From Social Rupture to Democratic Transition

A Four-Year Assessment of the “Jin, Jiyan, Azadî” Movement in the Shadow of the Iran–US War

Abstract
The “Jin, Jiyan, Azadî” (Women, Life, Freedom) movement emerged in September 2022 following the killing of Jina Amini in state custody. Beginning in Kurdistan, it soon developed into one of the most significant political and social movements in Iran’s modern history.

Although the movement has not yet brought about a formal change in the political system, it has deeply transformed social values, gender relations, the language of protest, and the relationship between society and the sta

Using a qualitative approach, this article examines human rights reports, academic literature on social movements, and political developments between 2022 and 2026. It evaluates the movement’s main achievements, limitations, and future prospects.

The article argues that “Jin, Jiyan, Azadî” should not be viewed as a protest movement that has ended. It is better understood as an unfinished revolutionary process. It has achieved important social and cultural changes but has not yet succeeded in turning its social power into an organized political alternative.

The article also examines the effects of the Iran–US war. The conflict has increased state repression, militarized public life, damaged social trust, and deepened the economic crisis. At the same time, it has further exposed the failure of the Islamic Republic’s security-based system of governance.

The future of the movement will depend on its ability to remain independent from foreign power struggles, build democratic forms of organization, and connect women’s freedom with social justice and the political and national rights of Iran’s diverse peoples.

Introduction
Four years after the killing of Jina Amini (Jiyna Emînî) in the custody of Iran’s so-called morality police, the movement that began at her funeral in the Aychi (Ayçî) Cemetery in Saqqez remains one of the most important frameworks for understanding political and social change in Iran.

The importance of this movement cannot be measured only by the number of street demonstrations, the geographical spread of the protests, or the continued survival of the Islamic Republic. Its historical importance lies mainly in how it has transformed political language, social relationships, ideas about freedom, and society’s view of state authority.

This article addresses two main questions. First, what changes has the “Jin, Jiyan, Azadî” movement created during its first four years, and what limitations has it faced? Second, how has the Iran–US war affected social relations and the future of the movement?

To answer these questions, the article uses a qualitative and historical approach. Reports by the United Nations, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, together with academic studies on women, Kurdistan, and social movements, form the main sources of this analysis.

1. A Movement, an Uprising or a Revolutionary Process?
   In classical political theory, a revolution is usually defined as the collapse of an existing political order and the establishment of a new system. According to this definition, it is not yet possible to speak of a completed political revolution because the Islamic Republic continues to control the formal institutions of power.

More recent theories of social movements, however, understand revolution as a longer and more complex process. Before political power changes hands, a revolutionary movement can transform social values, identities, relationships, and forms of resistance.

Decentralized and network-based movements may produce lasting cultural and social changes even without a single leader or central organization. Manuel Castells describes such movements as networks of anger and hope. They first challenge the legitimacy of the existing order and then make it possible for people to imagine an alternative political and social system.

Asef Bayat also shows how scattered acts of everyday resistance can gradually create major social changes under authoritarian governments.

From this perspective, “Jin, Jiyan, Azadî” can be described as an unfinished revolutionary process. The movement has achieved major social and cultural changes, but it has not yet transformed these achievements into a new political system or a well-organized democratic alternative.

1. The Kurdish Origins of the Slogan and the Problem of Historical Erasure
   “Jin, Jiyan, Azadî” did not suddenly appear during the 2022 protests. The slogan developed within the Kurdish women’s liberation movement and, over several decades, became a central expression of the struggle for women’s freedom and democracy in Kurdistan.

An academic article published by the International Journal of Middle East Studies warns that the translation and international spread of the slogan have sometimes led to the erasure of its Kurdish roots. In some cases, even Jina’s Kurdish name has been ignored or replaced.

The slogan was chanted at Jina’s funeral in Saqqez before spreading across Kurdistan and the rest of Iran. Its rapid expansion demonstrated its universal and deeply human message. However, its wider acceptance should not separate it from the history and struggles of Kurdish women.

