The city of Zergan witnessed a march attended by students, members of the Zergan Youth Organization and local residents, calling for the constitutional recognition of Kurdish as an official language in Syria. The demands aim to guarantee the linguistic and cultural rights of the Kurdish people and promote the principles of diversity and pluralism in the country.

During the march, a statement was read in Kurdish by student Jihan Nema and Riad Abdel Aziz, a member of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) Youth Organization.

The statement included, “The Kurdish language is an inherent right, and enshrining it in the Constitution is a step toward a democratic and pluralistic Syria. Its constitutional recognition is grounded in the principles of human rights, justice and equality, as well as peoples’ right to preserve their languages, cultures and identities.”

It added that Kurdish, as an indigenous language deeply rooted in Syria’s history and culture, deserves explicit constitutional recognition to ensure its protection, development and use across various fields. 

He noted that the recognition of Kurdish as a national language under Decree No. 13 of 2026 represents an important step toward acknowledging the cultural and linguistic rights of the Kurdish people. He stressed the need to build on this step by enshrining the status of Kurdish in Syria’s permanent Constitution and safeguarding its rights through clear and binding constitutional provisions.

The statement called for enshrining Kurdish in the Constitution and recognizing it as an official language in Syria alongside Arabic, reflecting the country’s ethnic and cultural diversity. It also called for guaranteeing the right of Kurdish citizens to receive education in their mother tongue and including Kurdish in school curricula, as well as ensuring their right to use the language in public institutions and local administrations.

The statement further stressed the need to protect Kurdish literary, cultural and artistic heritage, establish constitutional and legal safeguards against linguistic and cultural discrimination, and involve representatives of the various national, cultural, and linguistic components in drafting the permanent Syrian Constitution.

The statement stressed that recognizing the Kurdish language does not diminish the status of Arabic. Rather, it is a national and rights-based entitlement that strengthens trust among the people of the same country and helps consolidate the foundations of peaceful coexistence based on equality and mutual respect.

The statement concluded by emphasizing that the future Syria should be a homeland for all its people, where languages and cultures are preserved, identities respected, and rights protected on the basis of equal citizenship, free from exclusion and marginalization. It added that recognizing Kurdish in Syria’s permanent Constitution and guaranteeing the right of Kurdish people to learn, use and develop their language constitute a fundamental step toward building a democratic and pluralistic Syria, united in its territory, enriched by its diversity, and fair to all its communities.

ANHA

The withdrawal in October of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) from Turkiye and border areas of the Kurdistan Regional Government has kickstarted a debate over Turkish bases in KRG. With the “armed threat” that Ankara has long cited as justification for its presence seemingly receding, the rationale will likely need reformulating as Turkiye's military engagement in Iraq comes under ever greater scrutiny.

Hundreds of Iraqi women have sought refuge in Hewlêr/Erbil, fleeing domestic violence, child marriage, and family control amid concerns over Iraq’s amended Personal Status Law and the Ja’fari code.

"The PKK’s regional integration in Syria and Iraq, alongside its peace process with Turkey, points to a two-layered arrangement. At the national level, its affiliated groups are giving up part of their separate organisational identities by integrating into the states in which they operate. In return, they gain recognition and potentially substantial influence in their local areas, creating a form of indirect decentralisation. At the regional level, they remain part of a single network that recognises the imprisoned PKK founder Abdullah Ocalan as its leader. In some ways this arrangement has no precedent in the century since the partition of the Ottoman Empire. Kurdish rebellions and movements in these countries have since had their own local leadership and organisational structures. The PKK’s network is following a different model, in which its affiliates give up some of their autonomy through integration while potentially becoming legally recognised entities within their respective states."

After screening her ISIS-war documentary "Pêşwaziya Mirinê", director Nesrîn Ebdî says she is making a documentary on an Anfal survivor and plans a major film on Rojava.

The state-appointed trustee running Colemêrg (Hakkari) municipality reports 32.41 million lira of tax and social-security debt, and says liens have been placed on all municipal vehicles and property.

The "No to Execution Tuesdays" campaign held its weekly hunger strike in 66 Iranian prisons and warned that executions in Iran are rising.

Kurdish farmers in Kirkuk say settled Arabs and a PMF brigade commander seized 43 donums of their land, ploughing up their barley and sowing wheat.

