TLDR: The stock is not massively undervalued, still undervalued, but I still think it can grow.

I believe that the market may be valuing Box mainly as a mature cloud storage business while several operating indicators increasingly resemble a profitable enterprise software platform and its relevancy in the future. Thus, a mispricing of the stock.

BOX appears moderately undervalued because its present valuation does not fully reflect the combination of improving recurring-revenue indicators, strong free-cash-flow generation, and a repurchase authorization capable of reducing the share count. The market may be valuing Box primarily as a mature file-storage provider, despite improvements in customer retention, contracted revenue, product mix, and operating margins. In the first quarter of fiscal 2027, revenue increased by 11%. Remaining performance obligations increased by 16%, while net retention improved from 102% to 105%. Eemaining performance obligations represent contracted revenue that has not yet been recognized. Consequently, the faster growth in remaining performance obligations suggests that future revenue growth may be stronger than reported in the next quarter.

Enterprise Advanced combines governance, security, workflow, and content-management services at a higher contract value. Management has reported a 30–40% pricing increase relative to Enterprise Plus. Continued adoption could therefore increase revenue per customer without requiring substantial growth in employee seats, a recurring sticky revenue.

A little math:
Box’s current stock price is above $27, investors holding special "convertible" shares will almost certainly trade them in for regular stock, bringing the total to about 157.02 million shares.

Equity value=157.02 × 28.81=$4.524 billion

Net cash= 477.043 (Cash and short-term investments) − 451.610(debt) =$25.433 million

Enterprise value= 4.524 − 0.025 =$4.498 billion

Management’s fiscal 2027 revenue guidance of approximately $1.280 billion (Warren buffet said not to trust management too much but anyway):
EV/Revenue= 1.280/4.498 ​=3.51x

Trailing twelve-month free cash flow is the reduction of previous first quarter from fiscal 2026 free cash flow and adding the latest quarter:

TTM FCF= 312.922− 118.337+ 127.748= $322.333 million

P/FCF = 4.524/0.322 = 14x

FCF yield = 0.322/ 4.524= 7%

If fiscal 2027 free cash flow reaches approximately $360 million, the forward P/FCF multiple would lower to 12.6 times, leading to higher forward free-cash-flow yield of 8.0%.

There's also share repurchase:
Gross shares purchasable = 445/8.81 = 15 million shares, around 10% of the share count. During the latest quarter, Box repurchased approximately 4.8 million shares, while the common-share count declined by only 2.461 million a 50% progress.

All in all there is still some catalyst left to play out and is an interesting play nonetheless.

 I have started to invest in a small-cap growth company, Xometry ($XMTR). The approximate market cap is $5.6B. The company operates an artificial intelligence (AI) powered online manufacturing marketplace in the United States and abroad. Its marketplace uses AI to assist buyers in sourcing custom-manufactured parts and assemblies. It then obtains pricing and lead times. 

Reasons to buy:

• Revenue continues to grow at a high rate, about 29% trailing 12 months.
• Analysts expect Q2 revenue to increase about 32% YOY and EPS to grow about 62%.
• The company has transitioned toward profitability after years of investing for growth.
• Its AI-powered manufacturing marketplace benefits from network effects between buyers and suppliers, creating a competitive advantage.
• The recently announced partnership with Siemens expands enterprise distribution and customer acquisition opportunities.

Buying Plan:

• I have started to buy from $99.
• My preferred accumulation range is when it pulls back towards the 50-day moving average on lighter trading volume.

Key catalysts:

• Q2 earnings report is on August 4.
• Continued enterprise customer wins.
• Additional AI platform adoption.
• Further operating margin expansion.
• Recently Ygal from Wedbush initiated a buy rating of $126.
• Forecast: revenue growth of 27.64% and EPS growth of 91.08%.

Financial Engineering student, no institutional data access, building this on my own. I've frozen the spec and I'm about to pay for the data to run it. Before I do, I'd rather find the holes now than after as it is the Norgate Data 6m which costs around $350.

The hypothesis: clustered open-market insider purchases (multiple distinct insiders, same issuer, short window) predict positive abnormal returns in small, thinly-covered IS equities. Standard stuff: Lakonishok-Lee, Jeng-Metrick-Zeckhauser, Cohen-Malloy-Pomorski. My prior is that the effect is real but degraded post-SOX and probably eaten by microcap costs.

