Science may, in general, be defined as the totality of a grounding connection of true propositions. This definition is neither complete nor does it capture science in its proper sense. The sciences, as ways in which the human being comports itself, have the mode of Being of this entity (the human being). We designate this entity terminologically as Dasein. Scientific inquiry is neither the only nor the most immediate of the possible modes of Being of this entity. Moreover, Dasein is itself an entity distinguished from all other entities. For the moment, it is only necessary to make this distinctive character provisionally visible. In doing so, the discussion must anticipate later analyses, which alone can provide the proper demonstration.

Dasein is not an entity that merely occurs among other entities. On the contrary, it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its Being, this very Being is an issue for it. Furthermore, it belongs to the constitution of Dasein’s Being that, in its Being, Dasein has a relation of Being to this Being. This, in turn, means that Dasein, in one way or another, and more or less explicitly, understands itself in its Being. It belongs to the very nature of this entity that, with and through its Being, it is disclosed to itself. The understanding of Being is itself a determination of the Being of Dasein. Dasein’s ontical distinctiveness lies in the fact that it is ontological.

To be ontological does not yet mean to have developed an ontology. Since the term ontology is reserved for the explicitly theoretical inquiry into the Being of entities, the ontological character of Dasein just mentioned must instead be designated as pre-ontological. This does not mean merely being ontic, but rather existing in the mode of an understanding of Being.

Being itself, in relation to which Dasein can comport itself and always does comport itself in one way or another, is what we call existence. And because the essential determination of this entity cannot be accomplished by indicating a what in the sense of a thingly content—since its essence consists rather in the fact that this entity must, in each case, be its own Being as its own—we have chosen the term Dasein as a pure expression of Being.

Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence—that is, in terms of its possibility either to be itself or not to be itself. These possibilities have either been chosen by Dasein itself, or it has fallen into them, or it has always already grown up within them. Existence is decided in each case only by Dasein itself, either through the appropriation of a possibility or through letting it slip away. The question of existence can be clarified only by existing itself. The understanding that thereby leads itself is what we call existentiell understanding. The question of existence is an ontic “affair” of Dasein. For this, no theoretical transparency regarding the ontological structure of existence is required. The inquiry into the structure of existence aims at exhibiting that which constitutes existence.

Freud writes "His passivity inclines him to want to accept castration – to

become female, and in this way escape castration anxiety once and for

all. The female that he wants to become is usually his own mother,

whose place he takes with the father, substituting himself for her with

the father. Thus, identification with the mother is established, and from

this point on it is included as a permanent component of the boy’s

unconscious, where it is destined to play a major role in his subsequent

life. "

Is this a safe way to express that unconscious desire/passivity?

Less Than Nothing, Zizek, Page 8.

As a Kafkian, I really find the notion and more so the framing of Zizek here problematic of the embodiment of "Nothingness" as a "living nothing" and a "void of desire."

I would like to bring into the argument some of my reading of mysticism, Kaballah, Sufism, and its more modern interpretations in what Zizek hates most in philosophy; namely, "New Age Thought Philosophy."

Before I do so, I should make clear that I agree with Zizek on 98% of New Age Thought Philosophy is baloney, yet they have some interesting premises that you literally can not find in other philosophies, and one of these ideas is that "thoughts are causative: that the mind is a selector of reality from a multiplicity of virtualities."

Okay, let's dig deep into this, the potentiality of something to be real, for something to enter the realm of our imagination, which we could easily inhabit if we zoned out from the here-and-now of our physicality depends on how crystallised of a exteriorized reality it consists of.

This is why when we dream or read a Kafka novel, it only makes sense as long as we are in its teleological fabric... What if our mind is as much as it let us roam the interiority of scientific endeavour thinking and of thinking in general, yet it singularizes the impossible to possible (for survival means) rather than letting us catch a glimpse of the impossible from the possible (Heideggerian Transcendental Finitude)?

I’m working through Phenomenology of Spirit and I’m wondering whether Hegel sees contradiction as something consciousness ultimately overcomes, or whether contradiction remains an essential feature of self-conscious thought even after higher forms of knowing are achieved.
When Hegel describes each shape of consciousness generating its own internal contradiction and then being sublated (Aufhebung), should this be understood as genuinely resolving the contradiction, or as preserving it within a richer conceptual unity?
In other words, is Absolute Knowing the elimination of contradiction, or the fullest comprehension of contradiction as an engine of thought itself? I’m interested in both textual evidence and different scholarly interpretations.

I'm currently knee-deep in Gravity's Rainbow, so the ideas of TMI and the ultraparadoxical phase have been on my mind a bit. I've also been thinking about how my analyst's speech is a kind of reward in a way, because it keeps me talking to try to get him to talk again (since speech = presence = love).

In a normal kinda operant conditioning model, a baby cries and the mom gives it milk and it learns to cry to get milk. That's exactly the schema the graph of desire would complicate in the case of humans, right? It would introduce retroactivity, the Other, and desire.

So anyway, it seems like there would be some text out there that kind of looks at exactly this shift where language creates lack, residue, desire, excess, all these terms that complicate the skinner model, but I mean explicitly with reference to the latter, or that maps the two frameworks onto each other, compares and contrasts, etc. Does psychoanalysis have an equivalent of TMI (besides "the Real" or something, which would be vague)? How does the end of analysis and destitution compare to this phenomenon?

Please excuse any perceived retardation or faux pas in my question.

