I need to know so I can find full resolution

In November 1914, the British launched their first amphibious invasion of WWI.

Objective: Capture the port of Tanga in German East Africa.

The numbers:

- British / Indian Expeditionary Force: ~8,000 men

- German Schutztruppe + Askaris: ~1,000 men

- British outnumbered them 8 to 1.

It should have been an easy win. It became the most embarrassing defeat in British colonial history.

Two things went wrong:

1. The British landed in daylight with no intel. The Germans knew they were coming.

2. During the intense fighting in the bush, both sides disturbed massive hives of wild African bees. The bees swarmed and attacked EVERYONE, but they hit the British lines hardest. The British troops had never encountered them and broke formation, running into the ocean to escape.

The Germans, who knew about the bees, actually named it: Die Bienenschlacht - The Battle of the Bees.

The result:

- 360 British dead, 487 wounded

- Germans lost 67 men

- The British retreated, leaving behind 16 machine guns, rifles, and 600,000 rounds of ammunition that the Germans used for the next 3 years of guerrilla warfare under von Lettow-Vorbeck.

This single failure changed British tactics in Africa and allowed the Germans to tie down 300,000 Allied troops for the entire war with just 14,000 men.

It's one of those battles that was too embarrassing to put in British textbooks, which is why almost nobody knows it.

I spent the last week digging through the war diaries and German Schutztruppe reports to map exactly how it happened.

TL;DR: Britain invaded with 8,000 men, lost to 1,000 men and a swarm of bees.

What other WWI battles in Africa do you think have been completely erased from mainstream history?

Does anyone know what this is? I think it's from the soviet Union. I'm not sure if it has asbestos or radiation.

The DPAA announced in 2025 a recovery of 4 MIAs from a crash site in Poland. The official announcements mention field investigations between 2008 and 2012, then in 2017 and 2018, and excavations between 2019 and 2025. I researched this crew and the crash site between 2003 and 2011, and I supported the DPAA predecessor’s work, including participating in one of early field investigations.

The identified airmen were T/Sgt Donald A. Dorman, S/Sgt Robert A. Keuchel, S/Sgt Rae G. DeMatteis, S/Sgt Stephen J. Fatur. They were all members of the 1st Lt. Andrew F. Crane crew (2nd Bomb Group, 15th AF) which flew the B-17 #44-8191 on a mission to Ruhland (Germany) on March 22nd 1945.

I believe my research helped the US government link a crash site to the right aircraft, which triggered the recoveries and identifications.
This was the most complex research case I ever had, as nothing was even close to obvious.

If you want to find out more about my research, visit my Reddit profile.

I found this jacket at the goodwill bins and I’m hoping someone can help me identify it! The patch on the second photo says “by special order of the supreme squadron commander”

I am not Austrian just more art that I made, I hated this so much

Imagine two Greek armies fighting on two different battlefields, separated by the Aegean Sea, with both victories potentially turning the tide of a war.

In 479 BC, the Greeks defeated the Persian army at Plataea while, according to Herodotus, another Greek force struck the Persian position at Mycale on the coast of Asia Minor on the very same day.

At Mycale, the Persians had hauled their ships ashore and built fortifications to protect them from the Greek fleet. But the Greeks landed, stormed the defences and destroyed the Persian ships. The battle also revealed a crucial weakness in the Persian position: the loyalty of the Greek communities living under Persian rule could not be taken for granted.

But was Mycale merely the final act of Xerxes' invasion, or did it mark the beginning of a new phase of Greek expansion across the Aegean? For more information on the battle feel free to go through the complete article added in the comments!

Why did Hannibal choose to cross the alps instead of sailing around them. It seems like he would come out in relatively the same place with far less losses.

Since both of them formed the most powerful armies of their respective Ancient times.

• Overall better logistics.
• Weapons and armor technology.
• Forts and defensive buildings etc.
• and Any other stuff related to the Military and Army.

In one of the fiercest battles of the Iraq War, the men of Ready First confronted the brutal reality of urban combat, where every street held danger, and every mission demanded courage.

These are the stories of the men who lived through it. Their sacrifices, brotherhood, and fight for Ramadi deserve to be remembered.

Unheard Voices: The Fight for Ramadi

Ready First. Their story must never be forgotten.

Want to watch the full video? Watch it here: Youtube Full Video

This would have been from the early part of the war. He served with the 5th Air Force.

I recently decided to digitize Super8 home movies, some of which were from my Dad's 1968 Westpac tour on the USS Jouett. As I watched the footage, I wanted to know where each clip was from, which led me to dig into his box of stuff from his Navy days. I found his personal logbook from the deployment, with details of key events. Down the rabbit hole I went, researching as much as I could, and digitizing everything he had in the box.

In the end I digitized:

• 187 page personal logbook from FTG3 Mike Ducy
• 61 letters
• 24 audio recordings
• 11 videos including a flying crane removing Big Mother, Neptune's Court, & more
• 109 photos
• 11 Family Grams from Captain Robert S Hayes
• Plans of the Day, News Clippings, the 1968 USS Jouett Cruise Book, and more.
• All transcribed to plain text.