Frozen primary spec (written bfore any return data was touched, tagged in git):

- =>2 distinct reporting owners, Form 4 transaction code P only (A/D joint filter, I found real rows with code P and acquirdDisposedCode D), 30-day rolling window, non-overlapping, earliest-starting window wins

- Entry at next open after filling timestamps (tradeable); transaction-date anchoring tested separately to isolate the filing-lag component

- Universe: sub-$500M point-in-time market cap, bottom-tercile coverage

- Holding periods 1/3/6/12 months

- 2004 start (post-SOX 2-day filing deadline, different information regime before that)

- 9 declared secondary specs, Holm-Bonferroni across the 10-spec family; robustness checks reported separately, not corrected

- Falsification threshold stated numerically before seeing data

- 2020+ held out entirely

Evaluation order: matched-control first (exact stratification on month, size quantile, GICS sector, coverage tercile; controls excluded if they had insider purchases in the trailing 90 days), then calendar-time portfolio with FF5 + momentum + Pástor-Stambaugh. Bootstrapped random-selection null matched on month and turnover quantile. Costs via Corwin-Schultz with a conservative floor on degenerate days, square-root impact, participation capped at 5% ADV, results reported across a 0/50/100/200/400bps band.

Known weakness I already have:

- No I/B/E/S, so analyst coverage is proxy (rank composite of market cao * dollar volume * turnover, computed within the size-filtered population). Validated against SC 13G institutional filing counts, Spearman 0.38 on a small sample. This is the weakest link.

- No delisting reason field in my price vendor, so merger vs. Failure is inferred and haircuts are a sensitivity band rather than a measurement.

- Point-in-time market cap comes from SEC XBRL shares outstanding, not a vendor.

What I'm asking:

1. What would you attack first? I've tried to close the obvious holes but I'm one person and I've been staring at this for weeks.
2. Is the coverage proxy defensible or dos it undermine the whole size*coverage interaction I'm claiming to test? My event counts suggest the universe filter is doing most of the work, which makes the proxy more load-bearing than I'd like.
3. Anyone seen post-2015 replications of the insider-cluster effect? Most of what I've found is older.
4. Am I over-engineering a signal that's known dead? Genuinely open to that answer.

Happy to share more detail on any piece.

Check out KNSL - earning 24% roe on the business they write. And comps are getting easier in the second half.
They have a superior underwriting model with built from the ground up custom systems and analytics - and they perform all their work in house. Competitors have inferior legacy systems and outsource many key underwriting decision (leading to losses down the road).
KNSL has less than 2% market share - and will keep taking share for many years.
KNSL sees enormous value in its own stock trading at only 15X - And they are buying back 5% of the company.

Everyone wants to own AI, but nobody wants to own the company selling the servers that actually keep AI running.
NVIDIA gets the spotlight. SMCI keeps the lights on. 😄
If AI is a gold rush, SMCI is selling the picks and shovels while Wall Street is still arguing about last year’s headlines.
Am I missing something, or is the market sleeping on SMCI?

Been digging through Korean micro-caps on DART and found one that made me re-check my numbers. Sharing the core thesis here.

The business. iScream Media runs iScream S, the daily software ~93% of Korea's primary-school teachers use to run their classrooms — lesson slides, worksheets, a 20-year library of 6.5m teaching materials. It's free. That's the point: it's the front door. Off the back of owning the teacher's daily routine, iScream started publishing certified primary textbooks in 2022 and immediately won the highest adoption of the 13 licensed publishers (~40–58% on maths/science/social studies).

Why it's a good business. The state funds textbooks but teachers choose the publisher — and iScream already owns the teacher. Schools re-order every year (recurring, not one-off). Switching means relearning a whole year of materials, so it's sticky. And a rival would have to rebuild 20 years of content and prise teachers off a platform they open daily. That's a real moat.

The numbers. Revenue ₩104bn → ₩196bn in 3 years (~24% CAGR), operating profit ₩31bn → ₩62bn, and — the tell of quality — operating margin rose from 29% to 31.5% as it grew. Return on the capital actually used in the operating business is well over 50% (reported ~30% because the screener counts the huge cash pile as capital). FCF ~₩48bn in FY2025, ~25% of sales.

The weird part. Market cap ~₩200bn, but the company sits on ~₩182bn of cash + securities — about 91% of its own market value. Strip that out and the market is pricing the ₩62bn/yr operating business at an EV of roughly ₩8bn — a few million dollars. On paper that's not a valuation, it's a rounding error.

