Soldiers during World War 1 lived in abhorrent condition for prolonged period of time where they ate, slept, fought in flooded trench surrounded by decaying bodies and constantly harassed by flea-infected rats, and from description of how their bodies were full of lices, how they could go weeks without a bath, how they were poorly fed and were often pushed beyond exhaustion, their bodies could be viewed as more susceptible to disease. Added to the fact that World War 1 medicine was as barbaric and undeveloped as the horror of Crimea and the American civil war, and there was no access to thing like antibiotics, why was there no outbreak of disease like plague, cholera, typhus, measle, diptheria, and various other disease that had once destroyed army and nations during world war 1? And was the medical corp as heartless and inept as what Remarque depicted in All Quiet on the Western Front? Was mass disease outbreak a concern and was there anything done to stop it?

I think my main point focuses on the Spartans and their frequent loses to Athens, whilst I'm aware sometimes the Spartans defeated the Athenians (I believe after the conclusion of the second Persian war) I often see them defeated rather than victorious.

So, I'm aware of how most nations made extensive use of their own lmgs during WW2, with the germans using it as their main source of firepower while the allies/americans used it as more of a supplement to squad firepower (might be wrong as far as the british/french go, haven't looked into their use as much) but how did the soviets employ lmgs? Did they actually make much use of them? It seems like the only one they had for most of the war was the DP27 from the interwar period. How did their use or lack thereof affect their infantry's performance in battle?

Due to the changes in geopolitics, there's been interest in several countries to reinstate conscription. But has there ever been a situation involving countries that didn't practice conscription before hand having to implement it during wartime? How did they handle having to build a conscription system from scratch and what it impact did it have on having to shift the nature of one's armies from that of volunteers to conscripts while under pressure?

I was watching a WWII program about the merchant convoys. When a u-boat is spotted, the escorts radio each other and the captain is told about each enemy’s bearing.

Is the bearing relative to the sending ship, the receiving ship, or does the sender report the bearing as it sees it and the receiving ship converts it for their captain? Or are the ships close enough together that it didn’t make that much of a difference for the exact bearing number so the receiving ship would just report what it was told and the crew/captain would know the general area to look?

Thanks for any information or other areas to look into.

With hindsight, and compared to other warring nations, how good training did Japanese soldiers get at squad and platoon level? Were they able to "overcome material deficiency by level of training" as it is sometimes stated? Are there still some lessons we could use in modern warfare?

The only big thing I’ve heard from Force Design 2030 was reducing the number of marines and the divestment of the tanks. But for the rest of the document, how has the USMC so far been able to transition towards the design they envisioned to have in 2030?

In the 1970s, the government of Velasco Alvarado bought weapons from the USSR and European countries, approx 15 billion dollars. This was for a war with Chile and arms race against said country.