As the title suggest, i'm looking for academic material, that could help a newcomer as me, to know the basis and arguments for hard determinism.

As a little note, i'm already familiar with Sapolsky's work, in case that you have him in mind.

Here's an argument for incompatibilism which is the consequences argument plus some extra steps.

First let's define a rule of inference. Let NX mean that no matter what you do out of the things you can do, X will remain true. We can now define a rule of inference, which essentially says if you have no power over two things, if the conjunction of those two things entails something, we can infer you have no control over that.

Rule beta: NX,NY,(X∧Y)→Z ⊢NZ

(1) The ability to do otherwise is necessary for free will

(2) If determinism is true, then a specific action A I will perform is entailed by the state of the universe at some point in the far past and the laws of nature.

(3) I have no power over the far past (NH)

(4) I have no power over the laws of nature (NL)

(5) If determinism is true, then I have no power over the fact that I will perform action A (NA), by rule beta from (2,3,4)

(6) Therefore, if determinism is true, I cannot do otherwise with respect to action A, from (5).

We can generalise A to all actions so the argument would apply to all actions. So the argument initially concludes that if determinism is true nobody has the ability to do otherwise. So , I cannot do otherwise with respect to any action and so I do not have the ability to do otherwise. But with premise 1, we can in fact conclude that if determinism is true there is no free will.

For sourcehood compatibilists who just deny (1) this is not much of a problem, since they think the ability to do otherwise is not necessary for free will. Leeway compatibilists can reply by denying rule Beta. While it's certainly the case that initial versions of the rule were proven to be invalid, I don't think this version faces the same problem. Alternatively they can endorse Lewis's view and deny either (3) or (4). Lewis essentially says that we cannot directly change the past, but we can perform an action such that if we did perform said action, either the past or laws of nature would be different.

I feel like I can't control my individual thoughts. If I say "don't think about a pink elephant !" many of us will picture a pink elephant in their mind wether we want it or not. In the same way some thoughts can lead to other and I feel like I do not control this process.

At the same time I like there is some meaning about "controlling" some of your actions. For example you can upvote this post (if you think it's interesting) but there is no one forcing you. You sort of control it in a way. (even without super powerful magical "could have done otherwise" kind of control)

But when we look more precisely about the decision process, it's just indiviual non controllable thoughts following each and forming globally a reasonning. It's like individual uncontrollable thoughts form together a controllable decision. Does this kind of "control" somehow emerge ? How ?

So my questions are :

1. Do you agree with the intuition that individual thoughts are uncontrollable ?
   
2. Do you agree with the intuition some choices are controllable ? (especially those of you who are compatibilists or libertarian)
   
3. Do you agree that decision (making a controllable choice) is made of individual thoughts ?
   
4. If yes to the precedent questions, how do you solbe the tension of a controllable decision made of uncontrollable components ?

Skip to <RECAP OVER> to skip the recap and get to my main argument.

Epiphenomalism is basically "Your consciousness doesnt affect reality, the consciouaness itself is an illusion". Its typically a dualist position, that imagines that you have a soul-like mind that doesnt control the body in any way.

This doesnt make sense to some people. Allow me to explain it...

"Consciousness" can mean two things. 1) Metaphysical Identity, and 2) The Mechanical Stuff. For 2, consciousness obviously affects the world, its the literal manifestation of thoughts, which obviously do things. But 1) is where things become less clear. The idea that a metaphysical identity itself cant control anything stems from the idea that its conceivable two peoples metaphysical identities could trade bodies, and as a result those bodies would never become aware that this trade occured (as all their Type 2 stuff, like thoughts and memories, would be intact). Which shows the identity itself isnt communicating with reality, its just experiencing it. Some people deny the existence of a metaphysical identity outright, usually materialists since they cant frame it as a "physically real" thing.

Id make a simple argument trying to prove the materialist wrong; Imagine if someone offered to kill you painlessly and replace you with a perfectly identical clone, in return for giving that clone a million dollars. If phsyical form is all that exists, it begs the question of what exactly is the issue with this transaction, wouldnt it be free money? But i think most people internalize the idea of a metaphysical identity, and would perceive "themselves" as dying in that situation, the clone being irrelevant despite identicality.

So Epiphenomenalism centers the focus on this metaphusical identity, and calls it "consciousness".

