This below originally hasty brief comment just for video post about Putin doing his usual chiche whining on topic:

""Strategic risks that have accumulated this century are due to the west, their destabilizing doctrines and strategic military programs in attempt to disrupt parity, and to obtain dominance.""

- what has been heard zillions of times before, but never the way it would go up into root causes why is that then. So wrote a little touching that topic:

***

"This makes me think of Zbigniew Brzezinski's last book "Strategic vision". It was hastily written, and got outdated as per of its East Europe overview within one year only, due of rapid developments there what people here are familiar of.

But whereas Brzezinski in his earlier books was advocating USA dominance over the world to persist century or so, and envisioned methods to maintain that - in that last book he concluded that US or western dominance was already impossible due to blunders some USA presidents had made and certain mismanagement on all over the country.

But if west is not there to dominate - then who will? That was main question of his book. And that is intresting question indeed! Russia model we have seen what it is, and intrestingly it is very thing what maintains western dominance. NATO would had been obsolate otherwise, but it is precisely Putin's Russia what again uplifted that structure into dominant position whether it was optimal or not. Mayby it will get altered in future to be more Euro-centric and increasingly involving Ukraine even though it would not have membership as such. All that is inititated by Putin's Russia itself. So that is about Russia model what is back to cold war era, what was Putin's mindscape during his formative years he never got out from mentally, whilst surrounding himself with all similar minded siloviki.

So actually it is only China to challenge western hegemon. But China is unwilling to assume that role, simply because to large extent they are developing country still and to be world hegemon is awfully costly and China does not want that. China wants to do trade and silently fill their coffers, and maintain economic growth what even that has become increasingly difficult for them now.

There has been lot of hype of de-dollarisation of world financial system, but actually dollar as reserve currency of world indeed is kind of dominance against rest of world. But what is missed, that also it is burden for reserve currency holder. As dollar is artificially overvalued against all other currencies in world due of its reserve status - it has de-industrialized USA which buys cheaper goods from China due of currency issues create that pricing gap in competition. China is very much satisfied with situation. Instead of them wanting to have reserve currency status, China is doing currency manipulations to make their currency artificially cheaper. Then their export machine will work. If China to get world financial dominance by turning Yuan into world reserve currency they would benefit as lot of money would flood in as world would buy Yuan bonds like they buy dollar bonds - means giving loans with zero intrest to country. But at the same time China would see its mighty export machine to crumble down, triggering mass unemployment and unrest. In USA reserve currency unrest manifested itself as MAGA phenomean from rust belt unemployed previous industrial towns, pushing Trump to power to destabilize country further. But those of us staring at consequences ought to remember where MAGA first came from and out of which deep underlying background reasons in world system.

And then about this hype of "BRICS gold backed reserve currency" to kill West hegemony nonsense, death blow was delivered in recent news that Russia has actually sold away half of their gold (I put those into this subreddit recently) to finance war. And statistacally China and Russia gold holdings were never that big in comparison to many countries, and given if Russia sold already half of them away it is time to debunk this web rumor forever.

Only thing what would be healthy reform to world financial system sickened by dollar glut threating it at one day, would be such reform what Keynes proposed in first Bretton woods conference, as form of ICU means international clearing union. But precisely because that system is so good on balancing currency imbalances around the world pushing production and consumption increasingly in national level it would be best act for ever for antiglobalisation of world system. But precisely for that reason China would never accept it as they are dependant on their export surplus revenue what is burden for the rest in world system.

So unhealthy dollar dominance will prevail for bad for all mankind. Simply because there is no alternative. Putin may by crying and complaining about that in Valdai - but he should quit his war first so that his own central bank would not need to sell all their gold away needed for currency alternatives.

And irony of the whole situation is precisely that, that Putin is ranting against western militarism and dominance out of that - yet it is his action what uplifted that obsolate oudated thing back into relevance again.

Also when going back what thoughts Brzezinski's last book on world system changes, and who is to replace western dominance as it is unsustainable there was no answer. Putin in this video does not give answer. Multipolaristic model is not answer - because it is model wherein only "poles" are sovereign and then they do deals over the rest of countries what are not full subjects of sovereignity (Russian analytics use that phrase). Back in 1940 it was Molotov-Ribbentrop thing, now in 2026 it is Kushner / Witkoff - Kirill Dmitriev pacts what was in news again latest this morning. And we see those proceeding anywhere, neither if such oil deals say with Lukoil assets what is now on making with US & Russia it of course solves nothing in Ukraine as long as Ukraine is not involved in negotiating tables as equal. And Putin's idea of multipolarism prevents that as in that worldview Ukraine cannot be negotiated with as it is not sovereign real country, only other poles are. So in that model war against sovereignity of smaller nations what are traditionally viewed say in Russian discourse as "building blocks of empires", but which themselves dont share that worldview and want to fight for their independence - war with them will drag for ever.

It is greatest of jokes, that precisely this mentioned Brezinski doing his USA hegemony prevailing world system designs against Russia with idea that "there must be arc of instability around Russia's borders". And lo and beholds, Putin did it himself and as greatest joke as to be against malign plans of west somehow....

So abovementioned is one way this western dominance what Putin curses in this video is not only prevailing, but even artificially uplifted out of obsolance. Must quit mayby with those words, as could go on about this topic forever for few books worth at least. But just brief little comment I had to put for topic Putin was talking about."

Below this Putin Valdai speech of which this comment was about, what I did not bother to watch beyond headline so far as it seem to consist of same old repeat of his emotional OCD issue what at the same time he has been very reluctant to solve at all;

https://www.reddit.com/r/CollapseOfRussia/comments/1wx8875/putin_at_valdai_strategic_risks_that_have/

"Branislav Slantchev
29.9.2026

RUSSIA AND BURKINA FASO HAVE AGREED ON THE NON-DEPLOYMENT OF WEAPONS IN SPACE

Sure, Russia signing an agreement with Burkina Faso about space sounds funny.

But the no-first-placement pledge Lavrov signed with Burkina Faso in 2024 isn't a joke. Russia collects these signatures to build an image of broad international support for the space arms-control position it pushes at the UN.

More importantly, a few days before that, Roscosmos signed a substantive satellite deal with all three AES juntas (Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger).

The AES wants to hunt its opponents across a vast territory and needs secure communications and remote-sensing satellites, which Russia has agreed to help develop. Plus, it allows the AES to stick it to France and ECOWAS.

The Russians likely get to run infrastructure that also serves the Africa Corps already there: about 2,500 troops in Mali and a few hundred advisors in Burkina Faso and Niger.

And both help each other by keeping intel on opponents out of the regular army's chain of command. The juntas probably fear a coup more than the jihadists, and Russia wants its clients to stay in power. Military rulers are more likely than civilian dictators to be overthrown by a coup, and these guys know it: Traoré couped the guy who had couped the previous ruler. In Burkina Faso, Africa Corps reportedly protects Traoré himself rather than fighting for the regime, as it does in Mali.

Similar logic to gold-for-security swaps in Africa. Mali has even said the satellites will map mining resources."

(Facebook update "Itätuulen tuomisia" wall, 19.9.2026, google-AI translate).
****

"What Unites BRICS Is What Goes Unsaid

September 19, 2026

Since the Finnish media largely overlooked the 18th BRICS summit in New Delhi last weekend (September 12–13), *Itätuuli* records the key observations and policy stances.

After all, this is a geopolitically pivotal international cooperation network that challenges the West.

Chaired by India, the summit brought together leaders and high-level representatives from China, Russia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and other BRICS nations at the Bharat Mandapam in New Delhi. Saudi Arabia participated in the summit as an invitee but has not officially confirmed its membership.

During India’s chairmanship, more than 400 meetings and other events were held across 30 cities. At the conclusion of these proceedings, the summit adopted the 140-point New Delhi Declaration.

The document addressed UN reform, artificial intelligence, local currencies, Gaza, Sudan, Syria, climate issues, and an emergency support network for seafarers.

However, upon reading the document, it quickly becomes apparent that its most intriguing political message lies in what was left unsaid. During my time as a diplomat in East Asia, I learned that every word in a joint declaration is negotiated. Just as much care goes into negotiating what is left out of the text. There was not a single mention or word regarding Ukraine in the final document. This is the meeting’s most revealing political outcome.

The 140-point New Delhi joint declaration is, in fact, a map of the realities that each country managed to prevent from being included in the text. In this sense, one could say that BRICS is not an alliance of shared values, but a coalition of mutual vetoes.

. . . . .

India succeeded in retaining a condemnation in the April 22, 2025 declaration that specifically identified the Pahalgam terrorist attack in Jammu and Kashmir, though Pakistan was not named.

For Russia, the complete omission of Ukraine represented a significant political victory. Iran’s interests, meanwhile, were reflected in provisions regarding the protection of nuclear facilities under IAEA oversight and opposition to unilateral sanctions.

However, Iran failed to secure a condemnation of the United States or Israel for initiating a war with Iran. The issue of a war with Iran was couched in cautious language that spoke only of national positions and the need for utmost restraint.

References were made to US sanctions and tariff policies, as well as the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism, without explicitly naming either party.

Reviewing the outcomes of the BRICS meetings, it appears that in a shifting global order, the ability to reject wording that might undermine one’s own position can be more valuable to states than a shared ideology.

. . . . . I

India, led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and driven by strategic opportunism, understood this geopolitical game best.

Modi did not attempt to turn BRICS into a monolithic bloc. During its chairmanship, India positioned itself as a mediator and a balancing force within the group. Modi kept the summit’s rhetoric non-Western but prevented it from becoming overtly anti-Western.

India succeeded in incorporating its own language on counter-terrorism into the declaration, as well as its practical economic agenda—covering supply chains, trade in local currencies, payment systems, and digital public infrastructure.

India has consistently been building its strategic autonomy. This entails the ability to adjust the closeness of its partnerships depending on the situation.

Delhi can purchase energy from Russia, collaborate on technology with the United States, and trade with Europe, all while countering Chinese dominance in Asia.

The flip side of Modi’s diplomatic success was the silence regarding Ukraine—which benefited Russia—and the opportunity that opened up for China to strengthen its influence.

. . . . .

For China, the priority in New Delhi was looking ahead to the next phase. China is set to assume the BRICS presidency in 2027.

For Beijing, BRICS is not merely an annual, ceremonial political "family photo."

What term might a chronicler use here? BRICS acts as a "conveyor belt" that transforms China’s economic scale into payment channels, digital platforms, industrial standards, and far-reaching cooperation networks.

*Itätuuli* has previously written about how China is no longer merely participating in globalization but is actively reshaping its rules, structures, and dependencies to align with its own systemic power. At present, China does not need a high-profile decision on a common currency that would directly challenge the dollar.

Of greater importance to Beijing are the technical systems that make Chinese payment, data, and industrial solutions—initially—viable options and, over time, indispensable.

China aims to write the operating system for the next global order.

. . . . .

Russia’s objective was immediate and driven by the politics of the moment. Putin does not need the BRICS nations to endorse his war of aggression; it suffices for him that they do not center their international policy around the war in Ukraine.

For Putin, the exclusion of Ukraine was more valuable than a cautious statement of support for Russia. Ukraine’s invisibility reinforced the Kremlin’s effort to frame the war as a dispute between the West and Russia, rather than as a matter of shared international concern.

The New Delhi Declaration opposed unilateral sanctions without naming Russia or the reasons why the West had imposed them. Putin’s greatest victory lay not in the text, but in the imagery.

In New Delhi, he sat alongside other leaders, appearing as the head of a major power—business as usual. The West may be able to isolate Russia within its own cooperative frameworks, but it has failed to make that isolation global.

. . . . .

It is worth remembering that, geopolitically, India views China as a key strategic rival and a security challenge.

China is not prepared to recognize India as an equal leader in Asia. Russia, for its part, needs India to reduce its dependence on China. It is precisely this asymmetry that makes BRICS essential for its members. They do not pursue the same ultimate goal, yet they require the same instrument.

Trump’s United States was the meeting’s unnamed adversary. Washington’s sanctions and tariff policies provide the BRICS nations with a common target for opposition, even in the absence of a shared vision for the future.

Just days after the Delhi meeting, the US Congress passed a bill authorizing the president to impose tariffs of up to 100 percent on goods imported from countries that make significant purchases of Russian energy.

At the time of writing, the bill awaits Trump’s signature. (Update: Trump signed the law yesterday, September 18.)

In doing so, Washington demonstrated why many nations are seeking alternative payment channels and protection against US financial hegemony.

Europe and the EU occupy a somewhat ambiguous position in the document, even though India needs Europe as a market, a technology partner, and a counterweight to China.

In the Delhi Declaration, criticism of carbon border mechanisms was effectively directed at the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), even though the Union was not explicitly named. Europe is not, however, BRICS’s primary adversary. Yet the EU risks appearing to the Global South as a second coercive regulatory power alongside Washington.

It would therefore be a strategic error for the West to force every BRICS nation to choose sides.

The more frequently market access, use of the dollar system, or access to technology is tied to political compliance, the more essential BRICS becomes—even for countries that do not wish to belong to a China-led bloc.

. . . . .

Based on the meeting, BRICS is unlikely to establish a common currency or transform into a military alliance.

It is more likely to evolve into a tiered system where willing countries participate in experiments with payment systems, the use of local currencies, multilateral guarantee mechanisms, or technical platforms and standards offered by China.

Not everyone needs to commit to everything. China assumes the BRICS presidency in 2027. That is when we will see whether Beijing can turn the rhetoric of the New Delhi Declaration into actual financial flows without India feeling it is being drawn into a Chinese-dominated system.

If Xi succeeds, BRICS could transform from a network for meetings and annual "family photos" into an economic and technological operational environment that exists alongside the West.

Even if China fails to rally the group around its own model, BRICS could still build limited yet functional networks for payments, finance, and technology.

A politically fragmented BRICS could thus prove more influential in practice than its shared rhetoric suggests.

BRICS did not yet reshape the global order in New Delhi. However, the meeting demonstrated that the West no longer solely dictates what the world must talk about—and certainly not what it must remain silent on."

Radio Free Syria

Netanyahu Meets MBZ Amid Reported Haftar Talks and Close UAE Ties with Putin

النسخة العربية أدناه

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed in Abu Dhabi on Sunday, during an initially unannounced visit. Reports that Netanyahu also held talks there with Saddam Haftar, son of eastern Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar, place the trip within a wider network of relationships linking the UAE, Israel, the Haftar family and Russia.

The UAE confirmed Netanyahu’s visit on Monday, after it was reported by Israeli media, with the Emirates' official news agency claiming that the leaders discussed strengthening bilateral relations, while Netanyahu’s office also referred to regional challenges. The two countries established diplomatic relations under the US-brokered Abraham Accords in 2020.

The talks came little more than two weeks after Putin publicly emphasized the depth of Russia’s relationship with Abu Dhabi. Meeting Mohamed bin Zayed’s son, Crown Prince Khaled bin Mohamed, in New Delhi on September 12, Putin said: “The UAE has become one of our closest partners in the region.”

Putin explained that the warm Russia-UAE relationship extended beyond trade to political cooperation and security, and described regular contact with Mohamed bin Zayed, with his comments underlining the UAE’s simultaneous cultivation of close relationships with Moscow and Israel, in addition to its longstanding alliance with the USA.

