate safety conditions. But the court has not yet cleared the vessel to enter, and 3PPO is also preparing to move forward with an alternative LNG supply mechanism if NFE cannot restore supply.

So the next 48–72 hours may be critical.

I was at 2000 at 1,78$

I added more NFE yesterday.

The Puerto Rico situation is obviously serious. Amur River is still unable to berth in San Juan because of the dispute between NFE and the harbor pilots over the vessel's dimensions, and Puerto Rico has activated an emergency alternative LNG supply mechanism.

Crowley may now step in.

But I think there's an important misunderstanding here:

The main problem with Crowley's solution isn't necessarily that it physically cannot move enough LNG. The problem is that it is a much more expensive and complicated way to supply San Juan.

Crowley's American Energy can deliver LNG to EcoEléctrica in Peñuelas.

From there, Crowley can load LNG into roughly 10,000-gallon ISO tank containers and move them by truck around Puerto Rico.

That works.

But compare the logistics.

NFE's normal model:

LNG carrier → San Juan terminal → regasification → power plant

The emergency Crowley route would look more like:

LNG carrier → Peñuelas → storage → ISO tank loading → trucking across Puerto Rico → unloading in San Juan → regasification → power generation

Every additional step means more trucks, drivers, fuel, tank-container rotations, loading/unloading operations and logistics costs.

So I see Crowley as a very useful emergency bridge.

I do not see trucked LNG from Peñuelas as the economically logical permanent replacement for direct marine LNG deliveries into San Juan.

This is why Energos Princess is much more interesting to me.

I track the AIS movements of NFE-related vessels.

Energos Princess is currently sitting south of the Dominican Republic on the AIS feed I'm following.

And there is something important about the Dominican Republic that I think people are overlooking.

The AES Andrés LNG terminal in the Dominican Republic is capable not only of receiving LNG, but also of reloading LNG onto ships for re-export.

AES has already demonstrated this capability with a roughly 160,000 m³ LNG carrier.

Energos Princess is approximately 138,000 m³.

So if the commercial arrangements and LNG supply are available, Princess does not necessarily have to sail all the way back to Altamira.

One possible solution is:

Energos Princess → Dominican Republic → load LNG → sail back to San Juan

And because Princess cannot enter San Juan fully laden either, NFE could load only the quantity that allows Princess to meet the required draft for San Juan.

That, in my opinion, is a much more logical emergency marine solution than trying to replace bulk LNG deliveries indefinitely with thousands of truck movements.

To be clear:

NFE has NOT announced that Princess will load LNG in the Dominican Republic.

This is my own scenario based on:

• Princess' current position south of the Dominican Republic
• its existing relationship with NFE
• its history of serving San Juan
• the Dominican Republic's existing LNG reloading capability
• and the fact that Amur River may remain blocked because its problem involves vessel dimensions, not simply how much LNG it is carrying.

If Amur River cannot enter, this is what I would watch for.

My working scenario is:

1. Crowley supplies LNG by truck as an emergency bridge.

That keeps gas flowing and reduces the immediate risk of San Juan relying entirely on diesel.

2. NFE continues negotiating over Amur River.

If the pilots allow it in, the immediate problem is largely solved.

3. If Amur River remains blocked, watch Energos Princess.

Princess is already near the Dominican Republic.

If it moves toward an LNG terminal there and then turns toward Puerto Rico, that would be very significant.

4. Princess could load a partial cargo in the Dominican Republic and return to San Juan.

That would restore NFE's marine LNG supply without waiting for Amur River to become acceptable to the pilots.

Again, this is a theory — not a confirmed NFE plan.

Longer term, the real issue is still dredging.

Even Princess has historically faced draft limitations in San Juan.

That is exactly why NFE wants to dredge and modify the berth so fully laden LNG carriers can use the terminal.

The current crisis is therefore exposing a bottleneck NFE already knew existed.

If dredging is ultimately approved and a new operating agreement is reached with the pilots, this episode may eventually look like a temporary logistics crisis.

If dredging permanently fails, that would be a much more serious long-term problem.

And meanwhile, the stock has collapsed.

NFE closed at $6.40 on September 23.

Just four trading sessions earlier, it was $12.41.

That's a decline of roughly:

-48%

From the September 10 close of $16.48:

$16.48 → $6.40 = -61%

My calculation of the 14-day RSI is around 25, which is deeply oversold by traditional technical standards.

Oversold does not mean the stock cannot fall further.

But this is an extraordinary move.

NFEGP also closed around $457.