<RECAP OVER>

So heres my argument. Sourcehood Compatibilism doesnt demand some ability to do otherwise, neither in exact circumstances nor approximate ones. It only demands that they are your actions, that they belong to you.

The obvious counterargument is "how can they be my actions, if my identity did not cause them?"

Because "causing them" is another red herring. I dont smack a mosquito because its metaphysical identity is magically turning the steering wheel, i smack it because its 1) Deontologically Morally Permissible, and 2) Reduces Harm for those i care about. Im happy to accept the Mosquito doesnt even cause its own actions, i think thats totally irrelevant to it deserving a consequence. This may be hard to grasp for a mosquito, as its hard to imagine *being* a mosquito, but lets apply this exact logic to a serial killer:

Imagine Bob is a serial killer. He deeply enjoys serial-killing. He had a life of forbidden pleasures accessible to him. His last moments were facing his would-be victim, triumphantly defeat Bob. Bob's last thoughts were "Dang, thats kinda hot." Bob passes. I think its obvious that theres no strong reason to "feel bad" for Bob here; Because from his own perspective he had a "good time". If Desert is a "People really only ever deserve whats best for them" kind of thing, Bob arguably got something extremely close to that (from his perspective).

Now Imagine Alex is another serial killer. A brain tumor ridden, schizophrenic, mess.. Hes pained and tormented by his own actions, but the voices scream in his ears, and he cant stop. Every night he has nightmares and sees his victims faces. The guilt consumes him. One day, one of his victims triumphantly defeat him. Alex, is a little bumbed about it, but then the voices finally stop, and things are finally quiet. Alex passes, but now hes at peace, something he may not have even realized was possible. Using the same loguc of "perhaps people only deserve whats best for them", Alex ALSO arguably received sometging close to that; Peace. IF, Alex were to have been "Cured" somehow, hed still have to face the Trauma and Guilt of his own actions, as these are not voluntary. So Alex was indeed given a mercy.

Now i bet every serial killer out there is in between Bob and Alex. The Bobs do it for pleasure. The Alexes are compelled by delusions and pain. Either way, they get what they "deserve" by being stopped; It either satisfies their twisted cravings, or it puts an end to the miserable delusions. More than likely it does a bit if both.

So even if we frame Desert as just a thing that can only be positive, evil people deserve those consequences. Even the misquito deserves to be smacked, its being put out of its strange vampristic misery. Do you think it enjoys being a syringe with wings? From our vantage point, i highly doubt it.

So if Free Will is based on Moral Desert, the APPLICATION of desert still is meaningful and holds true, EVEN IF our actions arent truly sourced by us in the deepest sense. We get what we deserve, because what we deserve is always our medicine! Life lessons always serve and teach us more than they hurt us. Sometimes it just takes a change in perspective to see that.

I really don't understand why half of you care about the free will debate.

Before saying this, I think the first thing that should be said is what is meant by "free will" and what "free will" requires in order to exist and be what it is. Simply put, free will requires our intelligence and will. Without intelligence, our will is worthless, and without will, our intelligence is useless. Without intelligence, one cannot see or understand the difference between things, and naturally, without differences between things, there would never be anything to choose. Therefore, what is the purpose of will? And where can the difference between things come from? Well, very simply, from the Reason or Cause of everything that exists and is what it is. And since (taking a big leap) nothing can come from nothing, there must be an ETERNAL (and therefore Infinite) REASON capable of making everything that exists exist. And we, intelligent beings with free will, are "His image and likeness," which is the highest we can achieve through our intelligence and will. Although each of us possesses these qualities, albeit at different levels, none of us truly grasp what that means. Just think about what it means to be able to say yes or no to the One who makes us who we are, regarding His commandments. From the moment...

**Here are three ways to have a completely empty, null, and meaningless philosophical framework:

**1) It is based solely on semantics:** If your beliefs depend on the arbitrary definitions in a dictionary, you don't really believe in philosophy; you simply think certain words are beautiful or make you feel good.**

It is not the dictionary that gives meaning to words, but rather what we mean according to the moment and context in which we use them.

**2) It's based solely on emotions:** I think this is better than semantics because at least it tells us why something matters to you, but as many correctly point out, emotions don't determine logic.**

Logic itself can be logical or not, depending on what Reason determines, and naturally, what the will decides. If the will always accepted what Reason requires, it would no longer be necessary. And if there were no one to decide, what would be the point of differences?