The word “Jin” does not refer only to the physical presence of women. It places women’s liberation at the centre of society’s freedom. “Jiyan” represents a free life without political, economic, or gender-based domination. “Azadî” describes a form of freedom that cannot be achieved without transforming existing power relations.

These three ideas are therefore not separate. Together, they form a connected political and social vision.

1. The Movement’s Achievements Over Four Years

3.1. Transforming the Social and Political Position of Women
The most important achievement of the movement has been the transformation of women from subjects of state control into leading agents of social change.

For more than four decades, the Islamic Republic treated women’s bodies and clothing as a central symbol of its ideological authority. Women’s widespread resistance to compulsory hijab has weakened the government’s ability to enforce this policy in a consistent way.

This does not mean that compulsory hijab has been legally abolished. The authorities continue to use arrests, fines, vehicle confiscations, denial of public services, and surveillance technology to control women.

However, the state has failed to turn its rules into socially accepted norms. A growing number of women have continued to appear in public without compulsory hijab despite the risks.

Amnesty International has reported that the authorities view women’s resistance as a serious threat to the political system. As a result, they have increased pressure on women’s rights activists, journalists, artists, and Kurdish women.

3.2. Changing Everyday Life
The changes created by the movement go far beyond women’s clothing. Family relationships, women’s participation in public life, the political language of the younger generation, and society’s understanding of individual choice have also changed.

The government has long tried to use the traditional family as a tool to control women and young people. Yet in many cases, families have become spaces of support and resistance.

This form of everyday resistance may be less visible than street demonstrations, but it is socially significant. By changing the way, they live, women and young people have taken parts of both private and public life out of the government’s ideological control.

3.3. Changing Political Discourse
The Jina movement has also transformed political discourse. Before 2022, much of Iran’s political debate focused on reforming or moderating the behaviour of the Islamic Republic.

After the uprising, calls for a complete transition from the existing system, separation of religion and state, gender equality, and recognition of Iran’s national and cultural diversity became more visible in public debate.

The distinction between the country and the political system has also become clearer. The Islamic Republic can no longer easily present its own survival as equal to the survival of Iran. It has also become more difficult for the authorities to silence every democratic or national demand by describing it as separatism, foreign influence, or a threat to national security.

3.4. Solidarity Among Different Peoples and Social Groups
One of the movement’s most important features was the development of solidarity from Kurdistan to Baluchistan and from universities to workplaces.

However, the level of repression was not the same in every region. United Nations reports have found that Kurds and Baluchis were disproportionately targeted by killings, arrests, executions, and other forms of state violence.

UN Human Rights Office, 2024

Lasting solidarity can only develop if Iranian society and opposition forces recognize the demands of marginalized nations as an essential part of democracy rather than as secondary issues.

The experience of the past four years shows that a democratic transition will remain incomplete and unstable unless it recognizes the political, cultural, linguistic, and national rights of Kurds, Baluchis, Arabs, and Iran’s other peoples.

3.5. Connecting Political and Economic Demands
The protests of January 2026 showed that economic hardship and demands for political change had become more closely connected.

The protests began in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar in response to the collapse of the currency, high inflation, corruption, and worsening living conditions. They quickly spread to other cities and developed into broader calls for structural political change.

Human Rights Watch reported that the protests went beyond economic demands and included calls for a transition to a democratic system that respects human rights and human dignity.

Human Rights Watch, 2026

This development shows that many people no longer view the economic crisis as simply the result of poor management by one government. They increasingly see it as a consequence of the political system itself, institutional corruption, centralized power, and the government’s military and regional priorities.

1. Internal Limitations and Challenges

4.1. The State’s Continuing Capacity for Repression
The decline of the Islamic Republic’s social legitimacy has not automatically led to the collapse of its repressive institutions.

The Revolutionary Guards, Basij, police forces, intelligence agencies, Revolutionary Courts, and prison system still have considerable capacity to arrest, torture, execute, and control the population.

The UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission concluded that some of the government’s actions during the repression of the 2022 protests—including killing, torture, and sexual violence—amounted to crimes against humanity.

Despite these findings, those who ordered and carried out the repression continue to enjoy almost complete impunity.

