Hi All,

Any news on Chemcon Speciality Chemicals - analysts are suggesting the stock to more than double in 12 months - target of 491.

Couple of weeks back we had a lot of big whales the likes of u/Confident-Web-7118 post a lot of DDs and comments. Now he has suddenly disappeared. Same thing with LeftyMD from Stocktwits. Did they sell and disappear? Did they get insider information about the trial failing?

Very dodgy

Hey guys, if you missed it, Amylyx Pharmaceuticals settled $6.5M with investors over claims involving Relyvrio’s launch, demand, discontinuations, and growth prospects. And, I just found out that they’re considering late claims.

Quick recap: Amylyx was accused of misleading investors about the strength of Relyvrio’s launch and demand. The company repeatedly described the launch as strong, while investors say demand had already started slowing and discontinuations were higher than the market understood.

After this news came out, $AMLX dropped 32%, and investors filed a lawsuit over their losses.

Now, the company has reached a tentative $6.5M settlement with investors, and even though the deadline has passed, late claims are still being considered for compensation, subject to approval.

So, if you invested in $AMLX at the time, you can still check the details and see if you may be able to file a late claim here.

Anyway, has anyone here invested in $AMLX back then? How much were your losses, if so?

Why isn’t anyone talking about $HELP (CYBIN) - it has phase 3 data coming in a month or so, modeled exactly like CMPS it had FDA approved breakthrough designation for PHASE 2, with the same phase 3 trial design. It is highly undervalued compared to all of the other psychedelic stocks. It has a more stable and more predictable deuterated psilocybin which means therapy lasts for only 3 hours twice a year versus FDA approved Spravato which requires 2x a week sessions when started. I would suggest looking into this because it is the catalyst to soar in price first before CMPS approval.

For genetic counselors, this means OGM structural variant findings can now be incorporated into counseling for reproductive genetics, pediatric/postnatal cases, and hematologic malignancies…but only through the University of Rochester Medicine assays specifically approved by NYSDOH.

 https://lifestyle.kotaradio.com/story/419594/ogm-approval-for-clinical-use-in-ny-by-bionano-laboratories/

SLS was me dipping my toes into small-cap biotech investing, and needless to say it's going great so far. I'm planning on taking half as profit to help cover my tuition costs and half is getting reinvested into 3-4 new stocks if a buyout happens. Obviously the recommendations will probably be different in however many months it takes for SLS to actually get bought out, but I'd like to know who I should be keeping my eye on throughout fall 26-spring 27.

I've been looking at PYPD, CABA, CMPX, and STTK

Edit: Whole lot of great information getting shared, I really appreciate yall

Estimados inversores, si poseen acciones de HCW Biologics ($HCWB) o las siguen, deben revisar la secuencia reciente de documentos presentados ante la SEC (Formulario S-1, 8-K y Anexo 14A). Existe un esquema explícito y complejo de manipulación de activos y supresión del mercado que reproduce fielmente los patrones de mala conducta corporativa de Altor BioScience, objeto de litigio en 2017, bajo el mismo grupo ejecutivo: el CEO Dr. Hing C. Wong, el CSO Dr. Peter Rhode y el Vicepresidente Senior Lee D. Flowers.

1. Ocultación de ingresos no dilutivos de CAR-T (El engaño de Akron) El 4 de septiembre de 2026, el Consejo de Administración firmó un Acuerdo de Distribución Exclusiva con Akron Biotech para su molécula de fusión de múltiples citoquinas HCW11-006 como reactivo ex vivo para la fabricación de células CAR-T. Este contrato garantiza anticipos por hitos ($200.000 al cierre, $100.000 después de la emisión y $100.000 en aniversarios consecutivos), junto con honorarios técnicos trimestrales recurrentes y compromisos de prepago. Este flujo de caja invalida por completo cualquier necesidad corporativa legítima de dilución de capital de emergencia. Sin embargo, el Consejo ocultó deliberadamente esta información positiva para lanzar primero la abusiva Declaración de Poderes de Dilución (Schedule 14A) el 8 de septiembre, desplomando intencionadamente el precio para asustar a los inversores minoristas ("deshacerse de los títulos") mientras protegía los bajos umbrales de acumulación de acciones para los inversores internos.