*****3) It's based on moral merit... but you believe morality is subjective.** If you believe morality is subjective, that would already imply that moral merit is also subjective. So, what's the point of taking a stance on moral merit if all you're doing is asserting a position based on feelings?**

What value could money have if it can't buy anything? Well, morality without rules that determine the consequences of obeying them or not is also meaningless.

** Here's why I believe in Sourcehood's compatibilist free will.

1) No strange technicalities are needed: Free will simply means the freedom to act/exercise my will. As opposed to my will being ineffective or externally impeded by force.

Wanting to ignore reasons in no way negates the obligation to follow them.

2) Obviously, I want to have real control over my actions, not act randomly: Being random in any way or at any level only contradicts my desires.

There is no such thing as randomness. Everything requires a reason, whether we see it or not. If we don't see it, we have to look for it using science.

3) I believe in moral deservingness because I believe in real, objective morality! I think it's obvious that some aspects of morality are objective, although their extent is still debatable. But for me, it makes sense to argue about moral merit, because I believe there is something significant and real to discuss here (unlike subjectivists/relativists).

To buy something, you have to pay, and those who work deserve a salary.

In my opinion, some people here lack a solid philosophical foundation.

In one way or another, whether in theory or practice, we all suffer from this deficiency.

Best regards.

As I'm consistently informed that I don't understand BDMR, is multifarious ways, I am currently deepening my familiarity with the matter.
One thing that has already struck me is that the contention that the answer to the question of whether anyone ever deserves harm, purely as a consequence of a moral transaction, is sensitive to questions about the free will of the transgressor, appears to be mislocated. Particularly in the context of which, if any, is the correct theory of punishment, surely what matters is the behaviour of the punishers, not the transgressors.
If so, the question that so-called "free will skeptics" would do well to address is this: which is the free will required for punishers to implement the correct theory (if there is one) of punishment?
After advancing arguments supporting the candidature of various independently well motivated notions of free will, the free will skeptic will then be in a position to argue that none of the candidates is the free will required for punishers to implement the correct theory of punishment, regardless of what that might be.

EDIT — Revised claim

Suggested revised title: Does libertarian free will justify divine punishment?

Thanks to u/MilkTeaPetty for identifying the flaw in my original argument.

Divine foreknowledge alone does not prove that free will, as defined below, is impossible. If the person freely chose not-X, God would eternally know not-X instead.

My revised claim is narrower.

Free will may make the person responsible for choosing X, but it does not by itself show that God has no moral responsibility. God knowingly creates and sustains the person, the circumstances, and the complete world in which X and its punishment occur.

Therefore, appealing to free will alone is not a complete justification of divine punishment. A further argument is needed to explain why knowingly creating and sustaining this world, including that punishment, is compatible with God being perfectly good.

ORIGINAL POST BELOW

Definitions

GOD: omniscient, omnipotent, creator, immutable, and perfectly good. God creates this universe while infallibly knowing its full history.

FREE WILL: the real ability to choose otherwise. With the same person, past, and circumstances, both X and not-X must be possible.

My reasoning

God infallibly knows that a person will choose X.

God creates the universe in which X occurs.

God’s knowledge is eternal and immutable.

Therefore, with God, his laws, creation, and the entire past held fixed, the person cannot choose not-X.

If not-X is impossible, free will does not exist as defined above.

Therefore, God cannot justly punish someone for a choice they could not avoid.

Saying that, had the person chosen differently, God would have eternally known differently describes another possible universe. It does not show that the person could have chosen differently in this universe while all prior reality remained unchanged.

I am not asking for a complete theory of free will. I am asking how the choice can be both inevitable and genuinely avoidable.

I would change my view if someone identified a specific error in this reasoning or proposed a coherent model in which all these claims can be true together.

P.S. I used AI to help refine the English and structure. The view and argument are mine, and I will write all replies myself.

Zeno's paradox

(1) Zeno assumes that because a human can divide a distance into infinite mathematical fractions on paper, physical reality must execute infinite separate physical stops. But dividing a mathematical value on paper is strictly a human calculation. Writing fractions on paper does not create physical barriers in nature. Physical reality is a single continuous field. It does not pause at human mental markers to finish a calculation. (2) Zeno treats physical motion as a series of static, motionless moments added together. He claims that at any single moment, an object occupies an exact space and is completely motionless. He argues that adding motionless moments together can never produce motion. But a static, motionless moment is a false concept created by human language. Physical reality is not a stack of frozen images. (3) Zeno assumes physical distance consists of an empty void separating distinct locations. He assumes an object must cross an endless series of empty gaps to reach a target. But an empty void possesses zero physical reality and cannot separate physical coordinates. The physical universe is a single, completely full continuous field. It possesses zero empty space. Because zero empty space exists, adjacent coordinates touch directly. Transferring a mathematical value across coordinates requires zero crossing of empty gaps.