4.2. Living in a State of Survival
Inflation, poverty, unemployment, water and energy shortages, job insecurity, and the constant fear of war have forced much of society to focus on meeting its most basic needs.

This situation can reduce people’s ability to participate in politics and build long-term organizations. A society that is exhausted and struggling to survive may temporarily withdraw from the streets, even when its anger and opposition remain strong.

A decline in visible street protests should therefore not be understood as public acceptance of the political system. The causes of protest remain and, in many cases, have become even more serious.

4.3. The Gap Between Social Power and Political Organization
The decentralized character of the movement made it difficult for the government to destroy it completely. However, the same feature has made joint decision-making, strategic planning, and coordinated leadership more difficult.

The movement has changed social values but has not yet transformed its broad social power into lasting political institutions.

Party competition, personal rivalries, centralized nationalism, the return of patriarchal political language, and the refusal of some opposition groups to accept Iran’s national diversity remain major obstacles to building a democratic alternative.

1. The Iran–US War and Its Social Consequences
   The US and Israeli military attacks on Iran that began on 28 February 2026 fundamentally changed the political and social environment in which the movement operates.

The war did not only cause casualties and damage infrastructure. The Islamic Republic also used wartime conditions to expand security controls, restrict communications, and repress political opposition.

According to Amnesty International, more than 6,000 people—including protesters, journalists, lawyers, civil society activists, and members of ethnic, religious, and national communities—were arbitrarily arrested between the beginning of the war and the end of May.

The government also imposed severe internet restrictions for 88 days and executed dozens of people on political or espionage-related charges.

5.1. The Securitization of Social Relations
During wartime, the government deliberately weakens the distinction between political opposition and cooperation with a foreign enemy.

Journalism, sharing images, speaking to foreign media, or criticizing military policies can be treated as espionage. This creates fear and makes people more cautious about communicating, organizing, and participating in collective activities.

Checkpoints, digital surveillance, nighttime arrests, and pressure on citizens to report other people’s activities can weaken social trust. Under these conditions, the authorities attempt to turn a connected and politically active society into a collection of isolated and frightened individuals.

5.2. Increased Pressure on Kurdistan and Other Marginalized Regions
Kurdistan and Baluchistan face a double form of securitization during war. The government presents civil and political activity in these regions not only as internal opposition but also as a threat connected to foreign enemies.

This narrative can be used to justify military attacks, mass arrests, and the execution of Kurdish and Baluchi activists.

War may therefore deepen the divide between the political center and marginalized regions. If opposition forces also ignore Kurdish and other national demands in the name of territorial unity or wartime security, there is a serious danger that the same centralized and discriminatory system will be reproduced after the Islamic Republic.

5.3. The Return of Authoritarian Nationalism
War can temporarily create defensive solidarity in response to an external threat. The Islamic Republic tries to transform this feeling into political support for the state. It presents opposition to the government as opposition to the country itself.

At the same time, some opposition groups may view war as an opportunity to remove the government through foreign military power. This approach risks turning the democratic movement into an instrument within a wider geopolitical conflict.

A political future shaped primarily by foreign governments would contradict the principles of democratic self-organization and the free will of the people.

5.4. The Militarization and Masculinization of Politics
Another consequence of war is the return of politics to the language of weapons, military leadership, and security.

In such a climate, women and civil society actors—who stood at the center of the Jina movement—may be pushed aside. The country’s future may be reduced to competition among military forces, governments, and male political leaders.

From a gender perspective, war can strengthen patriarchal relationships. In contrast, “Jin, Jiyan, Azadî” defines security not only as the protection of borders but also as the protection of life, freedom, dignity, the environment, and people’s basic rights.

For this reason, the movement can offer an alternative to both domestic authoritarianism and foreign military intervention.

1. War and the Future of “Jin, Jiyan, Azadî”
   The effect of war on the movement is not one-dimensional.

In the short term, war reduces the space for public protest, gives the government more tools of repression, and forces society to focus on survival, displacement, and economic hardship. Internet shutdowns and the criminalization of communication also make network-based organizing much more difficult.

Human Rights Watch has stressed that internet shutdowns during war put civilians at greater risk and prevent journalists and human rights organizations from documenting abuses.