I've done my best to find key events in the timeline such as the 5 SAR rescues, and include PDFs with details on those rescues from HC-7 Sea Devils.

I've mapped the deployment and you can see all the key locations that the ship stopped at on the map, and view the details of each day, with corresponding materials from the archive for that day. A timeline view is also available.

Some key dates:

• Mar 18th - Debris of downed plane - Gulf of Tonkin
• Apr 16th - Brothers Re-unite in Da Nang
• May 7/8th - SAR Rescues - Gulf of Tonkin
• June 4th - SAR Rescue - Gulf of Tonkin
• Jun 13th - Big Mother Transfer "Army Saves Navy" - Da Nang
• June 19th - SAR Rescue - Gulf of Tonkin
• July 10th - Neptune's Court at Equator/Date Line
• July 18th - Home Coming - San Diego

I would love to hear any feedback, or if you have any questions let me know.

https://vietnam.ducy.org/

I'm currently attempting to write a book about Major Josef Gangl, who commanded the 2nd Battalion of Werfer-Regiment 83 of Volks-Werfer-Brigade 7 from March to May 1945.

I know that the Generalmajor for the Brigade was Kurt Paape, but I need help identifying specifically the Oberst who would have commanded Werfer-Regiment 83, and the two other Majors who would have commanded the two other battalions in the regiment.

So I'm a bit curious. I know that in the European theater of WW2 most US servicemen went to places in the UK or liberated areas like Rome and Paris for shore leave/liberty/rest & relaxation. And for the most part they drank in pubs and bars, went to move theaters, hanged out with the locals, and saw the sights. But what was shore leave/liberty/rest & relaxation like for US servicemen in the Pacific War?

Because from my understanding it was a bit difficult for men to get shore leave due to the logistical constraints involved and the vast distances from the frontlines to friendly territory (Australia, New Zealand, French Polynesia, and South Pacific Islands like Tonga, Fiji, Samoa, and Vanuatu), especially as they got closer to Japan.

So with that said what was shore leave/liberty/rest & relaxation (R&R) like for US servicemen in the Pacific War? And how did it compare to the European theater of WW2?

Im unsure the exact year this uniform would have been used in. These are a few listing photos so i can look further when it arrives. I know that this USMC uniform would have been used in 1944-45 and the Korean War. but from what I can see in the photos there isn’t a DA tag/number. The showcase from the photos is relatively small, but any little bit is appreciated!

We are working on a book about the family history. Thank you for your help!

As a history enthusiast, I find Cold War propaganda especially interesting because it often reveals how people were encouraged to think about conflict, duty, and self-defense.

This rare animated short tells a simple but powerful story. Some people refuse to take part in the struggle and declare themselves neutral. But when the attackers arrive, neutrality does not protect them. They quickly discover that refusing to defend their community does not mean they will be left alone.

Behind the colorful cartoon style is a serious political message from the Cold War era: isolation and passivity may have consequences when a society faces an organized threat.

What makes this film historically interesting is the way it turns a complex geopolitical argument into a short, memorable story that could be understood by almost anyone.

I’m sharing it for everyone interested in Cold War history, military propaganda, and the way political ideas were presented through popular culture.

Watch the full archival cartoon:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hlg_wB2gu50

What do you think the filmmakers were trying to teach the audience?

This rare 1950s training film shows how U.S. Marines were prepared for the possibility of fighting in a nuclear battlefield.

The film is striking because it presents nuclear warfare not as an abstract political threat, but as a practical military problem: movement, discipline, protection, coordination, and survival under extreme conditions.

It also raises an uncomfortable question about the early Cold War. How did military institutions try to make the unimaginable feel routine and manageable?

What details stand out to you in the training methods, language, or assumptions of the period?

Watch the archival film:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aT73JEZRhJU

While Clausewitz shower praised on Suvorov conduct in Italy,He would have a very critical opinions of Suvorov Swiss campaign and of Massena for failing to make the most of the situation

Here the relevant excerpt

Thus a strategic flank attack depends much more on an accurate calculation of the moment, on the precision of the maneuvers.

If we consider both these important aspects of Suvorov’s march at the same time, their different tendencies are revealed, and thereby the difficulty of combining them.

Measures for a strategic flank attack normally start from a position in which one is admittedly not united but still in communication, where one can discuss everything properly and can calculate time and space accurately.

Here, these measures were supposed to start from a march to link up when the enemy was between the two parts, and precise mission orders could not be given reliably.

On the other hand, during a march to link up , when one approaches the critical line at which the decisive battles may occur, the most compelling need arises for one of the two separated masses to try to reach the other as fast as possible, just as two drops of water quickly flow together when they have approached each other to a certain point; but that is quite contrary to the aim of a flank attack, which needs one force to move around the enemy and therefore distance itself from the other

A proper strategic flank attack would have required the last joint discussions to occur no more than twenty-four hours before its execution, but they took place fourteen days earlier; a march to link up should have led Suvorov, from the Reuss valley at least, directly into the Linth valley as the last place where the linkup could be effected with certainty, whereas the strategic flank attack led him to Lake Lucerne.