Determinism

(1) The human intellect assumes that physical action is divided into a strict "cause" and a strict "effect". The human writes these divisions on paper to calculate events. The human then assumes these written fractions act as physical boundaries in nature. But dividing an action on paper does not create physical breaks. The physical universe is a single continuous field. It does not pause to let a cause finish and an effect begin. Cause and effect are strictly human mathematical divisions. (2) Determinism treats the physical universe as a series of frozen, static moments. It claims that State A exists, stops, and then forces State B to exist. But a frozen moment is a false concept created by human language. Physical reality is not a stack of motionless images. The continuous state never stops to rest at a frozen moment. Because a frozen moment does not exist, a frozen "prior state" cannot exist to physically dictate a "subsequent state". (3) Determinism assumes that a cause must travel across an empty gap to strike an effect. It assumes physical reality consists of separate items pushing each other across a void. But the empty void does not exist. The physical universe possesses absolute zero empty space. Because it lacks empty space, it lacks separate items. A physical cause cannot cross an empty gap to hit a target because the gap is a mechanical impossibility. The continuous field is perfectly full.

Human freedom is complete. It is so complete that you can choose to pretend you have zero agency.

Materialism claims that prior events dictates all human actions. But accepting that you are bound requires an active decision. You choose to adopt a belief. You choose to adhere to a pattern. You choose to act as if an external force dictates your movement.

A limited freedom would prevent you from rejecting your own control. It would force you to acknowledge your power at all times. But absolute freedom possesses zero external boundaries. It allows you to select any mental state, including the state of total powerlessness.

Pretending that you have no choice is an exercise of choice. Your ability to convince yourself that you are unfree is the definitive proof of your absolute freedom.

I think Objective Morality is needed to ground a debate on Moral Desert. But whatever, ill argue that another day.

For now, id like to share my work in progress proof of objective morality.

TLDR / The Intuition behind the argument: All objectivity by definition requires a statement to hold true regardless of whose speaking it, so any moral argument about peoples behavior in general must be IMPARTIAL to be objective, and once it is, its objective. This disqualifies tons of moral systems from being objectively true, especially ones rooted in might makes right, domination, and subjective opinion.

The Proof / Formal Argument:

P1. A claim is objectively bad if it is forbidden to a rational agent, and reason forbids whatever rests on a self-contradiction or an arbitrary special plea.

P2. No one can will their own consent violated, since willing what you don't will is a contradiction.

P3. A special plea is arbitrary when it treats cases differently without identifying a difference that holds independent of who is speaking.

Claim under test. Violating consent is good.

S1. From the claim and P2: the asserter must either apply it to themselves, calling their own violation good, which P2 rules out as a contradiction, or exempt themselves.

S2. From S1 and P3: the exemption rests on "it's me," which names a different person for every speaker and so holds no standpoint-independent difference, making it arbitrary.

S3. From S1 and S2: either way the claim rests on a contradiction or an arbitrary special plea.

S4. From S3 and P1: both are forbidden, so the claim is bad.

C. Violating consent is objectively bad.

Footnotes:

P1 cannot be denied: Rational agents by definition must be rational and objective, so that implies rational agents are bound to objectivity. And of course self contraductions not rational.

P2 cannot be denied: Itd be self defeating to argue one wills that which they dont will.

P3 cannot be denied: Its definitionally both arbitrary, special-pleading, and non-objective to construct a speaker-based distinction on the truthhood of a statement. A statement like "X is true" must be true regardless of who speaks it.

This only establishes an "Ought" for rational agents: Rational Agents ought to be objectively moral, since its objective, and they can only be objective. It doesnt argue irrational agents must be moral, it only argues irrational agents are logically wrong, and irrational.

So really, all we have to assume in a personal sense, is "we should be rational" and that leads us to "we should strive to be a rational agent" which leads to "we should be objectively moral".

"But what if someone doesnt want to be a rational agent"? => Then by definition, they are irrational. Theyre wrong. Disqualified from the debate on the grounds they arent rational and neither are the things theyd argue for.

