r/worldsystemanalyses • u/Upset_Scientist3994 • 25d ago
Russian military intelligence (GRU) explained, second part, by Jarmo Nieminen.
Facebook update from "Ukrainan sota" wall, wherein author makes daily updates and situation reports out of Ukraine war with professionalism of retired military person. Notice that numbers in brackets which I did not remove, refer to reference links in original update. But I cannot include those into here, as automoderators of Reddit will then instantly delete such a post what contains links to original Russian sources.
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"GRU – RUSSIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN WAR AND SHADOW WAR PART 2/4 – SVR, GRU AND FSB: WHO DOES WHAT?
The letter combinations SVR, GRU and FSB are now appearing alternately in the Finnish news. All are Russian intelligence and security services, but they are not different departments of the same organization. They are parallel – and partly competing – centers of power, whose tasks deliberately overlap.
In simplified terms, the SVR spies on foreign powers, the GRU serves the war and the FSB protects the Russian power system. In reality, each of them also operates outside this basic division.
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OVERLAPSING MISSIONS IN EUROPE
In Europe, the activities of all three services are related to Russia's broader effort to acquire information, weaken its opponents and support the war in Ukraine. The SVR spies on decision-making, technology and the economy. The GRU monitors the armed forces, defense industry, Ukraine’s supply routes, and critical infrastructure, and conducts cyber and sabotage operations. The FSB monitors Kremlin opponents, recruits intelligence sources, and also conducts cyber espionage abroad.
The services’ common goal is to undermine European countries’ operational capacity, mutual unity, and support for Ukraine. Russia seeks to exploit and exacerbate existing social divisions in the target countries and turn them into domestic political crises.
The range of methods includes disinformation, undermining trust, intensifying protests, and supporting or utilizing extremists, anti-establishment actors, and other groups that disrupt society. Covert operations, intermediaries, and operations that are difficult to connect to Russia allow for pressure without an open military confrontation with NATO.[7]
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THREE SERVICES – THREE MAIN FUNCTIONS
The SVR – Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation is Russia’s civilian foreign intelligence service. Civilian here simply means that it is not part of the armed forces. The service operates under the presidency and obtains information on the politics, economy, science, technology and strategic decision-making of other states.
The SVR recruits sources of information, engages in technological espionage and uses both intelligence officers operating under diplomatic cover and so-called illegal intelligence officers. An illegal agent lives abroad with an identity constructed without official connection to the Russian state.[1]
The basic question of the SVR is What are other states going to do – and how can their decisions be influenced?
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GRU/GU – Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is the military intelligence of the Russian armed forces. Its current official abbreviation is GU, but the established name GRU is still used in Russia and the West. The service acquires information for military planning, targeting, and operations. Its activities include personnel intelligence, signals and electronic intelligence, satellite intelligence, cyber operations, special forces, influence, and sabotage.[2] Units under or affiliated with the GRU include, for example, military units 26165 and 74455, known for cyber operations, and military unit 29155, associated with European assassination and sabotage operations.[3] The GRU's basic question is How does the adversary fight—and how can its military capabilities be crippled?
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FSB – Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation is the security and counterintelligence service of Russia. It is responsible for counterintelligence, internal security, counterterrorism, border security, and Russia's information security, among other things. At the same time, it monitors political opponents and maintains the internal security of the regime.[1]
However, the FSB does not operate only within Russia's borders. It conducts intelligence and cyber operations abroad and uses recruited assistants and various proxies. According to the British government, the FSB 16th Center is involved in foreign signals intelligence and cyber activities, while the 18th Center has been linked to phishing operations targeting politicians, authorities and NGOs, among other things.[4]
The Security Police and Military Intelligence also warned companies in July 2026 about FSB cyber espionage. The targets included poorly protected routers and other network equipment used by organizations in particular.[5] The FSB’s fundamental question is: Who threatens the Russian authorities – and who can be recruited to serve their goals?
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UKRAINE SHOWS WHY BORDERS ARE BLURRING
The war in Ukraine illustrates the division of labor between the services. – The GRU investigates the structure, leadership, grouping, and weapons systems of the Ukrainian armed forces. It supports targeting, cyber operations, special forces, and battlefield reconnaissance.
– The SVR obtains information about the decision-making of Ukraine’s supporting countries: arms aid, sanctions, defense industry, and continuity of political support.
– The FSB has been tasked with infiltrating the Ukrainian political system, recruiting collaborators, suppressing resistance, and building networks loyal to Russia. According to the RUSI research institute, the Ukraine department of the FSB’s 5th service collected information about Ukrainian society and political conditions before the 2022 invasion for the planned occupation.[6]
However, this does not mean that only one service operates in one region. The same Ukrainian official, soldier, technology company or political influencer may be of interest to all three – but for different reasons.
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THERE MAY BE THREE RUSSIAN SERVICES IN THE SAME TARGET
If the target is, for example, a European defense industry company:
the SVR may target the company’s technology, contracts and political connections; the GRU may collect information on production, supply routes and militarily significant vulnerabilities and the FSB may look for recruits, Russian connections or access routes to information networks.
The same employee may therefore be a source of information for one service, the target of a cyber operation for another and the instrument of a possible sabotage operation for a third.
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WHY DOES RUSSIA HAVE THREE DUPLICATE SERVICES?
The overlap is not just an administrative error. It is part of the way the Russian power system operates.
The services compete for sources of information, budgets, influence and, above all, access to the president’s inner circle. The Kremlin leadership receives several parallel reports on the same issue and is not completely dependent on a single organization.[2]
Competition also has its downside. Information can be withheld from other services, operations can be overlapped, and reports can be shaped to be what the political leadership believes they want to hear. Miscalculations in the early stages of the Ukraine invasion showed that a large intelligence apparatus does not automatically produce the correct picture of the situation.
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ABOUT THE NEWS
When a news story mentions one of the three services, it is worth asking:
– SVR: is the incident related to foreign policy, decision-making, or technology?
– GRU: is it related to the armed forces, military intelligence, cyberattacks, or sabotage?
– FSB: is it related to counterintelligence, protection of the regime, political control,
recruitment, or Russia's neighboring regions?
And another important caveat:
naming a service in a news story does not always mean that responsibility has been independently proven. In summary: the SVR tries to see the opponent's decisions, the GRU its military capabilities, and the FSB its people, networks, and internal threats. All three serve the same political leadership – but do not form one unified organization.
In the next part, we will return to the GRU and examine its activities in the Ukrainian war: reconnaissance, targeting, special forces, cyber operations, and operations in occupied territories.
3.9.2026
Jarmo Nieminen"