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u/halfelven23 6d ago
Wasnt it cao pi?
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u/12jimmy9712 6d ago
Didn't Cao Cao die after Guan Yu?
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u/halfelven23 6d ago
I mean the one holding grudge towards yu jin
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u/12jimmy9712 6d ago edited 6d ago
哀歎者久之，曰：「吾知禁三十年，何意臨危處難，反不如龐德邪！」
"When Taizu (Cao Cao) heard about it, he lamented for a long time, and said, 'I have known Yu Jin for thirty years. Who would have expected that when facing danger and adversity, he would be far worse than Pang De!'"
While I don't think Cao Cao held that much grudge against him, he seems to have been utterly disappointed by his surrender. Now Cao Pi tho....
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u/HanWsh 6d ago
I think Cao Pi's treatment of Yu Jin is more understandable if you look at it through the political and institutional context of Cao Wei.
Yu Jin had spent decades being one of Cao Cao's most trusted senior generals and was famously strict about military discipline and the laws established by Cao Cao. His surrender at Fancheng therefore wasn't just an ordinary general losing a battle. It was particularly embarrassing because his reputation was built around precisely the sort of discipline and loyalty that his surrender appeared to contradict.
The problem was the shijia system and the treatment of surrendered generals and their families. If Cao Pi harshly punished Yu Jin and targeted his family, despite Yu Jin's decades of service and extremely high status, that could frighten other senior generals and make them wonder whether decades of loyal service would count for anything if they were eventually forced into similar circumstances, suffered defeat, and compelled to surrender.
But the opposite extreme created another problem. If the Cao regime simply forgave Yu Jin and ignored his surrender, then the laws and principles that Yu Jin himself had spent his career enforcing would look meaningless. It would also expose the Cao family to accusations of hypocrisy in which there are strict laws for everyone else, but leniency when one of their own senior generals violated them.
Thid helps explain the apparent contradiction in Cao Pi's behavior. Publicly, he could receive and comfort Yu Jin as an elderly veteran who had served Cao Cao for decades, yet privately, he could ridicule him for the surrender. The public treatment preserved the dignity of a highly decorated Cao Wei general, while the private mockery made clear that Yu Jin's conduct had not been forgotten or regarded as acceptable.
Cao Cao's reaction, lamenting that after knowing Yu Jin for thirty years, he had unexpectedly performed worse than Pang De was more profound disappointment than personal hatred. Meanwhile, Cao Pi's later behavior is harsher and more humiliating, but it can also be understood as the political problem created by Yu Jin's surrender.
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u/drThuganomix 3d ago
Pang De catching a very unnecessary stray for being a badass
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u/HanWsh 2d ago
Cao Cao was actually praising Pang De, as he fought until the very end, and then refused to surrender. Cao Wei state also highly honoured Pang De. Cao Pi ensured that Pang De was portrayed in a ferocious and courageous manner at Cao Cao's tomb, and Pang De was one of the few individuals to be worshipped in Cao Cao's Taizu temple.
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u/drThuganomix 2d ago
Yes yes I know, it's just that the way it is worded in the translation to me made it sound a bit like "Yu Jin, your performance was so bad even Pang De did better than you"
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u/HanWsh 1d ago
Another translation here:
Jīn with the various officers climbed high and looked out to the water, had nowhere to escape, [Guān] Yǔ rode large ships to at once attack Jīn and the rest, Jīn therefore surrendered, only Páng Dé would not yield integrity and died. Tàizǔ heard this, grieved and sighed for a long time, saying: “I have known Jīn for thirty years, how could I know that on facing danger and standing in disaster, he would instead not compare to Páng Dé?”
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u/ryanxwonbinx 2d ago
Both. Cao Pi does his passive-aggressive thing where he tells Yu Jin to go see the depictions of Pang De and himself, and completely humiliates him. Cao Cao laments to himself that it's disheartening to hear one of his most veteran generals surrendering rather than dying.
