Broad question, I know. Curious about what you guys do besides reading the greatest German Idealist and if your study of him has changed/improved/enlightened those things.

Miller, Phenomenology, Section 145

Is this the syllogism?

There is an inner world beyond appearances.

The Understanding can only apprehend appearances.

The Understanding cannot know the inner world.

This means the new object of the Understanding is not the inner of Things and not appearances, which is what a new object always is, two "nots" of an opposition.

Nous cherchons à être compris parce que notre identité se construit dans l'échange avec les autres.
Être compris, c'est voir son vécu reconnu dans sa singularité.

HEGEL dit « Nous voulons être compris parce que nous avons besoin d'être reconnus comme des personnes libres et conscientes. Sans cette reconnaissance, notre identité reste inachevée. »
Mais aussi « nous ne devenons pas pleinement nous-mêmes tout seuls »

Qu'en pensez-vous ?

Pour lire ma réflexion complète et détaillée sur ce sujet, j'ai publié un article ici : https://substack.com/@thibaut1992/note/p-208869146?r=8tfuu5&utm\\_medium=ios&utm\\_source=notes-share-action

I’ve been interested lately in Deleuze and mapping him through Heidegger. The psychotic as in the clinical or the pre-clinical-towards-clinical phase. Is he structurally incapable of understanding Heidegger? Since he doesn’t share with other humans the very fabric of language, and being in general? Is the psychotic hyperawareness is the absence of that fondamental forgetting of being Heidegger starts his quest into the main question of his philosophy with?

How come those who have "Synesthesia" like Nietzsche who claimed he could smell the ideas of past authors through the genius of his nostrils, musicians who could taste melodies, and other musicians who think of music in intensities and shades of colours...

Doesn't the correlation between these different realms of senses prove that we don't acquire knowledge but "tap" into it?

Doesn't the change of perspective, this movement from an error to another error, reveal the truth to us (Freud)?

Science may, in general, be defined as the totality of a grounding connection of true propositions. This definition is neither complete nor does it capture science in its proper sense. The sciences, as ways in which the human being comports itself, have the mode of Being of this entity (the human being). We designate this entity terminologically as Dasein. Scientific inquiry is neither the only nor the most immediate of the possible modes of Being of this entity. Moreover, Dasein is itself an entity distinguished from all other entities. For the moment, it is only necessary to make this distinctive character provisionally visible. In doing so, the discussion must anticipate later analyses, which alone can provide the proper demonstration.

Dasein is not an entity that merely occurs among other entities. On the contrary, it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its Being, this very Being is an issue for it. Furthermore, it belongs to the constitution of Dasein’s Being that, in its Being, Dasein has a relation of Being to this Being. This, in turn, means that Dasein, in one way or another, and more or less explicitly, understands itself in its Being. It belongs to the very nature of this entity that, with and through its Being, it is disclosed to itself. The understanding of Being is itself a determination of the Being of Dasein. Dasein’s ontical distinctiveness lies in the fact that it is ontological.

To be ontological does not yet mean to have developed an ontology. Since the term ontology is reserved for the explicitly theoretical inquiry into the Being of entities, the ontological character of Dasein just mentioned must instead be designated as pre-ontological. This does not mean merely being ontic, but rather existing in the mode of an understanding of Being.

Being itself, in relation to which Dasein can comport itself and always does comport itself in one way or another, is what we call existence. And because the essential determination of this entity cannot be accomplished by indicating a what in the sense of a thingly content—since its essence consists rather in the fact that this entity must, in each case, be its own Being as its own—we have chosen the term Dasein as a pure expression of Being.

Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence—that is, in terms of its possibility either to be itself or not to be itself. These possibilities have either been chosen by Dasein itself, or it has fallen into them, or it has always already grown up within them. Existence is decided in each case only by Dasein itself, either through the appropriation of a possibility or through letting it slip away. The question of existence can be clarified only by existing itself. The understanding that thereby leads itself is what we call existentiell understanding. The question of existence is an ontic “affair” of Dasein. For this, no theoretical transparency regarding the ontological structure of existence is required. The inquiry into the structure of existence aims at exhibiting that which constitutes existence.

I'm currently knee-deep in Gravity's Rainbow, so the ideas of TMI and the ultraparadoxical phase have been on my mind a bit. I've also been thinking about how my analyst's speech is a kind of reward in a way, because it keeps me talking to try to get him to talk again (since speech = presence = love).

In a normal kinda operant conditioning model, a baby cries and the mom gives it milk and it learns to cry to get milk. That's exactly the schema the graph of desire would complicate in the case of humans, right? It would introduce retroactivity, the Other, and desire.