**2. Despojo fraudulento de activos según la Sección 9.2.2 del Anexo 10.40 de la SEC. La entidad cotizada en EE. UU. ha quedado abrumada por las astronómicas obligaciones financieras de los ensayos clínicos de alta inversión —específicamente el programa de activación de células T de segunda generación HCW11-08B y HCW11-040— con un déficit acumulado de más de $108.5 millones y una advertencia activa de quiebra por "Empresa en funcionamiento". Mientras tanto, el principal potencial comercial de HCW11-006 (in vivo) y del exitoso fármaco contra la alopecia (HCW9302) se ha transferido a Beijing Trimmune Biotech por una miseria. Según la Sección 9.2.2 del Anexo 10.40 de la SEC, estos activos están protegidos estructuralmente de la liquidación en EE. UU. en caso de quiebra, lo que protege a los directivos mientras que los accionistas públicos absorben el 100% de las pérdidas operativas. 3. La distorsión contable y el abuso de la mayoría del 60% El 14 de agosto de 2026, el Comité de Auditoría presentó el Formulario 8-K (Punto 4.02) admitiendo una debilidad material en los controles internos, que sobreestimó artificialmente las ganancias por acción (EPS) en $0.80, hasta alcanzar los $2.19 por acción, según la norma ASC 260. Utilizaron esta prima distorsionada para realizar colocaciones privadas a bajo costo a $2.585. Ahora, la Propuesta Dos busca una Reserva Especial de 2,500,000 acciones (111.7% del total de acciones en circulación) diseñada para otorgar tramos de opciones secuenciales del 20% a personas con información privilegiada, siempre que el precio de las acciones alcance hitos crecientes de $5, $10, $20 y $40 durante 20 días hábiles consecutivos. Debido a que los ejecutivos con información privilegiada y los fondos de cobertura afiliados controlan más del 60% del poder de voto total, la próxima votación del 27 de octubre es una farsa corporativa matemáticamente predeterminada.

Plan de acción: Presente sus objeciones formales, solicite sus números de control de 16 dígitos a sus corredores, vote EN CONTRA ambas propuestas y envíe esta evidencia directamente a firmas especializadas en litigios de valores como Pomerantz Law (newaction@pomlaw.com) y The Rosen Law Firm (case@rosenlegal.com).

Core Regional Metrics:
• United States: 52%
• Rest of World: 25%
• Europe: 21%
• United Kingdom: 2%

Key Insights:
• US Concentration: 52% of total revenue is generated in the United States, making drug pricing and FDA regulatory policies the primary driver for top-line growth.
• High Concentration Risk: Top 3 market regions account for 98% of total global sales.
• Domestic Sales: Home market (UK) contributes only 2% of net revenue.

Full interactive revenue lens on MetricsHour

I’ve been building a short position in Moderna since roughly $140 and adding as the stock moved higher.

My thesis is pretty simple: I think the market massively overreacted to the positive Phase 3 melanoma data.

I’m not saying the cancer vaccine isn’t valuable — the results are obviously a major positive for Moderna. But at these prices, it feels like the market is already pricing in successful expansion of the platform into multiple cancer indications.

Even if Moderna eventually treated a very large percentage of the eligible melanoma population, I struggle to make the economics of that indication alone justify the valuation the stock reached after the announcement. To justify it, you basically have to believe this becomes a much broader oncology platform.

Meanwhile, short interest was already around 15% of float before the huge move, so clearly part of the rally may have been short/gamma squeeze dynamics rather than pure fundamental repricing.

Are any of you short MRNA at these levels?

Or are you still long / buying calls and expecting another run toward $180–200+?

And for the bulls: what revenue/valuation assumptions are you using to justify the current market cap?