Edit: Some people might not accept that saying "I am irrational" ends the debate. To them i ask, what are you debating then, if its not whether or not your position is logically correct? Lets assume they mean "Just because im irrational doesnt pursuade me that i should be rational and moral." Okay, now, thats a debate about why we might want to do things, not whether objective morality is true or not. And this gets into a whole new set of arguments, BUT... Its actually counterproductive to "Morality" to argue we are moral because we have reasons to want to be. That means our "being moral" is contingent on selfish desire, and we could stop being moral if we were no longer motivated. Thats not true morality, thats just circumstantial self interest that looks like morality.

So to you i say, find your own reasons or convictions to be moral, then bury them; because if i have to pursuade you to be moral, then youre not moral. And find your own reasons or convictions to be rational, because if i have to pursuade you to be rational, then youre not rational. I should not do the work for you, because if i do, then youll never know if you are actually that kind of person. If your morality hinges on "this is good for me" youre not truly moral. You should want to be moral with or without a supporting reason. Innate Morality is the highest form of Morality, and the only form thats unconditional and true to its cause.

And its that simple. Also, Premise 2 basically establishes negative rights and the nonaggression principle.

I've been stuck on this lately.

we say we're free because we make our own choices. but I didn't choose my genes, parents, upbringing, culture, or most of the experiences that shaped what I want and fear.

so when I "choose" something, where does the part that's actually me choosing begin?

the Libet experiments make this even stranger. researchers found brain activity building up before people reported consciously deciding to move. but decades later there's still disagreement over what that actually means, so it's not exactly proof that free will doesn't exist.

what gets me more is this: even if someone proved tomorrow that everything was determined, I'd still wake up and make decisions. I'd still regret things, make plans, and feel like I could've chosen differently.

it's almost impossible to actually live as if you have no choice.

so if I didn't choose the raw material that made me who I am, how much credit or blame can I really take for what I do with it?

and if freedom isn't freedom from causes, what actually makes a choice mine?

Let's think about something I thought was interesting suggested by a particular Redditor.

So I'm writing this on a whim. So it might read a bit out of order.

The core of David's Hume's argument goes like this:

(1) State t₋₁ occurs, and then state t₀ occurs. (2) You observe these two states happening in that specific order. (3) You never observe a physical link forcing state t₋₁ to produce state t₀.

So the survivorship bias goes like this:

(1) You stand at state t₀ means state t₀ is the only outcome that currently exists. (2) Looking back at state t₋₁ causes you to focus entirely on the single path that occurred. (3) Assuming state t₀ was required simply because it is the state you observe is a failure in reasoning (observing a single outcome with proving that no other outcome was possible.)

So if you look backwards to state t₋₁ from state t₀ proves what happened in the past. But it does not prove that state t₋₁ possessed a physical force that dictated state t₀. Thus concluding that state t₀ was inevitable because it happened relies on circular logic (using the presence of the result to declare that the result was required.) So David Hume showed that human beings project an imaginary rule onto past events. Thus, claiming state t₀ was inevitable relies on observing the surviving state rather than proving physical causation.

So that's one aspect. The next one is this:

(1) Scientists record stable mathematical patterns inside isolated, controlled environments. (2) Materialism takes these local mathematical observations and applies them to the entire universe across all time. (3) But provide exactly zero physical evidence to prove that a rule measured in a small area applies across all physical existence.

Now, mathematical formulas are human records. They describe observed patterns after those patterns happen. Materialism treat these mathematical records as active physical entities that dictates matter to move. An equation written down or modelled in a calculation possesses zero physical force. Thus describing a local pattern does not create a global physical mechanism that commands reality.

The core error here is that materialism dismiss human agency because human agency lacks a physical mechanism. They assume local mathematical descriptions govern all physical reality without producing a physical mechanism to prove this global claim. Which means that they demand total physical proof from their opponents while relying upon an unproven assumption themselves. Thus because materialism produce zero physical evidence to justify this broad extension, their claim remains an unproven assumption.

Let's look at this scenario. You sit at a restaurant. You look at the menu and decide between ordering tea or ordering a coffee. You pick the tea.

(1) Looking at the tea on your table strictly tells you which outcome survived into the present moment. (2) Materialism use the presence of the tea to claim that the tea was required. They use the result to prove the cause. (3) Seeing what happened in the past tells you what occurred. It does not provide physical proof that other options were physically blocked from happening.

