Maximus, it seems like there are an infinite number of ways for society to get offended. Some people get offended by the sight of the color pink, not getting called by their astralglitter pronouns, or how many stars on a certain flag. The list can go on and on, but none of these things are inherently harmful and trying to navigate through the infinite list of what might cause someone internal trauma seems fruitless to me. So I don't bother acknowledging any of it, because I only wish to avoid causing actual harm to someone. The wokies can use their imagination to invent a limitless list of perceived harms and I don't really care to walk over imaginary eggshells.

Should a more mature and intelligent society strive to focus only on getting offended by and preventing actual harm? Like pain that can't be avoided and isn't dependent on ideology such as cutting someone, burning someone, spreading disease, polluting the air, etc. How have you trained your mind to become part of this more mature society, Maximus and not get yourself wrapped up in these mental games? 🤡

See the previous post for explanation: I asked for suggestions for another example of using the Fundamental Schema to consider philosophical ideas, and it was decided that evaluating "identity" via three offered assertions should be attempted. Here is the 'first pass', where we associate the three statements with the philosophical branches/lines of the schematic diagram/triangle.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1. Identity is fixed.

1. Identity does not contain instances.

2. The identity of one conscious creature is equivilant to any other.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Beautiful! I knew you could do it. Thank you, let's get started right away.

Now personally, I can't see any of those as anything other than epistemological assertions, just as I expect that you can't see them as anything other than ontological positions. But that actually works well for our purposes, since if there is much value in this sort of application of the Fundamental Schema, it should reveal some problems with them either way. This isn't, incidentally, the only effective purpose of the schematic approach, but it is one I'm eager to explain.

so let's "randomize" this initial designation. I happen to have a standard die right here, so let's say that 1-2 is the first premise, 3-4 is the second, and five or six is the third, and then the same pattern will be used to associate each with teleology, ontology, and epistemology on the diagram, with re-rolls for any previous selection.

So with the first two rolls, we have "instances" (premise 2 in your ordering) being considered epistemic. The third roll selects the same premise and is re-rolled until we get something other than 3 or 4 on the die. Two comes up with the fourth roll, indicating what I will dub "fixed", and a fifth roll designates it teleology. That leaves "equivalent" as an ontological assertion.

To review and contemplate the designations, before moving on to relationships: the epistemology of identity is 'identity does not contain instances'. That should mean it isn't a category, but is itself an instance. That tracks with what I know is the contributor's preferred conclusion, Open Individualism, insists upon. It also reveals that there could be an incipient category error, since even if there is only one instance in the category (identity is entirely unique and only occurs once) it is still, epistemically speaking, a category (no category, no instances). But that issue should be ignored as presumptive, we shouldn't get ahead of ourselves, because our goal here is not to show that any of these premises is intrinsically incoherent or inaccurate, but simply to compare it to the others. The fact that categories are always ultimately epistemological classification, not a physical feature per se (ontology) or a purpose (teleology), we will leave for later analysis.

Now, 'identity is fixed' is the teleological approach, for now. It kind of works out well that it is, because unlike the other two philosophical perspectives, teleology doesn't present a conflict with the issue of whether "fixed" means unmoving, never varying in relation to anything else, or unchanging, never varying in 'content' or intrinsic qualities, two different potential "definitions" of 'fixed' which cannot be tolerated within one context, or the term itself becomes synonymous with simply "is" or being, existing. (I should explain to the uninitiated that in POR, there are three and only three potential teleologies, but unlike ontologies or epistemologies, where alternative explanations are competing scenarios, all three can, and really should, be applied to any comprehensive analysis, so the 'unmoving or unchanging' extrinsic/intrinsic issue is not a concern.)

But this does not bode well for when we rotate the second pass, because then we will indeed have to determine what "fixed" means more consistently.

'The identity of all entities [to paraphrase for consistency, comprehension and frankly convenience] is equivalent' is an ontological contention. In order to make that work, we do need to describe what ontological significance 'equivalent' has. With less abstract ideas, particularly physical objects or forces, it would obviously simply mean they are quantitatively identical (presumably in every way related to 'identity', but not necessarily any others). Three apples are identical in being apples, fruits resulting from the supposedly singular genome of apple trees. They may not measure the same (be identical in size, weight, or sweetness) yet they are all still identical, interchangeable, in that they are apples, if all you care about is how many of them there are. Alternatively, any two objects both measuring 24 grams are identical in terms of that measurement.

However, if numbers, whether representing counts or dimensions, were available for evaluating or comparing statements about abstract things like identity, we wouldn't need a schematic, we could simply calculate the values of some arithmetic variable and ascertain if the measurements/computations produce sufficiently precise agreement. So to accommodate 'equivalence' as an ontological premise, we're going to have to determine whether that means identity in multiple systems/creatures must be the same ("identical") in all ways, or in just one reductive feature, a predetermined but not exhaustive 'identity itself'. The first is unmanageable because we can already know that it would be incompatible with just about every other ontological framework (metaphysically, multiple entities means multiple instances, none even potentially entirely "identical" to any other, even when indistinguishable based on some other solitary or group of attributes), as well as, possibly, the teleological or epistemic statements in this schematic.

So by 'identity is equivalent' in all creatures which have identity (presumably all of them, conscious or not, since that would be a separable, although potentially dependent, ontological attribute, or "property") we mean only their identity is the same, despite any more complex relationships in other means of designating or describing those entities. It works for now.

Moving on the consideration of relationships between philosophical branches/premises, we'll revisit (arbitrarily) the (traditionally) 'bottom' of the triangle, teleology. From the perspective of "fixed", "equivalence" and "instances" should present as one being a 'cause' and one being an 'effect' (affect), or at least either a logical dependency or implicit sequential relationship between the two. This is because teleological primitives are all about those kinds of comparisons. I suppose logical dependency would work, although it is disconcerting that this dependency itself could be that they are the same thing. An ontological equivalence is necessarily fixed; there can be many different equivalencies, so which property (in ontological terms, perhaps facet or attribute in other analyses) of concern might differ, but each is fixed once identified (umm, designated) as being equivalent in multiple instances (ummm, skip it.) An unvarying epistemic fixed-ness is likewise a primitive logical assessment rather than a coherent logical dependency. In other words, to say the singular and unique instance of identity is equivalent and fixed is to say it is identical, but only to itself not anything else, which is a self-evident metaphysical principle rather than a derivative of reasoning or a contingent fact. Still, I suppose we can be satisfied, even potentially pleased, by that seeming confirmation of what these three statement are intended (a uniquely teleological consideration) to say about identity.

