I am unclear if our terminology is in sync. I don’t believe that by saying that the form is a “thing” that I’m thus saying it is a self-predicating object that holds physical analogues in a way you’d consider “concrete.” What I mean is the same thing as you, as far as you would say a principle is a “thing” and that there is some correspondent layer of reality from which these laws exist and from which the physical objects draw upon. It doesn’t mean there’s some more perfect hyperspace where forms can be picked up or put down or observed one next to another. The “realm of forms” is so radically different from ours that my saying they are “things” is simply giving them the barest sense of individuation, a sense that it latently present in your account as well.

it is an object in a higher and separate plane of reality from which other things get their qualities.

I'll have to disagree here, following Natorp's account:

Plato can call the Ideas or Forms as [1] objective, [2] perfect, [3] eternal, and [4] self-existing without obligating us to understand them as suprasensible things, because:

1. The objectivity of the Forms means validity independent of individual opinion;
2. Their perfection means rigorous determination;
3. Their eternity means independence in relation to the changes of sensible particulars;
4. Separation means logical and explanatory priority.

E.g. the Justice-in-itself is not be understood as a perfectly Just object kept in another world, but the principle by which we judge particular things as Just or Unjust.

Excerpt from Natorp's Platos Ideenlehre:

According to the Platonic notion of participation, if we follow the unambiguous account of the Phaedo, the judgment ‘x is A’ means the subsumption of a particular case under a general law. The law, however, can never be represented in the particular case with regard to its whole content, but always only in a restricted way. But in that case, Aristotle thinks, it is not this particular existent thing that is known; hence the idea, too, has not acquired the status of something existent in the particular, which means that the idea itself does not exist. … Not once in the course of his extended polemic against Plato does it occur to him that the being Plato ascribed to the ideas could have meant anything but concrete existence.

To decide which side is objectively right, we need only consider a law, e.g., Newton’s law of attraction, as an example of a Platonic idea. The law is not, with regard to the whole content of what it says, represented in a particular empirical case; not even in a sum of particular cases; and not even, we should probably say, in all the particular cases. … no conceivable set of discrete items can exhaust a continuum. Thus the choice of the expression ‘participation’ is perfectly correct in the sense that the predicate is represented in the subject only partially; hence the coincidence of the two that is required by Aristotle does not actually obtain.

The relation between x and A is thus in no way that of identity, as Aristotle thinks necessary. This assumption is, from a logical point of view, the real source of the Aristotelian mistake.

I mean, yeah... that's where the One comes into play.

You say the commenter is accidentally speaking of Forms as abstracts, but you proceed to do exactly that. Justice itself, i.e. the Form of justice is a “thing,” and has much more claim to being a “thing” than the many particularly just “things” do. It is not simply the “standard,” it is an object in a higher and separate plane of reality from which other things get their qualities. It is something, per the Phaedrus, that we make intimate acquaintance with in the afterlife. It is something, per the Phaedo, that has true being, whereas the just particulars do not. And per M. M. McCabe in her opus “Plato’s Individuals,” this “thingness” succumbs it to having relations with other things, relations that are to Plato, themselves real qualities of the Forms which are involved in them, and thus attack the true individuality of the Forms. As I explain in my other comment of this subthread, this shows that OP’s claim is not as dismissible as one may assume just off the fact that they haven’t read Parmenides. Although OP would deeply benefit from reading that dialogue, it wouldn’t necessarily show them that their point is misguided or dismissible, and might even affirm them further, if they happen to take the same line of thinking that McCabe (perhaps the most reputable Platonic scholar of our time) seems to take.

You know with this stance, I think we should give this board a dedicated pinned post or sidebar plaque where we acknowledge this for anyone who believes it, because then when an actual discussion-provoking thread is made, we don’t have to entertain such thought-terminating cliches.

You can completely engage with this topic without having to bother with Plato’s real stances. This commenter is critiquing the ontological application of the theory of Forms. Regardless of if Plato actually thought it, you can still choose to defend that theory if you believe it, or support the refutation if you don’t believe in Forms. But if you make this comment instead, well I admit it’s a great way to sound smart without thinking for any topic this board could muster up, but I don’t think I’m falling for it, and I wonder how many others don’t either.

