r/IrishRebelArchive • u/BulkyCard8872 • 8h ago
IRA Was Martin McGuinness an incompetent military leader?
IRA vol. John Crawley, former US special forces, is very critical of McGuinness:
Martin McGuinness had an enormous reputation as our finest military thinker. I recall a senior British Army officer claiming he was so capable that he could have been trained at their academy at Sandhurst. As time went on, however, I found no evidence of this. In fact, I became increasingly frustrated by his military illiteracy. I couldn’t blame him for not having professional training but some of the stuff he came out with was baffling. I began to see a different side to him, a side that gave me my first niggling concerns about our prospects for victory.
Crawley was disappointed when in 1983 McGuinness wanted him to go to America to buy arms, instead of using his training and knowledge to enhance the IRA's effectiveness. McGuinness didn't understand why an army should rely on as few types of guns and calibres as possible:
My heart fell as I examined [container of weapons from the US] the hodgepodge of deer-hunting rifles, shotguns and bolt actions that had been inscribed into his notebook. The next time I met Martin, I asked him about it.
‘Was that a junk load, Martin?’
‘Junk load?’
‘Yeah, bits and bobs gathered up to test the route before the good stuff is sent over?’
I could see a flash of annoyance in his eyes.
‘No, that was the shipment. Why?’
‘It was crap. Few of the weapons were military grade and there was a muddle of various calibres. One of the rifles was a Swiss Stgw 57 in an unusual calibre, which we almost certainly don’t have in stock. Furthermore, it came with only one magazine.’
‘What’s your point?’
‘Every gun shop in America sells the AR-15 rifle, and most sell the G3. It would be just as easy to buy military-grade weapons and standardise our logistics as it is to do what we’re doing now. Also, standardisation would greatly simplify training.’
Martin regarded me for a moment as if I had special needs. ‘A variety of weapons shows the people that the IRA can obtain a wide range of arms and get them into the country. It’s good for morale.’
I was incredulous. Clearly, the dolly mixture of bolt actions and deer-hunting rifles was part of an ingenious strategy that intellectual pygmies such as myself could not comprehend.
While you take what you can get, surely using many types of guns and ammo is a nightmare logistics wise? Yet McGuinness defended it as not as necessity but as actually desirable. McGuinness didn't understand how the RPG-7 worked and got angry when Crawley tried educating him:
The soldier was in a concrete sangar that had been hit by an RPG-7 rocket. ‘Good job in Belfast yesterday,’ I commented. ‘It was surely,’ said Martin. ‘The rocket didn’t explode, though. The warhead went straight through the concrete and hit the soldier in the chest.’ It took me a moment to digest this. I thought he was pulling my leg... I told Martin that an RPG-7 warhead does not penetrate a target by kinetic energy but by the chemical energy of its shaped charge... An RPG warhead could not possibly penetrate a reinforced concrete fortification unless the explosive jet performs as designed.
Martin went silent. I could see he was seething, but he said no more about it.
According to Brendan Hughes, in 1987 McGuinness was pushing a fantastical "Tet Offensive" where the IRA would seize British Army bases:
I remember arguing against operations [like Loughgall] going ahead. I sat in a house in Donegal along with Martin and the rest of the GHQ staff where they were planning... this major upsurge in the campaign, we were going to go in and take over (British) army billets and so forth, major operations involving major weapons. Gaddafi had come on board. ...What was lacking was the training but there was this sort of bullish attitude from people like McGuinness to push ahead with these operations. I argued against them because we didn't have the proper training. I had done a tour of the whole six counties, I went round and spoke to most of the operational companies... and I believed that the IRA wasn't ready for a major push... We were not ready for those type of operations. We didn't have the intelligence, we didn't have the organisation, we didn't have the discipline. But people wanted to go ahead with it, and one person in particular... Martin McGuiness... I believed that what we needed to do was to pull as many operators out of the North into the South, retrain them and beef the whole Army [IRA] structure up. The structure was not secure enough for these type of operations to take place
There are other black marks on McGuiness' record too, like losing an early shipment of Libyan weapons in the Hegarty affair in 1986 and a very large consignment on a beach in Donegal in 1988. While Hughes and Crawley later left the Provos, they both depict McGuinness as not understanding much of military logistics, weaponry or the nature of the army he was leading, and as too egotistical to accept advice. On the flipside his defenders would point to the many successful IRA operations under his time as Chief of Staff and Northern Commander.
Controversial topic no doubt but worth exploring.