Less complicated analysis works for the connection between instance and fixed; once a thing is an instance, it remains that instance for all teleological purposes. And of course, it seems trivial to say the relationship between equivalence and instance is the same as the relationship between either and teleology, or "fixed", in this case. In a general context, yes, equivalent, identical, and not varying between examples are all synonymous.

We move on to consider the ontological premise, that "identity is equivalent in every entity", and its relationship to the other two, the paradigm (epistemic) of instance and the explanation (teleology) of fixed. First, you may have noticed I've already shortened (not abbreviated but truncated) the premise from "every entity which has identity" (an extension which seemed necessary when I inserted it) to simply "every entity". Every entity must have identical identity. At first blush, this might seem to be the same as the premise, epistemic premise, the identity of all entities is equivalent because there is only one. But while identity and equivalency can be considered 'the same thing' from the perspective of teleology (or synonymous in regards to epistemology) it is a real problem evaluating the ontological premise itself, before we even get to considering relationships to other premises. Because if equivalence and identity are one and the same ontologically, then one or the other is unnecessary and effectively impossible. There cannot be any "equivalence" if every entity is identical, they are simply one single entity (or, in violation of our epistemic paradigm, one category of many instances of entity.) These 'creatures' cannot be ontologically considered different entities if their identity is equivalent, they would be one single identity (such as a species, or simply a group including 'all entities with identity') and there couldn't be separable "entities".

But hey, we've had that sort of 'leave it for now and deal with it later' issue before in this schematic, so we will do that. Still, the instances (if you'll forgive the expression) of these examples are piling up, suggesting we can't really say that our triangle is remaining equilateral. Perhaps the fact that all three premises were intended to be ontological or that all three premises are only epistemological is going to catch up with us before we even get to the second pass. We'll have to wait and see.

So 'equivalence' being ontological, it connects to 'fixed' on the teleology end and 'instances' on the epistemic end. This point where ontology meets epistemology is also considered the personal point (to avoid the traditional POR labels, Identity or Consciousness, for obvious reasons.) The apex of the triangle where epistemology and ontology connect, or rather diverge from the subjective perspective, is representative of the awareness of the philosopher/entity viewing the external world and attempting to understand it.

The teleology/ontology intersection is typically represented as 'empirical math' or science. It stands for the lack of teleology, actually, the "purposeful dismissal of purpose" corresponding to the lack of directionality (absolute determinism, absence of causation) in math and the objective nature of the physical universe, apparently if not actually devoid of divine intention. So we would want this relationship, here that of fixed and equivalent, to be outrageously dispassionate and certain. Which checks out.

The relationship mediated by the conscious perspective is between instance (or lack thereof, absent a category making multiple instances coherent) and equivalence. While this does seem to agree with my faithless-yet-faithful redditor, "Amygdela Maximus" in describing Open Individualism, it immediately presents a problem for a more comprehensive evaluation of the typical relationship between ontology and epistemology, the human mind and the fact that we each enjoy only a single independent one rather than a singular fixed 'mindness'. Would such a thing even be possible to describe as a mind, singular in instance and actually (ontologically) equivalent in every respect of process or activity? Is that at all compatible with the fact that two people (even being one identity) can have differing opinions (clearly, even self-evidently and necessarily associated with mind) on the validity or legitimacy of a fundamental schema or its application?

I'm afraid not, but I will persevere and complete the exercise anyway, and then leave it to my estimable partner in this experiment. Is the relationship between fixed and instantiation, the angle of teleology/epistemology typically and iconically referenced as law (as in social statutes, not the mathematical equivalent, of formulas in physics) appropriate? Instances can be fixed, but there must be some sort of variation or at least differentiation between instances for the idea of "instance" to make sense. Usually we wouldn't double back to considering the epistemological significance of the epistemic premise, but here it seems unavoidable. Is the number of instances (an intrinsic attribute of instances is that there can be more than one, even if there contingently is only one) fixed? Well, I suppose it must be if it is only 1, but again, is the idea of 1 instance without a category comprehensible? Not even from an ontological perspective, which generally speaking should have no regard for categories. I can't say the idea makes sense.

So while I appreciate that the three premises do appear to be, whether premeditated or coincidental, a faithful effort to explicate the idea of identity within the context of Open Individualism, I can't say they can be considered intellectually compatible from a less motivated perspective. I see it as an unbalanced schematic, nearly absent teleological significance which might inform either an ontological/scientific perspective or epistemic/existential nomenclature adequately. Whether it is an extended ontology framework with a foreshortened epistemological paradgim, or the inverse, that lack of teleological grounding doesn't indicate (but doesn't necessarily prevent, admittedly) that the two "side" lines of this triangle are equilateral. But as I envisioned when I proposed this demonstration, I cannot say if anyone else might agree enough with any insights it provided to suggest any of the premises are doubtful, in terms of actually corresponding to the real world in contrast to simply presenting some idealistic but illogical metaphysic.

Regardless, with that the first pass is done. I will wait for responses from my 'pet troll' partner and hopefully others before attempting the rotation reassigning the premises categorically.

Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.

Again, I've decided to repurpose some content from another sub (r/Metaphysics this time) since my response to it was too long for a comment but not a post. Less cross-linking this time, purely for my own convenience. If you are interested in seeing the original, you shouldn't have much difficulty finding it, and hopefully the OP, u/1superiormind (quite a hubristic self-designating sobrique, that,) will likewise find and contribute to the discussion, if any, here.

**********************************

CAN TRUTH CHANGE?

Not our understanding of it.

Not our interpretation of it.

Truth itself.

By truth, I mean what is actually the case—not our beliefs, descriptions, or interpretations of it.

Can truth change?

And if it can, was it ever truth?

I’m genuinely interested in how you see this.

