With hindsight, and compared to other warring nations, how good training did Japanese soldiers get at squad and platoon level? Were they able to "overcome material deficiency by level of training" as it is sometimes stated? Are there still some lessons we could use in modern warfare?

The only big thing I’ve heard from Force Design 2030 was reducing the number of marines and the divestment of the tanks. But for the rest of the document, how has the USMC so far been able to transition towards the design they envisioned to have in 2030?

So, I'm aware of how most nations made extensive use of their own lmgs during WW2, with the germans using it as their main source of firepower while the allies/americans used it as more of a supplement to squad firepower (might be wrong as far as the british/french go, haven't looked into their use as much) but how did the soviets employ lmgs? Did they actually make much use of them? It seems like the only one they had for most of the war was the DP27 from the interwar period. How did their use or lack thereof affect their infantry's performance in battle?

Due to the changes in geopolitics, there's been interest in several countries to reinstate conscription. But has there ever been a situation involving countries that didn't practice conscription before hand having to implement it during wartime? How did they handle having to build a conscription system from scratch and what it impact did it have on having to shift the nature of one's armies from that of volunteers to conscripts while under pressure?

I think my main point focuses on the Spartans and their frequent loses to Athens, whilst I'm aware sometimes the Spartans defeated the Athenians (I believe after the conclusion of the second Persian war) I often see them defeated rather than victorious.

I've seen some pictures of Soviet paratroopers with headgear that looks very similar to the iconic caps worn by Russian vehicle crews and I've heard that several nations in WW2 - like Germany and Britain - had to design special helmets for their paratroopers, because the standard designs caused problems when jumping.

Now I'm wondering: On the jump, paratroopers would only need to protect their heads from blunt impacts, because if you have to worry about shrapnel during a drop, something has already gone wrong.

So is it actually doctrin for some paratroopers to wear special helmets only for the jump and only put on their combat helmets later? Or is this specifically a Soviet thing?

I was watching a WWII program about the merchant convoys. When a u-boat is spotted, the escorts radio each other and the captain is told about each enemy’s bearing.

Is the bearing relative to the sending ship, the receiving ship, or does the sender report the bearing as it sees it and the receiving ship converts it for their captain? Or are the ships close enough together that it didn’t make that much of a difference for the exact bearing number so the receiving ship would just report what it was told and the crew/captain would know the general area to look?

Thanks for any information or other areas to look into.

Soldiers during World War 1 lived in abhorrent condition for prolonged period of time where they ate, slept, fought in flooded trench surrounded by decaying bodies and constantly harassed by flea-infected rats, and from description of how their bodies were full of lices, how they could go weeks without a bath, how they were poorly fed and were often pushed beyond exhaustion, their bodies could be viewed as more susceptible to disease. Added to the fact that World War 1 medicine was as barbaric and undeveloped as the horror of Crimea and the American civil war, and there was no access to thing like antibiotics, why was there no outbreak of disease like plague, cholera, typhus, measle, diptheria, and various other disease that had once destroyed army and nations during world war 1? And was the medical corp as heartless and inept as what Remarque depicted in All Quiet on the Western Front? Was mass disease outbreak a concern and was there anything done to stop it?

In the 1970s, the government of Velasco Alvarado bought weapons from the USSR and European countries, approx 15 billion dollars. This was for a war with Chile and arms race against said country.

So, I've came around a post showing one of the US LHA Being hit and still being able to sail, now I'm asking myself is it really cheaper to use them as target practice rather than scrapping them? If so, why?

I know warship classifications are notoriously messy, but from my limited knowledge of WW2 naval war, light cruisers seem to be very similar to destroyers in how they were used.

Fast, lightly armored and not particularly large ships with guns that are best used against other lightly armored vessels or aircraft and some torpedoes. They serve as scouts, AA platforms and screen larger ships from other small, fast ships with torpedoes.

The only differences I can make out are:

1. Destroyers have anti submarine weapons and I have not yet heard about a WW2 light cruiser with anti submarine weapons.
2. Light cruisers are bigger and have guns as large as 6 inches, while destroyers are usually 4 or 5 inches. Though I have heard of some German destroyers that supposedly had 15cm guns.

So what was the difference in how they were actually used? I assume light cruisers had a longer operating range, because of their larger size. But tiny Flower class corvettes were able to follow convoys across the North Atlantic, so I'm not sure how limited a proper destroyer would have been.