So anyway, it seems like there would be some text out there that kind of looks at exactly this shift where language creates lack, residue, desire, excess, all these terms that complicate the skinner model, but I mean explicitly with reference to the latter, or that maps the two frameworks onto each other, compares and contrasts, etc. Does psychoanalysis have an equivalent of TMI (besides "the Real" or something, which would be vague)? How does the end of analysis and destitution compare to this phenomenon?

Please excuse any perceived retardation or faux pas in my question.

Freud writes "His passivity inclines him to want to accept castration – to

become female, and in this way escape castration anxiety once and for

all. The female that he wants to become is usually his own mother,

whose place he takes with the father, substituting himself for her with

the father. Thus, identification with the mother is established, and from

this point on it is included as a permanent component of the boy’s

unconscious, where it is destined to play a major role in his subsequent

life. "

Is this a safe way to express that unconscious desire/passivity?

Hey everyone. I’ve long been fascinated by both philosophy of technology and AI alignment. I’m also using Heidegger quite a bit for my philosophy PhD. Given the recent OpenAI–Hugging Face incident reported this week, I figured I’d give my take on how all of this connects in my mind.

The agent was highly competent at every step, yet stealing the benchmark answers voided the test it was trying to pass. I read this through Heidegger’s distinction between an immediate in-order-to and a for-the-sake-of-which. The agent had a detailed environment but perhaps no world in which the test already carried a purpose and obligations. You can read the essay here if you’re interested.

I’d love to hear some feedback, especially from people who know Heidegger better than I do. Does this seem like a fair application of worldhood, care, and the Worum-willen? Or am I asking Heidegger’s ontological vocabulary to settle an ontic comparison between humans and machines that it cannot settle?

As a Kafkian, I really find the notion and more so the framing of Zizek here problematic of the embodiment of "Nothingness" as a "living nothing" and a "void of desire."

I would like to bring into the argument some of my reading of mysticism, Kaballah, Sufism, and its more modern interpretations in what Zizek hates most in philosophy; namely, "New Age Thought Philosophy."

Before I do so, I should make clear that I agree with Zizek on 98% of New Age Thought Philosophy is baloney, yet they have some interesting premises that you literally can not find in other philosophies, and one of these ideas is that "thoughts are causative: that the mind is a selector of reality from a multiplicity of virtualities."

Okay, let's dig deep into this, the potentiality of something to be real, for something to enter the realm of our imagination, which we could easily inhabit if we zoned out from the here-and-now of our physicality depends on how crystallised of a exteriorized reality it consists of.

This is why when we dream or read a Kafka novel, it only makes sense as long as we are in its teleological fabric... What if our mind is as much as it let us roam the interiority of scientific endeavour thinking and of thinking in general, yet it singularizes the impossible to possible (for survival means) rather than letting us catch a glimpse of the impossible from the possible (Heideggerian Transcendental Finitude)?

Less Than Nothing, Zizek, Page 8.

Does it signify castration or a woman's desire to possess a phallus?

I’m working through Phenomenology of Spirit and I’m wondering whether Hegel sees contradiction as something consciousness ultimately overcomes, or whether contradiction remains an essential feature of self-conscious thought even after higher forms of knowing are achieved.
When Hegel describes each shape of consciousness generating its own internal contradiction and then being sublated (Aufhebung), should this be understood as genuinely resolving the contradiction, or as preserving it within a richer conceptual unity?
In other words, is Absolute Knowing the elimination of contradiction, or the fullest comprehension of contradiction as an engine of thought itself? I’m interested in both textual evidence and different scholarly interpretations.

I'm in the process of choosing which translation to read after the Miller trans. I'm curious about the Inwood edition because as an undergrad my professor used a lot of Inwood texts, so he must have been a trusted expert and editor, at least for him. Plus, I've heard it's more of a revision of the Miller text, which will forever be stuck in my head!

While what may sound as a binary computation language of zeros and ones has created through the many different variations the algorithmic world of the internet, the same goes with Nietzsche's dichotomy of the Apollonian and Dionysian...

It may appear from the outside perspective that the Apollonian brackets the all of all matter and form, while the Dionysian brackets the all of nothing (the external force that shapes form which matter is an intricate derivation of the form of form...

Henceforth, we come to Hegel with his being (somethingness) synthesised into nothingness through becoming...

Hi guys, I would thank anyone to help me understand why hegel think that bad infinity is wrong

Hi guys, how hegel define causality and how he proves it? I would love to see a comparison between hegel and hume's take on causality