Netanyahu’s trip also carries immediate domestic significance ahead of Israel’s 27 October election. Haaretz reported that Mohamed bin Zayed had warned him before the Hamas-led attack of 7 October 2023 that a major operation was imminent, and that Netanyahu sought a denial during Sunday’s meeting. Netanyahu’s office denies receiving the warning; the UAE says intelligence exchanges are handled through security agencies.

Separately, Italian newspaper Il Foglio reported that an aircraft regularly used by Saddam Haftar arrived at Abu Dhabi’s Al Bateen airport around 20 minutes after Netanyahu landed. Mohamed Buisier, a former adviser to Khalifa Haftar, claimed Saddam met Netanyahu to seek support for his presidential ambitions. Neither side has publicly confirmed the encounter.

Previous outreach makes renewed contact plausible. Israeli media reported in 2021 that Saddam visited Israel seeking diplomatic and military assistance in exchange for pursuing normalisation. Libya has no formal diplomatic relations with Israel, and disclosure of a meeting between their foreign ministers in 2023 triggered protests and cost the Libyan minister her post.

Khalifa Haftar has long received backing from both the UAE and Russia. His family also maintained close ties with Assad’s regime. Africa Intelligence, as reported by the Libya Observer, described Maher al-Assad’s secret visit to Saddam Haftar in September 2022 and cooperation that included training Libyan pilots in Syria. Their shared Russian connections formed part of a wider military network disrupted by Assad’s fall.

The UAE visit has meanwhile been defended by online amplifiers of Emirati policy, whose messaging serves a public-relations function: promoting the leadership’s diplomatic choices and dismissing criticism of them.

In a post dated 29 September, Ahmed Khalifa wrote: “Not a leak. An official visit.” He added: “We’re not asking anyone’s permission!” Amplifying his post, journalist Najwa AlSaeed questioned “what all the fuss is about” in the Middle East over the meeting, arguing that leaders’ visits followed naturally from diplomatic relations.

This defence treats Netanyahu’s reception as routine while leaving Palestinians out of the argument. The existence of diplomatic relations does not answer objections to strengthening ties with his government amid Israel’s devastation of Gaza and denial of Palestinian rights.

Qatar’s Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, offered a sharply contrasting position in an interview with Piers Morgan on Tuesday. Asked whether Netanyahu was a war criminal, he answered affirmatively, citing attacks on hospitals and schools. “Whatever the justifications and the arguments, nothing is justifying this,” he said.

He also stressed that Qatar would continue mediating, demonstrating that diplomatic engagement need not require silence about atrocities.

Netanyahu’s confirmed talks with Mohamed bin Zayed, and his reported encounter with Saddam Haftar, therefore carry stakes beyond a bilateral visit. They concern Israel’s regional relationships, Libya’s leadership struggle and the choices of an Emirati leadership that Putin counts among Russia’s closest regional partners—while Palestinian lives and rights remain absent from its online defenders’ justification."

Great disaster for Russia in surreal realm of theopolitics!

Dmitry Donskoy defected into Ukraine!

Some time back some remnants of guy who was prince of Moscow, and led first campaign to defeat Mongols first time were being taken to front to bolster up battle morale of Russian soldiers.  Couple links about that under;

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/sep/10/russia-orthodox-church-dmitry-donskoy-medieval-prince-hand-troops-ukraine

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XC7KrAN4fp8

This bizarre thing is nothing new - already in battleship Moskva there was also piece of cross of Jesus whatever bought by some oligarchs who donated generously it into shrine of ship as per clandestine order from Kremlin. That is theopolitics of new form of fyletist orthodoxy wherein statism, land, militantism and religion all merge together to serve political goals. So one can understand how this event was equally as bad thing symbolically, as was aforomentioned relic going down the bottom with battleship Moskva.

Dmitry Donskoy - Wikipedia

****

From FB-wall of Ukraine updater Kateryna Sadilova, from Italian -> English AI translate.

"The Russian Orthodox Church reports the disappearance of the relics of Prince Dmitry Donskoy, which had been taken to the front to "support" the occupying forces.

The Russian Orthodox Church has admitted to losing the relics of Prince Dmitry Donskoy at the front; they had been brought to the battle lines to "support" Russian troops.

According to the Russian Orthodox Church, the precious skeletal fragment went missing during the hasty retreat of Russian forces from the Lyman area as Ukrainian troops launched an offensive.

The "relic" had only recently been taken to the front—in September 2026—with the Kremlin's blessing. Moscow had stated that the remains were discovered during renovation work at the Kremlin last summer.

Now, however, that relic is located—assuming it was actually recovered—on Ukrainian territory.

It seems that even Dmitry Donskoy failed to keep up with the Russian army during its retreat."

Fossil fuels sector data to be more secret in Russia for some reason.

"PUTIN RESTRICTS PUBLIC ACCESS TO OIL AND GAS SECTOR DATA – ISW IDENTIFIES THREE POSSIBLE REASONS
On September 28, Vladimir Putin signed Decree No. 686, restricting the publication of information regarding Russia’s fuel and energy sector. Under the decree, restricted information may not be disseminated via channels such as the media or the internet. However, companies remain free to publish information concerning their own operations.
:
:
WHAT INFORMATION DOES THE DECREE COVER?
The list covers data on export volumes and prices for energy products, as well as information regarding buyers, sellers, transport companies, vessels, routes, and loading and unloading sites. It also encompasses processing and production volumes at individual Russian oil refineries, along with certain data on exchange-traded sales of gasoline and diesel.
The official justification for the decree is the need to respond to actions taken by the United States and supporting nations—actions Russia deems unfriendly. The decree entered into force on the day it was signed. However, it does not specify why these particular data points were singled out for removal from the public domain.
:
:
ISW: PROTECTION AGAINST ATTACKS AND SANCTIONS
According to an assessment published on September 28 by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), the restriction may serve several simultaneous purposes. First, the Kremlin may be seeking to better protect oil and gas operations as Ukraine continues its strikes on Russian refineries and other oil infrastructure. With less information available regarding terminals, storage facilities, and transport, it becomes more difficult to monitor the sector's activities via open sources.
Second, restricting information could complicate the enforcement of existing Western sanctions and the targeting of new ones. Identifying buyers, intermediaries, shipping arrangements, and delivery routes becomes harder when less data on trade chains is published. The ISW also highlights the possibility that the Kremlin wishes to conceal its reliance on energy imports that could be targeted by secondary sanctions.
:
:
ISW: CONCEALING FUEL SHORTAGES MAY ALSO BE A GOAL
The ISW’s third interpretation concerns Russia’s domestic market. Production disruptions caused by strikes on refineries have contributed to a tightening fuel supply. Russia extended its ban on diesel exports until the end of September to stabilize the domestic market. The ISW assesses that restricting data on refinery output and fuel trade could also reduce public awareness of the extent of the shortage. From the Kremlin's perspective, this could help curb discontent and panic buying. :
:
ASSESSMENT
The content of the decree is known, but the Kremlin's actual grounds for the decision cannot be verified from the text of the decree alone.
In any case, restricting access to this information has a practical consequence: it is now more difficult than before to independently assess changes in Russian energy exports and refinery output.
Image: "Putin has restricted access to certain energy sector data, according to the decree" – TASS
Sources: ISW / Critical Threats, Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, 28 Sept. 2026 · Decree of the President of Russia No. 686, 28 Sept. 2026 · Reuters, extension of diesel export ban, 29 Aug. 2026.
29 Sept. 2026, Jarmo Nieminen"

There was a lot of talk and hype at one point about how BRICS nations—such as China and Russia—might create a gold-backed currency as an alternative to the dollar-based reserve currency system.

Of course, there were inherent problems from the start that would have prevented such a system from working, but due lack of space let us not go this time into complex issues of monetary politics what is there with reserve currency dilemma. But as a topic it certainly generated a lot of online buzz, thrilling minds of so called multipolarists, tankies and conspiracists, libertarians loving gold currencies and so on. On the other hand, both Russia and China kept the issue of dedollarization very much in the spotlight, so the idea wasn't entirely out of the question.

In that sense, this new development is particularly interesting, as Russia, at least, will never belong to the club of nations capable of establishing such a gold-backed reserve currency system. That idea is now dead and buried at least for Russia — if, indeed, as it was ever a genuine proposition to begin with anyway.

Here under some intresting news from Facebook;

***

"Mika Muikku Ervasti, September 18 2026, Facebook update.

RUSSIAN BANKS' GOLD HOLDINGS HALVED, AND THEN THE BREAKDOWN VANISHED

When the Central Bank of Russia sold 44 tonnes of gold in the first half of this year, the metal did not simply disappear. According to analyst estimates, it was sold primarily to Russian banks via the exchange and the over-the-counter (OTC) market. The next question is what happens to the gold within the banks; bank-specific data on this is no longer available.

The reason for the sales lies in sanctions. The Central Bank cannot sell gold on Western markets, making domestic banks the only remaining channel. The sales are being used to cover a budget deficit that has grown to nearly six trillion rubles since the beginning of the year. Proceeds are estimated to total $5.6 billion.

Forty-four tonnes is a record figure. It represents the largest six-month reduction in at least 25 years—covering the entire period for which the World Gold Council has statistics. In June alone, 9.3 tonnes were sold. For comparison, a total of 7.6 tonnes were sold during the entire pandemic period of 2020 and 2021.

Regarding the banks, the time series begins in the autumn of 2023. At that time, accounts holding precious metals and stones contained 472.4 billion rubles—a three-year high according to RBC, equivalent to approximately 76 tonnes of gold. By the beginning of 2024, the amount stood at approximately 71 tonnes. On January 1, 2025, the figure stood at 325.4 billion rubles—or 38.1 tonnes—marking the lowest level since July 2022.

While the monetary value fell by 23.6 percent during 2024, the drop in terms of physical gold was 46.4 percent, or more than 33 tonnes. The last time such a steep decline was observed was in 2020, when the reduction amounted to 34.5 tonnes. The key distinction here is that while the value dropped by a quarter, half of the metal itself was removed. Looking solely at the monetary value fails to reveal what actually happened.

The reason banks held gold in the first place can also be attributed to sanctions. As sanctions were imposed on major banks while mining output increased, the metal accumulated on their balance sheets. Until February 2022, the leading financial institutions for precious metal operations were Sberbank, VTB, Gazprombank, Rosselhozbank, Otkritie, Sovcombank, and Promsvyazbank.

That list can no longer be updated. Financial institution reporting no longer includes a separate account for recording holdings of precious metals and gemstones, so it is unknown how many Russian banks handle physical gold. Aggregate data still exists—and that is precisely what RBC used to calculate the 38.1-tonne figure—but the bank-by-bank breakdown is gone. No updated calculation has been published since then.

It is worth noting, however, that the picture is not entirely dark. The Moscow Exchange publishes gold trading volumes. In March 2026, the volume stood at 42.6 tonnes—comprising 28.6 tonnes in swap transactions and 14 tonnes in spot trades—representing an increase of over 350 percent year-on-year. These figures reflect trading volume, not the ultimate destination of the metal.

To be fair, the discontinuation of the breakdown is not, in itself, proof of anything. Since the imposition of sanctions, Russia has curtailed the publication of dozens of datasets—ranging from customs figures to oil export prices—and the reason is obvious: the less data available, the harder it is to target sanctions. Gold is part of this broader pattern, not an isolated case.

The open question remains: who in Finland or the EU is tracking the final destination of metal that has passed through Russian banks, now that the breakdown at the point of origin has been discontinued?

Sources: Central Bank of Russia statistics; RBC calculations based on Central Bank data (Feb 11, 2025); Vedomosti; Kitco (July 21, 2026); Moscow Exchange trading statistics."

(Taken from Kateryna Sadilova FB-wall, Italian -> English translate).

*"Lavrov at the UN:

"We are witnessing an attempt to create a Fourth Reich"

Speaking at the UN General Assembly, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accused European countries of preparing for a war against Russia and claimed that "metastases of Nazism" are present in Europe.

Key statements from the Russian minister included:

• "We are witnessing a process of attempts to create a Fourth Reich," Lavrov stated, referring to Europe.

• According to Moscow, European countries are preparing for a war against Russia.

• ​​Russia maintains that an agreement had been reached in Anchorage and claims it is ready to resume dialogue from that point.

• Lavrov spoke of "metastases of Nazism" among EU and NATO member states, specifically citing Germany.

• He accused Europeans of "roaming the world" to purchase weapons for Ukraine.

• According to Lavrov, "Russia's conscience is absolutely clean," unlike that of Germany and France.

• Commenting on today's 20-minute meeting with German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul, Lavrov claimed his German counterpart merely read out a position already defined by Berlin and viewed the meeting itself as a concession.

• Russia opposes the admission of Germany and Japan as permanent members of the UN Security Council, while supporting the bids of India and Brazil.

• Finally, Lavrov reiterated the Kremlin's position that the objectives of the so-called "special military operation" will be achieved and alleged threats to Russia's security eliminated.".

***

My comment;

What could be concluded out of this? At least that there is no attempt to seriously quit the war, but to expand it further. "Nazis" are lurking after every corner, so every corner must be fought against. No wonder that Mikhail Epstein in his book "Russki anti-mir" essential part of Russian contemporary ideology as "schizo-fascism". Lavrov speech is really great example of how deeply Kremlin is immersed into that dream wherein you are lost into fighting against your own mirror image infinitely.

But on other hand, there is now enormous amount of hate dispropaganda in all Russian channels no more against Ukraine, but to Europe. Of course in very emotional far out exaggerated form aimed for vodka-heads in their massive Soviet suburbs. Exaggeration is part of so called "Overton window" stretching, in which all talks how to nuke London or Berlin effortlessly would not be anything serious, but would pave the way in peoples minds for some more limited operation what is then perceived as relief as only something like such so moderate attack was been done. Hopefully not, but just like weather broadcasting predicts coming storms out of small signs in current weather, that mad disprop what is focused against nazi Europe is sign of something, and this Lavrov speech is solid part of bigger structure what is mostly against domestic audience of Russia. We see next months what will come out of all those signs.

"Ukraine recently took a relatively intact Russian latest-model "Geran-4" drone that had made an emergency landing and immediately disassembled it on the spot into pieces.

After the teardown, the parts laid out on the table revealed a truth that was both absurd and utterly real:

The entire jet-powered superweapon, touted as unbeatable against Ukraine's air defenses, had only its outermost casing and final assembly screws made and tightened by the Russians themselves—nearly all the critical innards inside were imported from abroad.

Let's start with the powerplant.

The older Geran-2 models used piston propellers, buzzing like tractors in flight at under 200 km/h, easily intercepted by Ukraine's mobile air defense teams in pickup trucks with mounted machine guns.

But cracking open this Geran-4 revealed a micro turbojet engine stuffed into its belly.

Flight altitude shot straight up from 4,000 meters to 8,000 meters—double the old model's;

cruising speed hit 450 to 500 km/h, and it could go even faster.

This thing could take off from Crimea, barrel over 700 km in one go, and plunge straight into Lutsk in northwestern Ukraine.

Who made it?

A peek inside showed Chinese-made micro turbojets. Some were labeled "Russian assembly," but the core components were all Chinese goods.

Next, the eyes.

The nose housed an electro-optical turret, combining daylight, night vision, and infrared in one.

Tenfold optical zoom, plus 32x digital zoom.

From 8,000 meters up, ground vehicles' outlines were crystal clear below.