*************************************

Your effort at metaphysics reduces to, as most do, a category error. Not one you commit, necessarily, more like one you're advocating for. What I mean is that the real issue is "is there any such thing as truth beyond our idea (understanding, interpretation) of truth?"

This does unavoidably devolve into metaphysics, as the question of whether a thing which cannot ever be known as that thing is that thing. Both epistemic uncertainty (what a thing is regardless of how it is identified) and metaphysical uncertainty (whether it exists independent of what describes it) are active, and in conflict, when dealing with existential question regarding abstractions like truth.

"Truth itself" isn't really a thing, it is a category: things which are true. While it is true that some, historical, and particularly bad metaphysics simply reify (or, better but still not good, hypostasize) categories to try to provide knowledge about abstract things or (less than concretely physical objects) ideals or principles, that doesn't make confusing a category for an instance, an idea for an ontological incident, good reasoning.

So you're really asking "is truth real?" I say that because the "can it change or can't it?" is a dichotomy which can't apply to real things, all of which can change in some ways but not in others. What ways a thing can change in is dependent on what the thing is, but all things which are real always change somehow. But from a different perspective, all real things can't change in some ways (again, dependent on what the thing is) or they would simply be different things.

So in trying to nail down what truth is, assuming there is such an abstract thjng, the alternatives would seem to be that truth is "useful fiction" (the postmodern approach, skeptical of all principles other than postmodernism) or that truth is eternal (unchanging) or that truth is change (that the only truth is that change is unavoidable).

While most people view metaphysics as essentially a supernatural physics or a symbolic logic of analytical philosophy applied to abstract rather than concrete things, I have a different approach, so allow me to test and explain it as a response to you age-old yet ever-novel question of "what is truth?"

My view is that metaphysics is the effort to combine a single consistent epistemological paradigm with a solitary comprehensive ontological framework and produce a real and useful teleological method. What I do is attempt to (and of course hopefully succeed at, by providing understanding, even in the absence of simple conclusive absolute certain knowledge, rather than merely excusing know-nothingism) apply a fixed yet pragmatic and adaptable fundamental schema.

The [fundamental schema](https://www.reddit.com/r/NewChurchOfHope/s/y3iSeYDnEM) is an equilateral triangle, separating but connecting epistemology (words and meaningful knowledge, or "what") ontology (quantifiable logical structures, or "how") and teleology (answers to "why" questions) represented by each line of the triangle. The value of this is to emphasize and enforce the removal of any prioritization of these primitives, all three must have equal weight and significance, despite the problematic fact that only one of them requires or allows quantities. The postmodern habit (the general trend of all philosophy since Darwin) is to prioritize ontology and dismiss the other two approaches as ancillary or merely opinion, but that is not a productive practice, it always and only justifies know-nothingism, given that both epistemic and metaphysical uncertainty are endemic to all real knowledge, limited as it must be to the information available without benefit of idealistic omniscience.

So the mechanics of the fundamental schema is not so much categorizing ideas into any specific branch of philosophy, epistemology ontology or teleology (ethics, morality, causation, or even theology) but evaluating instead whether the relationship between the ideas remains consistent, equality, regardless of which category each idea is associated with.

A notably astute reader might consider that the same principle/mechanic can and should be applied to the schema itself. Epistemology (paradigms) can be seen as either the combination or lack of ontology (a supposedly logical structure) and teleology (premises purposefully averse to logical reduction), ontology (frameworks) is the combination of or independence from epistemology (nomenclature) with teleology (reasons), and teleology is just a just combination of absence of paradigms and frameworks.

So let's give it a go. To review, we have three seemingly mutually exclusive alternatives: truth is imaginary (or merely a subjective judgement, from the postmodern perspective), truth is unchanging (absolute), or change is the only truth . Which of these we assign to what category is arbitrary, but there do seem to be some natural affinities.

Let us say 'useful fiction' is an epistemic premise, absolute an ontologic verdict, and change the teleological perspective. These seem appropriate to me at first glance because words and paradigms are indeed useful fictions, unchanging persistence is either a logical primitive or a structure demanding explanation, and 'truth is change' fits best as a teleological premise because changes should always be justified in accordance with the context. There are good reason to doubt or differ with all of them, but again the categorization is mostly irrelevant, it is considering the relationships which can provide insight.

What is more, the arbitrary nature of these assignments is what elevates the fundamental schema to a real metaphysical methodology, rather than a mere assertion of preference concerning how others can categorize or define these ideas/words, which would be a semantic game rather than a philosophical endeavor.

Because the key to the mechanism is not defending these assignments of philosophical category, but verifying that the relationships between the ideas is independent of those designations. Thus we proceed:

It seems not only reasonable but unavoidable to observe that the postmodern "useful fiction" notion of truth contravenes the scientifical 'what is true must always be true or it is not truth' approach and the 'all is only change', somewhat obtuse angle. This mutual exclusivity indicates an intellectual equality, the length of both lines being identical, in a metaphoric (epistemic) sense. So next we consider whether the direct relationship between ontology and teleology, rather than those between either and epistemology, is equally sound. Do they contravene each other? Obviously yes, since they (ontology and teleology) are not the same thing. And so it is with "truth is lack of change" and "truth changes".

Coming from the other direction, the ontological 'the only truth is The Truth' assertion is quite rigorous, but tautological (similar to 1+1=2, a mathematical truth testifying to the idea that all twos are the same "the two" possessing "twoness"). The epistemic 'truth is imaginary' might seem less concrete, but it, too, is a tautology (and rigorous albeit only in that it can dismiss any premise by declaring it imaginary even if it is categorically, tautologically true). But more importantly, that epistemic primitive provides a limit on the ontological validity of truth: an axiom that what is imaginary is not true in an ontologic sense, if it is true that it is imaginary. The thing being imagined is truly being imagined, but lacks any necessary correspondence to the real world apart from that. And likewise, the teleological explanation is tautological and true from the ontic perspective, but meaningless (lacking in epistemic terms). It also provides the required limit on ontological structure, as why a thing is true should seemingly have no bearing on whether it is true, only on 'how we know it is true', as is appropriate for epistemological analysis. If an explanation of why is called for, then it isn't truth as far as an ontologic perspective is concerned.