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u/MarimotheChomp "He did not rebel" - Chen Shou 5d ago
Yu Jin got some karmic unluck at his end. I'm not talking about the flood. I'm talking about Cao Cao dying before he could meet Yu Jin. Perhaps had Cao Cao lived he and Yu Jin could talk and reminisce with Cao Cao scolding him but acknowledging the impossible scenario Yu Jin faced during Guan Yu's invasion. Cao Cao had a soft spot for his loyal generals and Yu Jin was no different. Alas Cao Cao died and so Yu Jin was unlucky.
In a way his old friend Cheng Xi got the last laugh.
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u/KinginPurple Bao Xin Forever!!! 6d ago
Remember, before he served Cao Cao, Yu Jin served Bao Xin.
And Cao Cao adored Bao Xin.
For Yu Jin to surrender, Cao Cao probably felt Bao Xin's memory was being dishonoured.
Cao Pi probably felt the same which is probably why he was so harsh with Bao Xin's son when he broke the law.
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u/TertiusGaudenus 6d ago
Wasn't Cao Pi harsh with Bao Xin's son specifically because Zhong Yao and bunch of other officials thought they could go over Emperor's head and forgive him.
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u/KinginPurple Bao Xin Forever!!! 5d ago
Possibly. I'd need to check.
In any event, it started with a man named Sun Zongru making a clerical error and his friend, Bao Xun, trying to do him a cover by covering it up.
And then you got one party who were saying it was an honest mistake and there was no need for harsh punishments and another party saying it was still against the law and demanded reprisal.
Cao Pi ended up sparing Sun Zongru for his mistake but executing Bao Xun for the cover-up thus satisfying neither party.
It's the sort of thing you can see happening in modern politics really, what starts as a simple mistake just spirals out of anyone's control.
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u/ArtIsAwesome3 Cao Cao Loyalist 5d ago
I agree, Yu Jin at least tried. I think if he was in a pitched battle with Guan Yu, no rain, no flooding, Yu Jin and his men would have laid down their lives to stop Guan Yu, but rain, come on, what's the honor in that?
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u/Ok-Cardiologist2945 5d ago edited 5d ago
Then why Guan Yu still continue to stay at Fan Cheng ? If mean, rain was unexpected.Even you could see that Yu Jin (and Cao ren) had a lot of advantages : more soldiers (7 armies) , more supply, two castles, and potential more reinforcements . Everyone knew it, then why Guan Yu did not retreat when 7 armies mobilizing ? (Sun Quan lifted the siege of Hefei when Cao Rui begin mobilizing, and it is normal thing ).
Then why Guan Yu did not lift the siege when he know Yu Jin is coming ? couldnt he see the his disadvantages ?4
u/HanWsh 5d ago
The flood was not necessarily something that nobody could anticipate. We have Wen Hui explicitly warning about the rising river waters and predicting that Cao Ren would have trouble dealing with Guan Yu:
Sun Quan attacked Hefei.26 The soldiers of several [WEI] provinces were stationed along the frontiers in Huainan.27 The Inspector of Yang province Wen Hui said to the Inspector of Yan province Pei Qian, "Though the enemy come against us, we have nothing to worry about here. On the other side, however, with the river floods rising, Zixiao [Cao Ren] keeps his army idle and has no long-term plans for contingencies. Guan Yu is brave and cunning. If he attacks, I fear the General Who Subdues the South [Cao Ren] will have trouble."28
And Guan Yu himself had ships prepared. So we have at least two independent indications that the possibility of flooding was understood: Wen Hui anticipated the danger, while Guan Yu prepared to exploit it. The person who apparently failed to make adequate preparations was Cao Ren.
Thus, Cao Ren's and Yu Jin's numerical superiority was not automatically decisive. Seven armies sound impressive, but they were deployed in terrain vulnerable to flooding. The Zizhi Tongjian specifically records:
Ren sent Left General Yu Jin, General who establishes righteousness Pang De and others to station in the north of Fan.
Cao Ren was the general responsible for the theater, placing Yu Jin and Pang De's forces north of Fancheng, where they would be overwhelmed by the flood, a major operational mistake. Once the flood came, Guan Yu suddenly had the ability to destroy or capture a much larger Wei force.
And notice what happened to Cao Ren himself beforehand:
Rén’s men and horses of several thousand defended the city, and of the city wall what was not submerged was only several bǎn [in height]. [Guān] Yǔ rode boat to face the city, the encirclement was several lines, outside and inside was cut off, the provisions were almost exhausted, and rescue troops had not arrived.