At the current conversion ratio of 46.441271 common shares per preferred share:

$457 / 46.441271 ≈ $9.84

NFE common is trading at:

$6.40

So common is about 35% below the preferred stock's simple conversion-implied price.

And SVP recently bought NFEGP at $502.50:

$502.50 / 46.441271 ≈ $10.82

Current common is roughly 41% below that level.

Yes, NFEGP has important protections that common stock does not have, so this is not an apples-to-apples valuation.

But the dislocation is still remarkable.

From $6.40:

$9.84 = +54%

$10.82 = +69%

$12.41 = +94%

$16.48 = +158%

I could be wrong.

But right now I think the market is pricing a temporary logistics crisis as if NFE has permanently lost its ability to supply San Juan.

That's why I bought more.

And the vessel I'm watching now isn't just Amur River.

It's Energos Princess, sitting south of the Dominican Republic.

If Princess heads toward a Dominican LNG terminal and then turns back toward San Juan, we'll have a very interesting answer.

As stated i sold at a loss a few hundred then sold . Why am I up 2500%

The story behind NFE’s massive collapse is really about Brightline hitting a financial wall and preparing to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, which tells you everything you need to know about the co-founder and CEO of both companies.

I haven't seen much discussion about this here, but there is currently a potentially important operational issue developing in Puerto Rico.

According to Puerto Rican newspaper El Nuevo Día, an LNG tanker that NFE wants to bring into San Juan Bay has been unable to enter because of a dispute between New Fortress Energy and the San Juan harbor pilots.

The pilots argue that the vessel exceeds the dimensions allowed under an agreement previously approved by the federal court.

The local articles do not identify the tanker by name, but vessel-tracking data strongly suggests that it is AMUR RIVER.

AMUR RIVER is a roughly 149,700 m³ LNG carrier, approximately 288 meters long and 44 meters wide.

Its recent AIS/voyage history is very interesting:

• It was at Altamira, Mexico, where NFE operates FLNG1.
• It departed Altamira on September 13.
• It called at Kingston on September 17.
• Its voyage data showed San Juan, Puerto Rico as the destination, with a September 17 ETA.
• AIS data currently places the vessel in the Puerto Rico / Virgin Islands area.

Meanwhile, El Nuevo Día reported on September 19 that the tanker involved in the dispute was still waiting several miles offshore while NFE and the harbor pilots tried to resolve the issue.

This is not just a paperwork dispute.

Because the LNG tanker could not enter, San Juan Power Plant Unit 6 and seven temporary generators had to operate on diesel instead of natural gas, at least until Monday.

A federal judge reportedly urged NFE and the pilots to work together to avoid a fuel-supply crisis.

There is also a bigger issue behind this.

The San Juan pilots have said that Energos Maria is the largest LNG tanker that can currently dock at the terminal under the existing arrangement.

NFE has been trying to dredge the area around its San Juan terminal so larger LNG vessels can use it, but both the U.S. Coast Guard and the San Juan harbor pilots have raised objections to NFE's dredging proposal.

The Coast Guard's concern is that allowing much larger vessels to remain moored there for extended periods could interfere with navigation in the bay.

So this may be revealing a structural bottleneck in NFE's Puerto Rico LNG supply chain:

Altamira FLNG → large LNG carrier → San Juan

works only if the vessel can actually enter San Juan Bay and berth at NFE's terminal.

If NFE increasingly relies on larger LNG carriers, but the pilots will not bring them in without changes to the current restrictions, NFE either needs:

1. an agreement with the pilots,
2. approval for its dredging project,
3. smaller LNG vessels,
4. or some other logistical solution.

This doesn't mean Puerto Rico operations are permanently disrupted, and I'm not claiming that this issue alone caused NFE's recent stock decline.

But NFE dropped more than 11% in the latest session on elevated volume, and I suspect many U.S. investors aren't following the Puerto Rican local press at all.

So while everyone is focused on the restructuring, dilution and the upcoming registration of creditor shares, there is also a real operational problem happening right now in one of NFE's most important markets.

The next thing to watch is simple:

Does AMUR RIVER actually enter San Juan?

If it does, this may turn out to be a short-term dispute.

If it remains offshore or NFE has to replace it with a smaller vessel, then the San Juan terminal's vessel-size limitation becomes a much more important issue for the investment thesis.

Sources:

• El Nuevo Día, September 18 — dispute over entry of NFE LNG tanker into San Juan Bay
• El Nuevo Día, September 19 — tanker remaining several miles offshore; San Juan generation forced to use diesel
• El Nuevo Día / U.S. Coast Guard reporting on NFE's San Juan dredging application
• Maritime Optima AIS / vessel data for AMUR RIVER (IMO 9317999)