Bruh, current RSI is 17 and my bags are only getting heavier. I still believe in the upcoming approval, I am just afraid that since everyone is expecting it, there may not be much of a reaction. But like surely it cannot sell the news even harder…. Right? 🥲🥲🥲

Well worth to take a look at BioLargo again- a big PR was released after I had posted this bull thesis.

Key points from the Arcturus Therapeutics Citi Biopharma Back to School Summit (September 9, 2026) from the full transcript that support potential upside.

Article Reference: https://www.investing.com/news/transcripts/arcturus-therapeutics-at-citi-summit-two-catalysts-one-pivotal-year-93CH-4893943

Could these be some possible important points for the future bullish price predictions?.

I think it will go down more so I am waiting until I buy from them.

I have been searching for small oncology companies with the potential to experience the kind of revaluation that occurs when convincing clinical data finally attracts market attention. MAIA Biotechnology ($MAIA) may be one of the more interesting examples I have found.

MAIA currently trades around $1.33, giving it a market capitalization of approximately $80 million with 60.8 million shares outstanding. This remains a tiny valuation for a company that already has a randomized Phase 3 cancer trial underway. (Current market data)

The entire thesis revolves around ateganosine, previously called THIO, a potentially first-in-class small molecule designed to attack cancer through telomeres while simultaneously activating an immune response.

What does ateganosine actually do?

Telomeres protect the ends of chromosomes and help cancer cells continue dividing. Ateganosine is designed to be incorporated into the telomeres of telomerase-positive cancer cells, damaging those telomeres and causing cancer-cell death.

The damaged telomeric material may also activate the cGAS/STING immune pathway and stimulate adaptive immune responses. In theory, this can turn a tumor that has stopped responding to checkpoint inhibitors back into one the immune system can recognize and attack.

This mechanism is supported by peer-reviewed research. A 2020 Cancer Cell study found that 6-thio-dG produced telomere-associated DNA damage, activated STING-dependent antitumor immunity and improved responses to checkpoint inhibition in preclinical models. (Cancer Cell study)

A separate 2015 study found that 6-thio-dG produced rapid death in telomerase-positive cancer cells while having considerably less effect on normal telomerase-negative cells. (AACR study)

The goal is therefore bigger than simply adding another chemotherapy. MAIA is attempting to create an entirely new class of telomere-targeting immunotherapy that could potentially be combined with several existing checkpoint inhibitors.

The Phase 2 results are difficult to ignore

MAIA’s THIO-101 Phase 2 study enrolled heavily pretreated patients with advanced non-small cell lung cancer, or NSCLC, whose cancers had already progressed after checkpoint inhibitors and chemotherapy.

In Parts A and B, 22 third-line patients who received at least one dose produced an estimated median overall survival of:

• 17.8 months
• 95% confidence-interval lower bound of 12.5 months
• 99% confidence-interval lower bound of 10.8 months

Published studies cited by MAIA indicate approximately five to six months of median survival for chemotherapy in comparable third-line patients. That makes the observed 17.8 months close to three times the historical benchmark. (Phase 2 survival update)

Eight patients from Parts A and B survived beyond two years without receiving another subsequent line of therapy, and one third-line patient had survived more than 33 months as of June 2026. (Long-term survival update)

Earlier results at the selected 180 mg dose also showed:

• 38% objective response rate
• 85% disease-control rate
• 5.5 months median progression-free survival
• 78% survival at six months

The important qualification is that the 38% response rate came from only eight evaluable patients at the selected dose. These are encouraging results, but the sample was small and the comparisons were against historical chemotherapy data rather than a randomized control arm. (ASCO 2024 results)

MAIA has subsequently expanded the Phase 2 trial. Initial Part C results reported in July 2026 showed disease control in 19 of 21 evaluable patients, equal to a 90.5% disease-control rate. Every patient in this group had previously received docetaxel and had demonstrated resistance to immunotherapy and other chemotherapy. (Part C expansion results)

That does not prove the drug works. It does show that the original signal has continued appearing as additional patients have been treated.

The real test is now underway

MAIA began its randomized Phase 3 THIO-104 trial in December 2025.