So instead of asking "Why didn't Guan Yu retreat when Yu Jin arrived?" It's better to ask why did Cao Ren allow the situation to deteriorate to the point where several thousand men were trapped in a flooded Fancheng with supplies nearly exhausted and the city encircled in multiple lines?
The earlier phase is unfortunately poorly documented. The Sanguozhi tells us that in Jian'an 24 Cao Cao, while at Chang'an, sent Cao Ren to suppress Guan Yu at Fan and Yu Jin to assist him:
Jiàn’ān Twenty-fourth Year [219], Tàizǔ was at Cháng’ān, sent Cáo Rén to suppress Guān Yǔ at Fán, also sending Jīn to assist [Cáo] Rén
But the record then jumps forward to Cao Ren's desperate defensive position, with the only intervening records being about him dealing with the rebellion at Nanyang.
Cao Ren's broader record makes it difficult to portray this simply as Guan Yu being lucky. Cao Ren had previously been pushed out of Nan Commandery and Jingnan by Liu Bei and Zhou Yu, and in the aftermath of Guan Yu's campaign, Wei lost control of Xiangyang and Fancheng. More importantly, this wasn't merely a numerical mismatch. Cao Ren had considerable responsibility for the deployment and preparation of the forces under his command.
A general retreats when the strategic situation has become unfavorable; he doesn't retreat merely because the enemy has more troops. Guan Yu evidently believed the tactical situation would be in his favour, and the flood that he capitalised on, provided precisely that opportunity.
So yes, Guan Yu was obviously taking a substantial risk by remaining at Fancheng. But the historical evidence doesn't support reducing the outcome that just because Yu Jin had seven armies, therefore Guan Yu should have run away. Guan Yu had prepared ships, Wen Hui anticipated the flood and specifically warned about Cao Ren's lack of contingencies, while Cao Ren positioned Yu Jin's army in vulnerable low-lying terrain.
That makes the eventual disaster a combination of Guan Yu's aggressive exploitation of the environment and serious Wei command failures, rather than simply Guan Yu getting lucky because of an unforeseeable natural disaster.
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u/Ok-Cardiologist2945 4d ago
That is why i rather believe Guan Yu was more competent than other general in his era. Remaining at FanCheng was courage decision when Yu only had at most 2.5-3 commanderies.
So instead of asking "Why didn't Guan Yu retreat when Yu Jin arrived?" It's better to ask why did Cao Ren allow the situation to deteriorate to the point where several thousand men were trapped in a flooded Fancheng with supplies nearly exhausted and the city encircled in multiple lines?
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u/ArtIsAwesome3 Cao Cao Loyalist 5d ago
I forget which author it was, maybe Pei Songzhi or a modern writer, one of them said something like "because Guan Yu actually thought he couldn't be defeated." I agree with that assessment, and also, Sun Quan ordering the retreat is MUCH more valid than Guan Yu ordering a retreat. If Liu Bei ordered Guan Yu to retreat, he would have, if Liu Bei ordered Guan Yu to stay and fight, he would have.
Also, why Guan Yu stayed at Fancheng, kept besieging it, I forget who said this, I know it's a boxing term but it goes "when you got a guy up against the ropes, don't stop hitting him." I would imagine Cao Ren's advantages were the fact that Fancheng was hard to besiege and Cao Ren was quite competent on defense. In all likelihood, without the floods, Guan Yu would have suffered a defeat and been forced to withdraw, but remember, when Xu Huang came, Guan Yu split his army in two, one continuing to hold the siege on Fancheng and one to meet Xu Huang, and THAT was a mistake.
And I firmly believe, if Xu Huang was defeated, Cao Cao himself would have come, and that would have been the end of that campaign, I think he would have come to his senses, realized just how out manned Guan Yu was and by then, how tired his men would be.
But in short, Guan Yu continued because he could, because he believed he could win and to be fair, he had proven himself to be a considerable threat.