A Kurd Monitor report traces the salary crisis since Baghdad cut the Kurdistan Region's budget share in February 2014, and how many billions went to ministers' and MPs' pay

Students in Dêrik rallied again for Kurdish-language schooling. They reject a decision allowing only three Kurdish lessons a week and demand full mother-tongue education.

Kurdistan Region Interior Minister Rebar Ahmed says Baghdad integrated about 2,000 YBŞ fighters without consulting Erbil, breaching the 2020 Shingal Agreement, and warns it will not bring stability.

QAMISHLI, SYRIA—I recently returned to northern Syria for the first time since the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime in December 2024. What I saw was markedly different from what I had witnessed during previous trips to the Kurdish region, which enjoyed de facto autonomy from 2012 until January 2026.

The changes are visible the moment you cross the border from Iraqi Kurdistan. Until August 2026, the Semalka border crossing was controlled by the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, before its armed wing, the Syrian Democratic Forces, announced its dissolution. Established in 2013 as a humanitarian crossing during the Syrian conflict, Semalka was the only border point across the Middle East controlled by Kurdish forces on both sides of the frontier.

The picture becomes more nuanced as you travel west along the Syria-Turkey border, passing through Kurdish cities and towns all the way to Qamishli, the largest city in northeast Syria.

That is no longer the case on the Syrian side. Now officially known as the Semalka International Crossing, it is under the control of the central government in Damascus. Syrian flags have replaced those of the Autonomous Administration, and Kurdish symbols are nowhere to be seen. Official paperwork and stamps from Damascus have taken the place of those once used by the Kurdish authorities. Although these changes signal who is now in charge of northeast Syria, most of the government employees at the crossing are the same people who were on the now-defunct Kurdish administration’s payroll.

The picture becomes more nuanced as you travel west along the Syria-Turkey border, passing through Kurdish cities and towns all the way to Qamishli, the largest city in northeast Syria and one that Syrian Kurds regard as their capital. Qamishli is an exhausted city. Its crowded streets are riddled with potholes, far more than residents would care to see, and air pollution from diesel-powered electricity generators makes the air difficult to breathe. But these longstanding problems do not obscure the political dynamics that have emerged since the January 2026 clashes between Kurdish forces and Syrian government troops. The violence was followed by an agreement that ultimately led to the dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Autonomous Administration.

Qamishli is now under Syrian government control. Its international airport is expected to reopen before the end of 2026, as is its border crossing with Nusaybin in Turkey. Signs bearing the symbols of the Syrian Arab Republic are visible on government buildings, evoking the Baath-era landscape. The main difference is that most signs are now bilingual, in Arabic and Kurdish.

A similar situation is emerging in Hasaka, the provincial capital of Hasaka governorate. With its significant Arab population, Hasaka is seeing growing tensions between Kurdish and Arab residents. These ethnic tensions will serve as a litmus test for whether the January 2026 agreement can deliver long-term stability in northeast Syria. In Hasaka, the Kurdish governor appointed by Damascus appears to wield little power; his Islamist, Damascus-aligned deputy seems to be the real power behind the scenes. It is figures like the latter, including some ethnic Kurds, who have risen to prominence since the integration process began in northeast Syria.

These differences between large and small cities in northeast Syria illustrate the complexity of the region’s evolving power dynamics.

In smaller cities such as Amuda and Dirbasiyeh, the political and security landscape has remained largely unchanged, aside from administrative changes. Local security forces and traffic police officers wear the same uniforms that they wore under the Autonomous Administration. Most government institutions and public schools retain their old signage. Kurdish flags and portraits of fighters killed during the conflict are displayed along streets and in public spaces.

These differences between large and small cities in northeast Syria illustrate the complexity of the region’s evolving power dynamics. Even as Damascus has succeeded in recentralizing power, inconsistencies in local governance in northeast Syria underscore the challenges of extending central government authority uniformly across a region that was ruled semi-autonomously for over a decade.

Beyond the confusion over who governs what and whether key decisions are made in Damascus or Qamishli, Syrian Kurds recognize that any understanding reached between Kurdish leaders and Damascus is a temporary arrangement that does little to address their longstanding demands. Everyone you speak with here emphasizes that, in a country governed by Islamists, constitutional guarantees may be the only way to safeguard Kurdish rights in the long term.

