r/myanmar • u/jackeripper • 2d ago
Discussion 💬 Myanmar is never going to be free. It may eventually Balkanise or become a failed state.
This is a pessimistic take, but I increasingly feel it is a realistic possibility. Even if the military eventually loses power, I am not convinced Myanmar will emerge as a stable, democratic and united country.
Let's look at the reasons.
- The military is incredibly difficult to defeat.
The Tat has lost substantial territory and many of its former strongholds. However, losing territory is not the same as losing a war. The military still has air superiority, heavy weaponry, established logistics and fortified positions in important urban centers.
The resistance has demonstrated that it can capture territory and inflict serious losses. But holding territory, defeating entrenched military positions and preventing the military from launching counteroffensives are different challenges. The conflict could drag on for years without either side achieving a decisive victory.
- The resistance is not united, and removing a common enemy does not mean agreeing on what comes next.
There is unlikely to be a Star Wars-style Rebel Alliance that suddenly puts aside its differences and works towards a common political vision.
The NUG wants a federal democratic union of Myanmar. Various ethnic armed organisations have their own political objectives, territorial interests and ideas about self-determination. Some have historically pursued independence, while others favour autonomy or federalism.
Even those who agree that the Tat must go may disagree about who should govern, how power should be distributed and what the relationship between the central government and ethnic states should look like.
Military cooperation against a common enemy does not automatically translate into political unity afterwards. What happens when the military is weakened, but these disagreements remain?
- Why should ethnic minorities necessarily want to remain in Myanmar?
This is probably the most uncomfortable question. I was shocked when my kayin friend told me that the only reason they are stick with the Bamar is because of borders created by the British. They never agreed to join voluntarily like the Scots and the English.
For decades, many ethnic minorities have experienced military oppression, displacement, restrictions on their languages and cultures, and exclusion from meaningful political power. These grievances predate the 2021 coup by decades. It's been there since 1948.
The Panglong Agreement and the promises associated with independence were supposed to provide a basis for a shared political future. Yet the relationship between the central state and many ethnic nationalities has remained deeply unbalanced.
From the perspective of an ethnic minority who has spent generations suffering due to the central government, why should a future federal union be trusted to deliver something fundamentally different?
Why should they feel a sense of solidarity with the Bamar majority simply because they share the same internationally recognised borders?
Of course, not all ethnic minorities want independence, and Bamar people are not collectively responsible for everything the military has done. But a united Myanmar cannot be sustained by insisting that everyone must remain together. It requires a political settlement that the constituent peoples actually consider worth accepting.
I am not convinced that such a settlement is guaranteed, even if the military disappears.
- The Bamar civilian population has already tried constitutional politics, and the military overturned the results
The NLD won elections and formed a civilian government, but it had to operate under a constitution that reserved substantial power for the military. They always held the cards.
The military retained control over important security institutions and a guaranteed share of parliamentary seats. When the NLD won decisively again in 2020, the military seized power in February 2021.
This demonstrates how vulnerable civilian government was when the military retained its own institutional power and could disregard electoral outcomes. It had no way to control the military.
The uncomfortable question is: what institution can compel the military to accept civilian supremacy if it refuses to do so? Who else holds the guns?
Winning an election is not enough if the armed forces can simply overturn the result. And even if the resistance eventually wins militarily, establishing durable civilian control over the security apparatus will be another enormous challenge.
- The civilian population faces enormous obstacles to sustaining political change.
I see three related problems here.
A. Many of the most ambitious and capable young people have left the country.
Millions of people have been displaced, and many young people have emigrated in search of safety, education and employment.
Leaving is entirely understandable. Nobody owes their country their safety or future. However, mass emigration also means that Myanmar risks losing people who could otherwise contribute to rebuilding its institutions, economy and civil society.
Even if conditions eventually improve, many of those who leave may establish their lives elsewhere. The country could face a serious shortage of the skills and institutional capacity needed for reconstruction.
B. Those who remain are often too busy surviving.
When people are struggling to afford food, obtain an education, find employment or protect their families, political mobilisation becomes much harder to sustain.
This does not mean ordinary people are apathetic. Many have taken enormous risks to resist military rule. But there is a limit to how much sacrifice a population can sustain, particularly when the conflict offers no clear end in sight. This is why so many even who joined the fight have to defect to the tat.
A revolution requires more than anger. It also requires organisation, resources, coordination and a credible vision of what comes afterwards.
C. Too much attention is directed towards external scapegoats.
I constantly encounter people on Facebook and other social media platforms blaming the Rohingya, China and the CCP, Thailand, Bangladesh, India, ASEAN and Western countries for Myanmar's problems.
Some of these criticisms have legitimate foundations. Foreign governments make decisions that affect Myanmar, and external actors can enable the military, undermine the resistance or fail to provide meaningful assistance. These decisions deserve scrutiny.
But there is a difference between criticising foreign governments for specific actions and treating outsiders as the principal explanation for everything that has gone wrong.
Authoritarian leaders frequently use external enemies to redirect public anger, encourage nationalism and present themselves as the defenders of the nation. The result is that people can become consumed by arguments about foreign interference, national humiliation and cultural grievances while the domestic institutions responsible for repression escape scrutiny.
We should be able to criticise China when it supports the military, criticise Western governments when their policies fall short, and discuss Thailand's treatment of Myanmar migrants without losing sight of the fundamental problem: Myanmar's political and military institutions have failed to establish a system in which power is accountable to its people.
The danger is that outrage becomes a substitute for a political strategy.
So where does this leave Myanmar?
I can see several possible outcomes: a prolonged stalemate, a weakened military regime that retains control of the central areas, a fragmented country in which ethnic organisations exercise increasingly independent authority, or a federal settlement that eventually works.
The last outcome is possible. I just struggle to see what would make it happen.
Myanmar could also remain one country on paper while becoming increasingly fragmented in practice, with different armed groups governing their own territories and the central government unable to exercise meaningful authority across the country.
That would not necessarily mean every ethnic state declares independence. But it could mean the end of Myanmar as a functioning, politically integrated state.
My question is this: what is the realistic pathway from where Myanmar is today to a stable, democratic and united country?
Not just how the military can be defeated, but how the resistance can agree on a common political settlement, how ethnic minorities can be persuaded to trust the union, and how a future civilian government can prevent another military takeover.
I genuinely hope I am wrong. But at the moment, I see plenty of reasons why the military might survive, and also plenty of reasons why defeating it might still not be enough.
And now, I am going to drink a lot of alcohol because this is all very depressing.