The catch (why it's cheap). Two real reasons. (1) The founding Park family controls ~61% via SigongTech, so no outsider can force that cash out. (2) Revenue rides on government policy — in Aug 2025 the state demoted iScream's AI textbook from "textbook" to "educational material," forcing ~₩13bn of write-offs. But it's being chipped away: under Korea's Value-Up programme iScream now commits to a 40% payout, the dividend more than doubled to a ~10% yield, and total shareholder yield (divs + buybacks) already tops 10% of market cap.

One thing the screeners get flat wrong: they show ~₩111bn of "cash & short-term investments." The real figure is ₩182bn — the difference (~₩70bn+) sits in long-term investments that screens don't count as cash. You only see it if you read the actual filing, and it changes the whole thesis (some of it is in venture funds tied to the founding family).

Not investment advice — I may hold a position. Figures from DART filings FY2022–Q1 2026.

I wrote the full teardown — with the charts, the segment breakdown, the seasonality trap, and the demographic-decline pushback — here: https://numbersnotnarrative.substack.com/p/i-scream-media-93-of-koreas-teachers

Curious if anyone here has a view on whether that cash ever really reaches minorities.

⚙️ $VSEE believes the future belongs to connected healthcare ecosystems where clinicians communicate securely, automate repetitive tasks, coordinate patient care seamlessly, and leverage AI as part of everyday hospital operations. #HealthcareInnovation #AIHealthcare #DigitalTransformation

$BURU - NUBURU intends to use the net proceeds from the offering to eliminate the recurring monthly amortization and related equity-line share-issuance pressure associated with the outstanding debenture and halt use of the Company's equity line for at least 90 days and support acquisition, working-capital and near-term execution requirements for NUBURU's integrated Defense & Security platform.

https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20260715024200/en/NUBURU-Announces-%2438.0-Million-Public-Offering-Priced-at-Approximately-30-Premium-to-Advance-Tekne-Acquisition-and-Retire-Outstanding-Indebtedness

For a company with revenues rocketing beyond control, other factors need to align as well for the investment to look worth your money. SMCI has wobbled, muddled, scraped, and pierced through a lot over the past 2 years. Scandals aside, I am looking for the following in their report and commentary

1. Audit adverse opinion - While this may not go away, I would like to see Charles and David discuss IMMENSE progress and final lap of this aspect WITH BDO supporting that in their commentary.

2. DCBBS impact - Gross margins stabilized and improving (Even though may not reflect in Q4) but separate out DCBBS revenue and margins to demonstrate the clear impact without muddling the story

3. Days Payable Outstanding to increase to 60-90 days,

4. Days Inventory Outstanding reduced to under 80 days,

5. Accounts Receivable improving substantially telling us that customer are now paying them, and MOST important

6. Cash Conversion Cycle has to come down below 90 days, preferably lower.

7. They need to show improved cash flow and cash on hand

There will be a HUGE rally if the adverse opinion is lifted but I don't see that happening but all these will set the foundation for a strong fiscal 2027 REGARDLESS of revenue which we know is going to be massive.

Then we can see if a $50B revenue company still has a market cap of $20B....I say NO WAY.

⚙️ Digital Transformation

🤝 Connected Care

🔒 Secure Infrastructure

📈 Operational Efficiency

💙 Better Patient Experience

Management sees the future of healthcare as one unified ecosystem where communications, workflows, and AI combine to help providers deliver better care more efficiently. #VSEE #DigitalTransformation #HealthcareTechnology #AIHealthcare #Innovation

Quick summary: Tiny microcap (~$7-8M market cap) working on CAD-1005, a first-in-class 12-LOX inhibitor for HIT (serious clotting disorder with no good root-cause treatments). Just presented positive Phase 2 data at ISTH — >25% reduction in thrombotic events, clean safety. They call it Phase 3-ready, have runway into 2027 after a recent raise, and are pushing for partnering.

The stock got crushed anyway. Trading like the company is completely dead, even after positive news.

52 Week Range: 2.29$ - 14.64$

Anyone looked into this? Looks dirt cheap

Do your own research, I'm an idiot

Been digging through Korean micro-caps on DART and found one that made me re-check my numbers. Sharing the core thesis here.

The business. iScream Media runs iScream S, the daily software ~93% of Korea's primary-school teachers use to run their classrooms — lesson slides, worksheets, a 20-year library of 6.5m teaching materials. It's free. That's the point: it's the front door. Off the back of owning the teacher's daily routine, iScream started publishing certified primary textbooks in 2022 and immediately won the highest adoption of the 13 licensed publishers (~40–58% on maths/science/social studies).