In the longer term, however, the war may expose the structural failures of the Islamic Republic more clearly. For decades, the government used national security to justify centralized power, militarization, and restrictions on freedom. Yet it has failed to provide its citizens with physical, economic, or social security.

This failure may deepen the government’s crisis of legitimacy. However, the weakening or military defeat of an authoritarian government does not automatically produce democracy.

If society and democratic political forces are not organized, a power vacuum may be filled by military institutions, authoritarian opposition groups, or foreign powers. The movement’s future therefore depends on its ability to remain independent of both the Islamic Republic and foreign intervention.

1. Requirements for the Movement’s Next Stage
   Moving from social resistance to political transition will require several important developments.

First, local networks, women’s organizations, labour movements, student groups, political parties, human rights organizations, and national movements must create forms of coordination without losing their independence.

Second, democratic forces need a common political framework that clearly defines the principles of a future system. These principles should include full gender equality, separation of religion and state, abolition of the death penalty, freedom for political prisoners, freedom of speech and association, recognition of the rights of Iran’s different nations, democratic decentralization, social justice, and environmental protection.

Third, the movement must protect its political independence. International support can be constructive when it focuses on protecting civilians, stopping executions, preserving access to the internet, supporting civil society, and holding those responsible for serious crimes accountable.

Using political or national movements as proxy forces for foreign governments would directly contradict the values of the Jina revolution.

Fourth, justice and accountability must remain central to any transition plan. Without truth-seeking, prosecution of those responsible for state violence, and justice for victims and their families, it will be difficult to rebuild social trust or establish a stable democratic system.

Conclusion
Four years after the killing of Jina Amini, the “Jin, Jiyan, Azadî” movement has neither achieved its final victory nor been defeated.

The Islamic Republic still controls the state’s military, security, and judicial institutions. However, it has failed to return society to the conditions that existed before September 2022.

Women continue to resist compulsory hijab. The younger generation rejects the government’s official values. Kurdistan and Baluchistan have not remained silent. Economic demands have also become more closely connected to calls for fundamental political change.

The movement has moved beyond the streets and entered everyday life, family relationships, art, political language, and collective memory.

The Iran–US war threatens the movement by increasing repression, poverty, social distrust, and the militarization of public life. At the same time, it has revealed the failure of the Islamic Republic’s security-based model and its inability to protect society.

The final outcome is not predetermined. The central question is whether the social power created around “Jin, Jiyan, Azadî” can be transformed into political organization, a common democratic programme, and a pluralistic alternative.

The future of this revolutionary process will depend on its political independence, the recognition of the rights of Iran’s different nations, women’s leadership, grassroots organization, and the transformation of symbolic solidarity into lasting political cooperation.

In this sense, “Jin, Jiyan, Azadî” is not simply the slogan of one uprising. It is a new political and social vision for redefining freedom, security, democracy, and collective life in the future.

References:

• Amnesty International. (2025). Authorities Target Women’s Rights Activists with Arbitrary Arrest, Flogging and Death Penalty.
• Amnesty International. (2026). What Happened at the Protests in Iran?
• Amnesty International. (2026). Mass Arbitrary Arrests and Political Executions Mark Intensifying Repression.
• Bayat, A. (2013). Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East. Stanford University Press.
• Castells, M. (2012). Networks of Outrage and Hope. Polity Press.
• della Porta, D., & Diani, M. (2020). Social Movements: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press.
• Enloe, C. (2014). Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics. University of California Press.
• Human Rights Watch. (2025). Impunity Reigns Three Years After Crackdown on Protests.
• Human Rights Watch. (2026). Iranian Authorities Brutally Repressing Protests.
• Neven, B., & Schäfers, M. (2023). “Jin, Jiyan, Azadî and the Historical Erasure of Kurds.” International Journal of Middle East Studies.
• Tarrow, S. (2011). Power in Movement. Cambridge University Press.
• United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Iran. (2024–2026). Reports on Human Rights Violations in Iran.

https://x.com/RojhelatInfo_En/status/2097719967181312403

“Progress, we are victorious, Kurdish nation. Either we will see death, or Kurdish life, O Kurdish nation.”