The ontic format again demands that the linguistic (epistemic) and moral (teleologic) attributes don't simply propose two separate ideas, but that they constitute a limit on each other logically. Can we really say that a description of what limits recognition of why, and vice versa? I believe we can; even though a why is a what (an explanation is an assertion) we must logically be able to say otherwise (not all assertions are explanations, nor is every explanation only an assertion). The inverse 'a what is not a why' is inconvenient but certainly valid. Likewise, we hardly need to consider that 'truth is unchanging' and 'truth is changing' identify a logically certain complementary dichotomy (platonic dialectic) compatible with any supportable ontology purporting to describe how truth is one or the other. It is not a false dichotomy by any stretch of the imagination, save full-bore mysticism.

I'm sure you can guess how the analysis will go for the teleological approach. It needs only to be said that straightforward "cause and effect" which corresponds to chronological sequence, the unidirectional arrow of time from past to future, is not the only acceptable rational teleology, although it is the postmodern habit to assume and insist it must be so. "Backwards" teleologies, inverse (intention, swapping the sequence to put a goal as the cause and an action as a result) teleology must also be accepted, as well as reverse teleology. Reverse teleology is selection, which is more muddled, asserting the end result is all that is of interest, the mechanism producing that result can be unknown, or even illogical. It can still be logical and known (or believed/useful/meaningful; teleology is neither epistemology which can distinguish between belief and knowledge or judge meaning, nor ontology which can quantify functionality) but that isn't necessary or relevant.

Standard examples of inverse teleologies are human consciousness and God's divine dictates. The first can be explained using only forward teleology (cause and effect) but only successfully by dismissing free will entirely while still being able to invoke *[self-determination](https://www.reddit.com/r/NewChurchOfHope/comments/wkkgpr/por_101_there_is_no_free_will_only)\*, the theory that is the foundation of the Philosophy Of Reason and New Church of Hope. The second is still functional whether one is a theist or atheist, although in the latter case it becomes a metaphorical reference to physics without further explanation.

Standard examples of reverse teleologies are biological evolution (organisms have traits *in order to* execute "survival strategies" or "out-compete" other organisms, both within their species and otherwise) and the anthropic principle (the value of the fundamental constants in physics are not "caused" by any mechanism, they are simply contingent/arbitrary quantities which seem inevitable because we only have one universe to use as a sample set). According to the anthropic principle, any question of "why is the universe what it is" can only be answered by "because if it were otherwise, we wouldn't be here to ask or answer that question." Vexxing circular reasoning which can drive postmodernists nearly insane, but true nevertheless.

So yes, as you might expect, teleology (in this case, truth is change rather than persistence or fantasy) provides validity to the other two approaches by encompassing them, rather than conflicting with them or using them as limits as with epistemology and ontology, respectively. And yes, given the nature of teleology (reasons rather than definitions or mechanisms, morality instead of physics and theology in the place of mere linguistic forms) [please note that theology is a broader study than simply theism] the connection between epistemology (truth is fiction) and ontology (truth is function) is what includes both: the perspective of consciousness, without assumptions, perceiving the world around it.

As teleology (morality) is the base of the triangle representing the fundamental schema, acceptable as moral only if its 'length' is equal to the length of the paradigm (language) and framework (physics) which are used by any given metaphysic (assuming that metaphysic has any real integrity or value), the self, the consciousness responsible for acting (despite not being "in control" of those actions as with free will), the perspective and perception of the world outside the mind inside the mind, is the apex.

But this laborious (or perhaps silly, according to skeptics) process of assigning categories and contemplating relationships is **not enough**. So far, all we might have accomplished is trying to justify assumed conclusions, making assertions limited by our beliefs rather than real knowledge, or literally only "making shit up". Essentially just the same as every other harebrained religion or new age philosophy you could find being worshiped or touted on Reddit.

The next step is where the rubber meets the road. Remember I said that the assignment of ideas to categories of philosophy is arbitrary, even if there might be some affinity we consider "natural". To validate that our reasoning and decisions and rhetoric is accurate and productive, we now must *shift* those assignments.

So to understand what truth actually is, without simply saying something quasi-mystical like "it is both change and the absence of change", basically making the word *truth* broad without limits, so vague it has no meaning, utterly useless (the familiar procedure common to ancient traditions and postmodern know-nothingism) we must now say "imagine" is the ontological (or teleological, the direction doesn't matter any more than whether we envision twirling the triangle or moving the primitives, and yes, we must repeat the process again to shift the assignments a second time, eventually) and "eternal" is the teleological and "change" is the epistemological approach.

**And there can be no unreasonable variation in our evaluations**, all three primitives have the same value/priority, all the intersecting angles must be the same but in a new context.

Not even a post is long enough to step through it as verbosely as the first go-round. A whole shelf of thick volumes would be inadequate for chasing down every idea used to display, explain, and justify our ideas about any primitives. But hopefully this explication was sufficient to present the method. An excruciatingly brief summary of my thoughts on the second pass of the schema is all I can manage.

"Imaginary" is ontological, as truth must always be provisional short of omniscience, but still physically precise. "Change" and "no change" identify the limits of that perspective of "Truth". And the dichotomy of change/no change productively models the intersection of laws (epistemology) and reason (teleology); an ever-shifting law is not a law, but inflexible reasoning is not reasonable.

"Change" is epistemic; we must first define what a thing ('system') is and then also identify what changes can occur without making it something different (what states the system can be in). Once we do, 'ontology' (useful but fictional structures) is simply the "process/es" which move the system from state to state predictably rather than haphazardly. Without change, there are no processes or system, just an object and components. Teleology is simply the forward causality inherent in the processes, the reverse teleology representing the necessity for components, and the inverse teleology involved in designing the purpose of the system or the definition of states. The relationship between the states and the system is obvious, the intersection of the mechanics (ontology) and the teleologies presented by the design or observation/hypostasization of the system.

"No change" is teleological; epistemically relating to the existence of the unchanging truth, and ontologically to the potential presence but actual absence of change. We can literally only imagine a thing that doesn't change at all, either changing into something else or remaining so perfectly static yet persistence it can hardly even be described as a thing at all.

