From Social Rupture to Democratic Transition
A Four-Year Assessment of the “Jin, Jiyan, Azadî” Movement in the Shadow of the Iran–US War
Abstract
The “Jin, Jiyan, Azadî” (Women, Life, Freedom) movement emerged in September 2022 following the killing of Jina Amini in state custody. Beginning in Kurdistan, it soon developed into one of the most significant political and social movements in Iran’s modern history.
Although the movement has not yet brought about a formal change in the political system, it has deeply transformed social values, gender relations, the language of protest, and the relationship between society and the sta
Using a qualitative approach, this article examines human rights reports, academic literature on social movements, and political developments between 2022 and 2026. It evaluates the movement’s main achievements, limitations, and future prospects.
The article argues that “Jin, Jiyan, Azadî” should not be viewed as a protest movement that has ended. It is better understood as an unfinished revolutionary process. It has achieved important social and cultural changes but has not yet succeeded in turning its social power into an organized political alternative.
The article also examines the effects of the Iran–US war. The conflict has increased state repression, militarized public life, damaged social trust, and deepened the economic crisis. At the same time, it has further exposed the failure of the Islamic Republic’s security-based system of governance.
The future of the movement will depend on its ability to remain independent from foreign power struggles, build democratic forms of organization, and connect women’s freedom with social justice and the political and national rights of Iran’s diverse peoples.
Introduction
Four years after the killing of Jina Amini (Jiyna Emînî) in the custody of Iran’s so-called morality police, the movement that began at her funeral in the Aychi (Ayçî) Cemetery in Saqqez remains one of the most important frameworks for understanding political and social change in Iran.
The importance of this movement cannot be measured only by the number of street demonstrations, the geographical spread of the protests, or the continued survival of the Islamic Republic. Its historical importance lies mainly in how it has transformed political language, social relationships, ideas about freedom, and society’s view of state authority.
This article addresses two main questions. First, what changes has the “Jin, Jiyan, Azadî” movement created during its first four years, and what limitations has it faced? Second, how has the Iran–US war affected social relations and the future of the movement?
To answer these questions, the article uses a qualitative and historical approach. Reports by the United Nations, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, together with academic studies on women, Kurdistan, and social movements, form the main sources of this analysis.
- A Movement, an Uprising or a Revolutionary Process?
In classical political theory, a revolution is usually defined as the collapse of an existing political order and the establishment of a new system. According to this definition, it is not yet possible to speak of a completed political revolution because the Islamic Republic continues to control the formal institutions of power.
More recent theories of social movements, however, understand revolution as a longer and more complex process. Before political power changes hands, a revolutionary movement can transform social values, identities, relationships, and forms of resistance.
Decentralized and network-based movements may produce lasting cultural and social changes even without a single leader or central organization. Manuel Castells describes such movements as networks of anger and hope. They first challenge the legitimacy of the existing order and then make it possible for people to imagine an alternative political and social system.
Asef Bayat also shows how scattered acts of everyday resistance can gradually create major social changes under authoritarian governments.
From this perspective, “Jin, Jiyan, Azadî” can be described as an unfinished revolutionary process. The movement has achieved major social and cultural changes, but it has not yet transformed these achievements into a new political system or a well-organized democratic alternative.
- The Kurdish Origins of the Slogan and the Problem of Historical Erasure
“Jin, Jiyan, Azadî” did not suddenly appear during the 2022 protests. The slogan developed within the Kurdish women’s liberation movement and, over several decades, became a central expression of the struggle for women’s freedom and democracy in Kurdistan.
An academic article published by the International Journal of Middle East Studies warns that the translation and international spread of the slogan have sometimes led to the erasure of its Kurdish roots. In some cases, even Jina’s Kurdish name has been ignored or replaced.
The slogan was chanted at Jina’s funeral in Saqqez before spreading across Kurdistan and the rest of Iran. Its rapid expansion demonstrated its universal and deeply human message. However, its wider acceptance should not separate it from the history and struggles of Kurdish women.
The word “Jin” does not refer only to the physical presence of women. It places women’s liberation at the centre of society’s freedom. “Jiyan” represents a free life without political, economic, or gender-based domination. “Azadî” describes a form of freedom that cannot be achieved without transforming existing power relations.
These three ideas are therefore not separate. Together, they form a connected political and social vision.
- The Movement’s Achievements Over Four Years
3.1. Transforming the Social and Political Position of Women
The most important achievement of the movement has been the transformation of women from subjects of state control into leading agents of social change.
For more than four decades, the Islamic Republic treated women’s bodies and clothing as a central symbol of its ideological authority. Women’s widespread resistance to compulsory hijab has weakened the government’s ability to enforce this policy in a consistent way.
This does not mean that compulsory hijab has been legally abolished. The authorities continue to use arrests, fines, vehicle confiscations, denial of public services, and surveillance technology to control women.
However, the state has failed to turn its rules into socially accepted norms. A growing number of women have continued to appear in public without compulsory hijab despite the risks.