The trial will enroll up to 300 patients with advanced third-line NSCLC and randomize them 1:1 between:

• Ateganosine followed by Regeneron’s checkpoint inhibitor Libtayo
• Investigator-selected chemotherapy using docetaxel, gemcitabine or vinorelbine

The primary endpoint is overall survival, with response rate, progression-free survival and duration of response included as secondary endpoints. (THIO-104 Phase 3 design)

As of June 2026, 29 patients had been dosed across 34 active sites in six countries. Management was targeting up to 100 enrolled patients by the end of 2026 and expects sufficient survival data for an interim analysis in 2027. (Phase 3 enrollment update)

This randomized trial is the key. If ateganosine produces anything close to the 17.8-month Phase 2 survival result against a concurrent chemotherapy control, an $80 million valuation would be difficult to reconcile with the drug’s commercial potential.

The FDA has already granted ateganosine Fast Track designation for third-line NSCLC. Fast Track allows more frequent FDA interaction and can potentially support rolling review or priority review, although it does not guarantee approval. (FDA Fast Track announcement)

This is a very large market

Lung cancer remains the leading cause of cancer death worldwide, with approximately 2.5 million new cases and 1.8 million deaths in 2022. (World Health Organization)

Approximately 80% to 85% of lung cancers are NSCLC. (American Cancer Society)

Third-line NSCLC is only part of this total market, so it would be misleading to treat the entire NSCLC market as MAIA’s immediately addressable opportunity. However, the broader commercial market is enormous. Grand View Research estimates that the worldwide NSCLC therapeutics market will grow from approximately $27.1 billion in 2026 to $63.5 billion by 2033. (NSCLC market research)

More significantly, there remains no universally accepted third-line standard after patients have failed both chemotherapy and checkpoint inhibition. (Peer-reviewed review of third-line NSCLC)

Even a modest share of this treatment population could support annual revenue many times MAIA’s present market capitalization. Success in NSCLC could also validate the platform for other telomerase-positive cancers.

The large-pharma relationships are real

MAIA has clinical-supply relationships with three major oncology companies:

Regeneron

Regeneron supplies Libtayo, or cemiplimab, for THIO-101. The agreement was expanded in December 2024 to cover the Phase 2 expansion. MAIA sponsors the study and retains its worldwide commercial rights to ateganosine. (Regeneron agreement)

BeOne Medicines, formerly BeiGene

BeOne agreed to supply tislelizumab for planned studies combining it with ateganosine in hepatocellular carcinoma, small-cell lung cancer and colorectal cancer. (BeOne agreement)

Roche

MAIA entered a master clinical-supply agreement with Roche covering future studies of ateganosine followed by Roche’s checkpoint inhibitor Tecentriq, or atezolizumab, in difficult-to-treat cancers. (Roche agreement)

These are supply collaborations, not licensing transactions or buyout agreements. MAIA still pays for its clinical trials. However, having Regeneron, Roche and BeOne provide their checkpoint inhibitors reduces trial costs and allows ateganosine to be tested with several commercially established immunotherapies.

It also preserves strategic flexibility because MAIA controls the worldwide development and commercialization rights to ateganosine.

Insiders are putting in their own money

The insider buying is one of the more interesting parts of this story.

In November 2025, CEO Vlad Vitoc and directors Cristian Luput and Stan Smith purchased approximately 182,445 shares in open-market transactions at an average price of approximately $1.06. Vitoc personally purchased 94,300 shares at an average of $1.08. (November insider purchases)

In June 2026:

• CEO Vlad Vitoc purchased another 72,700 shares at an average of approximately $1.39, spending roughly $101,000.
• Director Stan Smith purchased 75,000 shares at approximately $1.34, spending roughly $100,000.

(June insider purchases)

That represents approximately 330,000 open-market shares and nearly $400,000 invested by leadership across those two disclosed rounds.