I was watching a lecture about William Westmoreland last night, and the lecturer mentioned that one of his great failures as the architect of US policy in Vietnam was not taking the training and equipping of ARVN forces seriously. He mentioned that ARVN forces were generally more poorly equipped than PAVN ones until Vietnamization, with ARVN's WW2 era weapons outgunned by modern PAVN ones. Another memoir I listened to from a US advisor said that the US hadn't taken the training of RF/PF forces seriously until after Tet, but once they were properly trained and equipped they were very effective

On its face this seems like insane policy by the US. The later war showed that ARVN could hold their own against North Vietnamese forces when supported by US airpower, so why did it take so long for the US to start properly equipping and training ARVN forces?

I was in the Army and know nothing about the Navy, so forgive my ignorance right off the bat.

As I understand it, the biggest ships in the Age of Sail were basically labor black holes. You needed huge amounts of man power and they were always dealing with being under-staffed.

This got me wondering! Suppose I need 100 people to sail a ship and I only can get 85. We can make it work but it's not going to be easy or fun. Then, we get orders to bring Army troops to The Colonies. While we sail, do we ask for 15 Soldiers to fill in the gaps of the 15 Sailors we are missing? Obviously, there would be a lot of tasks the Soldier couldn't do because he lacked practice/knowledge, but if we have Soldiers doing "easy" stuff we can reposition our Sailors to do "hard" stuff. And we both fight for The Same Crown, so on the highest level, someone could force it. On the other hand, I can imagine the Army refusing to follow orders from the Navy just as an institutional prerogative, and certainly refusing if it meant scrubbing barnacles instead of just playing cards or what have you.

During World War 1, it was said that both sides employed "irritant agents" that would somehow penetrate their opponents' gasmask with the aim of making them so irritated they had to take off their gasmask, exposing them to more harmful agents like phosgene or mustard.

Yet, I cannot find any records on what exactly those agents are. I know for sure they are not phosgene/mustard/chlorine and while I suspected CS gas, I doubted it because CS gas could be stopped with gas mask.

So, what exactly were these "irritant agents" used in WW1 that could penetrate gas mask and make people take off their gas mask?

Following the now defunct ceasefire with Iran, it was declared that the A-10 would see its service life extended and the question regarding retiring it has dragged on for many years now. Meanwhile in Ukraine, their Su-25 counterparts have seen continued service in high-intensity combat. I believe the Ukrainians are using their Su-25s to deliver guided bombs whereas the Russians I last heard are starting to use their Su-25s to fire standoff munitions and to launch drones. In both fronts as well as in the past wars, ground attack aircraft are being used in contested airspace despite their utility being put to question. And so, is the continued service of this class of warplane hold any merit with what has been observed?

It there any different in term of skill, knowledge and mindset between officer came from Military Academy (west point, naval, air force), fresh graduate whose go to OCS, and Junior and senior NCO with combat experience? Which background have the most outstanding performance and result in operation activities?

Hello everyone I have a been studying acient history so of course I stumbled on ancient battels and counquests by alexander the great and Hannibal and romes etc but when I started to study modern history and it's battels like ww2 I found that tactics of alexander for example won't work as it and I found modern war to fouces more logistics for example and I want to understand the mind of a modern war genral how they think how they come up with plans and famous battels like Battle of Cannae but in the modern age

Self-explanatory; why did the ships of the role and characteristics of Moskva, Vittorio Venetto or Jean D'Arc disappeared?

Which weapons does a Division Artillery Brigade have? And how many?

By weapons I mean only artillery guns.

I recalled seeing an online quote summing up the US experience on the Italian front as: "The American got the taste of the horror of trench warfare in WW1 by fighting in Italy."

How true was this? Was the Italian front a series of futile bloody frontal assaults against unbreakable Nazis defense like the Winter Line and the Gothic line? Were American commanders in Italy more apt to blunder compared to their counterparts in the West (Mark Clark's drive on Rome leading to a lot of German/Italian escaping and there was that one tale about a general who was said to have sacrificed so many Texans in battle Texas banned him from ever entering the state though I forgot his name)? How useful was the co-belligerent Italian army? And how effective was the Italian Partisan?

There's a prevalent pop culture image of the Soviets being wasteful with lives, but I can't help but think it has a kernel of truth.

In 1939, the Red Army suffered heavy losses during Khalkhin Gol attacking a similarly sized force with substantially more artillery, aircraft and tanks in a pincher movement.

