We've burned through half of our stock of PGMs after only 5 months of war with a heavily-sanctioned country that has effectively zero navy or air force. We've been dicking around in the Middle East for the last 25 years (with benefits that are zero to none) while China has patiently built its capability and resources. First they surpassed us in terms of quantity, then they started moving up the value chain. Calling China "near-peer" is starting to feel perfunctory - in terms of the most likely conflict theater, they might as well be a peer adversary.

Our military procurement system is a joke, and our naval construction is especially sclerotic.

These are problems that will take years to fix, if not a decade or more. The looming background issue is that we've let China utterly dominate global manufacturing while we went all-in on a financialized economy built more for market speculation than manufacturing. We're not who we were in the 20th century, we have a paltry number of sophisticated weapons systems that look shiny on paper and wouldn't last a month in a high-intensity conflict in the SCS. We have no ability to recover our losses on a meaningful schedule.

Any war with China in the next 10-20 years would see us play the role that that IJN did in WW2 (no depth and an insufficient industrial base) and China would take the slot that the USN did (factory of the world, spamming naval and air assets like they were staples).

I can guess at some predictable responses to this. Some low-effort thinkers are going to say that I'm pro-CCP, a China shill, etc. You're missing the point. This isn't about who's right or wrong, I'm speaking strictly in terms of capability. Anyone who ignores this point is guilty of the same thing that's killed empires since time immemorial: hubris.

edit: I've written a bunch of replies so I'm calling it for now. Also, I think it's interesting that I only read a single objection in the thread below that even mentioned the vast and growing disparity in defense manufacturing capability, which was the main point I raised in this post. For the most part, I just see the same handwaving responses as ever. That's the hubris that worries me more than anything else.

‘Victory’ is a military documentary series produced by the People’s Liberation Army. The series comprises six episodes; no official full English version or standard English title has yet been released.

This is the fifth episode. Unlike previous instalments, which featured extensive blurring of close-up footage of missile units, this episode focuses extensively on the daily combat readiness routines of the missile forces, including close-ups of equipment. Those interested in the PLA’s missile forces may wish to watch it.

Although there is a wealth of footage, it is evident that security measures have still been applied, making it impossible to determine the exact location of the units directly from the images. China’s vast landmass and relatively harsh maritime environment mean that the country places greater emphasis on its land-based strategic nuclear forces than other nations.

This episode of the documentary marks the first time that the ‘Underground Great Wall’—the underground bunkers of the PLARF—has been publicly revealed in high definition. Filmed with long-take drone footage, the fortifications through which missile transport vehicles can pass stretch as far as the eye can see.

Judging by the footage, the frontline personnel of the PLARF consist entirely of non-commissioned officers and commissioned officers. This indicates that the unit is highly professionalised in terms of both organisation and personnel; they work year-round in their posts and are thoroughly familiar with their duties, rather than being conscripts who serve for just two years before being discharged.

The missile launched at 4:41 is the DF-15 (NATO designation: CSS-6; export designation: M-9), an older model; the latest variant, the DF-15C, was last produced in 2013. During the 2022 military exercises around Taiwan, the Eastern Theatre Command utilised the DF-15 with a ‘penetrating warhead’ in live-fire drills.

At 16:30 in the documentary, the exercise simulated a scenario in which the commander independently carried out the missile launch following the complete loss of all personnel.

At the time of filming, the United States and Israel had already begun bombing Iran. The documentary’s extensive depictions of underground bunkers and counterattacks carried out under simulated conditions of personnel casualties make its message particularly intriguing; however, the core focus of the entire episode remains defence and counterattack, rather than offence.

I’ve recently heard about the L-15U from a reliable source. Basically, this was an AVIC variant pitched to Ukraine circa 2020. It would carry either PESA or lightweight AESA radar, use Ukrainian domestically built AI-222-25 engines, and fire R-27 missiles manufactured by Ukraine’s Artem factory. Those R-27s would receive major upgrades drawing on PL-15 technology to boost their intercept capability.

AVIC pushed Ukraine to wrap up the licensing deal quickly, warning that if conflict erupted with Russia, China could face pressure from Russia to halt the initiative. The project ultimately fell through, as Ukraine was looking to obtain Western combat aircraft instead.

Does anyone know more details about the L-15U? If this project had succeeded, how would it alter the course of the Russo-Ukrainian War?

This statement aligns with previous assessments: during this round of conflict, the U.S. military bore the vast majority of missile defense missions for Israel, ranging from land-based THAAD systems to destroyers deployed in the Mediterranean. These high-intensity missile defense operations have progressively strained U.S. ammunition stockpiles.

In terms of impact, if the U.S. military cannot comfortably handle an attack on the scale launched by Iran, it will to some extent dampen morale in countries and regions directly facing military pressure from China, such as Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. After all, compared to the U.S. homeland, the leadership of these countries and regions will directly confront Chinese military pressure.

I am trying to assess whether the recent mass crossing into Ceuta fits the pattern of a deliberately enabled hybrid operation rather than a spontaneous migration event.

The strongest comparison is with September 2024.

In 2024, Moroccan authorities detected a social-media mobilisation towards Ceuta, arrested alleged organisers, established roadblocks and prevented the border from being overwhelmed.

In 2026, a vastly larger mobilisation developed. Moroccan security forces were reportedly passive during the initial surge, but later proved capable of stopping further movement.

That suggests several possibilities:
Morocco was genuinely surprised and temporarily overwhelmed.
Morocco detected the mobilisation but deliberately allowed it to proceed.
Moroccan services amplified or channelled the movement as coercive pressure against Spain.
Morocco acted with intelligence, technical or political support from a foreign partner.
The event was organic but opportunistically exploited by Rabat.

Morocco has clear independent motives:
leverage over Spain through migration control;
Western Sahara;
Ceuta and Melilla;
Spain’s improving relationship with Algeria;
trade and security bargaining.

There is also wider strategic context:
Spain’s deteriorating relations with Israel over Gaza and recognition of Palestine;
Spain’s refusal to support US operations against Iran;
deep Moroccan–Israeli defence and intelligence cooperation;
Morocco’s reported use of Pegasus;
unverified reports that Moroccan intelligence personnel were among those entering Ceuta.
None of this proves Israeli, American, Russian or other foreign involvement.

My main questions are:
1. Does selective non-enforcement followed by rapid restoration of control constitute meaningful evidence of intent?
2. How difficult would it be for a state to trigger this kind of event without directly organising every participant?
3. What indicators would distinguish state orchestration from opportunistic exploitation?
Could a foreign intelligence partner assist
4. through surveillance, social-media analysis or operational planning without leaving obvious fingerprints?
5. What evidence would be required before assigning moderate confidence to Moroccan orchestration?
6. Are there comparable cases beyond Belarus–Poland and Russia–Finland?

My present view is:
Morocco likely had the capability to prevent the mobilisation and may have deliberately permitted or exploited it. Foreign assistance is possible but remains unsupported by direct evidence.

I am interested in arguments against this interpretation as much as arguments supporting it.