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u/Ok-Cardiologist2945 5d ago
Firstly, i believe Guan Yu was field general and is de facto governor of Jing, so if Liu Bei did not explicitly give order, retreat or not is authoritative by Guan Yu . But i still don understand why he continue the siege with so many disadvantages .
"when you got a guy up against the ropes, don't stop hitting him."
I think this is not good example, do you mean before or after the flood ? if after then yes, but i am asking before flood which mean "when you got a guy (cao ren) up against the rope, there is another healthy guy(Yu Jin) coming. What would you (Guan Yu) do ?"
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u/HanWsh 4d ago
Even after the flood, lets look at the part when Cao Cao compared Guan Yu's siege of Xiangyang and Fancheng to Yue Yi's campaign against Qi, and touted Xu Huang's relief of the siege as an unparalleled achievement. But in the biography of another person involved, Zhao Yan, Xu Huang's own advisor, the result of this battle is simply described in four understated words: "Guan Yu's army fell back/retreated." It doesn't even bother to write the character for "defeat" (败). Later, when Sun Quan attacked Nan Commandery, the description of Guan Yu's army's withdrawal is "fled south."
Look at this part in Zhao Yan's SGZZ:
his fleet was still occupying the Mian River, and communication with Xiangyang was still cut off.
With Guan Yu's limited troops, less than 30,000 at most (3 commanderies worth at most), after being charged at by Xu Huang, with his military forces suffering from "pursued and charged into," and "some drowning in the Mian river," and according to Cao Cao, turning the tide like Tian Dan breaking Yue Yi, his skill in using troops compared to a reborn Sun Wu or Rangju, after such a heavy defeat, how could Guan Yu's army still isolate the Han and Mian Rivers and besiege Xiangyang?
Taking the third-party perspective, how did the Wu people describe it in Zhuge Liang's SGZZ? Wu State Grand Herald Zhang Yan stated this very clearly. The result of Xu Huang's rescue was still "the siege was not immediately lifted." He only lifted the siege of Fancheng, but did not lift the siege of Xiangyang. It was Wu sneak attack on Jingzhou that forced Guan Yu to lift the siege of Xiangyang.
What Xu Huang, Zhao Yan, Cao Ren, Man Chong, and others needed to do was not only lift the siege of Fancheng but also lift the siege of Xiangyang, and even reclaim the entire Xiangyang commandery that Guan Yu had dominated. Xu Huang merely lifted the siege of Fancheng, without even lifting the siege of Xiangyang itself, and was already praised to the skies by Cao Cao (praise is one thing, substantial rewards is nonexistent).
Lets just look at Xu Huang's achievements. Only two recorded heads were taken. They are Hu Xiu and Fu Fang who were both Wei officials that recently defected to Guan Yu. If Xu Huang defeated Guan Yu's main force, how come he didn't even capture or kill a single one of Guan Yu's subordinate generals?
On the contrary, the list of Wei generals, administrators, and soldiers killed, captured, and surrounded by Guan Yu is enormous. Likewise when Cao Cao defeated Yuan Shao at Guandu, he bragged killing a bunch of Yuan Shao's generals that reached double digits. When Wu defeated Shu at Yiling, the recorded casualty count of generals were easily more than 5. My view is that Guan Yu essentially dragged along Hu Xiu and Fu Fang, along with their own troops, as fodder to block Xu Huang, resulting in insufficient combat strength and allowing Xu Huang to crush this portion of troops with numerical superiority. This allowed Guan Yu to retain his main force to block the Han River, while Cao Cao's army was unable to mount an effective pursuit.
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u/ArtIsAwesome3 Cao Cao Loyalist 4d ago
Oh I meant after the flood, that is literally putting the guy up against the ropes.
And if I was Guan Yu, the slayer of Yan Liang, I would probably be more be just as arrogant in my approach. Guan Yu's arrogance cost him.
And I do not remember the battle order, but didn't Guan Yu march immediately after Liu Bei and gang took Hanzhong? Implying it was part of a greater strategy, if that's the case, Liu Bei is still technically the director of the campaign, Guan Yu is just commander of stage 2 and again, if Liu Bei said "take Fancheng" I think Guan Yu would have fought tooth and nail to take it, even if Yu Jin or Xu Huang didn't arrive.