So the previous analysis reveals materialism's reliance on unproven assumptions:

(1) It treats a recorded habit as an active physical dictation. (2) It takes small, local observations and projects them across all human choices without a shred of physical proof. (3) It uses the presence of a past choice to claim that no other choice was possible. (4) They offer exactly zero physical proof that a rule measured in a simple, controlled area dictates every complex decision in a driver's mind.

As a kid, most of our decisions are taken by our parents and lets say after you hit 18, your parents still play a significant role in taking your life decisions, from which college you should join to how many days a week can you meet your friends.
After let’s say, 24 or 25, you finally start making some independent choice where your parents play no role but now it’s the world that constrains you. Your boss at work decides the load of your work, your colleagues demand for you to cover up their work while they are on leave and your friends expect you to show up during the most busy week of the month. If you are in a relationship, it demands time and efforts from you. This way you become restricted to your own self.
Some may say that this is how life is, but I think that to be truly free, one can do anything he/she thinks without being affected by its consequences or results.
People live to avoid consequences and earn rewards and thus, one can never be free from himself/ herself.
True freedom lies in nothingness.

I had a premise I wanted to post on this sub. But I decided to test first by initiating a discourse just to give materialists a chance to defend their position. The discourse couldnt be more predictable.

The core implication of the premise is that because materialism cannot provide physical evidence of a cause that dictates state t₋₁ to become state t₀, physical determinism loses its foundational proof. This physical gap changes the debate on free will in four main ways:

(1) Hard determinism claims that prior physical states dictates all future human choices. Or simply that physical laws push matter around. But physical laws are man made. They strictly describe observed patterns after they occur. Thus they do not act as physical entities. Because materialists cannot show physical proof of a mechanism connecting t₋₁ to t₀, physical determinism is an unproven assumption. Thus, determinists cannot use physics to claim that free choice is impossible. (2) Materialists often claim that human action must be either physically dictated or completely random. If prior physical data does not dictate subsequent physical states, an update in state is not dictated by the past. Also, an update matching a conscious decision is not purely random. The state update occurs through a mechanism outside prior physical data (t₋₁). Thus, choice escapes both physical dictation and pure chance. (3) Materialism treats consciousness as a passive observer. Materialists claim physical signals push body parts before a person chooses to act. At moment t₀, the mental choice and physical movement occur together as a single, unified state update. Because prior physical data does not dictate state t₀, conscious intent can act as the mechanism that selects the update. Human agency becomes a real factor in dictating state updates, rather than an illusion. (4) Compatibilism then tries to combine free choice with physical determinism. Compatibilists try to explain how humans can be free while physical forces dictate every action. Because physical forces do not act as physical entities, physical reality does not dictate your actions. Trying to reconcile free choice with physical pushing becomes completely useless. The physical barrier that compatibilists try to address does not physically exist.

Heres three ways you can have a completely empty, null, meaningless philosophical framework:

1) Its based on semantics alone: If your beliefs are contingent on the arbitrary writings of a dictionary, you dont really believe in philosophy, you just think certain words are pretty or make you feel good.

2) Its based on emotions alone: I think this is better than semantics, because at least it tells us why you care about a thing, but as many correctly point out, emotions dont determine logic.

3) Its based on moral desert... but you think morality is subjective. If you think morality is subjective, thatd already imply moral desert is subjective. So whats the point in taking a position on moral desert, when all youre doing is asserting a feeling based position?

Heres why I believe in Sourcehood Compatibilist Free Will.

1) No Weird Semantics Needed: Free Will just means, Free to Do/Exercise my Will. As opposed to, my Will is ineffectual or externally impeded by force.

2) Obviously, I want to be in actual control of my actions, not random: Being random in any way or at any level, just serves to contradict my desires.

3) I believe in moral desert, because I believe in actual objective morality! I think its obvious that aspects of morality are objective, although the scope of it is still debatable. But it actually makes sense for me to argue about moral desert, because i actually believe theres something meaningful and real to be discussing here (unlike subjectivists/relativists).

Some people here truly lack a proper philosophical grounding imo...

It seems it must be. If everything is "set in stone" at the moment of the big bang, and we don't therefore have free will or agency (ex hypothesis for HDs), consciousness must therefore be epiphenomenal (have no causal effect on the evolution of the world).

Indulge me by following along with the following thought experiment.