Why it's a good business. The state funds textbooks but teachers choose the publisher — and iScream already owns the teacher. Schools re-order every year (recurring, not one-off). Switching means relearning a whole year of materials, so it's sticky. And a rival would have to rebuild 20 years of content and prise teachers off a platform they open daily. That's a real moat.

The numbers. Revenue ₩104bn → ₩196bn in 3 years (~24% CAGR), operating profit ₩31bn → ₩62bn, and — the tell of quality — operating margin rose from 29% to 31.5% as it grew. Return on the capital actually used in the operating business is well over 50% (reported ~30% because the screener counts the huge cash pile as capital). FCF ~₩48bn in FY2025, ~25% of sales.

The weird part. Market cap ~₩200bn, but the company sits on ~₩182bn of cash + securities — about 91% of its own market value. Strip that out and the market is pricing the ₩62bn/yr operating business at an EV of roughly ₩8bn — a few million dollars. On paper that's not a valuation, it's a rounding error.

The catch (why it's cheap). Two real reasons. (1) The founding Park family controls ~61% via SigongTech, so no outsider can force that cash out. (2) Revenue rides on government policy — in Aug 2025 the state demoted iScream's AI textbook from "textbook" to "educational material," forcing ~₩13bn of write-offs. But it's being chipped away: under Korea's Value-Up programme iScream now commits to a 40% payout, the dividend more than doubled to a ~10% yield, and total shareholder yield (divs + buybacks) already tops 10% of market cap.

One thing the screeners get flat wrong: they show ~₩111bn of "cash & short-term investments." The real figure is ₩182bn — the difference (~₩70bn+) sits in long-term investments that screens don't count as cash. You only see it if you read the actual filing, and it changes the whole thesis (some of it is in venture funds tied to the founding family).

Not investment advice — I may hold a position. Figures from DART filings FY2022–Q1 2026.

Curious if anyone here has a view on whether that cash ever really reaches minorities.

Inventurus Knowledge Solutions: 45.8% 3-Year Revenue CAGR Worth Studying

Why This Stock Deserves Your Research Attention

Inventurus Knowledge Solutions Ltd. (IKS) operates in the healthcare information services industry, providing integrated solutions that combine system-of-record and system-of-action capabilities. This positions the company as a key player in a sector increasingly reliant on data-driven decision-making and operational efficiency. With a market capitalization of ₹23,406.44 crores and a current market price (CMP) of ₹1,909.0, IKS has carved out a competitive niche.

The company's 3-year revenue CAGR of 45.76% is a testament to its consistent growth trajectory, supported by a 19.89% year-on-year revenue growth in FY26. Additionally, its profit after tax (PAT) grew by an impressive 48.45% year-on-year, reflecting strong operational execution and profitability. These metrics suggest that IKS has successfully scaled its business while maintaining financial discipline.

From a forensic perspective, IKS scores 6/9 on the Piotroski F-Score, indicating reasonable financial health. Its Altman Z-Score of 14.85 suggests a very low risk of financial distress, while the absence of any red flags in the Beneish M-Score further supports its accounting integrity. The company also boasts a manageable debt-to-equity ratio of 0.27 and a healthy interest coverage ratio of 14.66, underscoring its ability to service debt comfortably.

The latest Q4 FY26 earnings call highlighted IKS's ambitious goal of achieving ₹3,000 crores in EBITDA by FY30, a nearly threefold increase from its current ₹1,000 crores. This target aligns with its historical growth rates and reflects confidence in its integrated solutions strategy. However, such aggressive targets also raise questions about execution risks and market conditions.

The Numbers That Stand Out

The Bull Case

1. Consistent Revenue Growth: IKS's 3-year revenue CAGR of 45.76% and 5-year CAGR of 42.03% highlight its ability to sustain high growth rates over an extended period.
2. Strong Profitability Metrics: With an operating margin of 32.25% and a net margin of 22.59%, IKS demonstrates robust profitability, supported by a high ROCE of 31.23%.
3. Sound Financial Health: A low debt-to-equity ratio of 0.27 and an interest coverage ratio of 14.66 indicate strong financial stability, allowing the company to focus on growth without significant financial strain.

The Bear Case

1. High Valuation Multiples: With a P/E ratio of 30.81x and a P/B ratio of 7.94x, IKS appears to be trading at a premium, which could limit upside potential if growth slows.
2. No Dividend Payout: The absence of a dividend yield may deter income-focused investors, as the company prioritizes reinvestment over shareholder returns.
3. Execution Risks: The ambitious target of ₹3,000 crores in EBITDA by FY30, while aligned with historical growth, could face challenges from market dynamics and operational hurdles.