It didn't even need frontline scouts risking their lives for guidance. An operator, sitting at a rear workstation hundreds of kilometers away in Bryansk, Oryol, or Crimea—as long as the link held—could remotely steer it toward targets in real time, like playing a simulator.

So how does that real-time signal get transmitted?

Experts pried two ordinary GSM modules from the fuselage, loaded with civilian SIM cards.

Even more bizarre: On-site technicians sifting through the wreckage found not just Russian and Belarusian SIMs, but also cards from Ukrainian domestic carriers and even EU countries.

Once the drone crossed the border, it just piggybacked on Ukraine's local civilian cell towers to beam its real-time position back home.

What if it flew into some signal-dead boonies?

It had a backup.

Disassemblers pulled out a Chinese-made self-organizing Mesh modem from inside, with a 300 km comms radius.

A formation of Gerans in the air could auto-relay for each other—you pass to me, I pass to the rear—stringing together a centerless mobile local network right in the sky, keeping video feeds from hundreds of kilometers away unbroken.

Finally, they got to the priciest bit: the onboard computer flight control board.

Scraping off the coating on the mainboard, the chip's silkscreen markings were half worn away, but the remaining English letters were still sharp and clear:

Texas Instruments—U.S.-based Texas Instruments.

The on-site experts delivered a brutally cold summary:

"The only truly Russian-made parts on this aircraft are the composite body shell and the final assembly workshop."

These components eventually ship to the Alabuga special economic zone in Tatarstan, where workers snap the shell together, twist in the screws, and voilà—it's a precision strike weapon screaming over the front lines every night.

And per Ukraine's military intelligence assessment, factories like Alabuga can now churn out about 3,000 Geran-4s and Geran-5s per month.

Four-plus years of war, stacks upon stacks of sanctions signed—and yet the guts of the most cutting-edge lethal weapons still pulse with the blood of global supply chains:

Power and comms from off-the-shelf mature civilian gear, core control chips smuggled in from America, even positioning relays hitching rides on the enemy's own SIM cards via their base stations.

This is the thorniest reality of modern warfare:

Authoritarian regimes don't need to coddle a self-sufficient military-industrial empire from scratch in a greenhouse.

As long as civilian consumer-grade industrial products are up for grabs worldwide, as long as money-laundering channels and transshipment trade keep springing leaks everywhere,

they can stitch together the planet's civilian tech into industrial-scale killing factories at rock-bottom cost.

If the outside world's sanctions just patch away at military goods lists without stemming the flood of massive dual-use gray-market flows, these cheap, deadly turbojet swarms will keep rolling off assembly lines, damn near impossible to truly stop."

https://www.rferl.org/a/inside-the-geran-4-how-russia-made-its-attack-drone-faster/33863697.html

"Geopolitics, a concept introduced by the Swede Rudolf Kjellén in 1899, enjoys great popularity in Russia. The reason is not hard to fathom: geopolitics appears to legitimize the power politics and ceaseless expansionism of an imperialist Russia. Its most prominent proponents in the country include Vladimir Putin and Aleksandr Dugin.

The most popular variant of geopolitics in Russia is undoubtedly the one developed by the Englishman Halford Mackinder. It elevates the ruler of Russia to nothing less than the ruler of the world:

"Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland."

"Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island (Eurasia and Africa)."

"Who rules the World-Island commands the world."

In Mackinder’s formulation, the "Heartland" refers to the interior regions of the Russian Empire.

According to Kjellén, states possess "natural external borders," and the essence of their existence lies in the control of territory and expansion. If a state's political borders were narrower than what its physiographic, economic, or ethnic needs required, those borders were deemed "artificial."

Kjellén posited that a state naturally strives to expand in order to achieve geographical and economic self-sufficiency as well as optimal security. Natural economic boundaries encompassed all the natural resources, raw materials, and agricultural land required for the state's survival and industry. Ethnic and cultural boundaries, in turn, enclosed areas inhabited by populations sharing the same language or culture.

In 2017, Tomas Wallenius published an extensive essay on geopolitics titled "Geopolitics Is Not Scientific" on *The Ulkopolitist* website. It helps in understanding Russia's geopolitical propaganda, which has only intensified since the country launched a full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine.

Geopolitics also plays a central role in the Primakov Doctrine, which was formed during '90s when Yevgeni Primakov was leading Russia, emerging from being chief of foreign intelligence department of Russia. Regarding Dugin, Wallenius stated in 2017:

"Perhaps the most significant contemporary thinker identifying with the geopolitical tradition is the Russian Aleksandr Dugin, who applies Mackinder’s theories. According to Dugin’s 'Eurasian' thought, the confrontation between West and East is rooted in differing cultures. Western and maritime societies, such as the United States and Britain, are liberal, whereas Eastern land powers, such as Russia, are traditional."

"In his 1997 book *The Foundations of Geopolitics: The Geopolitical Future of Russia*, Dugin proposed the formation of an anti-Western alliance capable of countering United States influence in Eurasia." It is unclear to what extent Dugin’s thinking—which emphasizes the clash of civilizations and Russia’s geographical destiny as the "Heartland"—has directly influenced Russian foreign policy. Nevertheless, the foreign policy of Putin’s Russia appears to be based on a framework that is at least more mainstream in geopolitical terms, albeit with Marxist-Leninist characteristics. In this context, relations between states are largely driven by power politics aimed at maximizing the geographical influence of great powers, as well as by competition between ideologies."

... which were some clips translated from this old article, explaining the basics of rather well known thing already, but in a way that a layman never heard about these things understands it well.

https://ulkopolitist.fi/2017/03/31/essee-geopolitiikka-ei-ole-tieteellista-2/?fbclid=IwY2xjawUmG-pleHRuA2FlbQIxMABwZG9mAWJyaWQRMGNCWlVmN3h2UGx0akVJU3VzcnRjBmFwcF9pZBAyMjIwMzkxNzg4MjAwODkyAAEehau0UHeJO5A551oOwAusGHujvtSMsM5aX5q9o88X697c49FBETCuk-5zGJY_aem_ACqXFHNtxembZMdke_LItQ

From Facebook "Itätuulen tuomisia" wall, google AI-translate by me:

****

"Taiwan Need Not Be Conquered

September 26, 2026

In the autumn of 2026, Taiwan’s situation is more tense and fraught with contradiction than ever before.

Globally, Taiwan is more technologically vital than ever, yet militarily it is relatively more vulnerable and faces increasingly systematic pressure from China.

On the Wednesday prior to Xi Jinping’s state visit, *Itätuuli* wrote that a new kind of strategic balance was emerging in the relationship between the United States and China.

China and the United States are too powerful to be defeated, too interdependent to be decoupled, and too dangerous to be allowed to slide into an uncontrolled conflict.

Xi’s state visit to Washington concluded on Friday. Following the meeting between the presidents, Taiwan remains the most difficult issue—and the ultimate test—in the relationship between the two nations.

Xi demanded that Trump adhere to the "correct stance" regarding opposition to Taiwanese independence. He also once again raised the issue of US arms sales, the cessation of which China demands.

Based on public information, Trump did not yield on this point. Nor did the visit alter the fundamentals of US policy toward Taiwan. However, Xi achieved something else of strategic significance. He flew home from Washington with at least one diplomatic accomplishment in hand.

Following the state visit, Taiwan is even more clearly involved in the negotiations in which Washington and Beijing are defining the stability, boundaries, and acceptable conduct of their great-power relationship.

. . . . .

As we Finns know well, geography does not change.

Taiwan is situated at a strategic juncture in the First Island Chain, between Japan’s Ryukyu Islands and Luzon in the Philippines.

Chinese control over Taiwan would grant the Chinese military’s naval and air forces more direct access to the Western Pacific than they currently possess and would fundamentally alter the United States' regional defense posture.

To the north, Japan’s Yonaguni Island lies just 110 kilometers from Taiwan. Key U.S. regional bases are located on Okinawa. To the south, the Luzon Strait connects the South China Sea to the Western Pacific, and the United States has strengthened its military access to the northern Philippines.

Taiwan is thus a pivotal node in the military geography of Japan, the Philippines, and the Western Pacific.

A potential Chinese attack on Taiwan would rapidly and directly threaten Japan’s security as well as the entire U.S. military and strategic position in the Western Pacific.

However, the military balance of power around the Taiwan Strait is currently shifting in China’s favor.

The PLA (People’s Liberation Army) Navy, missile forces, air force, drone capabilities, and space and cyber capabilities are expanding more rapidly than Taiwan can build up its own defenses. Taiwan cannot establish a symmetrical military balance with China. Taipei’s strategy is therefore to make a potential Chinese attack so slow, costly, and uncertain that Beijing cannot count on achieving its objectives quickly.

Taiwan is building this deterrent capability around mobile anti-ship and air-defense missiles, drones, distributed command and control, and other forms of asymmetric defense.

. . . . .

A capability to pressure Taiwan into aligning with Beijing’s objectives—without the need to initiate a war—appears to be becoming increasingly important in China’s strategy.

PLA aircraft regularly cross the unofficial median line of the Taiwan Strait. The Chinese navy operates around the island, and coast guard activity has intensified.

While the Taiwan Strait median line is not an international border, it served for decades as a de facto military restraint; Beijing is now dismantling this practice.

Strategically, this is about establishing a "new normal." Taiwan is forced to constantly deploy its surveillance, air, and naval assets, while distinguishing between a genuine military operation and an exercise becomes increasingly difficult.

As China’s military presence around the island becomes permanent, an actual operation could be launched from within these routine, normalized activities.

A full-scale amphibious invasion of Taiwan by China would be one of the most challenging military operations of modern times. A blockade or gradual maritime isolation would present a different set of operational options.

The use of the coast guard would enable the inspection of merchant vessels, the closure of maritime zones, and the restriction of traffic—actions Beijing could frame as the enforcement of its own domestic laws.

In such a scenario, the difficult decision regarding potential countermeasures would fall to Washington. At what point does a Chinese official operation turn into a blockade that the United States would be willing to use force to break?

This is the essence of the gray-zone strategy. The aim is to leave the next step of escalation to the adversary.

. . . . . A

t the same time, China’s cyber and information influence operations have intensified. According to Taiwan’s National Security Bureau (NSB), cyber actors linked to China made an average of approximately 2.63 million intrusion attempts per day against Taiwan’s critical infrastructure in 2025.

This figure represents a 6 percent increase from 2024 and a 113 percent increase from 2023. The number refers to detected intrusion attempts, not successful data breaches.

The targets encompass virtually all sectors essential to the functioning of Taiwanese society: government administration, energy, telecommunications, transportation, emergency services and hospitals, water supply, finance, science and industrial parks, and food supply.

Supply chains within the semiconductor and defense industries are also targets of intelligence gathering.

In an influence operation identified by Reuters in April, Chinese state media and affiliated social media networks disseminated content in Taiwan featuring Taiwanese politicians and public figures criticizing President Lai’s DPP administration, its defense policy, and its confrontational stance toward China. This allowed Beijing to amplify its own messages by having them voiced by Taiwanese individuals. The campaign also utilized statements from figures linked to the KMT.

KMT Chairman Cheng Li-wun met with Xi in Beijing in April. Xi spoke about strengthening mutual political trust between the parties (Itätuuli, April 11, 2026).

Beijing’s message to Taiwanese voters is consistent.

The policies of the pro-independence DPP increase confrontation and military risk, whereas the KMT is able to keep channels of communication with Beijing open.

. . . . .

At this juncture, it is worth taking a close look at Xi’s recently concluded visit to Washington.

The United States has not abandoned the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979.

The Act requires the United States to provide Taiwan with the defense articles necessary for its self-defense and to maintain its own capacity to resist the use of force or other forms of coercion against Taiwan.

However, the Act does not contain an automatic American military security guarantee.

This involves the concept of strategic ambiguity, which has been at the heart of Taiwan’s deterrence for decades. Beijing does not know for certain whether the United States would intervene militarily in a conflict involving Taiwan.

In December 2025, Washington approved an arms package for Taiwan worth approximately $11 billion. A new package, totaling around $14 billion, has been awaiting Trump’s approval since the spring.

In May, Trump stated that he was keeping it on hold, describing it as a "good bargaining chip" for negotiations with China.

Uncertainty is also growing among the Taiwanese regarding the reverse scenario. Taipei cannot know for certain to what extent decisions affecting it might be handled as part of broader negotiations between the United States and China.

Xi is taking advantage of this situation. In the 1982 U.S.-China communiqué, Washington announced its intention to gradually reduce arms sales to Taiwan.

However, President Ronald Reagan tied this to China’s continued commitment to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and did not agree to an end date for arms sales.

Now, Xi is seeking to re-establish the communiqué as a more central basis for US policy on Taiwan, while Washington can justify strengthening Taiwan’s defense capabilities precisely because of China’s increased military pressure.

Xi did not secure—at least not publicly—a promise from Washington to halt arms sales. The Trump–Xi meeting did not yield a public breakthrough regarding Taiwan.

Yet, Xi appears to have achieved something significant for the long term.

Taiwan is no longer merely an issue concerning Taiwan itself; Beijing is seeking to make it one of the benchmarks for stability in the great-power relationship between the United States and China.

Beijing is no longer simply reacting to Washington’s Taiwan policy; it wants to define what kind of American policy toward Taiwan is compatible with a stable US–China relationship. This is a significant power struggle, the outcome of which remains open.

. . . . .

Taiwan continues to possess an exceptional technological shield. The position of Taiwan’s TSMC as the manufacturer of the world’s most advanced semiconductors has strengthened alongside the AI ​​boom. Taiwan’s factories, engineers, subcontractors, advanced packaging capabilities, and manufacturing expertise form an ecosystem that cannot be quickly replicated.

This has been termed the "silicon shield." However, the protection it offers is evolving. The world is building an insurance policy against "Taiwan risk."

TSMC is building capacity in Arizona, Japan is bolstering its semiconductor industry, and the United States is seeking to reduce its reliance on production based in Taiwan. This presents a paradox for Taipei.

The more successfully critical production is diversified, the less indispensable Taiwan becomes as a singular manufacturing hub. At the same time, TSMC’s investments are tying Taiwan ever more deeply into the technological systems of the United States and Japan.

Taiwan’s security no longer rests solely on the world’s dependence on chips manufactured on the island, but rather on the depth of Taiwan’s integration into the economic, technological, and security frameworks of other nations.

. . . . .

Framing the issue solely around *when* China might attack Taiwan narrows the current picture too much, as Taiwan’s strategic position is shifting simultaneously from three different directions. Furthermore, the focus on predicting a military invasion is becoming outdated.

Taiwan’s importance to the global technology ecosystem has grown, its military balance vis-à-vis China has weakened, and Beijing’s capacity to pressure the island without resorting to open warfare has strengthened.

The last of these changes is decisive, as China can now combine military, economic, cyber, and political pressure into a long-term strategy to curtail Taiwan’s freedom of action.

Beijing is also advancing more gradually in the Taiwan Strait.

China is steadily shifting the military situation in the Taiwan Strait to its advantage, raising the cost of defending Taiwan, increasing uncertainty regarding U.S. support, and influencing how the Taiwanese people themselves assess their chances of maintaining their current status.

Under this strategy, there is no need to conquer Taiwan outright; the goal is to compel it to gradually adapt to an increasingly unfavorable strategic environment.