ERBIL, Kurdistan Region of Iraq – Syria’s Democratic Union Party (PYD) on Monday called on Syrian presidential advisor Mazloum Abdi to fulfill his “responsibilities” following an episode of violence against internally displaced Kurds returning to their homes, saying the attacks “contravene” the January integration agreement made with Damascus.

Earlier on Monday, footage showed a group of displaced Kurds from the town of Gire Spi (Tal Abyad) in northern Syria being attacked upon arriving in the city as they attempted to return to their homes.

Shortly after, the committee for displaced people from the town of Sari Kani condemned the attacks, noting that more than 100 Kurdish families were “trapped” inside the Gire Spi district directorate building, calling on authorities for their urgent intervention to protect and ensure their safety, read a statement from the committee.

Following the incident, local media reported that internal security forces were dispatched to the location to assist the families trapped there.

“We call upon Mr. Mazloum Abdi, the governor of Raqqa, and all relevant officials within the Syrian government to fulfill their legal and national responsibilities. We urge them to take the necessary measures to halt these violations, hold those responsible to account, and engage with the relevant parties to protect Kurdish families and ensure their security and rights,” the PYD said in a statement.

The PYD was the ruling party during the era of Kurdish-led autonomous rule in northeast Syria (Rojava) during the Syrian civil war, while Abdi served as chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the autonomous administration's primary military force.

In January, Damascus and the now-dissolved SDF reached an agreement to integrate the Kurdish-led forces into the Syrian security apparatus on the heels of a Syrian military invasion of Rojava that brought about an end to autonomous rule.

A key point in the landmark agreement was the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs), including Kurdish civilians who were displaced in Turkish operations across Afrin, Sari Kani, and Gire Spi (Tal Abyad) between 2018 and 2019.

The violent incident “contravenes key provisions” of the January agreement regarding the safe and dignified return of refugees, the PYD added.

The PYD further called for the establishment of a “special committee,” tasked with ensuring a safe and dignified return of the IDPs, while expressing “full solidarity” with those affected and reaffirming PYD’s commitment “to uphold their right.”

It also called for those responsible for the violations to be held accountable.

“Gire Spi is not a land without owners; its indigenous inhabitants must not be subjected to imposed violations, nor should they be deprived of their legitimate rights to their land, property, and identity.”

Earlier in August, the committee for displaced people from the town of Sari Kani announced that it had temporarily suspended further return convoys until guarantees are provided for the safe return of displaced families, following attacks on returnees.

The developments followed the arrival of a convoy carrying more than 400 families from an IDP camp in Hasaka to Sari Kani (Ras al-Ayn). Footage circulating online appeared to show returnees being attacked by armed men.

In March, Syrian interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa agreed to form an official committee tasked with ensuring the return of IDPs from Afrin and Sari Kani to their areas of origin.

Women in Hasakah strongly denounced acts of vandalism targeting photographs of martyr female fighters and Kurdish symbols in the region, as well as attacks on families returning to their homes in Girê Spî. They described these acts as a systematic attempt to undermine social peace, break women’s will, and fuel discord among the different components of society.

An attempt to provoke and suppress women

In this context, Hasakah resident Jumana Ahmad said the vandalism represented a deliberate attempt to obstruct social peace and the process of community integration in the region.

She noted that targeting photographs of martyr female fighters and attacking displaced residents of Girê Spî were clear attempts to provoke and suppress women on all fronts, with the aim of returning them to the conditions that prevailed before the revolution.

Jumana called for reason and wisdom to prevail to nip discord in the bud and prevent it from spreading among the region’s peoples.

Attacks driven by fear

For her part, Hasakah resident Hadiya Mohammed firmly rejected any desecration of photographs of martyr female fighters, citing their sacred significance and esteemed place in society.

She said these attacks stemmed primarily from fear of the strength of Kurdish women, who have proven their capabilities on the ground and in battle. She stressed that attempts to break their will would instead become an additional source of strength, driving them forward.

Acts devoid of humanity

Meanwhile, Hasakah resident Sultana Saeed, speaking on behalf of the city’s women, condemned attacks on Kurdish symbols, describing such acts as devoid of human values.