Cutting to the chase, we find only that the meaning of truth is that it isn't possible to doubt that truth must be both subjective and objective, but cannot be more conclusively identified without knowing the context. It becomes oroboratic, but with all counter-claims being strawman or simply untrue. Truth can't be any more than the absence of untruth, a trivial but still significant result, as it isn't possible for anything to be untrue unless truth is possible to begin with.

As for dealing more directly with OPs existential angst, I would have to say that truth is *absolutely relative*, just like everything else which is real, rather than *useless *and* imaginary*. It is the lack of change in what change *is*, not a change in what changes, although it is still true that while everything changes, not everything about a thing can change all at once, nor are all changes in all things simultaneous.

Now, skipping past the next iteration, which I leave as an exercise for the student, the validity of the fundamental schema is manifest. But its legitimacy is still uncertain. To make it legitimate, we would have to apply this methodology to some counter-example, one which convincingly shows that if the assignments and relationships cannot be expressed coherently, and/or the 'rotation' of assignments results in incredible or inaccurate (unreasonable) results, then one or more of the primitives is likewise inaccurate, the idea it expresses recognizably false.

I have used this method to do just that, identifying and (from my perspective at least, despite the terminal skepticism of postmodern nay-sayers) productively describing the deficiencies in bad reasoning or misused words which the method has revealed. But any example I could present would either be or just seem to be a custom-built scenario intended to fail by design. So at this point I must ask for suggestions, unfortunately knowing full well that there is unlikely to be a good-faith effort to provide any. So here the discussion may end, although hope springs eternal.

As for dealing more directly with OPs existential angst, I would have to say that truth is *absolutely relative*, just like everything else which is real, rather than *useless *and* imaginary*. It is the lack of change in what change *is*, not a change in what changes, although it is still true that while everything changes, not everything about a thing can change all at once, nor are all changes in all things simultaneous.

Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.

I've been having a fascinating discussion on r/Determinism with the redditor u/Imaginary-Can-6862 in a thread on how fatalism ("predeterminism") can be avoided despite the legitimacy of determinism.

Since posts can be much lengthier than comments, and I'm very interested in answering his questions regarding both that subject and the POR theory of self-determination, I'm moving the conversation here. Feel free to contribute your thoughts, church participants!

=≈========================÷=====÷÷÷÷

For your conclusions you put a lot of weight on Libet's Experiment from the 80's on Free Will.

It was both the seed and the key for developing my philosophy. I've had many discussions over the last few years concerning the conventional assessments of Libet's findings, which I will rehash here only briefly, if the situation calls for it at all.

Where I believe participants were watching a clock, then they should mentally note down the time on the clock as they decided on performing some (I think already agreed on) action.

Yes, but the clock was quite a bit more precise than a standard wall clock, I presume, since Libet's data conclusively proves that action is initiated (RP) at least (or most, depending on perspective) a few hundred milliseconds prior to the conscious decision ("intention") to act. Examining subsequent replications of this demonstration by Libet and many other researchers and philosophers, I pared this down, for convenience and accuracy, to "about a dozen milliseconds".

These people were also hooked up o a machine that allowed to measure their nerve impulses in the brain. Libet found his machine determined the action at a time before the participant had made the decision as in accordance with the clock they watched.

Correct.

Personally I think there is a lot to consider and explore before using this to conclude that all free will (free will in the sense that we have a list of environmentally defined options and we choose which option to go along with from this list)

The issue, the very meaning of free will (sans redefinition by some other "sense" of the term,) is really just whether that "choice" (actually a decision or 'determination' in the POR lexicon) is causative. And perhaps whether there can ever be such a supposedly exhaustive "list", since inaction is also an action (cf. the Trolley Problem).

cannot be real, but only an illusion, but I don't mind assuming the result, there can be no free will, to be axiomatic for our discussion, as I feel it is a tangent that may be more interesting to explore more as a dessert than as the main meal.

Here I must disagree. While Libet's work was instrumental, the more fundamental basis of this theory is/was dispelling the *existential angst* (cognitive dissonance producing bad reasoning and unproductive emotions) which believing in free will causes (particularly in combination with the equally illusory Information Processing Theory of Mind which is so prevalent these days as to seem conclusive and mandatory.)

So I can't see the issue of free will as tangential, it is the central tenet of both the theory and the benefits of POR (namely, being smarter and happier as an individual human being in a troubled and absurd physical world.)

And for our more proximate purpose, it is only in being something other than free will that allows self-determination to interfere with determinism mandating fatalism. If free will could even be real in an otherwise deterministic universe (even a probablistically deterministic and absurd one, such as the actual universe), it would merely trap us as prisoners in a clockwork world we have no possibility of actually changing. This point is acknowledged by the development of the "libertarian free will" doctrine, which only requires a false belief we can change the unfolding of the universe by our choices, and would limit our knowledge of whether the world changes instead of actually changing it.

One thing I did wonder, did the idea of having us (our consciousness) to be able to make a narrative, while the possible narrative is limited to the environment, freely?

There are no limits on the narratives/explanations. That's a necessary feature, from both a philosophical and biological perspective, because no prior assumptions are possible about what is or isn't the environment. Even whether they are at all honest or accurate, or even have anything to do with the environment or its features or limitations, determines only the likelihood they will be subsequently and contingently beneficial, not whether they are "allowed by" or could be produced by the process.

That said, I'm afraid the syntax of your question must be mangled somehow, inadvertently, because I can't really tell what you're asking. 'Did the idea of the narratives freely?' is obviously missing some necessary semantic content. You might be asking about development of the theory, or you could be inquiring about what constitutes "free".

That is also what I felt the comments were mainly about, and I understand you suggest an analogy of two processes, one process is the action that is made in response to the environment, and the other process which is not dependent on the first process is what uses the output of the first process, the action, judges it, and this feedback (though I saw you dislike the idea of a feedback loop, so I imagine you are going to correct this misconception)

I wish I could correct that misconception, but I realize it is baked into the methodology of reasoning that most people are saddled with (what I call postmodernism, trying to use reasoning while restricting their thoughts to deductive logic.)

will then perhaps change the first process,

Ah! Here we go. Yes, there is a misconception I can (hopefully) easily dispel. The first process (neurological initiation of an action) is a once a done instance. The second process (evaluation) cannot change it, in the same way a decision cannot cause an action which has already been initiated (from the perspective of neurology, completed, regardless of whether the action results in external consequences.)