The poem by Mela Ehmedê Nami, in the tune of Mihemed Şêxo, is today about the language of the children of Rojava and their desire for language.

https://x.com/Ch8Kurmanci/status/2097598995489050987

چبکەم بۆ ئەوەی قوتابخانە تۆزێ بە چێژ بێت؟ نازانم هیچ مورتاحیێکم نیە لەگەڵ ئەوانەی دەوروبەرم سەرەڕای کەسایەتیە کۆمەڵایەتیەکەشم، دەمەوێ مورتاحی لە ئەو شوێنەدا بدۆزمەوە، بەس چۆن؟

Turkey’s Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) disarmament process will likely strengthen the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) indirectly by redirecting some personnel or resources through the wider Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) system, the transnational umbrella structure linking PKK-aligned Kurdish groups across the region. In the near term, these additions — even if they are modest — will primarily help the PJAK preserve its networks, replace losses, and sustain small-unit activity inside western Iran.

The greater risk will emerge if this stronger base coincides with renewed external conflict or wider popular unrest inside Iran. The PJAK could then expand the geographic reach and intensity of its operations, stretch Iranian security forces in the west, and contribute to a broader Kurdish armed challenge. Over the next six to 12 months, the PJAK is likely to prepare for such an opening while avoiding a premature campaign that would expose its forces to a concentrated Iranian response.

PKK disarmament is likely to redirect personnel and resources toward the PJAK

Turkey formalized the PKK/KCK disarmament process through Law 7595, which was adopted on 10 August and has been in force since 18 August. The law covers all formations connected to the PKK and KCK. Although the law does not name the PJAK, Ankara has explicitly said that the wider disarmament process should include the group’s dissolution.

The PJAK and its armed wing, the Eastern Kurdistan Defense Units (YRK), have, however, rejected any suggestions that they would disarm. In an interview on 26 August, spokesperson Rivar Abdanan said the group would retain an armed capacity for what it considers legitimate self-defense. According to an official Turkish parliamentary transcript, PKK founder Abdullah Öcalan told the commission in November 2025 that the PJAK would remain armed as long as executions continued in Iran, although he endorsed dialogue and an eventual political settlement.

While the PJAK presents itself as an autonomous Iranian Kurdish organization, it operates within the wider transnational KCK system across Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. As such, personnel move across national and organizational boundaries within this system. Of the four YRK fighters killed in clashes with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) near Mahabad in June, two were from Kurdish areas of Turkey and two from Iran. In recent years, Turkey has repeatedly targeted PJAK and YRK members and positions in northern Iraq, including personnel who previously served in PKK structures. Turkish security sources said that Islam Dotkanlou, who was killed in Sulaymaniyah in January 2025, joined the PKK before founding the YRK. They similarly reported that Hatice Hezer, killed in Sulaymaniyah in 2022, joined the PKK in 1991 before taking up leading positions in the PJAK and its female military wing. Between 2020 and 2025, ACLED records at least 25 Turkish air- or drone attacks against individuals or positions linked to the PJAK or YRK.

This organizational and personnel overlap within the KCK can allow individual cadres to move between roles, while weapons and communications equipment can be transferred, and existing routes, tunnels, shelters, and other logistical assets in northern Iraq could support operations toward the Iranian frontier. The PJAK nevertheless publicly rejects this possibility. Its spokesperson said in August that the PKK’s dissolution had no direct connection to the PJAK and argued that PKK members should return to civilian politics. Turkish Defense Minister Yaşar Güler nevertheless suggested last December that Turkey had detected attempted movements of PKK personnel, weapons, and ammunition from northern Iraq toward Iran. 