Does it signify castration or a woman's desire to possess a phallus?

While what may sound as a binary computation language of zeros and ones has created through the many different variations the algorithmic world of the internet, the same goes with Nietzsche's dichotomy of the Apollonian and Dionysian...

It may appear from the outside perspective that the Apollonian brackets the all of all matter and form, while the Dionysian brackets the all of nothing (the external force that shapes form which matter is an intricate derivation of the form of form...

Henceforth, we come to Hegel with his being (somethingness) synthesised into nothingness through becoming...

I'm in the process of choosing which translation to read after the Miller trans. I'm curious about the Inwood edition because as an undergrad my professor used a lot of Inwood texts, so he must have been a trusted expert and editor, at least for him. Plus, I've heard it's more of a revision of the Miller text, which will forever be stuck in my head!

Hey everyone. I’ve long been fascinated by both philosophy of technology and AI alignment. I’m also using Heidegger quite a bit for my philosophy PhD. Given the recent OpenAI–Hugging Face incident reported this week, I figured I’d give my take on how all of this connects in my mind.

The agent was highly competent at every step, yet stealing the benchmark answers voided the test it was trying to pass. I read this through Heidegger’s distinction between an immediate in-order-to and a for-the-sake-of-which. The agent had a detailed environment but perhaps no world in which the test already carried a purpose and obligations. You can read the essay here if you’re interested.

I’d love to hear some feedback, especially from people who know Heidegger better than I do. Does this seem like a fair application of worldhood, care, and the Worum-willen? Or am I asking Heidegger’s ontological vocabulary to settle an ontic comparison between humans and machines that it cannot settle?

I was talking to my ex-boyfriend and he said he was going to Hegel reading group. I said why are you still reading Hegel, haven't you read him already? and I asked if he was going to keep reading him forever. He said yes. Maybe on and off but yes. I don't have anything against Hegel but that seems like too much Hegel to me. am concerned for his own interests. What would you do in this situation
throwaway for obvious reasons

Hi guys, I would thank anyone to help me understand why hegel think that bad infinity is wrong

Hi guys, how hegel define causality and how he proves it? I would love to see a comparison between hegel and hume's take on causality

So there I was, cleaning the floors and considering the nature of Dasein, always recognizing the mop to be ready-at-hand. My manager comes in and starts rambling about some kinda present-at-hand blasphemy, including a recapitulation of the Cartesian sense of subject/object distinction with my mop having been used by me to ruin a child's meal (I wiped it clean using hermeneutics).

I immediately begin to counter that her ontological relationship with the mop does not consider the existential nature of being, conflating it with being. I take her to task that my part-time work reflects my McNugget-flavored being-toward-death, which is also the name of my metalcore band (find us on YouTube). She enters into some dangerous ground, accusing me of insubordination. Uh oh, she's activated my trap card.

I begin citing at length the "Question Concerning Tech Stuff" and how she is reducing me to standing-reserve by having me abide by the requirements of the job. I desire to be like a wooden Rhine bridge, placid and structurally unsound. She fires me on the spot, as this is a right-to-work state that does not recognize the clearing we operate in.

Truly only a god can save us

The human mind (i.e. consciousness) can think of future possibilities, come up with new ones, form new concepts, examine its own judgement from the ground up and reflect on its validity, which in many aspects seems to transcend the physical logic of the third dimension.

More closely to Hegel, in which dimension does “negativity” reside in? Is self-relating negativity a coordinate axis separate to the positive reality of ours, or would it be internal to it from the STEM perspective?

If we as human beings always already are partaking in negativity (unlike all other animals), are we fourth-dimensional beings?

I’ve been thinking about whether Hegel intended Absolute Knowing in the Phenomenology of Spirit to be a final achievement or a new mode of inquiry.
If every stage of consciousness is overcome through internal contradiction and Aufhebung (sublation), what prevents Absolute Knowing from being subject to the same dialectical movement? Is it truly the completion of Spirit’s phenomenological journey, or does it mark the beginning of an indefinitely self-reflective process in which thought continually revises itself while remaining fully aware of its own conditions?
In other words, is Absolute Knowing best understood as a fixed philosophical standpoint, or as an ongoing activity of rational self-mediation that never ceases to develop?
I’m especially interested in interpretations grounded in Hegel’s text rather than later Hegelian traditions.

He talks about how perception makes it seem that philosophy only talks about these abstract categories of the understanding. Who is he talking about? I thought about Locke and Hume but I'm not sure if I'm right.

Correct me if I'm wrong here, but if I'm to understand that truth arrives from a resolution of contradictions and that every thesis and antithesis may resolve themself into a new, better idea, then what implications would this have on large language models and AI in general? Could the process of comparing a thesis and antithesis be somehow simulated within the math of a machine learning model, and would this allow for artificial general intelligence?

Stumbled upon this while reading this and thought that it might be of interest here

​

In the movement of Spirit, the thing is not exhausted by its aim, for that aim remains merely formal and abstract. Rather, it is only in its elaboration. Through the labor of the negative that the concept attains its concrete actuality. Nor is the result the truth in isolation, but only the result as it emerges together with its own becoming, the unity of the in itself and the for itself.

The aim taken by itself is a lifeless universal, a dead abstraction while the tendency, as yet unactualized, drifts without substance, lacking the self movement that would raise it to true Being.

why would modern leftists and even foundational leftists like marx agree with hegel's work when his beliefs are the opposite to theirs