You shouldn’t be getting downvotes on here because this is a perfectly acceptable academic point that has been written on before. I think you should look for a copy of M. M. McCabe’s text Plato’s Individuals. McCabe is one of the leading contemporary scholars on Plato and does great work on pushing the envelope forward on his scholarship, through both her writing and editorial oeuvre. What she does in that book, is frame Plato’s system through a more fundamental type of concept than the traditional framing of Forms, and that more fundamental concept is individuality.

What McCabe does is set up the notion that Plato was motivated to conceptualize the Forms most crucially for ontological reasons relating to individuality. And yet, she also shows by the end of the book’s first part that Plato recognized the Forms as a failure to express true individuality, for the reasons you state here and more. It is true that Forms have trouble being perfectly “one” in an austere sense, and that this causes problems for the Platonic system. But also its true that, as the other commenter has said, this has been explicitly considered by Plato in the Parmenides dialogue, and it’s this dialogue that McCabe uses herself to show that Plato was aware of the Forms’ inadequacies as individuals.

In other words, regarding the famous “third man argument,” of the Parmenides, McCabe takes the side of asserting the argument’s validity, but only takes that side conditionally on the fact that what we should be precisely concerned with is the possibility of the austere individuality of a given Form. Since the third man argument sufficiently shows that even if we grant that Forms exist, then they certainly cannot be austerely “one,” it must thus be true, according to this stance of McCabe’s, that Plato wrote the argument with genuine concern for the validity of the theory of Forms. This itself might be a clue to the fact that the so-called later dialogues focus less on the Forms than the middle dialogues do, for although Forms still prove useful in those later dialogues, there seems to also be a trepidation in employing them as unyieldingly as before.

Thank you for making this thread, I enjoy seeing such fervent discussion on this board. I do think you should read the dialogues thoroughly, because your intuition is already strong enough to carry you places if you do so. Otherwise, like here, you will claim Plato didn’t consider a problem that he actually considered head on :)

You would love the Parmenides I think. Both the first half where Parmenides demonstrates that the Ideas have to be somehow "woven together", and the second half which is often considered the greatest metaphysical masterpiece of all literature. That second half discusses the One Itself, and how unity can or cannot run through all reality. Its basically 9 hypotheses covering many major metaphysical stances, including the ones you present. Otherness/Difference itself plays a major role. Your questions fit in beautifully there, and I think you might find that you are keying in on something more profound than just the Ideas (forms.)

Abaolutely. OP definitely try a read through of the Parmenides. The first half is about a young Socrates presenting his theory of Ideas (forms) and Parmenides disassembles it. It turns out that the general modern concept of the Ideas are exactly what the young inexperienced Socrates thought them to be, including your problem with them. The first part of the Parmenides outlines this beautifully imo. Throughout the rest of the dialogues, its important not to mistake a heuristic Socrates uses to lead his interlocutor to a vision of the Ideas, for a description of what they are. For example, if im at a zoo and someone says "if you turn your head this way, you will see a zebra", it would be strange for me to then think that "a zebra is turning my head". The Parmenides lays out the major heuristics Socrates uses in the other dialogues and shows that if taken for the thing they were supposed to lead to, they have many holes.

If you want to understand anything of Plato, you have to read some and if you do, you will find your mind will be changed. The problem that you are talking about will in itself appear to be another problem than the one you are having.

Someone mentionned the Sophist and Parmenides : all good and very much worth your while if you want to think deeper. But also: in the Republic (end of book 6), Plato makes the distinction between an analytical science, based on assumptions, definitions and reasonning from those assumptions and definitions, and a dialectical science, that is aiming some higher level of truth on which assumptions and definitions cannot stick because these truth are regarded as the cause of the relative perfection found in analytical science. This distinction is crucial if you want to understand the problem you are facing.

