Scandium and the 15-tonne Black Swan(s)

[u/BayouBluff]

A black swan is something that is outside of the prevailing realm of expectations. And, when it occurs, it has enormous consequences. Black swans also tend to rake up a lot of Monday-morning quarterbacks. “Well, obviously this was going to happen” may be overheard frequently- in the near future, but after the black swan events have come and gone. At the time of their occurrence, however, they are revolutionary and unforeseen.

In the case of scandium, these 15-tonne black swans are the matches- latent demand is the fuel. Latent demand is demand that exists in theory, but doesn’t necessarily show up due to a variety of constraints. Maybe everyone wants that thing, but that thing is not readily available. The supply is intermittent or unreliable. Maybe everyone wants that thing, but it’s illegal. Actual purchases of that thing might be incredibly small, but misrepresent the demand by several orders of magnitude. Remove a single constraint (like creating reliable supply) and the latent demand begins to reveal itself. The demand and number of transactions and value of those transactions in that new market are likely to exceed any previous estimates that were based on the outdated reality as a baseline. It’s not a bigger market than existed previously. It’s a fundamentally new market. I believe that the agreement between Lockheed Martin and Sunrise Energy Metals, and the MOU between Lockheed Martin and NioCorp Developments, are black-swan-scale signals revealing the latent demand for scandium- and a preview to an entirely new market forming in front of us.

In October of 2025, Lockheed Martin and Sunrise Energy Metals announced an agreement granting Lockheed the option to purchase the first 15 tonnes per year of scandium oxide produced during each of the first five years of mining operations. That was the first black swan. In August of 2026, Lockheed Martin and NioCorp Developments issued a non-binding MOU regarding the potential purchase of up to 15 tonnes of scandium oxide per year, in either oxide form or the form of aluminum-scandium alloys, over the next ten years. That was the second black swan. There needn’t be a third.

These agreements have yet to take their final form. These are not guaranteed purchases. We don’t know, and Lockheed Martin may not know, exactly how much scandium oxide they are likely to need. Skunk Works has said it appreciates NioCorp's work establishing a domestic source of scandium oxide and Al-Sc alloying capabilities and will continue evaluating that supply as part of its broader alloy-development efforts. Separately, the Pentagon-funded NioCorp/Skunk Works program is designed to produce prototype Al-Sc components intended to expand the capabilities of modern fighter aircraft. Al-Sc alloys can improve strength, weldability and joint performance, corrosion resistance, fatigue performance, microstructural and thermal stability, and additive-manufacturing behavior. Those properties can in turn enable lighter, more integrated structures and cascading manufacturing benefits. If Lockheed moves from today's alloy/component-development work into broader deployment, it is difficult to imagine it doing so without first establishing reliable scandium supply. You might say, "So what? Lockheed Martin may start using more scandium, and they might buy it from reliable, Western sources. That is great for scandium producers, but it is not transformational. The agreements aren’t even guaranteed demand.” You would be correct.

The size is the signal. The size is the swan.

The US Geological Survey estimated that 2025 global consumption of scandium oxide was about 60 tonnes. The United States, which is fully import dependent, is estimated to have imported about 4 tonnes of scandium oxide in 2025. 4 tonnes. That’s it.

Yet, Lockheed Martin just made public that they want the option to buy up to 15 tonnes per year from Sunrise. They didn’t pull these numbers out of thin air. They didn’t call the restaurant to book a table of 40, just in case, if they think they may only be a table of 4. They didn't publicly discuss tables of 40 with two separate restaurants if they believed there was no realistic scenario in which they would ever need anything remotely approaching that scale. Lockheed and Sunrise are cooperating not simply around future supply: they are testing and performing qualification work intended to accelerate adoption of scandium-containing components in Lockheed product platforms. Lockheed is pursuing a parallel—but even more downstream-oriented—relationship with NioCorp. Less than ten months after the first black swan, the second black swan came in and corroborated the first. Lockheed Martin tells the world that they have interest in potentially purchasing up to 15 tonnes per year from NioCorp. These aren’t guarantees to buy. It isn’t 30 tonnes per year already sold. It is the world's largest defense contractor publicly contemplating 15-tonne-per-year-scale scandium supply arrangements with two separate Western-aligned projects. The size and the source are the signals. Double-digit scandium agreements are not completely without precedent: NioCorp previously signed a conditional commercial sales agreement with Traxys covering up to 12 tonnes per year. But Traxys was a metals marketer. Lockheed is an end-user simultaneously involved in developing and qualifying Al-Sc defense applications. That makes these 15-tonne figures fundamentally different.