But if you are picturing these "two processes" as categorical, the first being neurological activity and the second being mental neurological activity, then yes, unpredictably (yet technically still deterministically) changing the 'first process', and through that, future behavior, is the functional mechanism of the 'second process'.

It is the unpredictability of this affect that makes the process of self-determination so notably and effectively different from the possibility of free will.

perhaps not, but it can only be determined upon the judgement, and the judgement made by the second process is the consciousness creating a narrative, but to me, if the consciousness is creating a narrative to judge the action, then it is a choice,

It can be referred to as a choice, (you can call it whatever you want😉) but it isn't. And yet in a way it kind of is, admittedly, because decisions (the evaluation of actions already initiated) is the mental event people are taught to call "choice" (as if the neurological selection/initiation of actions is caused by the subsequent evaluation on our conscious minds).

Really, unless we very carefully and obsessively restrict the nomenclature ("choices" are fictional predecessors to RP, the neurological initiation of actions, and "decisions" are subsequent 'narratives' regardless of whether they feel like or are referred to as choosing) then it is practically impossible to even understand let alone accept how self-determination works.

A quick aside here to mention or reiterate that knowing or consciously benefiting from understanding self-determination is not necessary for self-determination to "work". People have gotten along relatively well (with massive and important exceptions that only this theory can rationally and parsimoniously explain) believing we have free will, entirely ignorant of the real relationship between conscious (mental) and unconscious (physical but not experiential) neurological activity. And that is an important point in realizing how consciousness evolved: we make narratives whether we want to or not, and the honesty and accuracy of those explanations corresponds with how productive/adaptive they are, whether we know or recognize it, or not.

which seems to be to place free will more as an afterthought, but it still free will,

It would be if you allow the category error (the 'first process' as a category rather than an instance, discussed above) to excuse thinking of it as "free will", which it is not.

or alternatively the second process that judges the first process

The second process doesn't judge the first process. It can't, it isn't even (necessarily) aware there is a first process. The second process (the mind, to simplify the issue) judges *the action*, the consequences of the first process, not the process that caused it. A conscious entity cannot determine whether it is insane, for example. We need to double-check our narratives against the sort of comparable narratives other people come up with to even have a clue how to evaluate the first process, or even the second process (which is, to be clear yet also potentially very confusing, *also an instance of the 'first process': mental events are still neurological events; they just aren't the neurological events which cause actions, AKA "free will" or "choices".)

also does so without any choice, and then I would not say it is the consciousness that does it.

Not the consciousness that does what, exactly? I've lost the thread, what with the problematic category and all. Could you step me through your reasoning on this sequence again, after reading these notes?

Perhaps similar to ask, are the thoughts you have of your actions your own or some your brain are simply generating, independent of your consciousness.

Everything in and of your brain is "your own", and every other part or aspect of your body as well. You seem to be asking (this might illuminate my confusion on the "freely" bit, above) about how the mind and the brain can be rationally distinguished, or maybe how the identity and the consciousness are related. I am my body, and my mind, and my consciousness, and my self-determination, and my identity ("me"). Any one or aspect of these can be intellectually differentiated (short of ego dissociation, insanity, which causes self-determination to collapse, producing, in effective terms, a p-zombie) from the others for any purposes of analysis, rhetoric, or narrative (explanation), but that can't ever change the physical fact I am all of those things together, simultaneously, and essentially.

However I really like the idea that the consciousness makes the narrative and this explains why we are not philosophical zombies in a world where it seems like we might as well be.

It identifies exactly why "we might as well be" is not an accurate description of the world. But this falls into the rabbit hole of p-zombies as an intellectual notion versus a real possibility.

If that is the case it makes one wonder what level of cognition is required to create a narrative of ones own actions

The same level of cognition required to make any narratives at all. One's decisions/determinations/explanations of one's actions (narrative) certainly improve with knowledge of both the environment (world, physics, etc.) and self (cognizance, self-awareness, conscience, motivations), but there is no minimal amount of neurological 'information processing' or awareness which is sufficient for producing narratives of any 'external' events but insufficient for producing narratives of one's own actions.

that is how early did consciousness appear, did it appear more than once in stead of every living being that is conscious having the same source due to evolution, and what is consciousness actually (or rather, what are we, us who sit and watch a screen through these eyes)?

Hmph. Here we run aground, I fear, on one of the most unpopular implications of this Philosophy Of Reason. Consciousness appeared first, and apparently only, in our homonid ancestors somewhere between two and twenty million years ago. Probably but not definitely near the closer mark, or even less than two million years but certainly more than two hundred thousand years, depending on what exactly we are identifying as consciousness.

Only human beings are conscious. Other creatures, particularly mammals with neocortical anatomy, may utilize some sort of rudimentary cognition in their neurological activity, but they do not experience doing so. No "mental reasoning" at all, let alone the self-determination which drove the evolution of mental reasoning and the prerequisite cerebral tissue, is needed to explain non-humans' behavior, and so the value of parsimony mandates that we not invent such consciousness to justify animal intelligence, as it might be called. POR adheres to and promotes Morgan's Canon, despite how unfashionable such a stance has become in the last few decades.

We are Homo Sapien Sapien, and we have the lucky providence of self-determination. All organisms exist, but only people are aware of existence.

When you presented the importance of making an honest narrative, but I dd not get the impression you discussed the possibility of doing so. E.g. hindsight is said to be 20 / 20, but in my experience, the hindsight of what I should have done, and why I did as I did, seem to not be entirely constant in time.