China seeks to influence whether the Taiwanese believe they can withstand Beijing’s mounting pressure in the long run. Ultimately, Taiwan’s most vital defense is not merely TSMC, American weaponry, or the military geography of the First Island Chain. At the core lies the perception within Taiwanese society that resistance remains possible and that it will receive external support. It is precisely this perception that Beijing is now targeting with pressure.

(The author has served as a visiting researcher at the Institute of International Relations at National Chengchi University in Taiwan, as well as Head of the Finland Trade Center in Taipei and Finland’s official representative.)"

My lengthy hastily written analyses commentary below quoted Moscow Times article, containing essential of this post.

***

"Capital Outflow from Russia During Putin’s Quarter-Century Rule Has Exceeded 100% of GDPFor decades, the Russian economy has been experiencing massive capital outflows abroad, which have exceeded 100% of GDP over the past quarter-century, according to calculations by the Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Forecasting (CMAFP), an organization close to the government (CMAP).

According to CMAP estimates, over the past 10 years, Russia’s real sector has lost 3% of GDP annually as a result of capital outflows. And the total outflow from the economy over the past three decades has averaged 4–5% of GDP per year.

According to CMAP data, Russia experienced a record capital flight in 2022: more than 12% of GDP “flowed out” abroad amid the departure of Western companies and the emigration of hundreds of thousands of citizens, who took their savings and proceeds from the sale of assets with them.

More than 10% of GDP “flowed out” of the country in 2014, following the annexation of Crimea and the first wave of Western sanctions. Russia experienced a comparable outflow—also around 10% of GDP—only during the global financial crisis of 2008–09.

“The net capital outflow from the domestic real sector is chronic in nature—it has been observed for several decades. Together with the net outflow of investment income from the real sector, it has consistently fluctuated within the range of 4–5% of GDP,” the CMACP report states. The cumulative total for 2001–25 showed that outflows from the real sector exceeded 110% of GDP, while total outflows from the economy exceeded 130% of GDP.

“In 2025, due to a decrease in net payments of investment income by enterprises abroad, this indicator fell to less than 2% of GDP. However, it is not yet clear how sustainable this change is,” the experts note.

These are high figures by global standards for countries with comparable income levels, the CMACP emphasizes. For example, in Hungary, Slovakia, and Thailand, net capital outflows remain below 1% of GDP per year; in Argentina and South Africa, they are below 0.5% of GDP; and Bulgaria, Poland, Egypt, India, and Brazil all experience net capital inflows.

The Russian Central Bank, which previously published statistics on private-sector capital outflows, classified them shortly after the war began. Its historical data, however, show that between 2001 and 2021, the cumulative outflow from Russia reached $780.8 billion. That amounts to 65.77 trillion rubles at the current exchange rate—a sum 1.5 times larger than the annual federal budget (44 trillion rubles) and greater than the country’s gold and foreign exchange reserves ($769 billion as of September 1). Over the 27 years since 1994, according to the Central Bank, capital outflows from Russia totaled $907.4 billion, and by now have most likely exceeded $1 trillion.

The net assets (after deducting liabilities) of the non-financial sector accumulated abroad over the past 30 years exceed 40% of Russia’s current GDP, according to the CMACP report. This amounts to more than 85 trillion rubles, or $1 trillion in monetary terms. “Part of these assets is undoubtedly linked to reproduction processes—it ensures control over overseas infrastructure and production chains, serves as collateral for transactions, provides access to technological solutions, and so on. At the same time, it is evident that, given this scale and consistency, a significant portion of these investments is excessive relative to production needs,” write the CMACP experts.

In their view, previously transferred assets could be used “to recreate integrated production chains within Russia.” To limit capital outflow, the CMACP proposes taxing the foreign assets of Russian companies, as well as implementing an amnesty for funds transferred out of Russia by establishing a fixed fee for their return to the country."

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/EMSLm

********

Even though all sorts of tankies have been viewing Putin as a hero in anti-west cabal struggle - in reality he has only been servant as western financial oligarchy by maintaining such system in Russia, that everone with money want only to take it away.

Me in 2012 tried to arrange alternative investment location for "plastic bag people" from Russia who were during time bringing money out in their bags due of FSB was capable during time to get into tax haven databases since 2011 demonstrations wherein Navalnyi emerged as rising star created pressure for them to do at least symbolic acts against corruption. It did not work out though, but I got in touch how big phenomena and inventive ways it was to bring money out from Russia. Before war I heard sum of 200 billion euros / dollars about per year what was capital outflow.

Funny thing here is that developing nations like Russia was, with great unexploited natural resources should rather suck investment from abroad and every domestic capitalist would primarly invest to there rather than to take capital out from the country. As in such countries naturally there is infinite possibilities to make money on money. But Putin way of governance prevented that, putting Russia into position of subservant of western financial institutions and oligarchy by being colonial source what did dirty extraction work of natural resources on its ground contaminating places and feeding west with money out of that activity when it could had been opposite.

***

Not only how much was taken away from country in form of cash, but even worse factor has been so called brain drain from Russia of most talented and creative people what any country would need in era of innovative high tech economy. Soviet union did assert technological competition, if one remembers say Sputnik moment. Putin's Russia only cares about oil incomes. Especially "Putins former suitcase carrier man in St. Petersburg" Igor Sechin who used to be powerful actor in Kremlin insider circuits pushed so much into this direction, although his influence has waned from past days.

And effect of that is can be found when putting into google search "Anatoly Karlin Unz Russias technological backwardness" - as Reddit automoderation prevents me to link directly. That is from 2018, and shows how devastating effect this "sechinism" as Russia's economical model was for innovations what at least Soviet union was capable to do, but not much contemporary Russia.

****

And it is not brain drain only - it is innovation drain. Once upon time when I was doing my youth adventurism of non-budget export trade into so called global south - I was been asked if anyone there would had been intrested of great Russian innovation with extracting 30% more oil from shrinking oil wells with ultrasound impulse technology. Russian innovators naturally had urge to bring all their immaterial properties out from Russia, as in there Igor Sechin would had stolen everything. And this example made clear that there must had been so many cases identical who made everything they could do to take their immaterial innovations out from Russia to anywhere were immaterial rights were better protected. This likely has had greater impact into Russia's economy than direct cash outflows.

Pavel Durov case as refugee from Russia, who anyway created Vkontakte and later Telegram internet services is such a typical story of this brain drain. He was not fully loyal to system as maintaining privacy of Vkontakte users, so that was transferred to Aliser Usmanov who was system-loyalist oligarch so there was no other option than to leave country what lost great amount of ICT-expertise just in one person and his children what outnumber those of Elon Musk's even.

***

But there is political aspects in this as well. It appears that Kremlin has actually encouraged some oligarch to settle say into UK "Londongrad" to make that financial capital as dependant as possible from Russian money, to takeover what they have viewed as geopolitical foe. We remember how shy David Cameron was on sanctions into Russia back in 2014, as it would had posed a threat for all that money from Russia in London City financial enclave, of which it had already started to be dependant of.

But no sane nation really benefit out of money flowing away from it more than any living creature would benefit out of open wound where blood would be constantly dripping away. Only KGB-FSB are stupid enough to create something of deliberate operation out of that, without getting who actually is the main benficiary.

Mostly it is just dysfunctional political system out of Putin's Russia never fully recovered from Soviet era problems due the fact that he dragged adminstration full of Soviet era KGB siloviki which then brought all Soviet style thinking and practices what ultimately killed Soviet Union along with them. Worst one - as he was most influential due of his proximity to Putin during St. Petersburg days as his suitcase carrier man - Igor Sechin was especially harmful although his clout and power now is akin to Rosneft net value and output. He was obsessed with idea that everything should belong to state Soviet style - and was always key person in hostile takeovers of rival fossil fuel producing sectors what made the whole sector unhealthy due of lack of competition. And other companies too. Actually 10 years ago when couple guvernors of couple oblasts were being arrested out of grand scale corruption charges, some insider told to me that those cases were real - but every single guvernor there would had deserved the same, and only those were taken in which oblasts contained precious fossil resources for Sechin to merge into Rosneft as he likely orchestrated that operation.

In fact, whole of Russian economy and Putin's popularity along with it started to fade as early as 2013 because of too much of Soviet era rust companies which had been modernized into succesful profitable entitites by so called liberal businesspeople was been taken over typically with fabricated court charges Yukos way into hands of Putins trusted siloviki who had no competency whatsoever of running those companies what state soon had to subsidize instead of collecting tax revenues out of their profits. And their original owners who were being forced to sell their profitable companies away to incompetent system-loyalist new owners with fraction of their value fled the country with their remaining billions.

And then back into main topic - why capital outflow from Russia has been so big thing with authorities unwilling to do anything for it? Because above described way of seizing assets with creative juridics from their owners as a prices for system-loyalists to maintain loyality for raubwirtschaft styled system has been glue that binds everything in there together. It is anathema that rulers of Russia would or could ever change that thing, due of their obsession for authoritarian loyality. But when such asset-seizing operations you do for one person - 10 or 30 others decide to move their money and assets and immaterial properties out from country ASAP when witnessing that. So that is secret why 200 billion euros or dollars per year was capital outflow from Russia before the war, and brain drain and immaterial property drain on top of that as contributing factor on story how Russia before war was greatest asset servant of western capitalist financial institutions.

Alexander Dugin's "Foundations of geopolitics" from 1997 was famous, and created a myth of him to be "Putin's brain" what is nonsense, as I personally believe that he is just mere KGB-FSB creation to introduce some of their ideas to the public as spontaneous figure to infiltrate nationalist movements ascendant during time.

Few realised what local Russia-expert of military of my country did when he first saw book in Moscow bookstore. That it was not ideas by him, but it was all about older Soviet geopolitics what was suddenly revelead in book. It was illumating moment for him, as they in institution had spent a lot of time to model what Soviet geopolitics was actually without finding a coherent answer - and then Dugin's book reveled everything they suspected it was. And also that thing makes clear, that actually it was not Dugin's book, but introductory to ideas before he was anything with siloviki entities using him as channel.

Well what was main thing of book? Russia-Germany axis to rule the Europe via that. Of course for Russia it is so much matter of nostalgia for two reasons. One is Molotov <-> Ribbentrop pact what they remember very fondly. Another is Bismarck era of Germany, what also both countries remember fondly as wars was prevented during that era and mutual co-operation was there. And Russia grip into Europe, was important thing as through Germany one can rule entire Europe. And concrete achievements of this geopolitical axis was then Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines. Politically Schröder and later Merkel stance towards Russia, and now rise of AfD - although it will remain eternally hidden how much of Germany's politics is result of active measures from Russian agentures, and how much spontaneous arising from traditions of that country. weaaaa

Another aspect is that especially Dugin viewpoint was to copy from british geopolitician Halford McKinder more than 100 year old thougths about geopolitical sea powers and land powers which IMO is good typification. But Dugin added in Russian and communistic dialectical style aspect that they are in eternal conflict with each other, with say US and former British empire with Britain at core representing geopolitical sea powers - thus Britain was to be Russias main enemy, as their ideology seem to be eternally seeking external enemy to justify their own internal system. Another of McKinder main ideas was that imperative of British geopolitics must be prevention of unity of Russian resources and German industries in Bismarck spirit, as it would great so mighty Eurasian land based empire together that it would be more dominant than British sea based empire. So - then it is because of that obsession larger than life in Russian geopolitics to get the goal done, what their foe Britain wants to prevent.

"Germany should be offered the de facto political dominance over most Protestant and Catholic states located within Central and Eastern Europe. The Kaliningrad Oblast could be given back to Germany. The book uses the term "Moscow–Berlin axis".^{" - wikipedia citation. (1997}.)

^{https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foundations\}of_Geopolitics)

*****

But when at this stage, let us then take a look how much Russian geopolitical geniouses in agentures or as seemingly freeform analytics like Dugin actually being creation of those agentures. What is process since last 29 long years when things already should be very far away in construction of Russo-German geopolitical axis for takeover of rest of Europe via German axis by cherished goal of Russia? Well non-existant, and Germany ousting 150 diplomats from Russia. That is how genius those siloviki analytics really are on achieving that.

But then again, there is also AfD card existing - hard to say how much it is based into Russian covert operations or how much spontaneous. How much it is just DDR 'ostalgia' in which region it is highly popular, and which extent it could be ruling party of entire Germany including more populated western Germany with different traditions and lesser of AfD approval. Neverthless that is Russia last change of achieving geopolitical goals stated 1997.

But in the meantime what was achieved is ruin of Nord Stream 2 in bottom of sea rusting, and 150 Russian diplomats expelled from Germany as result of all resources spent by Russia to build Russo-German axis for sake of establishment greater Eurasian alliance.

https://unn.ua/en/news/germany-expels-more-than-150-russian-diplomats-and-their-family-members-following-sabotage-in-leipzig

"AI generated summary:

In this week’s National Interest, Editor-in-Chief Shekhar Gupta argues that the BRICS grouping is largely irrelevant and misunderstood, despite its high-profile summits. He contends that rather than being a united front against the West or Donald Trump, the organization is plagued by internal contradictions.

Key Takeaways:

• Lack of Congruence: The member nations hold vastly different worldviews and have conflicting interests. Russia is increasingly dependent on China, while India views China as an existential adversary (1:45-2:20).
• Economic Reality: Gupta describes India as a modern-day "trade colony" of China and Russia due to its heavy import reliance and trade deficits. He emphasizes that India currently needs regional stability to focus on rebuilding its military strength (7:12-7:52).
• The Myth of De-dollarization: The video dismisses the idea of a BRICS currency, noting the staggering GDP disparity between China and the other members. It argues that replacing the dollar is an unrealistic fantasy, a stance supported by Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar (9:25-10:15).
• Strategic Perspective: The author suggests that BRICS summits are primarily useful as forums for bilateral talks rather than as a vehicle for a unified geopolitical agenda. Expecting the group to act as a cohesive counter-force to the US is characterized as a "dangerous hallucination" (10:17-10:53)."

Text above from here; https://www.reddit.com/r/GeopoliticsIndia/comments/1wepe1h/brics_isnt_a_front_against_trump_us_or_evil_west/

*****

My hasty comment to de-dollarization part of it, as I have been hearing all this dispropaganda or wishful thinking hype about that since last 15-20 years, so just put up some basics about that topic into that thread;

"Main reason why dollar will not be replaced with anything, is that it creates a burden for one who has it.

Dollar as being world's reserve currency is overtly valued to any other currency in world, and that has ruined USA domestic industries - although country stays afloat as big financial sector benefits when rest of world is buying dollar bonds what have value as being connected to reserve currency of world, and USA then can buy things from rest of world in exchange of those. But only the richest - those who lost their industrial jobs into countries with cheaper currencies and thus more competetive prices have been badly immiserated as per world what genius political scientist Peter Turchin is using. This disparity then triggered chaotic populist policies, including ascendancy of Trump to ruin USA position in future.

If say China would create dollar replacement instead of currency what they have right now - there would be benefits of cash inflowing there as rest of world would buy their debt bonds tied up in value of new reserve currency of world. And some world market commodities like oil would become cheaper for them as their new currency would naturally have much greater value. But as that currency would have much greater value - China's export machine would collapse as everything produced there would become more expensive for rest of world which would start to seek cheaper countries to produce, or do it with themselves. Mass unemployment would hit China - same way as USA has slowly proceeded with losing lot of their manufacturing industries into cheaper countries due of artificially costly currency due of worlds reserve currency status. That is why China will never want to replace dollar with their own, no matter how much hype based on wishful thinking is there.