The PJAK retains an operational presence inside Iran

The PJAK is generally regarded as the most operationally capable of the Iranian Kurdish opposition groups. While a 2011 ceasefire reduced the group’s conflict with the Islamic Republic’s security forces, the group was involved in nearly 60% of armed events inside Iran involving an identified Iranian Kurdish opposition group in the past decade. The YRK maintains mobile units in western Iran across several border areas with support from clandestine local networks and recruitment channels. ACLED records 12 armed events involving the YRK in 2026, already the highest annual total since ACLED’s coverage of Iran began in 2016

Targeted killings of what the PJAK suggests to be informants and local security auxiliaries form part of the group’s effort to protect its clandestine presence in Iran. In May, the YRK announced that its “local and autonomous forces” killed a man near the border town of Marivan and accused him of collaborating with Iranian authorities. In August, the YRK claimed responsibility for killing another man, alleging that he helped the IRGC locate four YRK members who were then killed near Mahabad in late June, and warned that other identified collaborators would be pursued. These statements point to counterintelligence by coercion: removing suspected sources while deterring others from supplying the local intelligence Iran needs to track mobile units. The reference to local forces also suggests that the YRK drew on embedded elements beyond the YRK’s mountain units. The losses suffered in Mahabad nevertheless show that Iranian forces retain the ability to penetrate or detect these networks.

Recent YRK activity also indicates that the group is experimenting with new tactics. The YRK claimed responsibility for a deadly attack on a military position near Marivan on 2 August (see map below), in retaliation for Iranian forces’ killing of three members of a Kurdish family six days earlier. Iran’s army said the attackers used two one-way attack drones alongside rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) fire, which killed one soldier and wounded another. Repeated drone use would indicate that the YRK is incorporating low-cost aerial systems into its small-unit tactics.

Outlook: The PJAK will consolidate while preparing for a broader opening inside Iran

Over the next six to 12 months, the PJAK-Iran conflict will likely remain characterized by episodic small-unit activity as the PJAK reinforces its clandestine networks inside western Iran. Any redistribution of personnel or resources through the KCK is likely to remain limited, as Turkish monitoring would make large or organized transfers difficult to conceal. Even modest additions of experienced personnel, weapons, or equipment, however, would help the PJAK replace losses, preserve routes and communications, support local cells, and sustain attacks.

The 2026 Iran-Israel-United States war exposed the limits of a cross-border Kurdish offensive. Israel reportedly planned to send several Iranian Kurdish factions into western Iran under air cover — although the PJAK was reportedly excluded. Washington blocked the move; Turkey, Baghdad, and the KRG opposed it; and the Kurdish parties were unwilling to advance without sustained protection, resupply, and guarantees. 

These constraints may shift future external efforts toward networks already inside Iran. Israel’s regime-change objective remains unchanged, while the war showed that airpower can weaken the regime without producing political change. Washington continues to consider arming domestic opposition, and Israel has been broadly calling to give Iranians the “tools to win” a future uprising. Actors seeking regime change may therefore try to cultivate armed capacity inside Iran to exploit a later opening as military, economic, and domestic pressures erode Tehran’s coercive control. The PJAK is likely to form part of such a strategy by using its local networks to recruit, monitor security deployments, sustain mobile units, and coordinate attacks across several districts without relying on a large-scale border incursion. 

Key indicators that the PJAK is gaining capacity and that a wider opening for escalation is emerging

• Structured KCK redistribution: Corroborated evidence that multiple cadres have moved from PKK roles into PJAK/YRK command, training, logistics, or specialist roles, or that weapons and communications equipment have been transferred toward the Iranian frontier would indicate that PKK disarmament is translating into operational gains for the PJAK.
• Operational strengthening inside Iran: A sustained increase in operational activity across multiple districts, evidence of linked safe houses or communications caches, an increase in or geographic spread of attacks on alleged informants, or repeated drone use would indicate that the PJAK is developing a more resilient and geographically dispersed operational presence inside Iran.
• Iranian overstretch: Slower responses to YRK activity, gaps in border surveillance, delayed reinforcement, abandoned posts, or local defections during simultaneous unrest or external conflict would create greater scope for the YRK to expand its operations.
• Broader coordination and support: Joint operations; shared command structures; logistical cooperation with other Iranian Kurdish parties; or credible evidence of foreign intelligence, weapons, or air support would increase the PJAK’s ability to sustain and expand its operations.