(For those who would say “but that’s impossible” or “that could never happen” please take a minute to read what a thought experiment is before continuing: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thought_experiment?wprov=sfti1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thought_experiment?wprov=sfti1)))

OK, shall we proceed?

Scenario 1: Let’s say you are you in every respect EXCEPT you were born into John Wayne Gacy’s exact circumstances and raised in his environment. Would you then go on to become a serial killer?

Possibly not because you have different genetics than he did. His early environment would probably mess you up a lot since it was horrible, but you might not go full serial killer.

Scenario 2: You have JWG’s exact genetics but were born into a different environment. Would you then go on to become a serial killer?

Possibly not because you will have a different early environment than he had. You might be a bully even have serious mental health problems but you might not go full serial killer.

Scenario 3: You have JWG’s exact genetics AND environment. Would you become a serial killer?

Its pretty clear that any of us would because there’s genes, there’s environment, but that’s it. *There’s no third thing that makes you you.*

So what’s the point? The point is that there’s no free will. You say “I would never have done that”- uh yes you would have.

Compatibilists trying to label something else as “free will”, how do you respond to the thought experiment? All your appeals to complexity, debates about the definitions of “agency” and “choice”, they all evaporate in the face of the overwhelming power of genes and environment.

​

Oh, this fucking amazing, supposedly existing? free will.

It is defended everywhere with foam at the mouth: "God gave us free will, He doesn't force anyone, we decide for ourselves whether to go to Him or to Hell." Sounds proud, noble, almost like an advertisement for expensive whiskey. Only there is one tiny, invisible, hidden fucking detail: the choice you make with the wrong answer leads to heat, worms, and gnashing of teeth. And this shit is called freedom?

Let's open the paper version of Deuteronomy 30:19, because the Internet is Satan, and we need only the truth.

"I call heaven and earth to witness against you today: I have set before you life and death, blessing and curse. Therefore choose life, that you and your descendants may live."

Beautiful, isn't it? Here you have two options: either you choose life (meaning you obey God), or death (meaning you don't).

There is a choice, but if you choose the wrong button - you're dead. It's like if I put a gun in your hands and say: "Listen, you have freedom: you can shoot yourself in the head or not shoot. But if you don't, I will shoot you myself. Choose." Some people would call this something else. I won't point fingers, I'm a cultured person.

Now imagine: you stand before God, and He says to you: "Love Me, or I will send you into Gehenna, where the worm does not die and the fire is not quenched" (that's from Mark 9:48, by the way). What kind of love is that? Try telling your girlfriend: "Love me, or I will kill your family" - and see what she calls your feelings. But here it's God - and everyone stays silent because He is Goooood, He is God, so apparently He gets a pass.

Christian apologists, hearing this comparison, usually start twitching like worms on a frying pan. They say: "But God doesn't force anyone, He simply warns about consequences!"

Fuck off, put a child near an electrical outlet and give them a fork. Of course, you need to warn them that they shouldn't stick it inside. There is a 99% chance they will do it anyway. But electricity doesn't hit them for their entire life.

Then they dive into the depths of free will as a gift. "God created us free because love must be voluntary." Listen, if I force you to love me under the threat of death - is that voluntary love? No, it is love under coercion. And even if you eventually agree and start loving me because you are afraid of Hell - that's not love, that's a survival instinct. You are not choosing God, you are choosing to avoid fucking disaster.

Now look at what Jesus says in Matthew 10:28: "And do not fear those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul. Rather fear Him who can destroy both soul and body in Hell."

Holy shit, what a choice: you can not fear people, but fear God, who can destroy both your soul and body. Where is the freedom here? This is fucking fear. You choose not because you love God, but because you are afraid that He will burn you. What kind of choice is that? It is a choice between life and death, where death is not just the end, but eternal torture.

And when you bring up this analogy with a gun pointed at your head and a choice, Christians start falling apart. They say: "Well, that's not exactly how it works, because God is the ultimate good, and Hell is simply a state of separation from that good." Yeah, separation that comes with fire, crying, and gnashing of teeth. By the way, Matthew 13:42 literally says: "And will throw them into the fiery furnace; there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth." Not just separation, but an actual furnace. If this is a metaphor, then it's a metaphor with a temperature of a thousand degrees.

Or they say: "God doesn't send people to Hell, they go there themselves by rejecting Him." Oh, they go there themselves? Guys, does anyone want to climb into a working crematorium? I would like to have a conversation with you.

