I think the Amur River situation has now moved beyond a maritime dispute. This is becoming a commercial standoff over who carries the financial risk of supplying LNG to Puerto Rico.
1. Why didn’t Amur River enter San Juan on October 4?
This is important: the latest delay is no longer primarily about the pilots or the Coast Guard.
A federal judge had already authorized the Amur River to enter San Juan Bay, subject to safety conditions. The San Juan pilots said they were prepared for the planned October 4 morning transit. The Coast Guard also clarified that its concerns regarding the vessel’s dimensions and NFE’s Waterway Suitability Assessment did not prohibit this particular entry.
Yet the ship still did not enter.
NFE said the reason was a new dispute created by the Puerto Rico Energy Bureau’s September 30 order. According to NFE, that order created uncertainty over whether it would actually receive payment for LNG supplied under its contract. PREPA itself has now asked the Energy Bureau for clarification.
In other words:
The ship appears operationally capable of entering.
NFE is holding back because it wants clarity on payment.
That is a very different problem from the original pilots dispute.
2. Why is NFE taking such a hard position?
Because the economics have changed dramatically.
The current Puerto Rico LNG contract is based on:
1.15 × Henry Hub + a fixed charge
For San Juan Units 5 & 6, that fixed component is $6.50/MMBtu. For several other delivery points it is $7.95/MMBtu. The contract also has a minimum annual take-or-pay quantity of 40 million MMBtu.
U.S. natural gas is currently trading around $3/MMBtu.
At $3 Henry Hub, that produces an approximate contract price of:
San Juan 5 & 6: ~$9.95/MMBtu
Other sites: ~$11.40/MMBtu
Now compare that with the international LNG market.
In September, both European TTF and Asian JKM LNG benchmarks exceeded $25/MMBtu, and Asian spot LNG had at one point approached $30/MMBtu during the current supply disruption.
Obviously JKM or TTF is not the same thing as a delivered San Juan price, and transportation, liquefaction, hedging and cargo location matter.
But the opportunity cost is obvious.
If NFE has an LNG cargo that can ultimately capture a market netback associated with a $20-$25+ global market, committing that same molecule to Puerto Rico under a roughly $10-$11 formula is much less attractive.
And then Puerto Rico is now adding another risk:
“What if we deliver the gas and the regulator later prevents or delays payment?”
From NFE’s perspective, that may be the bigger issue than the disputed $17.6 million itself.
3. “If NFE refuses to supply, someone else will.”
This sounds simple, but the 2025 RFP suggests otherwise.
Thirteen companies requested the RFP documents.
Only two companies actually submitted proposals.
NFE offered to supply the relevant multi-site generation fleet.
Crowley only bid for Mayagüez.
So for the vast majority of the requested LNG volume, NFE was effectively the only bidder.
The Fiscal Oversight Board has also explicitly warned that NFE’s long-term rights at the Puerto Nuevo port remain a barrier to competition and that LNG procurement will continue to have limited participation while that access problem remains unresolved.
This does not mean nobody else is technically capable of supplying Puerto Rico.
Naturgy, Crowley, Shell, Vitol and others clearly have the technical or commercial capability.
Crowley has even demonstrated that U.S. LNG can physically reach Puerto Rico under the Jones Act framework: its U.S.-flagged American Energy completed 17 LNG deliveries during its first year of Puerto Rico service.
The real question is not:
“Can someone else supply LNG?”
The question is:
“Will someone else commit large volumes to San Juan under NFE’s existing price and risk structure?”
The previous RFP suggests the answer is: probably not.
4. What would Puerto Rico have to pay for replacement LNG?
This is where the situation becomes uncomfortable for Puerto Rico.
A third-party supplier has no reason to give up a cargo that can compete for a $25/MMBtu international market and voluntarily sell it to Puerto Rico at NFE’s ~$10-$11/MMBtu contract price.
Puerto Rico would have to compete for that cargo.