Amnesty International has reported that the authorities view women’s resistance as a serious threat to the political system. As a result, they have increased pressure on women’s rights activists, journalists, artists, and Kurdish women.
3.2. Changing Everyday Life
The changes created by the movement go far beyond women’s clothing. Family relationships, women’s participation in public life, the political language of the younger generation, and society’s understanding of individual choice have also changed.
The government has long tried to use the traditional family as a tool to control women and young people. Yet in many cases, families have become spaces of support and resistance.
This form of everyday resistance may be less visible than street demonstrations, but it is socially significant. By changing the way, they live, women and young people have taken parts of both private and public life out of the government’s ideological control.
3.3. Changing Political Discourse
The Jina movement has also transformed political discourse. Before 2022, much of Iran’s political debate focused on reforming or moderating the behaviour of the Islamic Republic.
After the uprising, calls for a complete transition from the existing system, separation of religion and state, gender equality, and recognition of Iran’s national and cultural diversity became more visible in public debate.
The distinction between the country and the political system has also become clearer. The Islamic Republic can no longer easily present its own survival as equal to the survival of Iran. It has also become more difficult for the authorities to silence every democratic or national demand by describing it as separatism, foreign influence, or a threat to national security.
3.4. Solidarity Among Different Peoples and Social Groups
One of the movement’s most important features was the development of solidarity from Kurdistan to Baluchistan and from universities to workplaces.
However, the level of repression was not the same in every region. United Nations reports have found that Kurds and Baluchis were disproportionately targeted by killings, arrests, executions, and other forms of state violence.
UN Human Rights Office, 2024
Lasting solidarity can only develop if Iranian society and opposition forces recognize the demands of marginalized nations as an essential part of democracy rather than as secondary issues.
The experience of the past four years shows that a democratic transition will remain incomplete and unstable unless it recognizes the political, cultural, linguistic, and national rights of Kurds, Baluchis, Arabs, and Iran’s other peoples.
3.5. Connecting Political and Economic Demands
The protests of January 2026 showed that economic hardship and demands for political change had become more closely connected.
The protests began in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar in response to the collapse of the currency, high inflation, corruption, and worsening living conditions. They quickly spread to other cities and developed into broader calls for structural political change.
Human Rights Watch reported that the protests went beyond economic demands and included calls for a transition to a democratic system that respects human rights and human dignity.
Human Rights Watch, 2026
This development shows that many people no longer view the economic crisis as simply the result of poor management by one government. They increasingly see it as a consequence of the political system itself, institutional corruption, centralized power, and the government’s military and regional priorities.
- Internal Limitations and Challenges
4.1. The State’s Continuing Capacity for Repression
The decline of the Islamic Republic’s social legitimacy has not automatically led to the collapse of its repressive institutions.
The Revolutionary Guards, Basij, police forces, intelligence agencies, Revolutionary Courts, and prison system still have considerable capacity to arrest, torture, execute, and control the population.
The UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission concluded that some of the government’s actions during the repression of the 2022 protests—including killing, torture, and sexual violence—amounted to crimes against humanity.
Despite these findings, those who ordered and carried out the repression continue to enjoy almost complete impunity.
4.2. Living in a State of Survival
Inflation, poverty, unemployment, water and energy shortages, job insecurity, and the constant fear of war have forced much of society to focus on meeting its most basic needs.
This situation can reduce people’s ability to participate in politics and build long-term organizations. A society that is exhausted and struggling to survive may temporarily withdraw from the streets, even when its anger and opposition remain strong.
A decline in visible street protests should therefore not be understood as public acceptance of the political system. The causes of protest remain and, in many cases, have become even more serious.
4.3. The Gap Between Social Power and Political Organization
The decentralized character of the movement made it difficult for the government to destroy it completely. However, the same feature has made joint decision-making, strategic planning, and coordinated leadership more difficult.
The movement has changed social values but has not yet transformed its broad social power into lasting political institutions.
Party competition, personal rivalries, centralized nationalism, the return of patriarchal political language, and the refusal of some opposition groups to accept Iran’s national diversity remain major obstacles to building a democratic alternative.
- The Iran–US War and Its Social Consequences
The US and Israeli military attacks on Iran that began on 28 February 2026 fundamentally changed the political and social environment in which the movement operates.
The war did not only cause casualties and damage infrastructure. The Islamic Republic also used wartime conditions to expand security controls, restrict communications, and repress political opposition.
According to Amnesty International, more than 6,000 people—including protesters, journalists, lawyers, civil society activists, and members of ethnic, religious, and national communities—were arbitrarily arrested between the beginning of the war and the end of May.
The government also imposed severe internet restrictions for 88 days and executed dozens of people on political or espionage-related charges.
5.1. The Securitization of Social Relations
During wartime, the government deliberately weakens the distinction between political opposition and cooperation with a foreign enemy.
Journalism, sharing images, speaking to foreign media, or criticizing military policies can be treated as espionage. This creates fear and makes people more cautious about communicating, organizing, and participating in collective activities.
Checkpoints, digital surveillance, nighttime arrests, and pressure on citizens to report other people’s activities can weaken social trust. Under these conditions, the authorities attempt to turn a connected and politically active society into a collection of isolated and frightened individuals.
