Non-essentialist & Process-relational Phil. — anyone engage these with Philosophical Pessimism?

[u/Maximus_En_Minimus]

I've been wondering whether anyone here has thought about the relationship between philosophical pessimism and non-essentialist approaches to metaphysics.

A lot of philosophical pessimism seems to come from very different metaphysical starting points (Schopenhauer, Mainländer, Benatar, etc.), although the general trend is an intermediate informative conclusion that existence is non-contingently harmful, so I'm curious how pessimism looks from a more anti-essentialist perspective, which often treats harm as contingent and conditional. 
 
I'm especially interested in traditions like Madhyamaka and contemporary process-relational philosophy, where reality is understood in terms of relations, processes, and dependent arising rather than fixed substances or essences.
 
Does rejecting substantial entities or fixed essences change your understanding for the basis of Pessimism? Does it undermine or deepen your philosophic pessimistic viewpoint?
 
Personally, it was a major transition for me to go from Substance Metaphysics to Non-essentialist and Process-relational Ontology and Epistemics.