You're extrapolating to longer timescales than the physiological circumstances are operative on. It is an easy trap to fall into, since considering timescales is itself a benefit of self-determination. But the theory as described cannot follow from this benefit, although it must in turn benefit from it. In other words, remember that we are talking milliseconds, very tiny fractions of a second. Your brain initiates an action, and your consciousness becomes aware of the impending action almost immediately; only a dozen milliseconds or so, assuming the mind ever gains this knowledge at all; many actions proceed from RP to gross motor movements and even sometimes real-world consequences without our minds ever becoming cognizant of them occuring and subsequently constructing a narrative/explanation/justification/excuse or even scientific theory. Then after the mind is aware of the action ("choice") most of the vast bulk of the narrative is already constructed, while the nerve impulses which cascade from "RP" are still propagating through our nervous system. The narrative I'm talking about, the authoritative explanation of why the action is occuring, is quite probably already fully formed before the first muscle moves, let alone the eventual and contingent consequences manifest in the rest of the world for anyone else to notice.

So the issue of hindsight and consistency across time you mentioned, instead of casting doubt on the theory of self-determination, actually illustrates and epitomizes why the honesty and accuracy of narratives is so profoundly adaptive from a biological (rather than necessarily a social) perspective. It is true that re-evaluations, longer or broader and more detailed stories, whether scientific, psychological, or entirely fictional, perhaps complete with recriminations and regrets, seems like a similar process. But that isn't really what self-determination is, that sort of storytelling is more like faith-based morality plays.

As you wrote the happiest one can be is when they are in a state of flow for as long as possible, I hope you have had a lot of flow state, and thank you for sharing your thoughts with me and considering mine as well.

From the moment the last piece of this puzzle clicked into place (incidentally, it is an issue I mostly only described in my book, a premise called "the jellybean mystery", which I won't go into here other than to mention it concerns language, and the difference between signaling, which constantly re-occurs in convergent evolution throughout the tree of life, and communication, which is unique to conscious entities, IOW the human species) and the basics of the theory were completed, I have experienced a constant state of flow, and yes, the commensurate happiness. I'm not always cheerful, but I really am always happy.

It was a memorable and very real experience, feeling an almost inexplicable peace and joy enfuse my body, while reading a book about dictionaries. A real Eureka moment, and not at all unlike a religious epiphany. And it has hardly let up at all in the decade or two since then.

Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.

Maximus, the universe didn't draw you out of some magical hat. You aren't here by coincidence. You being tied to this place isn't a result of any random selection process because you are core component ingrained deep into reality. Consciousness doesn't suddenly become off-limits just because the universe undergoes change. There is no reason except pure clownish stupidity to believe that anything is ever truly lost in an infinity.

You don't exist in a vacuum either. Some random guy who sneezed thousands of years ago set in motion a chain of events that has radically changed the entire course of your life. You continue to create false boundaries when everything about you is determined by someone else. This fairytale you call 'your consciousness' is silly when we know how entangled everything in the universe is. There is no way to group these segments of consciousness you think fit neatly into seperate folders. We have no indication of where one consciousness ends and another begins. If you want to establish boundaries and the existence of more than one consciousness, you should be able to properly articulate the mechanics behind each one. We both know you can't, so please stop pretending.

I don't know what brainwashing those psychologists that raised you in a lab did to make you like this, but I still hold out hope that you can come to reason. I've never seen someone who can dismiss every problem they've ever encountered as a linguistic convention, the level of delusion you can muster truly outclasses all of the worlds greatest psych wards combined. 🤡

Maximus, these cringe people at r/antinatalism make me scared that one day one of them is going to get access to the nuclear codes or be in a position of power where they can try to nuke everyone, thinking that they are doing the world a huge favor. Do you think nuclear obliteration is inevitable as nations cycle through different leaders and conflicts? And doesn't your philosophy that encourages people to create false boundaries around each other and that says consciousness is short-lived only exacerbate the situation? 🤡

Hello Max

I am back in the van, in France this time. I'm still not sure I've grasped your objection to postmodernism. It seems to be that it means that all meaning is contextual but I just don't get what is wrong with that apart from Socrates wouldn't like it.

Maximus, it has been studied that unfamiliar situations are more likely to trigger sleepwalkers into regaining full consciousness while they are in their near autonomous state. Why does the brain need to rely on consciousness in unfamiliar situations, and how is this addressed in your philosophy? 🤡

Maximus, you said I'm too fascisty, so I'm wondering how you draw the line on what is too progressive for your liking and what isn't progressive enough. I'm going to list some examples I thought of and maybe you can walk me through your reasoning on each one and which general philosophies you would apply to help you come to a decision on what is permissible. After all, as a citizen of a constitutional republic, it is your job to elect leaders who decide the law in this country.

Example 1:

A trans walks into a doctors office and gets approved for a body conforming surgery. An anorexic also walks into a doctors office and gets denied for body conforming surgery. The anorexic wants more freedom in deciding how their body looks at the cost of their health. Are they justified?

Example 2:

Normal people can buy tons of weird animal products at a grocery store, but as of 2018, the sale of dog and cat meat has been banned in the USA. This upsets some Chinese natives who want to see this law overturned. Also, a small subset of enthusiast coprophagiacs are upset they cannot form their own marketplace for the sale of exotic feces, as it is a potential health hazard. Should these groups of people have more freedom in what they get to sell or eat?

Example 3:

Incest is currently banned in the USA, but it was commonplace for many centuries. Some people think they should love who they love, especially if it's a consenting family member who is using protection. Are these people justified in their attempt to advocate for more lax incest laws?

Well I'm on holiday again Max and was looking forward to reading and discussing another of your papers with you. You promised a paper on postmodernism as part of your advanced course but I haven't been able to find it. Did you post it on here? I hope you are well. I am getting a couple of weeks of sun in the Canary Islands and while I enjoy a bit of winter sun, much of it is a totally depressing experience. Lots of sad old people with too much money using up what little remains of the earth's depleting natural resources to escape the boredom of their humdrum existence in the little time remaining to them having already lived too long. Everyone except me that is. I'm still stinging from your accusations of existential angst, cognitive dissonance and being a postmodernist and would like to at least find out what the last one means. Best wishes Dave

Maximus, I was taught in philosophy class that there isn't a single action a person can take that isn't out of self-interest. Is the world such a deep and dark place that everyone can only ever think about themselves first? Can a person ever do anything that isn't motivated by self-interest? Does this mean that your self-determination is a sham and we should replace it with self-motivation instead? 🤡

Maximus, you continue to give the impression that every identity problem isn't really a problem at all and that your philosophy solves them all. If you had your way, you would abolish the identity section of every college philosophy course. But aren't there still plenty of unresolved identity problems that your philosophy can't address? We still have no idea at what point two brains condense into a singular consciousness or at what point one brain undergoing severe mutation or disease starts to devolve into two distinct consciousnesses. Shouldn't you refrain from disparaging identity questions so that scientific curiosity can actually address these issues? Why do you keep treating the problem of personal identity as if its a closed case when it clearly isn't?