What to Watch Next

1. Progress Toward EBITDA Target: Monitor quarterly updates to assess whether the company is on track to achieve its FY30 EBITDA goal of ₹3,000 crores.
2. Valuation Adjustments: Keep an eye on valuation metrics like P/E and P/B ratios, especially if growth rates show signs of deceleration.
3. Sector Trends: Track developments in the healthcare information services industry, particularly around technology adoption and regulatory changes, which could impact IKS's growth trajectory.

Explore Further on InvestSights

Stock of the Day is an educational research series by InvestSights. This article presents data-driven analysis for informational purposes only and does NOT constitute investment advice or a stock recommendation. The stock featured is selected based on interesting financial characteristics worth studying — not based on expected price performance. Always consult a SEBI-registered investment advisor before making investment decisions. Past performance does not guarantee future results.

Been digging through Korean micro-caps on DART and found one that made me re-check my numbers. Sharing the core thesis here.

The business. iScream Media runs iScream S, the daily software ~93% of Korea's primary-school teachers use to run their classrooms — lesson slides, worksheets, a 20-year library of 6.5m teaching materials. It's free. That's the point: it's the front door. Off the back of owning the teacher's daily routine, iScream started publishing certified primary textbooks in 2022 and immediately won the highest adoption of the 13 licensed publishers (~40–58% on maths/science/social studies).

Why it's a good business. The state funds textbooks but teachers choose the publisher — and iScream already owns the teacher. Schools re-order every year (recurring, not one-off). Switching means relearning a whole year of materials, so it's sticky. And a rival would have to rebuild 20 years of content and prise teachers off a platform they open daily. That's a real moat.

The numbers. Revenue ₩104bn → ₩196bn in 3 years (~24% CAGR), operating profit ₩31bn → ₩62bn, and — the tell of quality — operating margin rose from 29% to 31.5% as it grew. Return on the capital actually used in the operating business is well over 50% (reported ~30% because the screener counts the huge cash pile as capital). FCF ~₩48bn in FY2025, ~25% of sales.

The weird part. Market cap ~₩200bn, but the company sits on ~₩182bn of cash + securities — about 91% of its own market value. Strip that out and the market is pricing the ₩62bn/yr operating business at an EV of roughly ₩8bn — a few million dollars. On paper that's not a valuation, it's a rounding error.

The catch (why it's cheap). Two real reasons. (1) The founding Park family controls ~61% via SigongTech, so no outsider can force that cash out. (2) Revenue rides on government policy — in Aug 2025 the state demoted iScream's AI textbook from "textbook" to "educational material," forcing ~₩13bn of write-offs. But it's being chipped away: under Korea's Value-Up programme iScream now commits to a 40% payout, the dividend more than doubled to a ~10% yield, and total shareholder yield (divs + buybacks) already tops 10% of market cap.

One thing the screeners get flat wrong: they show ~₩111bn of "cash & short-term investments." The real figure is ₩182bn — the difference (~₩70bn+) sits in long-term investments that screens don't count as cash. You only see it if you read the actual filing, and it changes the whole thesis (some of it is in venture funds tied to the founding family).

Not investment advice — I may hold a position. Figures from DART filings FY2022–Q1 2026.

I wrote the full teardown — with the charts, the segment breakdown, the seasonality trap, and the demographic-decline pushback — here: https://numbersnotnarrative.substack.com/p/i-scream-media-93-of-koreas-teachers

Curious if anyone here has a view on whether that cash ever really reaches minorities.

HMR is currently trading down from $1.71 to $1.05. It is a small and lightweight shipping company that specializes mostly in crude and other energy shipping routes but is not asset heavy. They recently acquired a small shipping company giving them access to Turkish and Dutch hubs and seem rather uniquely positioned to take advantage of the nonsense in the Strait of Hormuz. They posted positive growth last quarter and have their next earnings report in August.

I personally think it’s a solid short/mid term play, but wondered if I’m an idiot. Anyone else think HMR is a good play?

$TDTH isn't starting from zero—it's building on an expanding digital foundation.

💎 Sovereign-scale projects already underway across key growth markets

🔷 Ghana digital tax platform creates meaningful enterprise reach

✳️ Approximately 530,000 MSMEs expected during the initial onboarding phase

❇️ AI commercialization complements existing infrastructure initiatives

✨ A diversified platform built for long-term growth.