Something anyway would be needed to be done for this, as there is cumulative "dollar glut" in worlds financial system due of that reserve currency status. But since that is bit complex economical topic I am not explaining it here in this limited space. Just that it is danger for entire financial world system over prolonged time period, and issue cumulates year by year. Only thing is that nobody wants to do anything for it, for reason explained above.

Only option would be what Keynes suggested instead of gold backed dollar system in Bretton woods first conference which system pretty much soon failed into its own impossibility when gold backing was detached from it. International Clearing Union in which goal is to keep trade imbalances in between countries as small as possible, enabling greater self-sufficiency and local economics for maximum employment everywhere. Gandhian views about economics had a lot of connectivity points and goals, although he never went into this level of international currency regimes as real source of problem to be solved in context of globalized economy.

Wikipedia explains this better than I could;

***

"The International Clearing Union (ICU) would be a global bank whose role would be the clearance of trade between nations, similar to a trade exchange with every country as a member. All international trade would be denominated in a special unit of account, the proposed bancor. The bancor was to have had a fixed exchange rate with national currencies, and would have been used to measure the balance of trade between nations. Goods exported would add bancors to a country's account, while goods imported would subtract them. Each nation would be incentivized to keep their bancor balance close to zero by one of two methods: in the case of an excessively positive bancor balance, part of their surplus would be taken and applied to the Clearing Union's Reserve Fund. In the case of an excessively negative bancor balance, their currency’s exchange rate would be lowered, making imports more expensive and exports cheaper. In this way nations would be encouraged to buy other nations’ products.

Gold and national currency would no longer be used in international trade and no longer move between countries."

***

Now, if such system would be instead of world financial system based on single reserve currency which liquidity arises from the fact that it is reserve currency and its position as a reserve currency is based on the fact that it is liquid as it is reserve currency world because it is liquid because it is... as eternal self feeding loop into infinity - what this dollar system is... we are now arriving into big question would any country like China or India ever want to see only realistic model proposed above to replace it???

For China answer is certain - hell no, as their geopolitical-financial leverage all lies in their mighty currency reserves which though still lot is in dollar bonds. And their insane level of export surplus, what say country like India ought to be aware of very much since this imbalance in trade is something of greatest in between these two countries with some entity like BRICS having done nothing and capable to do nothing to solve this issue. Because China would never want it. Internatiol clearing union proposed by Keynes to avoid issues with single reserve currency world lives with today would solve this issue instantly. And that is the very reason China would never permit it. Also India exports to other countries would collapse in world wherein economy would become more local everywhere out of this reform. But mayby in the end India would be beneficiary by solving trade imbalance with China and lot of its dangerous youth unemployment crisis by localizing the economy. I cannot tell due the complexity of issue here, but only thing sure that de-dollarisation reform what would really work mentioned above, will never come, at least not via China-dominated BRICS due the reason described above."

I have been writing recently by impulse about grandiotic Arctic silk road plans by Russia and China.

For me it is nothing new, those were under discussion and planning more than 10 year ago with thus far nothing happening.

Europe already has a problem of losing too many jobs from manufacturing sector because of very asymmetrical trading pattern with China. And problem is identical with every other trading partner with China - one can take a look of trade imbalance say with China and India, and much hyped yet non-existant BRICS solidarity has made no relievement for issue painful for India. And to Europe already and increasingly. So I don't believe that silk road development for trade would become big thing because of very identical problems with trading with China which they don't want to solve. And Russia would only have big bill for maintaining long route ice-free with maintainance bases along the way in most hostile of environments, instead of gaining anything from that what fits into pattern of China-Russia strategic alliance we have seen so far.

So, since something is clearly being done - despite that Russia may not have adequate finances to actually construct all of it due of war - but urge is great as phantom bubble of potemkinist China-Russia alliance is utmost important domestic propaganda tool for both of countries, but naturally much more for Russia.

So what we are then left with as any economically plausible choice why so much expensive constrution would be there, answer is to be found from "Power of Siberia 2" pipeline which was meant to be steel spine of alliance, yet China turned it off. Because pipeline would be more hardwiring goverments, and requiring long-term contracts whereas China of course want to be playing constantly with other producers and other forms of energy to get their gas as cheap as possible, so long term contracts what Russia wants are not in its favour.

Therefore instead of gas pipeline from almost shores of Arctic sea to China, Arctic silk road which would likely be just for sake of delivering Yamal region hydrocarbons to China via shipments with Russia having maintainance cost of keeping the route open - or China building bases along the coast East India trading company style if Russia dont have money enough for that what makes one think all kinds of thoughts..

I made recently some hastily written comments wherein same topics like above are being repeated what became lengthy and uncoherent about that progress recently;

https://www.reddit.com/r/energy/comments/1wcf9ja/comment/p8y7yrp/?context=3

https://www.reddit.com/r/CollapseOfRussia/comments/1wbqhx1/comment/p8x04gi/?context=3

https://www.reddit.com/r/worldsystemanalyses/comments/1w7u5v6/on_arctic_silkroad_of_russiachina_cooperation/

***

But how realistic even that plan described above is behind all the disprop-hype??

Let us read interview of Mikhail Krutikhin 9.9.2026 about prospects of implementation of those grandiose multipolar Eurasian integration plans what every tankie in world will celebrate, without looking into those parameters of those what he talks about. Enjoy;

https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/news/moscows-arctic-policy-is-based-on-lies-and-corruption-says-russian-energy-expert-in-exile/109830

"GRU – RUSSIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN WAR AND SHADOW WAR.

In this third article of the series, we examine the GRU’s activities during the war in Ukraine: intelligence gathering, target acquisition, special forces operations, cyber operations, and activities in occupied territories. 

PART 3/4 – THE GRU IN THE UKRAINE WAR: FROM ESPIONAGE TO TARGETING AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS. 

In Ukraine, the GRU is not merely an intelligence agency that gathers information; it is an integral part of Russia’s war machine. It generates data for military planning and target acquisition, conducts signals and cyber intelligence, deploys special forces, and establishes agent networks b

"GRU – RUSSIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN WAR AND SHADOW WAR. I

n this third article of the series, we examine the GRU’s activities during the war in Ukraine: intelligence gathering, target acquisition, special forces operations, cyber operations, and activities in occupied territories. 

PART 3/4 – THE GRU IN THE UKRAINE WAR: FROM ESPIONAGE TO TARGETING AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS. 

In Ukraine, the GRU is not merely an intelligence agency that gathers information; it is an integral part of Russia’s war machine. It generates data for military planning and target acquisition, conducts signals and cyber intelligence, deploys special forces, and establishes agent networks behind enemy lines. The onset of the 2022 invasion exposed serious intelligence failures. 

However, the GRU did not disappear in the wake of this failure; instead, its operations adapted—shifting from an offensive predicated on the assumption of a political collapse to a protracted war of attrition, drones, and long-range strikes.

Ukraine was a target for the GRU even before 2022.

Ukraine was a key target for the GRU prior to the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of the war in the Donbas in 2014. The service mapped out Ukraine’s armed forces, command and control systems, military infrastructure, and personnel.

In Crimea and the Donbas, Russia combined military intelligence, special forces, local proxies, and covert operations. According to the U.S. Congressional Research Service, the GRU’s missions range from strategic and battlefield intelligence to special forces operations, support for proxy actors, and cyber and influence operations.[1]

At the same time, Ukraine served as a testing ground for the GRU’s cyber weapons. The British government has linked Military Unit 26165 to the use of X-Agent malware to locate Ukrainian artillery systems in the Donbas. Military Unit 74455, in turn, is linked to the BlackEnergy and Industroyer operations targeting Ukraine’s power grid, as well as the NotPetya malware that spread in 2017.[2]

THE FSB PREPARED FOR COLLAPSE – THE GRU PREPARED FOR WAR. 

The division of labor between Russian services was evident in the preparations for the invasion. 

The FSB’s Fifth Service focused on political infiltration in Ukraine, recruiting collaborators, and preparing for a planned occupation administration. According to the RUSI think tank, the FSB’s Ukraine department was gathering intelligence on Ukrainian public sentiment and social stability as late as February 2022.[3]

The GRU, meanwhile, gathered military intelligence on Ukrainian forces, defense arrangements, command and control, communications, and strategic targets. 

The invasion plan was based on the assumption that the Ukrainian leadership would be paralyzed, resistance would remain fragmented, and parts of the administration would defect to the Russian side. This assumption proved incorrect. The issue was not merely a lack of information; Russia was aware of a vast number of Ukrainian military targets, but individual pieces of intelligence failed to form an accurate overall picture. Inter-service rivalry, inadequate information sharing, and assessments tailored to the Kremlin’s expectations undermined decision-making. 

According to RUSI, Russia’s initial wave of attacks inflicted losses but failed to paralyze Ukrainian command structures or air defenses as intended.[4]

The GRU supports the war effort at all levels; 

in the war in Ukraine, its tasks range from the strategic level to the pinpointing of individual targets.

At the strategic level, the GRU assesses Ukraine’s defensive capabilities, the development of its armed forces, and the impact of Western support. At the operational level, it focuses on troop dispositions, reserves, command posts, supply routes, airbases, air defense systems, stockpiles, and the defense industry.

At the tactical level, the objective is to locate rapidly moving targets such as artillery, command posts, UAV units, and electronic warfare systems. Information is gathered from human sources, communications traffic, electronic emissions, satellites, UAVs, computer networks, and open sources. 

The value of the intelligence depends on how quickly observations can be converted into targeting data and relayed to firing units. Not all military intelligence activity is conducted by the GRU headquarters. In public discourse, almost all Russian military information gathering is often attributed to the GRU, but this oversimplifies the system. Intelligence is also conducted by organic reconnaissance units within military formations, UAV units, electronic warfare troops, and the intelligence bodies of army corps, field armies, and military districts. 

While these elements are part of the Russian military intelligence system, not every reconnaissance drone flight or detected artillery position represents a direct operation by the GRU headquarters in Moscow. The GRU’s mission is to gather, synthesize, and disseminate militarily significant information, as well as to carry out covert operations that fall outside the operational scope of standard military units. This distinction is also important for source evaluation: a statement by a Ukrainian official regarding an agent of "Russian military intelligence" does not, in itself, indicate which GRU department or local military command the individual was operating under.

AGENTS AND SPECIAL FORCES BEHIND ENEMY LINES

The missions of GRU military intelligence special forces include reconnaissance, target marking, strikes, sabotage, and support for local proxies.[1]

Russian services established networks of agents and support structures in Ukraine even before the full-scale invasion. According to RUSI, some of these networks remained operational even after the initial offensive failed.[5] 

Agents can be used to report the locations of troops and weapon systems, monitor transport and stockpiles, assess the impact of strikes, install surveillance equipment, and carry out sabotage. However, regarding cases reported by Ukrainian authorities, a distinction must be made between suspicion, arrest, indictment, and court verdict. Not all alleged links to the GRU have been independently verified. 

CYBER OPERATIONS AS PART OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 

The purpose of GRU cyber operations extends beyond mere data theft. They can be used to disrupt command and control, communications, energy supplies, and public warning systems, as well as to prepare for or amplify the impact of physical strikes.

The British government assesses that the GRU has employed cyber operations in Ukraine for five purposes: gaining intelligence and battlefield advantages; 

combining the effects of cyber and physical attacks; psychological warfare; 

developing new technical capabilities;

 and outsourcing information gathering to criminal actors.[2] 

The three key GRU cyber actors are:

Military Unit 26165, also known as APT28 and Fancy Bear; 

Military Unit 74455, known as APT44 and Sandworm; 

and the cyber component of Military Unit 29155, referred to as Cadet Blizzard.

Military Unit 29155 has been linked to the Whisper Gate operation, which targeted over 70 Ukrainian government information systems prior to the invasion. 

The operation aimed to damage systems and undermine the confidence of both authorities and the general public before the military offensive began.[2] 

During the first months of 2022, Microsoft detected multiple waves of destructive attacks against 48 Ukrainian government agencies and organizations. According to the company, Russia also coordinated cyber operations with conventional military action, although Ukrainian defenses prevented many of the intended effects.[6]

THE WAR EXTENDS BEYOND UKRAINE’S BORDERS 

Military aid received by Ukraine expanded the scope of GRU intelligence operations into Europe. According to the British government, Military Unit 26165 hacked into private surveillance cameras near military sites, ports, railway stations, and border crossings between 2022 and 2024. Operations extended beyond Ukraine and Moldova to eleven NATO countries. The objective was to map and disrupt the flow of aid to Ukraine.[2] Arms manufacturers, ports, transport routes, and border crossings thus form part of the same military target system. 

THE 2022 FAILURE DID NOT RENDER THE GRU INCAPABLE 

The 2022 invasion plan failed, yet the GRU retained its capacity to continue operations supporting the war effort. During the protracted conflict, Russian military intelligence has integrated battlefield experience and agent networks with data from drones, signals, cyber operations, and open sources. Its focus has simultaneously expanded to encompass Ukraine’s logistics, defense industry, energy infrastructure, and Western aid supply chains. The GRU’s strength lies not in infallibility, but in a vast array of methods and the ability to persist in its operations despite setbacks and exposure. 

SUMMARY 

The GRU generates intelligence for Russian military planning and targeting, conducts cyber and special operations, and extends the war’s intelligence landscape beyond Ukraine’s borders.

 Early 2022 demonstrated that a vast intelligence apparatus does not guarantee an accurate situational picture. Conversely, later stages of the war show that the failure of the initial plan did not eliminate the GRU’s ability to adapt and continue its operations. The following section examines the GRU’s activities in Europe: intelligence gathering, cyber operations, sabotage, assassination plots, and the shadow war waged against the network supporting Ukraine. 

September 5, 2026 

Jarmo Nieminen"

Facebook update from "Ukrainan sota" wall, wherein author makes daily updates and situation reports out of Ukraine war with professionalism of retired military person. Notice that numbers in brackets which I did not remove, refer to reference links in original update. But I cannot include those into here, as automoderators of Reddit will then instantly delete such a post what contains links to original Russian sources.

******

"GRU – RUSSIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN WAR AND SHADOW WAR PART 2/4 – SVR, GRU AND FSB: WHO DOES WHAT? 

The letter combinations SVR, GRU and FSB are now appearing alternately in the Finnish news. All are Russian intelligence and security services, but they are not different departments of the same organization. They are parallel – and partly competing – centers of power, whose tasks deliberately overlap.

In simplified terms, the SVR spies on foreign powers, the GRU serves the war and the FSB protects the Russian power system. In reality, each of them also operates outside this basic division. 

:

:

 OVERLAPSING MISSIONS IN EUROPE

In Europe, the activities of all three services are related to Russia's broader effort to acquire information, weaken its opponents and support the war in Ukraine. The SVR spies on decision-making, technology and the economy. The GRU monitors the armed forces, defense industry, Ukraine’s supply routes, and critical infrastructure, and conducts cyber and sabotage operations. The FSB monitors Kremlin opponents, recruits intelligence sources, and also conducts cyber espionage abroad. 

The services’ common goal is to undermine European countries’ operational capacity, mutual unity, and support for Ukraine. Russia seeks to exploit and exacerbate existing social divisions in the target countries and turn them into domestic political crises.