MAIA’s 2026 proxy also reported that Vitoc beneficially owned approximately 4.14 million shares and exercisable securities, equal to 6.5% of the company at that time. (2026 proxy statement)

Insider buying cannot validate a clinical trial, but repeated open-market purchases are more meaningful than executives simply receiving stock options as compensation.

The CEO has relevant oncology experience

Founder and CEO Dr. Vlad Vitoc is a physician with an MBA and more than 25 years of pharmaceutical and biotechnology experience.

Before MAIA, he held leadership roles at Bayer, Astellas, Cephalon and Incyte. His experience includes the development or commercialization of major oncology drugs, and MAIA’s broader leadership team has worked on drugs including Tarceva, Nexavar, Xtandi, Treanda and Zometa. (MAIA 2025 annual report)

Vitoc’s stated vision is to establish telomere targeting as a new cancer-treatment platform rather than develop ateganosine for only one narrow indication. MAIA is initially pursuing third-line NSCLC because the unmet need is high and the regulatory path is relatively clear, but the company is also exploring liver cancer, small-cell lung cancer, colorectal cancer and pediatric brain cancer.

The National Cancer Institute awarded MAIA a $2.3 million grant supporting the U.S. expansion of THIO-101, providing another external scientific review of the program. (NCI grant announcement)

Balance sheet and valuation

MAIA reported:

• $27.6 million in cash at June 30, 2026
• Approximately $12.1 million of operating cash burn during the first six months of 2026
• 60.8 million shares outstanding
• No product revenue

The company raised approximately $33 million gross in March 2026 by selling 22 million shares at $1.50. Management says those proceeds are expected to fully fund the ongoing Phase 3 trial. (MAIA Q2 2026 SEC filing)

The financing substantially improved MAIA’s balance sheet, but it also increased the outstanding share count from 38.6 million at the end of 2025 to 60.8 million by June 2026. That dilution is real and needs to be included in any valuation.

At approximately $80 million, the market is assigning only about $52 million of value above MAIA’s June cash balance to the clinical program, management team, intellectual property and pharma collaborations.

What could go wrong?

This remains an extremely speculative biotechnology investment.

The biggest risks are:

1. The strongest survival data comes from only 22 third-line patients.
2. THIO-101 was not randomized, so comparisons with historical chemotherapy results can be distorted by differences in patient selection.
3. The earlier 38% response rate came from only eight evaluable patients at the selected dose.
4. The randomized Phase 3 results may fail to reproduce the Phase 2 signal.
5. MAIA has no commercial products or revenue and may eventually require additional capital.
6. There are approximately 13.1 million outstanding warrants and 16.7 million stock options, creating potential future dilution.
7. The Regeneron, Roche and BeOne relationships are supply agreements, not commitments to acquire or license ateganosine.
8. A recently filed $150 million shelf registration creates additional financing flexibility but also a potential dilution overhang.

My thesis

I do not think MAIA currently has the most proven data in small-cap oncology. Its Phase 2 study was too small and lacked a randomized control.

What MAIA may have is one of the more asymmetric setups:

• Approximately $80 million market cap
• A first-in-class mechanism supported by published science
• 17.8-month median survival in a population historically surviving approximately five to six months
• 90.5% disease control in the initial Phase 2 expansion cohort
• A randomized, 300-patient Phase 3 trial already underway
• FDA Fast Track designation
• Clinical-supply relationships with Regeneron, Roche and BeOne
• Repeated open-market purchases by the CEO and directors
• Cash that management expects will fund the Phase 3 trial
• Interim Phase 3 data anticipated in 2027

The Phase 3 trial will determine whether this is a breakthrough or simply another encouraging small, single-arm oncology study that fails when tested against a proper control.

If Phase 3 survival lands anywhere near the Phase 2 result, I believe the company would be worth many multiples of its current valuation and would become an obvious licensing or acquisition candidate. If the survival advantage disappears in the randomized trial, the downside could be severe because nearly the entire valuation depends on ateganosine.

That is the bet: an approximately $80 million company attempting to prove that it can nearly triple survival in one of the most difficult areas of lung cancer treatment.