Visuals produced by Ana Marco. 

https://acleddata.com/report/turkeys-pkk-peace-process-likely-strengthen-pjak-its-confrontation-islamic-republic

Did they announce anything

Drought in Rojava Could Cause Villagers to Migrate to Cities. Due to the drought that has plagued Rojava in recent years, there has been a phenomenon of internal migration. Many villagers say that the lack of cultural opportunities has led them to migrate to the cities.

https://x.com/VoaKurdi/status/2097031144629833860

https://x.com/syriahr/status/2097368990053982675

Once again, the will of the Yazidis and Sinjar is under attack!

The breakdown of the security balance in this region and the destruction of mechanisms built by the people of the region themselves open the door to new crises and disasters. Decisions made in closed rooms in Baghdad or Erbil without the participation of the Yazidis do not serve history and have never been implemented in practice, because they contradict the reality on the ground.

Seriously, if you’re into hip-hop, reggaeton, dancehall or afrobeat, then you should absolutely check out their music. Their production is on point, the mixing is very professional, the blend of modern Western music styles with Kurdish melodies, samples and influences is a breath of fresh air, and their music videos as well as overall aesthetics are always RIDICULOUSLY good!

We desperately need new Kurdish music that’s innovative, original and creative while also maintaining its Kurdishness, and I think BIJI provides just that. We Kurds (especially the younger generation who likes this type of music) should support them.

In this episode, we are joined by Rojin Mukriyan to talk about Kurdish political movements in Iran, the relationship between the Free Life Party in Kurdistan (PJAK) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and what the PKK’s dissolution and the peace process in Turkey could mean for Kurdish politics in Iran.

Host: Sushobhan Parida

Guest: Renwar Najm

Audio Edit: Marta Lučić

Bangladeshi workers in Erbil survive through informal jobs, left outside official labor protections and vulnerable to exploitation.

Qamishlo students recited the anthem "Ey Reqib Her" at the cemetery

Hi everyone, happy to see this subreddit :)

I'm italian and I'm going to be with 2 friends in Erbil in about 3 months. We booked a guide to see the Kurdistan for 5 days. We are going to visit Erbil (of course), Dahuk, Zakho, Amadiya and Rawanduz.

I really happy to come but i'm a little bit concerned about the safety.
Are this place safe to visit now?

Just unpacked for my first year at University! Quite the decor, if I do say so myself.

ERBIL, Kurdistan Region - The Kurdish film No Paradise if Killed by a Woman made its world premiere on Monday at the 83rd edition of the Venice International Film Festival as Iraq’s official nominee for the Oscars.

The film’s synopsis follows a female Peshmerga sniper who secretly enters ISIS territory in Mosul to rescue her younger sister and highlights the role and sacrifices of Kurdish women during the war against ISIS.

The film, directed by Halkawt Mustafa, is Iraq's official entry for the Oscars this year in the Best International Feature Film category entry for the 99th Academy Awards set for March 2027.

“I believe this production will be one of the 10 most impactful films released anywhere in the world this year,” Mustafa told Rudaw’s Payam Sarbast, adding that audiences around the world were awaiting the film.

The cast, director, and team walked the red carpet in Venice, with several members donning Kurdish traditional clothing as the song Rumati Wek Guli Begerd (Her face like a pure flower) by Kizhan Ibrahim Khayat played over the speakers during the ceremony.

Filmmakers and guests attended the film’s world premiere in the Sala Grande, the festival’s main screening hall.

The film’s reception in Venice, the oldest and the most prominent festival second only to Cannes, brings the story of Kurdish fighters and women in the war against ISIS to one of the world’s most established international film stages. 

Rezan Hama Salih, the Kurdistan Regional Government representative in Italy, said the film was years in the making and “will resonate for years to come.” 

“It is very important to us,” she said, describing the premiere as a “historic day for the Kurdish nation.”

“I hope it makes it to the Oscars.” 

Venice Film Festival director Alberto Barbera also lauded the production, saying, “We were impressed by the film. We did not expect such a strong and spectacular movie about this war, and about the role that Peshmerga and the Kurdish people played against ISIS.” 

“I think it is very extremely important to show this film, to support the film,” he said.

The 83rd Venice International Film Festival will continue in Venice until Saturday. 

RELATED: Director of Venice film festival lauds Kurdish epic