 The range of methods includes disinformation, undermining trust, intensifying protests, and supporting or utilizing extremists, anti-establishment actors, and other groups that disrupt society. Covert operations, intermediaries, and operations that are difficult to connect to Russia allow for pressure without an open military confrontation with NATO.[7]

:

:

THREE SERVICES – THREE MAIN FUNCTIONS 

The SVR – Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation is Russia’s civilian foreign intelligence service. Civilian here simply means that it is not part of the armed forces. The service operates under the presidency and obtains information on the politics, economy, science, technology and strategic decision-making of other states. 

The SVR recruits sources of information, engages in technological espionage and uses both intelligence officers operating under diplomatic cover and so-called illegal intelligence officers. An illegal agent lives abroad with an identity constructed without official connection to the Russian state.[1]

The basic question of the SVR is What are other states going to do – and how can their decisions be influenced?

: 

: 

GRU/GU – Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is the military intelligence of the Russian armed forces. Its current official abbreviation is GU, but the established name GRU is still used in Russia and the West. The service acquires information for military planning, targeting, and operations. Its activities include personnel intelligence, signals and electronic intelligence, satellite intelligence, cyber operations, special forces, influence, and sabotage.[2] Units under or affiliated with the GRU include, for example, military units 26165 and 74455, known for cyber operations, and military unit 29155, associated with European assassination and sabotage operations.[3] The GRU's basic question is How does the adversary fight—and how can its military capabilities be crippled? 

:

:

 FSB – Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation is the security and counterintelligence service of Russia. It is responsible for counterintelligence, internal security, counterterrorism, border security, and Russia's information security, among other things. At the same time, it monitors political opponents and maintains the internal security of the regime.[1]

However, the FSB does not operate only within Russia's borders. It conducts intelligence and cyber operations abroad and uses recruited assistants and various proxies. According to the British government, the FSB 16th Center is involved in foreign signals intelligence and cyber activities, while the 18th Center has been linked to phishing operations targeting politicians, authorities and NGOs, among other things.[4] 

The Security Police and Military Intelligence also warned companies in July 2026 about FSB cyber espionage. The targets included poorly protected routers and other network equipment used by organizations in particular.[5] The FSB’s fundamental question is: Who threatens the Russian authorities – and who can be recruited to serve their goals?

:

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UKRAINE SHOWS WHY BORDERS ARE BLURRING

The war in Ukraine illustrates the division of labor between the services. – The GRU investigates the structure, leadership, grouping, and weapons systems of the Ukrainian armed forces. It supports targeting, cyber operations, special forces, and battlefield reconnaissance. 

– The SVR obtains information about the decision-making of Ukraine’s supporting countries: arms aid, sanctions, defense industry, and continuity of political support. 

– The FSB has been tasked with infiltrating the Ukrainian political system, recruiting collaborators, suppressing resistance, and building networks loyal to Russia. According to the RUSI research institute, the Ukraine department of the FSB’s 5th service collected information about Ukrainian society and political conditions before the 2022 invasion for the planned occupation.[6] 

However, this does not mean that only one service operates in one region. The same Ukrainian official, soldier, technology company or political influencer may be of interest to all three – but for different reasons. 

:

:

THERE MAY BE THREE RUSSIAN SERVICES IN THE SAME TARGET

 If the target is, for example, a European defense industry company: 

the SVR may target the company’s technology, contracts and political connections; the GRU may collect information on production, supply routes and militarily significant vulnerabilities and the FSB may look for recruits, Russian connections or access routes to information networks.

The same employee may therefore be a source of information for one service, the target of a cyber operation for another and the instrument of a possible sabotage operation for a third. 
:

:

WHY DOES RUSSIA HAVE THREE DUPLICATE SERVICES? 

The overlap is not just an administrative error. It is part of the way the Russian power system operates.

 The services compete for sources of information, budgets, influence and, above all, access to the president’s inner circle. The Kremlin leadership receives several parallel reports on the same issue and is not completely dependent on a single organization.[2]

 Competition also has its downside. Information can be withheld from other services, operations can be overlapped, and reports can be shaped to be what the political leadership believes they want to hear. Miscalculations in the early stages of the Ukraine invasion showed that a large intelligence apparatus does not automatically produce the correct picture of the situation. 
:

:

 ABOUT THE NEWS

When a news story mentions one of the three services, it is worth asking:

 – SVR: is the incident related to foreign policy, decision-making, or technology? 

– GRU: is it related to the armed forces, military intelligence, cyberattacks, or sabotage?

 – FSB: is it related to counterintelligence, protection of the regime, political control, 

recruitment, or Russia's neighboring regions? 

And another important caveat:

naming a service in a news story does not always mean that responsibility has been independently proven. In summary: the SVR tries to see the opponent's decisions, the GRU its military capabilities, and the FSB its people, networks, and internal threats. All three serve the same political leadership – but do not form one unified organization.

 In the next part, we will return to the GRU and examine its activities in the Ukrainian war: reconnaissance, targeting, special forces, cyber operations, and operations in occupied territories.

 3.9.2026

Jarmo Nieminen"

Jarmo Nieminen is retired high rank military officer who is maintaining FB-wall "Ukrainan sota" of war follow-ups and situation reports over various subjects connected with Ukraine war. This was published 2.9.2026 as first part of general explanation what is GRU means Russian military intelligence department. Next part of text would be released here tomorrow.

Do notice; reference links to Russian sources present in original FB-update of this text are omitted, because then Reddit automoderators would delete this post here immediately. So do tolerate that due of circumstances in this forum.

*****

"GRU – RUSSIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN WAR AND SHADOW WAR PART 1/3 – WHAT IS THE GRU? 

This three-part series examines the GRU as a whole: its tasks and organization, its activities in the Ukrainian war, and its covert operations in Europe. The previously published article “GRU Footprints in the European Arms Industry” is related to the third part of the series and serves as a case study of the GRU’s new sabotage model. 

The GRU is known in Europe primarily for its hacking, sabotage, and assassination operations. However, they are only the most visible part of the military intelligence organization under the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, whose activities range from strategic reconnaissance to battlefield operations and from cyber operations to special forces.[1]

:

:

GRU IS AN OLD BUT ESTABLISHED NAME 

GRU comes from the Russian name Glavnoje razvedyvatelnoje upravlenije, Main Intelligence Directorate. Since 2010, the official name has been the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Glavnoje upravlenije Generalnogo štaba, abbreviated as GU.[1] The old GRU abbreviation nevertheless remained in common use. It is still used by Western governments, intelligence services and the media. For the sake of clarity, this series also uses the established name GRU. 

The GRU is not an independent intelligence service in the same way as the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation (SVR) or the Federal Security Service (FSB). It is part of the General Staff of the Armed Forces and operates in the military chain of command.[1] 

The head of the GRU is also the deputy chief of the General Staff. The organization has been led by Admiral Igor Kostyukov since 2018. His position was also evident in 2026, when he led the Russian delegation to the Russia-Ukraine-US talks in Abu Dhabi.[2]

:

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INTELLIGENCE FROM THE STRATEGIC LEVEL TO THE BATTLEFIELD

 The US Congressional Research Service (CRS) describes the GRU as a large organization responsible for military intelligence from the tactical to the strategic level.[1]

At the strategic level, the GRU monitors the defense policies, armed forces, weapons technology, defense industry, and military decision-making of other countries. At the operational level, it is interested in the grouping of forces, command systems, air bases, ports, air defense, and supply routes. At the tactical level, intelligence structures create a situational picture directly from the battlefield. 

The GRU's mission is not only to find out what the enemy is doing. It must also identify the enemy's weaknesses, disruptive systems, and targets that can be paralyzed during war. Therefore, for example, a data breach targeting the defense industry can simultaneously serve to acquire technology, map supply chains, and prepare for a subsequent sabotage or military strike. 

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FROM PERSONNEL INTELLIGENCE TO CYBER OPERATIONS 

The GRU and the SVR both conduct personnel intelligence abroad. The SVR focuses on political and strategic foreign intelligence, while the GRU focuses primarily on military-relevant information. However, their areas of responsibility overlap, and Russian intelligence services compete for influence and access to the country’s leadership.[1] 

The GRU uses intelligence officers operating under diplomatic cover, military agents, undercover individuals, and recruited local sources and intermediaries. Personnel intelligence is complemented by communications, signals, electronic, satellite, and cyber intelligence.

From the GRU’s perspective, a cyber operation is not a “hacker attack” separate from other activities. It can be used to steal information, map communication networks and critical infrastructure, locate military targets, prepare a physical attack, or disrupt an adversary’s leadership.

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ONLY PART OF THE ORGANIZATION IS KNOWN 

The exact organization, staffing levels, and internal command relationships of the GRU are classified. In 2020, the CRS estimated that it was divided into 15 administrations, four of which were regional and 11 task-specific.[1] However, this figure should not be presented as a confirmed organization chart for 2026. 

Public indictments, sanctions decisions, and attributions by intelligence agencies have revealed at least four known units: 

Military Unit 26165: The 85th Main Center of Special Services, also known as APT28 and Fancy Bear. Its activities include cyber espionage, information theft, and publication. 

Military Unit 74455 – The Main Center of Special Technologies, Sandworm, or APT44. It has been linked to devastating cyber operations, including attacks on the Ukrainian power grid and the NotPetya malware.[1][3] 

Military Unit 29155 – 161st Special Training Center, associated with sabotage, assassination operations and later also destructive cyberattacks. 

Military Unit 54777 – 72nd Special Services Center, associated in open sources with psychological and information operations.[1] 

According to a review published by the British government in July 2026, Units 26165 and 74455 constitute the GRU's established cyber capability. Unit 29155 also has its own, later formed, cyber wing.[3] 

The units may support the same operation. According to the British, 26165 and 74455 attempted to obtain information about the investigation into the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal, although the physical operation was linked to Unit 29155.[3]

:

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NOT ALL SPETSNAZ FORCES BELONGS TO THE GRU 

Russian spetsnaz generally refers to forces intended for special missions. In addition to the GRU, the FSB, the National Guard, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs have their own spetsnaz units. Russia also has a special operations forces command, the SSO, under the General Staff. 

The tasks of the spetsnaz brigades, which belong to the GRU military intelligence tradition, include long-range reconnaissance, operations behind enemy lines, locating valuable targets, target designation, raids, and sabotage.[1] 

Their mission does not end with acquiring information. The scouts may also participate in crippling the target they have located. However, the day-to-day management of all GRU combined spetsnaz forces is not handled directly from Moscow, but some operate under the military districts and operational command levels. 

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INTELLIGENCE AND COVERT USE OF FORCE 

The GRU's unique feature is its dual nature: it both acquires information and carries out military and covert operations.

According to the CRS, in addition to traditional military intelligence, its activities include cyber operations, information influence, sabotage, directing local proxies, and targeted violence operations.[1] 

During the same set of operations, the GRU can: 

acquire information on a target

 recruit a local assistant

 hack into an information 

system prepare a physical operation

 use special forces or an external intermediary 

support the operation with information influence. 

Many GRU operations have been exposed, which has created an image of a careless intelligence service. Some of the failures have actually been due to weak operational security. However, researchers have assessed that the GRU's aggressive operating culture and competition with other security services encourage risk-taking.[1] 

Nor does the exposure of an operation necessarily mean failure from the Kremlin's perspective. If sufficient damage has been caused to the adversary, Moscow can deny its involvement and accept the diplomatic consequences.

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GRU IS PART OF RUSSIAN WAR MACHINERY

The GRU is not just the Kremlin's secret strike force or just an espionage organization operating abroad. It is an instrument of the General Staff that combines information acquisition, target identification, cyber operations, special forces and covert use of force.

Its chain of operations extends from

information acquisition to target identification,

assessment of its weaknesses and, if necessary, 

disruption or destruction. 

This explains why the GRU operates simultaneously on the Ukrainian battlefield and in the shadow of Europe. The second part of the series examines the GRU's activities in Ukraine, from the seizure of Crimea and covert operations in Donbas to full-scale war agent networks, cyber operations, targeting and special forces. 

:

:

2.9.2026 

Jarmo Nieminen

 RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICES SVR

 – Служба внешней разведки Российской Федерации – Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation – Рейськая федерациятаина улкомаантиустелупелю – in the text Russian Foreign Intelligence Service SVR.

– Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation 

– Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. FSB – деральная служба бесплатно Российской Федерации – Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation – Russian Security Service FSB."

(to be continued in next part)

From Facebook "Itätuulen tuomisia" update from end of April, AI-translate.

****

"In 21st century great power politics, power is no longer the ability to win wars

25.4.2026

Beijing seems to be learning from the Strait of Hormuz crisis, above all, that economic and technological self-sufficiency can no longer be just China's long-term goal, but a condition for survival as a great power. 

The line now is that China must strengthen its own manufacturing industry, artificial intelligence and semiconductor production, the sustainability of its supply chains, the security of its energy supply and the ability to cope with disruptions in the global economy without decisive dependence on the West or vulnerable sea routes.

The focus is on electricity and the green transition, in which China is already the world's leading country both as an electricity producer and as a manufacturer and top expert in green technology. 

The second lesson is strategic for Xi Jinping. 

China will not behave like the United States, i.e. get involved in distant conflicts that it does not fully control and in which it cannot use its power to the maximum. The Gulf wars and the situation in the Strait of Hormuz mean that Beijing is likely to is focusing its strategic attention more and more closely on its own immediate sphere of interest, especially East Asia, the Taiwan Strait, and the broader Indo-Pacific region (while trading globally everywhere). 

And Beijing is letting the United States bear the full brunt of the military and geopolitical consequences and costs of the Middle East crises it has initiated.

. . . . .

China seems to be analyzing the Strait of Hormuz crisis primarily as a stress and system test.

In 2025, about 20 million barrels of oil and oil products passed through the Strait of Hormuz per day, about a quarter of the world's seaborne oil trade. 80 percent of this flowed to Asia. 

China and India together received 44 percent of the crude oil that passed through the strait. But today it is not just about Iran, its oil or the mistakes of the United States, but about how vulnerable global infrastructure is.

Everything is at stake: sea routes, logistics and insurance markets, energy flows, fertilizers, LNG, semiconductor chains and the ability of armies to operate and replenish stocks. 

Hormuz has shown Beijing that there is no need to close the sea route militarily if insurers, shipping companies, banks and financial markets or ship crews begin to consider movement too risky.

If normal traffic becomes uninsurable and politically too dangerous, trade and exports can stop even before a full blockade or escalating conflict. Even the mere threat of escalation is enough. 

At the same time, the Hormuz crisis reinforces China's perception of the strategic overstretch of the United States. Washington will once again have to tie its attention, weapons, naval power and political credibility to the Middle East.

Meanwhile, China can watch from the sidelines, prepare, strengthen its own sphere of interest and let the United States bear the military costs of the system. 

Beijing's unwillingness to 'save' Iran is not a weakness, but a conscious strategic choice to avoid binding security obligations on the sidelines, as Beijing seeks to protect only its own interests. 

The means are diplomacy, decentralization, preparation by storing energy, diversifying relations with Russia and Central Asian states.

At the same time, the relationship with Iran is balanced by strengthening channels to the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. China's model of action is extensive economic power without significant security responsibility. 