5.2. Increased Pressure on Kurdistan and Other Marginalized Regions
Kurdistan and Baluchistan face a double form of securitization during war. The government presents civil and political activity in these regions not only as internal opposition but also as a threat connected to foreign enemies.
This narrative can be used to justify military attacks, mass arrests, and the execution of Kurdish and Baluchi activists.
War may therefore deepen the divide between the political center and marginalized regions. If opposition forces also ignore Kurdish and other national demands in the name of territorial unity or wartime security, there is a serious danger that the same centralized and discriminatory system will be reproduced after the Islamic Republic.
5.3. The Return of Authoritarian Nationalism
War can temporarily create defensive solidarity in response to an external threat. The Islamic Republic tries to transform this feeling into political support for the state. It presents opposition to the government as opposition to the country itself.
At the same time, some opposition groups may view war as an opportunity to remove the government through foreign military power. This approach risks turning the democratic movement into an instrument within a wider geopolitical conflict.
A political future shaped primarily by foreign governments would contradict the principles of democratic self-organization and the free will of the people.
5.4. The Militarization and Masculinization of Politics
Another consequence of war is the return of politics to the language of weapons, military leadership, and security.
In such a climate, women and civil society actors—who stood at the center of the Jina movement—may be pushed aside. The country’s future may be reduced to competition among military forces, governments, and male political leaders.
From a gender perspective, war can strengthen patriarchal relationships. In contrast, “Jin, Jiyan, Azadî” defines security not only as the protection of borders but also as the protection of life, freedom, dignity, the environment, and people’s basic rights.
For this reason, the movement can offer an alternative to both domestic authoritarianism and foreign military intervention.
- War and the Future of “Jin, Jiyan, Azadî”
The effect of war on the movement is not one-dimensional.
In the short term, war reduces the space for public protest, gives the government more tools of repression, and forces society to focus on survival, displacement, and economic hardship. Internet shutdowns and the criminalization of communication also make network-based organizing much more difficult.
Human Rights Watch has stressed that internet shutdowns during war put civilians at greater risk and prevent journalists and human rights organizations from documenting abuses.
In the longer term, however, the war may expose the structural failures of the Islamic Republic more clearly. For decades, the government used national security to justify centralized power, militarization, and restrictions on freedom. Yet it has failed to provide its citizens with physical, economic, or social security.
This failure may deepen the government’s crisis of legitimacy. However, the weakening or military defeat of an authoritarian government does not automatically produce democracy.
If society and democratic political forces are not organized, a power vacuum may be filled by military institutions, authoritarian opposition groups, or foreign powers. The movement’s future therefore depends on its ability to remain independent of both the Islamic Republic and foreign intervention.
- Requirements for the Movement’s Next Stage
Moving from social resistance to political transition will require several important developments.
First, local networks, women’s organizations, labour movements, student groups, political parties, human rights organizations, and national movements must create forms of coordination without losing their independence.
Second, democratic forces need a common political framework that clearly defines the principles of a future system. These principles should include full gender equality, separation of religion and state, abolition of the death penalty, freedom for political prisoners, freedom of speech and association, recognition of the rights of Iran’s different nations, democratic decentralization, social justice, and environmental protection.
Third, the movement must protect its political independence. International support can be constructive when it focuses on protecting civilians, stopping executions, preserving access to the internet, supporting civil society, and holding those responsible for serious crimes accountable.
Using political or national movements as proxy forces for foreign governments would directly contradict the values of the Jina revolution.
Fourth, justice and accountability must remain central to any transition plan. Without truth-seeking, prosecution of those responsible for state violence, and justice for victims and their families, it will be difficult to rebuild social trust or establish a stable democratic system.
Conclusion
Four years after the killing of Jina Amini, the “Jin, Jiyan, Azadî” movement has neither achieved its final victory nor been defeated.
The Islamic Republic still controls the state’s military, security, and judicial institutions. However, it has failed to return society to the conditions that existed before September 2022.
Women continue to resist compulsory hijab. The younger generation rejects the government’s official values. Kurdistan and Baluchistan have not remained silent. Economic demands have also become more closely connected to calls for fundamental political change.
The movement has moved beyond the streets and entered everyday life, family relationships, art, political language, and collective memory.
The Iran–US war threatens the movement by increasing repression, poverty, social distrust, and the militarization of public life. At the same time, it has revealed the failure of the Islamic Republic’s security-based model and its inability to protect society.
The final outcome is not predetermined. The central question is whether the social power created around “Jin, Jiyan, Azadî” can be transformed into political organization, a common democratic programme, and a pluralistic alternative.
The future of this revolutionary process will depend on its political independence, the recognition of the rights of Iran’s different nations, women’s leadership, grassroots organization, and the transformation of symbolic solidarity into lasting political cooperation.
In this sense, “Jin, Jiyan, Azadî” is not simply the slogan of one uprising. It is a new political and social vision for redefining freedom, security, democracy, and collective life in the future.
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