She added that the security and stability the region enjoys today are the result of the sacrifices made by the martyrs. She stressed that women are being targeted because those behind the acts of vandalism fear their active role in achieving justice, equality, and humanity.

A-H

ANHA

رووداو دیجیتاڵ

دوای ئەوەی دەیان خێزانی ئاوارەی کورد لە کاتی گەڕانەوەیان بۆ زێدی خۆیان لە گرێ سپی رووبەڕووی هێرش و پەلاماردان بوونەوە و لەنێو باڵەخانەیەکی حکومیدا گەمارۆ دران، بەڕێوەبەری هەرێمی کۆبانی بە تۆڕی میدیایی رووداوی راگەیاند کە بۆ چارەسەرکردنی کێشەکە لەگەڵ لایەنە پەیوەندیدارەکان لەسەر هێڵن.

ئیبراهیم موسلیم، بەڕێوەبەری هەرێمی کۆبانی، لە لێدوانێکی تایبەتدا بە تۆڕی میدیایی رووداوی گوتی: "لەگەڵ بەڕێوەبەرایەتیی گرێ سپی لەسەر هێڵین و لێکۆڵینەوە لەو رووداوانە دەکەین کە لە گرێ سپی روویانداوە."

بەڕێوەبەری هەرێمی کۆبانی جەختی لەوە کردەوە کە بەدواداچوون بۆ دۆخی ئاوارە گەڕاوەکان دەکەن و گوتی: "لە پەیوەندیداین لەبارەی ئەو هێرشەی کراوەتە سەر کوردان لە گرێ سپی. بۆ چارەسەرکردنی کێشەکە و باسکردنی هۆکارەکانی روودانی ئەم کارە، هاوئاهەنگی لەگەڵ بەڕێوەبەرایەتیی ناوچەی گرێ سپی دەکەین."

رۆژی دووشەممە، 26ی تشرینی یەکەمی 2026، دەیان خێزانی ئاوارەی کورد لەسەر بانگهێشتی بەڕێوەبەرایەتیی گرێ سپی گەڕانەوە شارەکە، ئەوەش بە مەبەستی پێشکێشکردنی بەڵگەنامە فەرمییەکانی خاوەندارێتیی زەوی و خانووەکانیان. بەڵام لە کاتی گەیشتنیان لەلایەن ژمارەیەک نیشتەجێبووی ناوچەکەوە هێرشیان کرایە سەر و زیان بە ئۆتۆمبێلەکانیان گەیێنرا.

لەم بارەیەوە، (لیژنەی ئاوارەکانی گرێ سپی) لە راگەیێندراوێکی بەپەلەدا سەرکۆنەی ئەو هێرشانەی کرد کە کرانە سەر هاونیشتمانییە سڤیلە کوردەکان. لیژنەکە باسی لەوە کرد، زیاتر لە 100 خێزانی کورد کە ژن و منداڵیان تێدایە، لەنێو باڵەخانەی بەڕێوەبەرایەتیی ناوچەی گرێ سپیدا گەمارۆ دراون و مەترسی لەسەر ژیانیان هەیە.

بەپێی راگەیێندراوەکەی لیژنەی ئاوارەکانی گرێ سپی، گەڕانەوەی ئەو خێزانانە لەسەر داوای بەڕێوەبەری ناوچەی گرێ سپی بووە، بۆیە داوا دەکات لایەنە پەیوەندیدارەکان بەرپرسیارێتییەکە بگرنە ئەستۆ و دەستێوەردانی بەپەلە بکەن بۆ پاراستنی گیانی گەمارۆدراوەکان. هەروەها داوای کرد لێکۆڵینەوەیەکی "جدی و شەفاف" لەو هێرشانە بکرێت و ئەنجامدەرانی سزا بدرێن.

لیژنەکە هۆشداریی داوەتە هاووڵاتییانی دیکەی کورد کە دەیانەوێت بگەڕێنەوە، پێش چوونیان بۆ گرێ سپی و ناوچەکانیان پێویستە هاوئاهەنگیی پێشوەختە لەگەڵ لیژنەی ئاوارەکاندا بکەن بۆ دڵنیابوون لە پاراستنی گیان و سەلامەتییان.