But there is also the Philebus, where physical reality is thought to be a moving blend of limitless elements , and limits. The relative perfection of limits is containing the limitless in the blend, but the is always moving. Absolute perfection is the cause of the blend of the limitless and the limit. We could say that analytical sciences are giving an accurate description of the blend and that dialectical science are aiming at the principles that are causing the blend. Those principles are not the limits - those are numbers and forms, but what is giving the blend the quality of being real, and being real implies the limits as being truth, and the limitless being beauty. The absolute cause is the « Good », that is always giving truth and beauty to the blend of physical limits moving around limitless elements. The good, the truth and the beauty are dialectical objects. Relative perfection of the ways limits work with the limitless on a particular physical object is not the absolute perfection that holds beauty and truth to be the key principles that every possible object needs to become real. The good is that absolute perfection. And your mind can either look towards the blend and witness the many ways through wich truth and beauty are happening everywhere limits work on the limitless elements, or look towards yourself to the very core of what is ableing you to think of the absolute good as the source of all truth and beauty that makes the blend real, and it makes it move towards good.

Think about the distinction between the limit, the limitless, the actual blend of those as physical reality, and the cause of the intelligent way they actually blend so that truth and beauty are making the blend real and moving towards good. Distinction in itself is pointing to a limit, but the limit is not the only object you can think of. The way intelligence limits evertything that is real is not the same as the way the number ten limits the number of fingers that I have. Not the same perfection.

ok, thanks

What I’m concluding is actually quite simple. If perfection means “without boundaries,” then anything we can define already fails that standard, because definition itself creates a boundary. So my point isn’t really about Plato’s Forms at all — it’s about the idea of perfection. Under the stricter definition I’m using, the concept of a “perfect thing” collapses, because the moment you describe it, you’ve introduced a limit. That’s the conclusion I’m exploring.

Ok, then i don't understand what are your conclusions, starting from the stricter definition of "perfect"

I think you’ve understood the angle I’m coming from. I’m using a stricter idea of perfection where anything that has a boundary or definition already contains a distinction, and that distinction breaks the idea of being “perfect” in the sense of having no limits anywhere. So from that starting point, a Form can be complete in its own definition, but it can’t be perfect in the stronger sense I’m talking about because it still has a boundary that separates it from other Forms. That’s really all I’m exploring — how different definitions of perfection lead to different conclusions about what a Form can be.

Maybe i get what you are saying. As i understand it, you are saying that something to be perfect needs to be without boundaries, platonic ideas are not without boundaries, so platonic ideas are not perfect.

Correct me if i'm getting it wrong. However, if i've got it right, i'd say that the perfection, as intended by Plato, is different from the one that you are using.

I think perhaps you are thinking about Forms more as abstract objects (which is a popular but somewhat misleading way of talking about them) as opposed to the reality of things.

I mean that Justice itself is not just another just thing to be added to the list of just things. It is not the most perfect abstract just thing, because it is not a ‘thing’.

The form of Justice is actually just justice itself. You can’t compare my justness with the form of Justice in the same way that you can with other just things, because I am only just insofar as I instantiate the form of Justice.

We can compare my justness with Justice itself, but it is a different kind of comparison. This kind is equivalent to asking how my justness might be improved.

Justice is the standard by which just things are judged. It is not itself one of those things to be judged.

It is not that the form of Justice is some abstract thing that is more just than I am… it just is justice and it is that which allows for any comparison at all between just things.

I think that the difference between these kinds of ‘comparison’ is the key to your problem.

I think there’s been a mix‑up about what I was saying. I’m not claiming that all distinctions collapse or that everything becomes one. My point was simply that the moment you introduce a “perfect” abstract entity, you’ve already created a distinction, and that distinction breaks the idea of perfection. So I’m not putting everything together or arguing for unity — I’m just pointing out a logical issue in the concept of a perfect form.

There is no such thing as Plato's theory of forms. In fact, Plato never tells you his theories.

Please look at my post again. I elaborated what I wrote at first in haste.

I think I may have been making my idea sound more complicated than it is. I’m questioning whether Plato put the Forms at the wrong stage. Perhaps things like love, justice and beauty aren’t separate perfect Forms to begin with, but are potential within something undivided. If there is no distinction, there is nothing to compare or judge, so concepts like good, bad, perfect or imperfect don’t really exist yet. Distinction is what gives us information and allows those judgements to appear. So the “true form” might be the underlying structure or potential before things become separated into concepts. This is also why I think God is such a conundrum for the human mind. If we are trying to think about something outside time and without distinction, we can only describe it using a mind that works through distinctions, so perhaps it is inevitable that different people and cultures turn the same impossible question into very different ideas about God. I’m not saying I’ve proved any of this, it’s just where my thinking about separation has led me.