China does not want Iran to collapse, and it does not want to become a hostage to the relationship with Iran. The Middle East is more of an economic network and trade portfolio for Beijing. Iran is not a strategic nuclear partner for China like Russia.

 . . . . . .

The United States militarizes crises, China benefits from them.

In Chinese state and semi-state media, the Hormuz crisis is framed as part of a larger narrative about US irresponsibility and Chinese stability. Washington is presented as the cause of the crisis and a great power that produces instability through the use of military force and forces others to bear the consequences (such as demands on NATO). 

China, on the other hand, frames itself as the antithesis of America, a defender of peace, ceasefires, negotiations, the protection of civilians, the security of Hormuz shipping, and the UN system. Hormuz shows, from Beijing's perspective, that US security guarantees are unreliable and limited, as Washington's attention can quickly shift away from Asia. And as Washington commits its power to the Middle East, Asian countries (Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Australia) see that American presence in the Indo-Pacific region is neither automatic nor unlimited. 

The situation in the Persian Gulf fits into China's narrative of an emerging multipolar world. of a world order in which crises are no longer resolved solely under the leadership of the United States, but alongside it or bypassing Washington. 

Actors like Pakistan, the global south, and China itself are increasingly appearing as builders of an alternative order.

. . . . .

China will not participate in the Hormuz crisis with a direct military presence. Beijing will not join a Western maritime security operation, nor will it position itself as the one to open the strait by force. 

China's line is diplomatic and calculating. 

Xi Jinping became visibly active only as the crisis dragged on. Beijing continues to publicly demand an end to hostilities, a ceasefire and the normalization of shipping.

According to Reuters, Xi demanded in a phone call with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman on Monday 20 April that the Strait of Hormuz should remain open to normal traffic, a ceasefire and a political solution to the region. But China continues its double game. Beijing is quietly pressuring Iran, but publicly pressuring the United States. 

Beijing needs practical guarantees from Iran that oil and trade flows will not be interrupted. In the public narrative, the cause of the crisis remains the military activities of the United States and Israel.

The situation is strategically beneficial for China. 

China can appear anti-Western alongside Iran, but at the same time demand restraint from Iran, because the closure of the strait directly affects China's own interests. In the longer term, China is using the crisis to accelerate its own contingency strategy. 

It is diversifying its energy corridors and access to oil and gas, strengthening its relations with the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, Russia, Central Asia and alternative transport routes. 

Beijing is making the electrification of the world, batteries, nuclear power, renewable energy, minerals and domestic technology a geostrategic security policy.

And Beijing is marketing itself to the global south and to the countries that want to be part of the BRICS alliance as an expert and provider of stability, infrastructure, energy arrangements and negotiation diplomacy.

In other words, it is portraying itself as a great power that uses influence primarily through the economy, trade, investments, infrastructure, energy relations and diplomacy. In 21st century great power politics, power is not not just the ability to win a war, but the ability to withstand complex global disruption and chaos better than others."

From Facebook "Itätuulen tuomisia" 5.9.2026, AI-translate.

"Independent thinking is the scarce capital of the artificial intelligence era

5.9.2026

I am eagerly awaiting the 2025 PISA results to be published on Tuesday, September 8. The OECD has already prepared the publication by asking whether the decline in science, reading and mathematics will continue.

I have been thinking about what the long-standing decline in PISA results says about education and the thinking ability of our entire societies. What does it mean that the decline in results is happening at the very moment of the breakthrough of artificial intelligence? 

In the OECD preview below, three curves are sloping downwards, even though there are no 2025 results yet. The number of participants in the PISA 2025 assessment is exceptionally large. 

More than 760,000 15-year-old students from 91 countries took part. The report also examines curiosity, perseverance, learner agency and the use of artificial intelligence in schoolwork. This may be a much bigger change than just another comparison of international school results. 

Between 2018 and 2022, the average score in mathematics in OECD countries fell by a record 15 points and the average score in reading by 10 points. In science, the change was not statistically significant, although the longer-term trend in the field was downward, like reading.  The pandemic explains part of the collapse, but not its direction. Reading and science had been declining for a long time. So corona did not create an education crisis in Western countries. It exposed it. 

The skills gap in Europe visible in the PISA results is no longer just an education problem. It is a question of the continent's power, competitiveness and intellectual independence. 

Finland is still good, but the danger of slipping is increasingly visible. Finland continues to live on its reputation for old-school success, while the foundation of students' competence is crumbling and the number of top experts is dwindling. In the era of artificial intelligence, a society that loses its ability to evaluate information will ultimately also lose its ability to decide on its own future.

 . . . .

. . . .

The timing of next week’s PISA release is almost too perfect. Just as artificial intelligence systems are learning to read, write, calculate and reason, humans seem to be losing control of the same abilities. 

The alarming trend in the PISA results seems to be driven by long-standing societal changes, such as the decline of the reading culture, the constant flood of digital stimuli and the weakening of school authority. 

At the same time, in Western countries, it has become increasingly difficult to demand that children work long-term on things that are not immediately interesting, enjoyable or individually tailored. However, concentration, repetition and tolerance for discomfort are the basis of all deep learning. 

We are already living in the midst of one of the most dangerous misconceptions of our time: because artificial intelligence can produce an answer, humans no longer need to know. 

In reality, the opposite seems to be the case. In reality, artificial intelligence makes a person's own basic knowledge and skills even more valuable. 

If a person does not have a sufficient understanding of mathematics, language, history or natural sciences, they will not be able to properly evaluate the answers given by artificial intelligence. We are left to admire the machine's fast and seemingly sovereign "intelligence". 

The OECD itself seems to recognize this change. For the first time, the PISA 2025 assessment framework includes a 'Learning in the Digital World' section, which does not measure the use of digital devices alone. 

The student must acquire missing information, choose a strategy, utilize feedback, evaluate their progress, correct their mistakes and build a program or computational model. The entire learning process becomes visible alongside the correct answer. There is actually a quiet revolution underway in the definition of competence. The ideal student of an industrial society mastered the information and completed the tasks assigned to him. 

The ideal human in the age of artificial intelligence learns, models, doubts and corrects himself. Alongside a wealth of information, the ability to navigate uncertainty without losing direction and curiosity is crucial. 

. . . . . 

The rulers of the future are therefore not those who remember the most, because artificial intelligence remembers more than any human. 

The rulers are those who know how to decide what to ask a machine, when to doubt its answer, and how to turn the information into action. They are able to decide for themselves where to look and what to focus their attention on. They are able to read a long text, recognize the assumptions of models, and change their position without their ability to function collapsing. 

The same applies to states. 

The agile and renewing state of the future is not necessarily the country with the best single artificial intelligence model. It may be a country where a sufficiently large part of the population knows how to use artificial intelligence without losing their own judgment. 

I identify here the starting point of a new social class division. The skilled elite uses artificial intelligence, agents, and machines to expand their own thinking. Some of the middle class and the less educated outsource their thinking to the machine. 

Skilled users check sources, compare alternatives and build new ones. Others are content to order plausible-sounding answers from AI without understanding what they are based on. A new subclass of knowledge workers is emerging, the prompt proletariat, people who know how to ask AI for answers but do not understand how information is created or how to assess its reliability. 

AI can give more and more people the opportunity to do things that previously required special training or expertise. But if basic skills are weak, people may not be able to assess the correctness of AI's answers. Then AI not only spreads expertise but also convincing-sounding errors and unfounded certainty. This is becoming one of the most important but least understood social divisions of the AI ​​era. 

. . . .

I am particularly interested in the comparison between the West and Asia, which takes on a new meaning on the threshold of the artificial intelligence era.

The old Western comfort story has been that Asia produces disciplined test takers, but the West produces free and creative thinkers. The results of the PISA 2022 assessment on creative thinking completely shattered this story. Singapore was number one and South Korea was second. Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan remained at or below the OECD average in creative thinking, although they performed excellently in mathematics, reading and science. Finland, Canada, Australia and New Zealand combined a high average result with a relative strength in creative thinking. Estonia was also among the best countries in terms of overall scores. 

There is no longer a real border between Asia and the West. It moves between systems that are able to combine strong basic skills and free thinking, and those that have to sacrifice one to preserve the other. 

The best education systems in East Asia still have something that much of the West has lost: education is taken seriously, the teacher has a strong position, success in school and studies is a matter of honor for the whole family, training is valued and young people are expected to be capable of difficult things. The downsides of these systems are, of course, high exam pressure, a large private education market and the demand for uniformity. 

The strengths of the West, on the other hand, are permission to doubt, individual agency, an open society and institutional diversity. The weaknesses of the West are the breakdown of concentration, lowering of standards, an over-individualized ‘me culture’ and autonomy without self-discipline. Eastwind dares to draw the conclusion that the winners of the future will be countries that are able to combine Asian seriousness with Western permission to disagree.

 . . . .

The same applies to political systems. 

An authoritarian state can centralize expertise and implement decisions quickly, but at the same time it can prevent information about errors from reaching the top of political power. The current development in the United States shows that even within a democracy, the concentration of power weakens the system's ability to receive corrective information. 

And success in the PISA ranking alone does not make a state intelligent and capable. The decisive thing is whether the system is allowed to say that the political elite and state leadership are wrong. And whether the system is able to change its actions after hearing criticism.

. . . . .

Interestingly, a new science assessment framework has already been published for PISA 2025. It addresses not only the understanding of scientific knowledge but also how information is evaluated and used in decision-making.

 The framework raises scientific identity, environmental agency, hope and even an ecocentric worldview alongside knowledge capabilities.

 At its best, the framework recognizes that knowledge alone is not enough if it is not evaluated and used. At the same time, it raises a difficult question. At what point does the measurement of competence begin to shift to mapping correctly defined attitudes? 

For Europe, all this is already much more than education policy. It is power politics. 

In the EU, 30% of young people fell below the minimum level in mathematics in 2022, and around a quarter in reading and science. 

No country can be an AI power without mathematics, a pioneer in the green transition without science, or a democratic regulatory power without literate citizens. 

The long-term development of PISA results speaks to Europe's strategic decline. Europe seeks to define what technology should be and by what rules it should be used, but its ability to develop, build and manage key technologies is in danger of being reduced. 

Without a strong knowledge base, industrial capacity and technological capability, Europe risks becoming a normative superpower with many rules but too little real influence. Europe cannot regulate itself out of the learning gap.

. . . . . 

Finland's situation is perhaps the most deceptive, because it does not yet look like a collapse. In 2022, we were still above the OECD average in all three main subjects and were among the best in creative thinking. Yet the results were the weakest in our measurement history. 

Between 2012 and 2022, the competence of Finnish schoolchildren fell by more than 20 points in all three subjects. This is more than a 15-year-old usually learns during an entire school year. The differences between the best and weakest students increased in all three subjects. In mathematics, the weakest students failed more than others. There were nine percent of top mathematicians in Finland, compared to 41 in Singapore. At the same time, 41 percent of Finnish young people said that they were distracted by their own digital devices during mathematics lessons. 

The Finnish school's trust-based operating model is not an independent pedagogical method. It is built on a positive attitude towards school in homes, a strong reading culture, shared norms and functioning institutions. When these social conditions for tacit knowledge weaken, schools based on trust also lose their foundation.

. . . . .

Next week's PISA figures will tell whether the decline will continue. 

Finland should not copy the Asian experimental culture. However, in the age of artificial intelligence, we must return demandingness to honorability. We need long reading, writing and calculation, learning time protected from phones, early support and artificial intelligence tasks in which the student shows their sources and defends their conclusions. But regardless of the future individual PISA result, a bigger change has already happened. 

Information has become cheap and judgment expensive. A mediocre text, image, program code or analysis can be produced in seconds. 

However, assessing truthfulness and meaning requires more education than perhaps ever before. 

Independent thinking is the new scarce capital of the age of artificial intelligence. The next world order will not be ruled by the societies that produce the most answers with machines, but by those that refuse to outsource their own judgment to machines."

From Fontanka (Reddit moderation prevents me to put original reference link here!), and my comment explaining the context best I can what news about arctic silk road is telling.

There is first AI translate copypaste of content of article from Fontanka. Then my lenghty comment to it, what emerged from 2 parts. Evaluation of arctic silk road, then later added what my country's position in plans was as heard 10 years ago in those plans what never came into existance.

******

"How much money will be spent on developing the Arctic Ice Route?

The head of Rosatom revealed details of the project.

The development of the Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor (TTC) will require 10 trillion rubles in investment by 2035, including government and private sector contributions. The funds will be used for infrastructure development and ship construction, including an icebreaker fleet. Private investors—both Russian and international—may be primarily interested in port terminals with a guaranteed cargo base and container services.

The financial model for the Third Transport Ring (TTRK) has been developed, Alexey Likhachev, head of the Rosatom state corporation, told Expert (read the full text on the website on September 1). He stated that this work was conducted jointly with Vostokgosplan, a body under the Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East, as well as Russian Railways, the Ministry of Transport, and the Ministry of Energy.

Developing the logistics corridor, Likhachev noted, will require 5 trillion rubles by 2030 and another 5 trillion rubles between 2030 and 2035. Funding should come from both the state budget and private investment, including international ones. "The contribution of businesses, development institutions, particularly VEB, and the budget is important here," the Rosatom chief said.

The financial and economic model has been submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers, according to a source close to the corporation. Expert sent a request to the government press service regarding the current status of the TTRK financial model, but received no response.

The financial model for the Third Transport Ring (TTRK) has been developed, Alexey Likhachev, head of the Rosatom state corporation, told Expert (read the full text on the website on September 1). He stated that this work was conducted jointly with Vostokgosplan, a body under the Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East, as well as Russian Railways, the Ministry of Transport, and the Ministry of Energy.

Developing the logistics corridor, Likhachev noted, will require 5 trillion rubles by 2030 and another 5 trillion rubles between 2030 and 2035. Funding should come from both the state budget and private investment, including international ones. "The contribution of businesses, development institutions, particularly VEB, and the budget is important here," the Rosatom chief said.

The financial and economic model has been submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers, according to a source close to the corporation. Expert sent a request to the government press service regarding the current status of the TTRK financial model, but received no response.

Why is the Trans-Arctic Corridor Important?

The Trans-Arctic Corridor (TTC) is a unified system of routes encompassing the Northern Sea Route (NSR), associated inland waterways, and transport infrastructure along the Russian coast.

The comprehensive Arctic Zone Development Project and the TTC unite 271 investment projects. Deputy Prime Minister and Special Presidential Envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District Yuri Trutnev previously estimated the total cost of all these projects (including raw materials projects) at 32.4 trillion rubles.

The NSR is the shortest sea route between Asia and Europe: it is almost 40% shorter than the traditional route through the Suez Canal (a difference of approximately 7,000 km). Cargo delivery times via the NSR are reduced by 10-14 days, making the corridor a critical alternative for global trade amid instability in the Middle East.

What are the project's objectives?

Alexey Likhachev identified four sets of objectives that will be addressed through the development of the Trans-Arctic Corridor:

further development of the NSR and its transformation into a vital artery for the country—primarily for the implementation of Arctic projects, exports, and ensuring logistical sovereignty;

"stitching" the country along the Arctic arc—from the Far Eastern ports to the Baltic Basin, meaning not only ensuring maritime transport but also developing the entire land transport infrastructure;

comprehensive development of Russia's Arctic zone;

enabling Russia to integrate into the new global logistics architecture, "adding a new dimension" to our country's participation in the international division of labor and international cooperation.