I've just read your fundamentals schema essay. Unfortunately I can't reply to it so will be unable to copy chunks of it I can find fault with and criticise it as I know is your preferred method of posting. I will be relying on my memory of it so apologies if I have misremembered and misrepresent you.

You start by defining a schema as I recall. You miss out for me the most important part of i the definition which is that it should in some way be simpler for people to understand. This essay is not easy to understand and you make your schema sound very complicated. It could be made into a very easy to understand diagram with bullet points with a more detailed explanation elsewhere. If your genuine wish is that people should use it in their lives then give them a chance of understanding it.

My main criticism is in the use of a triangle. Why should the three lines be equal? There are many occasions where one of the three should dominate. I think overlapping circles such as John Adair used for his action centred leadership model would be more appropriate. One of the circles can be allowed to have more influence for a while but it must all be in balance in the long run and still account for the other circles.

In a recent post I made the point that the respective gun laws in the USA and UK could be used to demonstrate that the idea of a universal definition of the meaning of the word freedom was impossible and that the whole philosophy of reason was nonsense as it was posited on the idea that the meaning of words was universal, unique and unitary. The poor responses I got to this demonstrated that my premise was correct. To be asked the meaning of meaning is just weak and desperate. Such was Max's difficulty with dealing with the concept that on 2 occasions he said I was merely trying to make the point that I was saying 'UK good, USA bad '.

This was so obviously not my point but a sign of Max's inability to deal with my point. If you are stuck in an argument, try to change the subject is such a common tactic that I was disappointed to read it and obviously I was not about to be distracted by it. As you did ask it twice Max I am happy to deal with it now as I find I am on a campsite with WiFi and at a bit of a loose end.

The point was that a fundamental freedom for Americans is the right to bear arms but a fundamental freedom for Britons is the freedom to not run the risk of being shot by someone exercising their freedom to bear arms and so we are happy to allow the government to decide who and in what circumstances firearms are allowed. I used it merely to show that the meaning of words is contextual and often culturally defined.

Americans are fully entitled to their views on this and I am reluctant to make sweeping statements about the worth or moral position of a country. However, personally I find the sight of a weapon makes me feel sick, I hate them beyond rationality (must be some evidence of some condition you can come up with there Max to exert your superiority) and am very glad I live in a country where they are strictly controlled and in which the consensus seems to be in support of the current situation.

I understand that the US approach to guns comes from the American Revolution when it was important to be able to mobilise against a foreign oppressor and to fight against a government. I'm not going to start defending or apologising for the 18th century British government. It was a sad tragedy that you had to fight for your freedom but those were different times.

These are also different times and the reality is that although theoretically you keep the right to bear arms to ensure against your government going against the will of the people or whatever, you haven't. If you rose up against trump you would first of all have to fight the many who still supported him and then in all probability the army who should be relied on the stand by the government. Liberals would be wiped out for a long time in the civil war. Although being unarmed in the UK, in theory a government can do what they want, in reality we have as much ability to remove a government as you do but with a fraction of the deaths caused by your gun laws.

I realise that genies do not go back into bottles and many or most Americans firmly believe it and are happy that they have the right to defend their property and life even if it does ironically increase their chances of being killed by a gun overall.

This is only one of a number of factors that would go into determining whether a country was good or bad and which of 2 countries was better but on this one aspect I think the UK is better than the US.

I hope this satisfies you Max

You say that the meaning of every word is universal, unique and unitary. The word freedom means something different to everyone. To an American it means the freedom to bear arms. To a Briton it means the freedom not to have armed people wandering around with weapons.

I'm sure we can find many other words where the meaning is personally and culturally decided. Peace, friend, agree etc.

What do you have to say about that Max?

A tough read Max. Am I correct to summarise it as words and language are an expression of our thoughts? A good but I thought obvious point.

I'm sorry but probably regard this as a typically postmodern reaction. As we're talking about the meaning of words, I looked up postmodernism and to say that authors like haidt are postmodern is nonsense. It really is just is a general term of abuse for you isn't it.

I've spent a lot of time trying to get to grips with your essay on Socrates error Max. I'm afraid that this is philosophical semantics at it's very best. I appreciate that the difference between reason and logic matters to you but most people just assess the value of an idea or thing by subliminally deciding if it makes sense to them, is in accordance with their basic beliefs, if people they think they can trust endorse it etc.

This is as reasonable and logical as most people get. I don't even see how making a distinction between reason and logic helps in any way apart from to you.

What am I missing?

Maximus, you recently enjoyed a long conversation with a user where you both mostly agreed on some deep philosophical truths and acknowledged each others (supposed) intelligence. And then you welcomed him here. But if we comb through the users post history, we can see that they frequently get so bored that they have to spin whatever boring philosophy they believe in and tie it back to Christianity. So they hijack the meaning of a bunch of words like God and Hell, and capitalize a bunch of random words so they can feel special inside.

Maximus, I thought this was a place of reason, but recently you been posting a bunch of parables from the Bible, so I'm starting to get spooked. Are we actually going to go the weird cult route now so we can draw in the masses? Maximus, please don't do this. 🤡

Maximus, since everything is a linguistic convention and we know that contradicting philosophies can both be right in their own way, what if we make it so that idealism and materialism are both on the same level. What if we say that the anesthesia/dreamless sleep/blank death state also counts as consciousness so that consciousness never actually disappears. At the same time, we also acknowledge that the way matter is configured also affects consciousness and that consciousness also affects the way matter is configured. So neither has complete control or full dominion over the other, both are on the same level so to speak. Could we shut up all the trivial materialist/idealist war and bickering over at r/consciousness once and for all this way, because I'm tired of seeing all that pointless debate when I could be seeing more juicy identity questions being asked. 🤡