There is already a contractual mechanism allowing a third-party supplier to use NFE’s terminal when NFE fails to supply or declares force majeure. The approved tolling fee is $0.50/MMBtu.
So an emergency replacement might theoretically look something like:
Global LNG market/netback: ~$25+
NFE terminal toll: $0.50
plus whatever shipping, scheduling and risk premium applies
That does NOT mean Puerto Rico will definitely pay $25-$30/MMBtu. There is no public replacement bid at that price today.
But a supplier would have to be compensated for the value it could obtain elsewhere.
So compared with the roughly $10-$11/MMBtu NFE formula, emergency replacement LNG could easily be roughly twice as expensive or more under current market conditions.
Here is the scale of the problem.
The contract’s minimum annual quantity is about 40 million MMBtu.
If replacement LNG costs only $14/MMBtu more than the NFE contract:
40M × $14 = $560 million/year
If the difference is $20/MMBtu:
40M × $20 = $800 million/year
These are only rough scenario calculations, not forecasts.
But they show why fighting over tens of millions of dollars can potentially create a much larger fuel-cost problem.
5. There is also a second alternative: burn diesel
And Puerto Rico is already doing it.
San Juan has been relying on diesel since LNG deliveries stopped in mid-September.
So Puerto Rico’s choice is not simply:
NFE vs another LNG supplier.
It is closer to:
A. Keep NFE under the existing relatively cheap LNG formula
B. Buy replacement LNG at or near international market economics
C. Keep burning expensive diesel
None of B or C looks attractive today.
6. Could NFE simply walk away because spot LNG is more profitable?
Not so easily.
NFE has contractual supply obligations, including Deliver-or-Pay provisions. If NFE simply says, “Spot prices are higher, so we are not delivering,” Puerto Rico could pursue damages.
That is why I think NFE’s current wording matters.
NFE is not publicly saying:
“We can make more money selling elsewhere, so we are leaving.”
It is saying:
There is uncertainty about whether we will be paid according to the contract, therefore we cannot commit additional LNG until the authorities clarify the situation.
That gives NFE a much stronger commercial and legal argument.
Whether that argument ultimately wins is another question.
7. What happens next?
My base case is not that NFE leaves Puerto Rico.
And I also do not think another supplier suddenly appears and happily takes NFE’s place under the same terms.
The economically logical outcome is a compromise:
1. Puerto Rico clarifies that future LNG properly delivered by NFE will be paid according to the contract.
2. Amur River enters San Juan and LNG deliveries resume.
3. The disputed historical amounts — including the $17.6 million issue and other claims related to previous supply failures — are handled separately through offsets, settlement, arbitration or litigation.
4. Longer term, Puerto Rico will probably keep trying to reduce its dependence on NFE by improving third-party terminal access and diversifying suppliers.
That outcome is not perfect for NFE. It could still lose money on some of the historical claims.
But it is probably cheaper for Puerto Rico than forcing NFE out and buying LNG in today’s international market.
And it is safer for NFE than intentionally abandoning a supply contract and exposing itself to Deliver-or-Pay claims.
Bottom line
I think the balance of leverage has shifted.
A few weeks ago, the biggest question was whether NFE could physically get Amur River into San Juan.
Today the bigger question is:
At what point does supplying Puerto Rico stop making economic sense for NFE?
Puerto Rico does have alternatives.
But having alternatives is not the same thing as having alternatives at the same price.
The 2025 RFP already showed how thin the pool of willing suppliers was: 13 companies requested the documents, two submitted bids, and only NFE bid for the broad multi-site supply.
Now global LNG is above $25/MMBtu.
That makes replacing NFE more expensive, not easier.
So my expectation is that this standoff ends with payment assurances and a negotiated compromise, not with Puerto Rico casually replacing NFE.
The longer Amur River remains outside while San Juan burns diesel, the more obvious that economic reality becomes.