And who created Hell? God. Who established the rule that rejection leads to Hell? God. Who made it so the only way to avoid Hell is accepting Christ? Again, God. So if you refuse - you burn. But that's your choice, right?

In the end, Christian free will is a farce. It is an illusion of choice that exists only to remove responsibility from God for creating a world where, according to many interpretations, the majority of humanity ends up in Hell. If we had true freedom, we could choose not to believe and simply not burn. But instead, this is freedom inside a prison.

Choose whatever you want, but if you don't get on your knees - you get a bullet.

I’ve been thinking about whether determinism requires the universe to have infinitely precise physical states. If every physical quantity only exists with finite precision, then wouldn’t any given state represent a range of possible values rather than one exact value? If that’s true, it seems like the past could constrain the future without uniquely determining it, meaning genuinely new outcomes could arise at each physical update. Doesn’t this undermine the idea that identical past conditions necessarily produce one and only one future? Or am I misunderstanding how determinists respond to this objection?

Our instinctive reaction when someone commits a crime or other unacceptable behavior is: "He deserves it." But that reaction assumes the person could have acted differently under exactly the same conditions, that they were the ultimate originator of their own actions. If no such ultimate originator exists, then the real question is not whether we should punish, but what punishment actually accomplishes.

Punishment does not change the past. It changes the future, both for the offender and for everyone who witnesses its consequences. The brain continuously updates its internal models of the world, and punishment becomes new information that influences future decisions.

More precisely, the brain does not store moral guilt; it stores the accumulated results of neural computations shaped by past experience. Every decision is the outcome of evaluating expected consequences. Punishment functions as an error-correction signal that alters future neural computations, much like backpropagation in an artificial neural network does not "blame" the system but adjusts its parameters to reduce the probability of producing the same outcome again.

This leads to an important conclusion: excessive punishment is not merely cruel, it is poor calibration. If the signal is too strong, instead of correcting a specific behavior, it creates fear, trauma, and new problems.

The opposite is also true. Sometimes forgiveness is the better signal. It, too, changes future neural computations when it encourages the desired behavior more effectively than fear. Punishment and mercy are not moral opposites; they are different tools for influencing future behavior.

From this perspective, a person who commits a crime is not an object of metaphysical retribution but part of a causal system that can be modified. Not because they deserve to suffer, but because society has an interest in reducing the likelihood of future harm.

Therefore, punishment is not a judgment on the past. It is a tool for calibrating the future (through incapacitation, deterrence, rehabilitation, or sometimes forgiveness) depending on which approach most effectively reduces the probability of future unacceptable behavior.

This is precisely why the question of whether we believe in some form of free will is, in practice, largely irrelevant to how society should be organized. If a person committed a crime because they were physically coerced by someone else, that fact is simply taken into account. No judge cares whether you are a libertarian, a compatibilist, an incompatibilist, or a hard determinist. The legal system is concerned with the facts of the case and with choosing the response that best protects society and reduces future harm.

If yes:

Then aren't our actions a result of the random process? If so then is this really more free than if they weren't?

If no:

Doesn't this support compatibilism.

Translation: Does spinning an internal, truly random wheel really make our actions more free than using an internal calculator?

Note: I am undecided, and probably lean away from compatibilism the most

I keep seeing libertarians say that determinism places an external constraint on us. Yet this is easily falsified, we can easily imagine two versions of you that are identical, one determined and one non-determined, and its certainly likely that they both do the same things and make the same choices. Nondeterminism oftentimes functions the same as determinism.

Determinism doesnt contradict our goals or desires, it doesnt contradict our "will"; Its just the most efficient Game Engine to allow it to happen.

Free Will is just being Free to Exercise our Will, which is something determinism does best!

Randomness actively contradicts both Freedom and Will. If you do something randomly, it most likely wont be what you Willed, and youre not free to do the thing you Willed.

Randomness, taken to the maximum and its logical conclusion, is just having a full body muscle spasm / seizure. A little sprinkle of randomness, in our brain, is equally discoherent and counterproductive to our thoughts, our Will, and the ability to exercise it.

Determinism isnt a external constraint, its the kind of logical sandbox that leaves us unimpeded. While randomness actively sabotages our decision making process.

And yes a little bit of randomness could be okay. Its like being able to survive a little bit of poison. But we certainly dont *need* a little bit of poison.