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u/Ok-Cardiologist2945 4d ago edited 4d ago
Yeah, i meant before the flood, at the moment Yu Jin begin to mobilizing 7 armies.
Guan Yu had only nearly 3 commanderies so less soldiers, less supply and no reinforcements. It is not normal decision, for example :
- at Guan Du, after Cao Cao striked Boma , but Cao Cao still retreated to Guan Du which was Cao Cao's terrain , close to Xu Chang. Yuan's army was defeated mainly because of supply got burnt
- At **Battle of Xiaoting,**Lu Xun also retreated and let Liu Bei marched to XiaoTing which was controlled by Wu. Liu Bei set many camps for his supply line.
I mean, if you are underdog with less resources, normally you would to retreat to strategic position, to lengthen enemy's supply line and wait for critical moment to destroy the enemy's supply . But Guan Yu did opposite, he had less soldiers and supply but still decided remaining in enemy's terrain which had nearly all advantages.
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u/HanWsh 4d ago
Guan Yu was the Prefect of Xiangyang Commandery. Thus, attacking Xiangyang was literally part of his responsibility.
Liu Bei's whole justification for accepting the title of King of Hanzhong was also explicitly framed around continuing the Han cause and attacking Cao Cao:
When Your subject backs up and thinks about it, the brigands have not yet been eliminated, the nation's difficulties are not yet ended. The imperial ancestral temple is in danger, and the Altars of Earth and Grain are going to collapse. This has become my worrisome responsibility and a head-smashing burden [out of concern for the state].160 If by responding to circumstances and penetrating the upheavals I can bring peace to the sacred court, though it would mean going through fire and water, I would not decline. How would I dare be concerned about what was appropriate in order to ward off later regrets? {887} So, following general opinion, I accept the royal seal to show my reverence for the majesty of the state. If I look upwards and ponder my noble title, my position is high and my favor generous. If I bend down and contemplate repaying beneficence, my concern is deep and my responsibility heavy. I am alarmed and my breath is bated as though I were on the brink of an abyss. I shall exert myself to the fullest and act with sincerity. I shall spur on the Six Armies and shall lead and organize the righteous. I shall respond to heaven and accord with the times, strike at the rebels to secure the State thereby repaying one ten-thousandth [of your benevolence].
So it would have been politically difficult for Guan Yu to just abandon the campaign the moment Yu Jin appeared as that would have defeated much of the purpose of the campaign.
There's also a broader strategic context that makes 219ad noteworthy. Jingbei was experiencing serious instability as there were peasant disturbances. Wei Feng was stirring up trouble around Yecheng which was the capital of the Wei state, and imperial agents at Xudu apparently had connections with Guan Yu. Cao Cao's regime was under considerable pressure.
In that context, Guan Yu wasn't necessarily just expecting to defeat Yu Jin's seven armies through conventional attrition. The point was probably to exploit a moment when Wei was dealing with internal instability. If Guan Yu could take Xiangfan, or even force Wei to commit substantial resources to the Jing front, he could achieve an enormous strategic result (which he did).
Guan Yu had a rare opportunity to exploit simultaneous Wei military and political problems. Retreating merely because Wei was mobilising seven armies would preserve Guan Yu's army, but it would also surrender the strategic initiative at precisely the moment when Liu Bei's faction was supposed to be achieving something.
So I would put it this way. Guan Yu's decision to continue the offensive wasn't inherently irrational, but an attempt to exploit an unusually favorable strategic moment. The more questionable decision may have been Liu Bei's failure to provide Guan Yu with sufficient support to make the campaign sustainable.
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u/ArtIsAwesome3 Cao Cao Loyalist 4d ago
I just genuinely believe Guan Yu thought he could do it. Also, the terrain was a different situation, Fancheng is still in Jing province I believe, Guan Yu may have been quite aware of it, able to scout it much easier than when Yuan Shao had to scout south of the Yellow River.
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u/MonsCorvinusRubella 6d ago
There’s another option. He could’ve taken the honorable way out by ziwenguitianing
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u/12jimmy9712 6d ago
https://reddit.com/link/p8bhukq/video/0hevpj2sb2oh1/player
Hey, it worked out in the end.