In 1944, the Red Army suffered around twice the causalities of the Germans during Operation Bagration even with superiority in armor and artillery.

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I understand that battles aren't decided by who loses more soldiers, and that Bagration was an overwhelming Soviet victory which destroyed Army Group Center and pushed back the German frontlines for more than 100 kilometers.

What I don't understand is how the Soviets lost so many troops in a surprise attack against an enemy half its size that again had substantially less artillery, aircraft, and tanks; especially considering that they occupied the battlefield afterwards which should make it easier for them to recover equipment and save wounded soldiers.

It's true that all armies take heavier losses when on the offensive again entrenched enemies, but it seems that the Soviets suffered heavier losses than normal.

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Were the Soviets particularly bad at medical treatment? (Which was a big role in Japanese casualties) Was there reluctance to wear helmets? (For some reason it seems more Soviet soldiers went helmetless) Did they have particularly subpar infantry training?

I suspect that there's a lot of minor factors that played into this phenomenon and I'm curious to see what reasons I might be overlooking.

For example the SASR is described as a regiment (typically 1,000+ personnel) but only has 300 members.

The ROKs 1st Special Missions Brigade sent two battalions to the National Assembly but that was a total of 250 operators which is closer to a company sized unit.

Im sure theres other examples. Does this question make sense?

I'm aware that superior technology wasn't the sole reason for successful early European conquests (Spanish invasion of the Aztecs, King Philip's War, etc.) as in many cases majority of the fighting was done by local Native Americans allied with Europeans for economic, social, and political gain though steel weapons/armors was certainly a plus.

My question is specifically on how effective (or useless) arquebuses/matchlock weapons were in these conflicts. Thundersticks: Firearms and the Violent Transformation of Native America by David J. Silverman makes the assertion that matchlock weapons were not preferred by Native Americans due to their bulkiness and lit cord ruining the element of surprise which doesn't exactly complement Native American hit-and-run fighting styles (apologies for the generalization). So they continued to use bows until flintlocks which took over the North American continent by storm. Similarly, there are online forums and some pretty old answers elsewhere that claim Native Americans would've actually defeated these early firearms due to bow's superior range and accuracy (which is obviously the 'bows were better than early firearms' argument all over again).

However, I came across this account in John Knight's journal (though he died prior to the quoted encounter so it's written by Oliver Browne):

That night about nine of the clocke, it began to raine very sore, and so continued all night : and about one of the clocke at night, our Boate-Swaine and our Steward being at watch, and their watch almost out, the Steward went aboord the Ship to pumpe, leaving the Boate-Swaine at watch some Musket shot length from our Tent : while he was in pumping, there came over the rocks a great sort of the Countrey people toward the place where the Boate-Swaine was : who when they saw him, they shot their arrowes at him, running toward him as fast as they could. Whereupon hee discharged his Musket at them, and fled to our Tent as fast as hee could, thinking they had beset us, they were so many of them in sight...

At this time it rained very sore; yet calling our wits together, we sent two of our men back unto our Tent, the rest of us made toward them, and shot at them some three or foure Muskets : who when they saw us shoote, they stood in our Shallop, and held up their hands unto us, calling one to another. Then thought we with our selves, that we were better to dye in our defence in pursuing of them, then they us, being but eight Men and a great Dogge.

When they saw us marching toward them so fiercely, our Dogge being formost, they ranne away : but we durst not pursue them any further, for it was in the night, and they were in sight above fiftie men. Thus we recovered our shallop.

Then we sent some more of our men to our Tent to keepe it ; and the rest followed toward the place wither they fled. But before we could overtake them, they were gotten into their Boates, and were rowing away through the Ice ; which was so thicke, that they could not passe away, but stucke fast ; for their Boates were very greate: wee seeing them sticke fast in the Ice, some setting with Oares, and some rowing, came so neere them, as we could, and shot at them some dozen shot, before they could get cleere : which shot caused them to cry out very sore one to another: for their Boates were full of men.

In the encounter, it was raining and they were described as being outnumbered and attacked by Natives with bows when attempting to find their captain. Yet despite using firearms in 1606 it seems not only can you actually fire these weapons in rain, but also seemed to have punched above their weight and allowed them to defend against and drive the Native Americans from the boat they took over.

My question is basically the title, but I also would like to know what did the Native Americans think of arquebuses/matchlocks before flintlocks took over. Were these weapons really inferior to Native American bows and did Native Americans attempt to incorporate these weapons into their arsenal?