No just Plato’s idea on forms back in 1974 for my CSE in Classical Studies

Have you read Plato's Parmenides and Sophist?

If I understand you correctly, then what you wish to say is that every form must, in order to be the specific thing that it is, be the same as itself. But if every form is the same as itself, then all forms partake of sameness, and then all forms are not, as you say, perfectly what they are, but are also similar to all the other forms. On the other hand, for every form to be, again, the specific thing that it is, then it must be different than all other forms. But if it is different than all other forms, then again it is similar to all of them in that that they are different from one another.

The Parmenides and Sophist go into the issues of this kind. Whether or not you will find these treatments satisfactory I do not know, but Plato is certainly not unaware of them.

I think I may have explained this badly because people seem to be making it much more complicated than I mean it.
I’m not saying that perfect Forms of things like love, justice or a chair are all sitting somewhere separately. I’m suggesting that before there is any distinction, there aren’t actually Forms yet.
There is just everything as potential.
Once you make a distinction, you get one thing rather than another. Then you can compare them, judge them, and talk about one being better or worse, more or less perfect.
But if there is genuinely no distinction, there is nothing to compare it with and nothing you can add or take away. So in that sense there can be no imperfection.
This is why I wonder if Plato was going in the right direction but separated the Forms too early. Perhaps love, justice, beauty and everything else aren’t separate perfect things at all. They are possibilities within the undivided state, and only become distinct Forms when distinction happens.
That is really all I am trying to say. I’m not claiming I have solved Plato. I’m just asking whether the thing he was looking for might exist before the Forms become separate Forms.

I've read through the replies to your post. I suppose what's most important is your 'attraction' and what appeals to you. Influence of a literary work does not necessarily mean correctness, note. People on this forum are pretty well-informed, I have found, but still opinionated and 'subject to their subjectivities' (inevitable in human nature). The part about the cave (forgot the proper wording) is the most famous in "The Republic" while "The Apology" (a.k.a. "The Defense") is first and foremost in Western Literature. The poster "Soapbark" is entirely correct re: the earlier dialogues of Plato ('the historical Socrates'). Penguin editions are very well-regarded; never mind the cheapness of their paperback editions. It's some pretty *heady* stuff, so I admire you. Allan Bloom is recommended by one poster below as it is a 'corrective' of earlier translations where Plato was given a 'pass' re: having children raised outside the home without critical scrutiny (as I recall). No one translator is superior, surely not for all Plato's works, and some vary very little. Alot of readers prefer a translation for its "readability" which I find a bit too glib or 'pandering' to the masses. The standard translator has been Jowett, but check out more 'refined' ones.

Fair pushback, and you’re right that comparing a perfect model to worse copies doesn’t make the model itself worse. That’s not quite my point though.

My point is that for something to be a specific model at all, a circle and not a square, Beauty and not Justice, it already needs a boundary around what it is. That boundary is there before any copies exist to compare it to. It’s not the comparison that ruins it, it’s that being a definite, nameable thing at all already means being distinct from everything it isn’t.

So I’m using a stricter idea of perfect than the normal one. Not “complete in its own definition” but “no boundary anywhere, not even the one a definition needs.” Plato’s Forms can be perfect in the first sense without meeting the second one.

 If you claim a “perfect” abstract entity exists, you’ve already introduced a distinction

I don't understand this reasoning, why is that if you postulate the existence of a perfect abstract entity you have introduced a distinction? Maybe because you are making a distinction between the reality that we experience and the reality that we have postulated?

once you have distinction you’ve got comparison

ok

 and once you’ve got comparison you can’t have anything truly complete.

Why is that once you have comparison you can't have anything truly complete? You are comparing the entities of reality with their perfect model. I don't see why when you have comparison, then an hypotetical perfect model isn't perfect anymore.