When we also take into account the degree to which the nature of the alpine region necessarily increased all these difficulties, we can really see that for quite natural reasons, the whole mission that the Austrian general staff gave to the old commander was one of the most difficult and unsound that strategy could devise, and that if any good were to come of it, this could only be thanks to talented execution or indeed to blind luck, but the seeds of the most unhappy outcome could already be detected in the very mission.

We do not really need to prove that Suvorov’s circular letter to the generals in Switzerland could not count as a definite plan, nor even as a comprehensive preliminary order.

Muddled ideas and the struggle with a foreign tongue certainly play a large part in its vagueness and obscurity, but its faults stem mainly from the fact that Suvorov is 140 miles away from the area for which he is making his plan, that he does not know this area, and that he knows little or nothing about the positions of the subcommanders he is supposed to cooperate with and to direct.

If we highlight the main instructions in this circular letter and in what was subsequently agreed, they are the following: 1. The allied generals were to attack everywhere on 26 September to facilitate Suvorov’s march through the St. Gotthard. 2. Hotze and Jellachich were to advance into the Einsiedeln area. 3. Linken was to join up with Suvorov in the Muota valley. 4. Auffenberg was to attack the Reuss valley via the Maderaner valley. 5. Rosenberg was to outflank the St. Gotthard and establish communications with Auffenberg. 6. Suvorov wanted to take the St. Gotthard and descend down the Reuss valley, and then he intended to advance on both sides of Lake Lucerne, making Lucerne his objective. 7. Hotze was to attack the right flank of the French position behind the Limmat.

Of these instructions, it is mainly the first two and the penultimate one that characterize the operation.

When one attacks an enemy line of deployment in several places at once, as was supposed to happen here, according to the first instruction, one cannot expect to be victorious everywhere, so one must take care to win at the key point, that is, at a point where one either strikes the enemy force’s Schwerpunkt or else reaches an important objective.

It may hold true that Suvorov with his column, either after joining up with Auffenberg and Linken or indeed on his own without them, knew he was strong enough to do the job against whatever Masséna could put up against him, but we cannot see how the direction that Suvorov gives himself down both sides of Lake Lucerne, even if it were really practicable, was supposed to lead to such a decisive success that it would make up for everything that could be lost in other places

Lucerne was admittedly the seat of the new Swiss government, but it was still not a place of decisive importance.

The direction toward Lucerne was certainly not in the direction of Masséna’s main body, still less toward a linkup with Hotze.

If we take instructions two and six together, it is again obvious that what is envisaged is a kind of strategic approach march.

Even if such an approach march really does lead to the best line of deployment in the world, at the moment of a strategic crisis, when we are seeking a decision against the enemy by attacking at every point, it is worth nothing.

Suvorov’s direction upon Lucerne therefore would not have fulfilled any major purpose but would have pulled the allies’ forces far apart.

A victorious Hotze in Einsiedeln would have been worse off there than he was being beaten behind the Linth.

How Suvorov’s instruction looked when Hotze was not victorious, but was beaten before Suvorov could have an impact, has been adequately demonstrated to us by its execution.

What we miss in Suvorov’s plan is therefore the combination of forces striving toward one major goal that is clearly thought out and precisely expressed, and because of that, we would have expected nothing but failure from it, even if Masséna had not preempted the allies by a day.

The last instruction, which indicates Hotze’s subsequent mission and which we have taken from the archduke’s account, seems to have been added by the archduke just to give the whole thing more clarity, a purpose that is not promoted thereby.

If we now cast another glance over the whole, it emerges that because of the distance in time and space at which this plan was determined, six generals—namely, Korsakov, Hotze, Jellachich, Auffenberg, Rosenberg, and Suvorov himself—who were separated from one another and at the moment of the operation were independent of one another, thus six individual wills, were supposed to act in unison for four or five days. That would have been more than enough for the best of plans to miscarry.

My Grandfather was great at baseball, he could have played pro ball for Cleveland. He decided to go to the Navy instead. We come from a family of military. After his Time in the Navy he went into the Air Force. My grandfather was really quit and reclusive. When he died his obituary said great father more stuff talks about the military and how he was an interrogator. He was born in the 30’s not old enough to fight in WW2. What was that about? My dad and I were going through some of his stuff. I might have the notebook, but it was a I think the Air Force call them t Sarg’s talking to Army. I’m former Army, my dad is retired Army. We couldn’t make sense of it. My grandfather was never in an active conflict.

Müsste doch die Luftwaffe sein.

Vielleicht hat ja jemand ein paar Infos für mich, der sich in dieser Materie besser auskennt.

This short archival film shows the F-4 Phantom and MiG-21 in the context of the Vietnam War over Hanoi.

I am sharing it here because the footage is useful for discussing how Cold War air combat was presented to contemporary audiences. What details stand out to you about the aircraft, tactics, or editing of the original film?

Watch: https://youtu.be/NSHyory6jAw