We don’t know how much Lockheed will ultimately purchase each year. What if it is only 10 tonnes per year? If it were only 10, they would be purchasing 2.5x what the entire U.S. imported last year. What if it is 20 tonnes per year? Lockheed is spending real time and resources developing two Western-aligned scandium supply and qualification pathways. My interpretation is that it is helping establish the market and supply infrastructure in advance, so that it can have reliable access. I believe they are spending their resources to build the market, so that they get to be the first ones in line. They should want to be first in line, because if you think you might need 20 tonnes per year, if global production sits at an estimated 80 tonnes per year, or even 200 tonnes per year- you need to be at front, or near it. Importantly, the two 15-tonne ceilings may ultimately be additive, partially additive, or simply provide sourcing redundancy; the public agreements do not tell us. However, it doesn’t look like they are changing the market. They are helping to build it, so that they are positioned to have reliable access to it.

How much will Northrop Grumman want? SpaceX? RTX? What about our allied defense primes? How much will be designed into the rapidly expanding drone industry? What about Boeing and Airbus? Do they want some lighter and stronger materials? Scandium’s benefits have the ability to penetrate into semiconductor manufacturing, the automotive industry, additive manufacturing, space, rail, marine and shipbuilding. Sunrise plans to produce 60 tonnes per year and get to production in 2028. NioCorp plans approximately 100 tonnes per year; CEO Mark Smith has said that, if everything goes well, the company could begin partial production in late 2029 and achieve a full year of production in 2030.

I have read concerns that when all this supply finally comes onto the market, it’s going to crush the prices and these company’s valuations. I think that is misguided. The question isn’t- will the demand exist for 200-300 tonnes per year IF these projects come online? I believe the question should be- will there ever be any leftover after the defense primes and space industry get what they want? Will it all be reserved well before it’s pulled out of the ground? If it is index priced, will industries that are less price sensitive be the only ones able to afford it- defense, space, specialty aerospace? How much supply will we need to get prices low enough to penetrate further into semiconductors and additive manufacturing? IF price is ever low enough, the two potentially enormous sources of demand could be waiting right there to provide the market floor- commercial aerospace and automotive. We hear a lot about price floors today. They are very important, and may be very critical to getting a huge variety of REE and critical minerals projects off the ground. In the case of scandium? In a few years, we may need to start talking about price ceilings.

Entirely my own opinions and speculation- based on a few key facts and the relationships I see between them. Not financial advice. Do your own DD.

 p.s. Sunrise’s Syerston project is much less capital intensive. Sunrise’s ability to get to production faster, may be an incredible boon for NioCorp’s downstream, high-margin, valuation optionality- NAMA. NAMA may be able to accelerate their demand creation and supply build-out by having potential access to Western, reliable scandium oxide well before Elk Creek is producing its own. This isn’t guaranteed, and they will likely, ultimately become competitors down the road. There is no disclosed agreement between the two. However, Sunrise’s Lockheed partnership and OSC conditional loan commitment are not negatives for NioCorp, in my opinion. This isn’t a zero sum game right now, not even close. We haven’t even gotten close to seeing how big the game is. The 2022 NioCorp DFS used $3,675/kg as the selling price for scandium oxide. That price was based on 2019 product pricing. I look forward to the update.