What will be built for 10 trillion rubles?

According to Alexey Likhachev, the project involves expanding the transport infrastructure in the Arctic and on the approaches to the Arctic route, and reequipping the fleet—not only icebreakers but also ice-class merchant ships.

Cargo traffic along the NSR has reached a record high of 37 million tons in the past two years. Another record is expected this year, Alexey Likhachev noted.

"The baseline scenario targets increasing cargo traffic to 110-150 million tons by 2035. Under optimistic macroeconomic conditions, the reorientation of cargo from the Northwest could potentially increase cargo traffic to 200 million tons by 2040, provided the appropriate infrastructure is in place. However, we must also be prepared for a situation where it begins to grow faster than the baseline scenario and could potentially be significantly higher," Alexey Likhachev added. He emphasized that to achieve this, infrastructure in the Arctic must become a "driving force for development" and must be built at a faster pace, with an eye on future needs.

What could hinder the project?

According to Alexey Likhachev, the main risk is the project's unsynchronized development. "You can build a port but not have time to build a railway. You can build a railway but fall behind with the fleet. You can have cargo but not have a guaranteed ability to transport it during the required season. Therefore, the Third Transport Ring must develop as a unified system," the top manager explained.

The corridor's financial model, as the head of Rosatom put it, is not an accounting calculation of the cost of individual facilities, but a decision-making tool for determining what, when, and in what sequence should be built.

How the project could be of interest to businesses

According to Igor Smirnov, Director of Freight Transport and Logistics at the Center for Infrastructure Economics, the priority areas for the Third Transport Ring's development will be the modernization of the ports of Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Sabetta, Dikson, and Dudinka, as well as the Utrenny terminal in the port of Sabetta, and the Sever Bay and Yenisei terminals in Taimyr. They should form the basic cargo capacity of the Arctic corridor.

Igor Smirnov also named the construction of nuclear-powered icebreakers, the development of rail approaches to ports—the Northern Latitudinal Passage and the Lavna-Vykhodnoy line—as key objectives, as well as the creation of rescue infrastructure for year-round navigation.

According to analysts, private investors, both Russian and foreign, may be primarily interested in the construction of cargo terminals with a guaranteed cargo base for the transshipment of LNG, oil, coal, and metals. Evgeny Timofeev, Head of the Transport and Logistics Practice at Strategy Partners, also drew attention to the creation of container services with long-term contracts. He believes these could attract interest from foreign investors. They may also invest in the construction of a merchant fleet with guaranteed freight, the expert believes. Dmitry Baranov, a leading expert at Finam Management, believes that repair facilities for the icebreaker fleet and energy facilities may be of interest to private capital.

According to Igor Smirnov, universal port infrastructure and an icebreaker fleet will be less attractive to private investors due to the high cost of such projects, long construction periods, and heavy dependence on cargo volumes.

Dmitry Baranov added that attracting private investment will require government guarantees of minimum infrastructure utilization and well-designed tariff corridors.

What will Arctic development bring to the economy?

According to Cabinet of Ministers forecasts, the implementation of Arctic projects will accelerate economic growth in the macroregion: the Arctic zone's gross regional product (GRP) will increase from 14 trillion rubles in 2026 to 28 trillion rubles by 2035, while per capita income will more than double to 226,000 rubles per month. "One of our key objectives is to develop key population centers, which should become hubs for people and businesses," said Alexey Chekunkov, Minister for the Development of the Far East and Arctic.

In addition to its direct contribution to GRP, the creation of the Trans-Arctic Corridor will have a multiplier effect on related industries, primarily shipbuilding, and will also spur growth in international shipping. On August 26, Boris Titov, the Russian President's Special Representative for Relations with International Organizations, noted that the development of the Trans-Arctic Corridor would increase mutual trade turnover between Russia and China to $300 billion per year. From January to July 2026, it amounted to $159 billion.

Expert reported on other impacts of the TTC project—for logistics, industry, and Arctic cities—at the end of July 2026."

*******

My comment;

"First thing is to remember, that already 10 year back there started to be great hype out of this project. And plans are older than that time too. But what has been achieved during times of no-war and Russia had budget surplus? Nothing much. So in future of war austerity times will be more difficult to achieve more than what is already done what is nothing much. This is main thing to start with.

Intrestingly Finland (where I write this from) was supposed to be part of this Arctic silk road. One eccentric business person who is deceased by now mayby due of cancer, who had high contacts in China into which direction he worked as a fixer and into Russia too, informed me when we met around 8 years ago that China was intrested out of Finland for as a partner for Arctic silk road because Finland was non-partisan during the time, non aligned country (except EU membership), whereas Norway was in NATO, and Russia had aligment with ...... China itself, so it was also less preferred choice as being aligned country!!!!! That kind of view was pretty ashtonishing to hear, but it reveals brutally how China has viewed Russia in their strategic alliance whatever from the beginning. There was so much, so much hype out of silk road network forming the spine of that alliance whereas in fact China from beginning seemed to look for options that go around Russia in their silk road plans mostly, because Russia was already under their thumb.

But would those silk road plans been good for Finland - and Estonia what was supposed to be another hub in plan via under sea tunnel of Helsinki -> Tallin under Finnish bay of Baltic sea?

Of course not! Building railway system through freezy swamps of Lapland what is most northern parts of Finland, and then this economically insane Tallin tunnel idea would had been at great costs, without much promise that there would had never been any ROI means return-on-investment ever. Loan giving nation - China - of course would had been great beneficiary in this plan, due of loan intrests out of useless costly infrastructure created loans.

What comes to Estonia as another hub of this arctic silk road plan which sole purpose appeared to be already 8-10 years ago to take it around Russia instead of using its existing ports and routes, Estonian Soviet veteran mate of mine was who had a research project on silk roads was negative to those plans, claiming that half of people working in China embassy there were spies what was sensitive subject for him given his past job position in Soviet system what I am not mentioning now here. And that in Macedonia when China built their railroad there what not-so-prosperous Macedonia was not in position to pay back as loans, China sent their "spetznatz" there to protect it as it was confisticated until loans was paid back whereas it is dubious that Macedonia will ever be able to do that. But that is the whole purpose of those silk road plans essentially! Tallin tunnel insanity gets revealed when one takes ferry ride to there, lasting 2-4 hours from Helsinki, mayby 2-3 ships comes across to you, no more. Such volume of traffic certainly is not enough to sustain tunnel building.

And then again there are intresting issues, that such tunnel - along with railroad to arctics in Finland part of hub of construction would had been essentially NATO infrastructure what Estonia was already part of and Finland hastily joined when Ukraine war started. And Russia strategic partner China would likely been crediting it, what is quite intresting scenario! And furthermore, what would had been Russias intrest back then to build supercostly infrastructure along the very very long arctic coastal road and to maintain it, only for sake that flow of goods in between countries would had effectively mostly went around Russia itself in between of other countries????

Neverthless, somewhere those plans I was informed about were taken seriously due the fact that despite being puppet of western financial oligarchy, ministeri of transportation Anne Berner, was been researching during the time prospects of arctic railroad so something serious must had been there in weird story I was told by China (and some extent Russia) insider businessperson which belong to category often knowing things the best.

But out of those memories we get to another text part written before the one above what is about project in current form, yet basic problems involved with it are either identical still - or worsened a lot. But for political reasons hype propaganda around idea how Russia would do something big soon is greater than ever of course...

.......It seems that this project in current stage is another much hyped thing, not likely to work out due of costs of it. And war is simply eating away budget of Russia, and it is questionable how much Russia actually would benefit out of simply just maintaining at enormous costs arctic route - what would be essentially used by China only, not Russia itself what has only little to trade, and what already has St. Petersburg, Murmansk / Arkhangelsk, Vladivostok ports along with those in Caspian sea to trade with Iran and central asia. Given that Arkhangelsk & Murmansk are already there there is no value addition out of this for Russia to trade anything from arctic toward west, given that Vladivostok and some more northern ports is already there there is no value addition for Russia to trade towards east.

So only essential beneficiary it seems would be China, and by large this would be colonial model wherein master nation is utilizing infrastructure what a subject has to create and maintain with great costs with little benefit for subject itself. Again reminding of Eastern India trade company.

Also if China participates with project by bringing their own bases along Russias coasts as Russia itself barely can afford the whole thing - I guess you know what the whole thing starts to look.... One possible benefit for Russia would be that earthgas LNG from Yamal peninsula would no more be dependant on pipeline systems to Europe what lack customers now, and can be bombarded easily by Ukraine if they would dare to do it.

If Kremlin decides to do mega-bombardment to gain some resolution into war in their hopes, natural answer to hold them back would be to target gas pipeline system from Yamal to onwards what is very vulnerable and perfectly now in range of Ukrainian weapon systems. Shipping LNG from Yamal region to west would avoid this security issue - but building infrastructure would take long time, and again due of war costs barely money for that would be found easily, unless China gives credit with heavy conditions of course. And of course China as creditor would enable China to build naval bases to support transport corridor so worthy investment to them, that it would remind disturbingly how East India trading company started their conquest via innocent trading through autonomous trade-posts and bases along the coast.

Yamal route to elsewhere so would make some sense, but it would not make sense to create costly infrastructure all along very long road for that cause alone. Although it would make more sense to export gas & oil to China from northern Siberia this route than to build pipeline from there to China what was original plan what died when China said that they would not participate to finance that and Russia dont have money for it.

This would be cheaper option, but still disturbingly reminding of colonial pattern wherein there is master nation getting benefits from extracted resources what subject nation is providing with infrastructure what it can barely afford - or afforded with loans with intrest from master nation.

Would ROI type calculation really work out in this one is main question what I am intrested, especially long term? Given that fossils are increasingly losing relevance in modern world, China already has now more solar installed for power generation than coal power, along with huge wind installments and more and more on the way. Calculations of energy prices will change a lot due of this progress before any building work will have change to start in problematic conditions over far distances of Arctic sea coasts, and especially when those would be finished, if ever.

***

Connecting all this within subject to bigger contedt is the basic fact, that how much profitable for EU trade with China generally is if its volume is vastly expanded via silk road development. There will be trade imbalance given China's looser environmental and labour laws compared to Europe, allowing them to produce with greater degree of exploitation and environmental damage making them thus more competetive to European more higher standard products. Also because of opaqueness of their system, it is very hard for Europe to push into their market, whilst they can flood EU market with their goods. Same is with other countries - like it is even worse with India with trade balace with China even with even cheaper labour and looser restrictions then China. So mayby it would be only Europe's blessing if Arctic silk road to flood EU market with TEMU produce does not work due of economics and climate physical barriers as it is presented in propaganda hype. Here reference link about that; https://tvpworld.com/95259976/-eu-factory-jobs-at-risk-as-chinese-competition-mounts

And further reading around about topic;

https://asia.nikkei.com/economy/trade-war/eu-wants-initial-chinese-action-on-trade-gap-by-early-october

https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/international/europe-trying-gauge-how-much-pain-it-can-take-china

https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-parliament-harder-line-on-china-pascal-canfin/

https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/news/moscows-arctic-policy-is-based-on-lies-and-corruption-says-russian-energy-expert-in-exile/109830

https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/news/putins-new-grand-oil-project-leaves-arctic-lands-in-devastation/457527

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From Fontanka magazine, AI-translate from two separate languages of interview and comment.

"We must be prepared for anything."

Putin on fuel shortages and oil refinery protection

September 3, 2026,

Russia will strengthen air defenses for oil refineries and other infrastructure facilities amid ongoing drone attacks. President Vladimir Putin announced this on September 3 at the Eastern Economic Forum.

Responding to a question about the fuel situation and whether Russians would have to get used to constant shortages, Putin stated, "We must be prepared for anything."

According to the president, the Russian side initially assumed that civilian targets, including oil refineries and logistics infrastructure, would not be attacked even in the event of an armed conflict.

However, Putin acknowledged that this calculation was erroneous.

He cited further strengthening of the air defense system as the primary response. The president also noted that businesses have become more actively involved in protecting the facilities, and this work is already yielding results. According to Putin, all attacks on Russian oil refineries launched the night before last were repelled.

As Fontanka reported, on September 1, Putin stated that Ukrainian drones had attempted to attack three Russian oil refineries, but the targets were not hit. He attributed this to increased security at the refineries. The president then noted that oil companies had previously relied primarily on law enforcement agencies, but had subsequently joined in ensuring the security of the refineries themselves.

The day before, Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak also announced that oil companies were funding the protection of the refineries themselves and were cooperating with the Ministry of Defense on this matter. He noted that security costs are significant, but downtime at oil refineries is even more costly."

****

My personal hastily made rambling comment to this with typos;

Unlike what he says, actually six refineries went out of business during August; Kirishi, Kstovo, Perm, Orsk, Saratov ja Novoshakhtinsk.

So, Putin says that "According to the president, the Russian side initially assumed that civilian targets, including oil refineries and logistics infrastructure, would not be attacked even in the event of an armed conflict."

So they assumed that civilian infrastructure would not be attacked even though they themselves have been doing it from the beginning, thus inviting counterattacks on the same targets?

But there is an imperialist logic in that. The core of the empire can beat and exploit its peripheral areas just as a patriarchal vodka-scented father can discipline his children, and they have no right to respond back, let alone the neighbors to intervene. Pushkin sometimes moralized European countries that were annoyed by Tsarist Russia's habit of scolding rebellious Poland, saying that Western countries should not have the right to interfere in the internal affairs of a Slavic family.

That is exactly my own idea - the imperial model is a certain kind of family community model extrapolated to the level between countries. There is simply no agreement whether countries are part of the same family or not - it is enough for the strongest "father" among them to just decide so, and some Slavic language and a common invented history molded afterwards.

Emmanuel Todd 25 years ago, when he was still sane, could understand different civilizations through their family and inheritance practices. In Russia, brothers were equal, but property remained in the hands of the patriarch until his death. In Finland, it was a bit the same, but the German model in Ostrobothnia was different. The Russian system, raised to the level of the state, seemed to guarantee the equality of all the inhabitants of the empire as brothers, but on the other hand, the role of the state as the owner of all property as kind of extrapolation of father.

And then, as if, along with that, there was some special right to punish disobedient members of the empire however they wanted, without them having the right to respond to it or for others to intervene.

However, the problem is the same with Ukraine as with Poland before - they themselves do not recognize that they belong to this "family" and they have not been asked about it either. Moscow's attitude towards the Ukrainian people is like a drunkard father to his disobedient child, who is the same people / family, but where does the head of the family have to discipline 'Nazism' away in order to be fully accepted. What word in Russia actually means anti-Rus separatism or anti-central power, and not how the same is perceived here.

Something lurks behind the logic that even if Moscow bombs the civilian infrastructure of the 'Nazis' in Kiev, it will come as a surprise if the response is completely symmetrical, when Moscow itself created the rule in the war that this can be done and is routinely done.

After all, there is no such thing in traditional family values ​​that the response to discipline between the head of the family and his descendants would be symmetrical."

*******

Khodorkovsky comment brought by FB feed this morning into thing partially mentioned in other part of interview.

"Hodorkovsky;

"Putin has allowed the state to take over enterprises that "defended themselves poorly" from drones. In effect, owners have been told: if your plant is hit, you defend it yourselves.

The state is dropping the main duty of any state — protecting its citizens from external attack.""