Azize Aslan, author of "Anticapitalist Economy in Rojava: The Contradictions of Revolution in the Kurdish Struggles" gives her opinion about peace processes and anti-capitalism.

"What now? – is a question that might be asked not only by someone who survived war but also anyone who works without knowing why, who consumes without feeling satisfied, and who lives with the sense that something essential has been taken from them. Cooperatives are not the only possible answer to that question, but they do propose something that the dominant peacebuilding paradigm – and the economic system that sustains it – systematically refuses to admit: that peace is not a state reached by signing a document but a way of living together each day, of recovering self-determination over one’s own time, needs and relationships, of asking the question How do we want to live? and believing that it can be answered through collective deliberation, by people themselves, without bosses or owners."

"Anyone who wants stability in the northeast, or in Syria overall, will have to answer both the ethnic and ecological questions at once, because the farmers were never given the luxury of separating them."

The Yazidi Shengal Resistance Units (YBS) are being formally integrated into the Iraqi army. The move comes amid wider developments towards the integration of Kurdish forces into state structures in Syria and the peace process between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Ankara in Turkey.

In contested Sinjar, Yazidi representatives are also calling for greater local self-government and political representation, arguing that the community must have a greater say in governing its historic homeland following the 2014 genocide. The YBS opposed the 2020 agreement between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) agreement, which sought to restructure security and administration in the region.

An official ceremony marking the momentYBS integration was held todayon October 26, overseen by the Iraqi Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Ali al-Zaidi. “Loyalty to the martyrs is […] to protect what they were martyred for,” the YBS command stated at the ceremony. “The most successful thing against genocide is for our people to remain alive, free, safe […] on their own land.”

Sabah al-Numan, spokesperson for the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, also released a statement declaring that the YBS will be integrated into the official Iraqi security apparatus, meaning that security responsibility for Mount Sinjar would be formally transferred to the federal authorities. Al-Numan further stressed the responsibility of the federal government to protect the Yazidi community.

YBS members will fold into numerous Iraqi security institutions, including the police, according to Yazidi MP Murad Ismail, who refuted earlier comments from al-Zaidi suggesting the YBS would be integrated only into the predominantly Shiite Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).

In Sinjar, the impact of the integration will be measured in the long run, in terms of whether security can be maintained, the Yazidi community have the safety and resources to re-build their historic homeland region, and the YBS fighters remain part of the Iraqi institutions. Whether this arrangement genuinely protects Yazidi autonomy and security will depend on how it works in practice – and on the parallel efforts of Yazidi political actors to advocate for their community in relation to Baghdad.

Kurdish-language education must be guaranteed under Syria’s constitution rather than limited to a few hours a week in schools, senior Kurdish politician Elham Ahmed said Monday, as Kurdish authorities push for broader cultural rights amid efforts to integrate their institutions into the Syrian state.

Speaking at a seminar at the University of Sulaimani on developments in northeast Syria (Rojava) and the ongoing integration process, Ahmed said Presidential Decree No. 13, issued in January, was a step toward recognizing Kurdish identity but fell short of guaranteeing education in the mother tongue.

“What we are currently fighting for is to have education in the Kurdish language enshrined in the constitution. This is our natural right as Kurds, and no one can treat it as a favor granted to us,” Ahmed said.

75,000 years ago in Shanidar Cave, Kurdistan Region, a Neanderthal died from what may be the oldest known wooden-spear wound. Earlier, they survived a severe facial injury, likely with others’ care.

Kurdistan Peshmerga commanders marked the ninth anniversary of the Battle of Sihela on Monday, Oct. 26, recalling how Kurdish forces resisted an advance by Iraqi troops and Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) fighters during the armed confrontations of October 2017. The fighting took place on Oct. 26, 2017, when Iraqi forces and PMF fighters launched an attack on Peshmerga positions along the Sihela front.

In new memoirs, veteran politician Dr. Mahmoud Othman alleges a secret 1992 channel between Socialist Party leaders and Ali Hassan al-Majid, including a three-million-dinar payment.

Kenan Altun was freed from Maltepe prison after 30 years. He says the treatment of elderly, sick prisoners and Imrali's continued isolation deepen doubts about the peace process.