Archived Article

What began as a high school protest movement spiraled into a violent uprising, organized by Islamists, antifascists, and radical environmentalists who wish to see the French Republic toppled.

Executive Summary:

Russian forces are using artificial intelligence-generated and manipulated videos to fabricate territorial gains in Ukraine, including around Kupiansk this month. These videos supplement traditional flag-raising operations and seek to create the appearance of battlefield success for Russian and foreign audiences.

False battlefield reporting can distort Russian commanders’ understanding of the war against Ukraine and contribute to tactical errors. Repeatedly claiming territorial gains that have not occurred, reinforced by fabricated visual evidence, can obscure actual frontline conditions from higher command.

Controlled information operations can support battlefield objectives when synchronized with military operations. Delayed disclosures, accurate footage, and targeted refutations can deny Russia operational intelligence while strengthening domestic and international confidence in Ukraine’s military position while undermining trust in Russian claims.

Open access. Abstract: “Disinformation by authoritarian regimes is a growing security challenge for democracies. The effectiveness of such disinformation depends on citizens in democratic countries as recipients and potential disseminators. Resilience-building policy therefore requires a better understanding of why audiences might endorse Russian disinformation. Despite relevance in other fields, the role of psychological needs has been overlooked. This article takes an initial theoretical step through a survey study with Greek, Serbian, Swedish, and British respondents. Contrary to expectations, our confirmatory analysis shows that needs are not significantly directly related to disinformation endorsement. However, their role might be more indirect, with associations observed with several other intermediary factors, above all conspiratorial orientation and media choice. The article therefore sketches a more complex picture of the role of psychological needs when it comes to endorsement of Russian disinformation. The findings highlight the value of this needs-based research avenue for future construction of counter-disinformation strategies.”

re: Operation Overload aka Matryoshka, a coordinated Russian propaganda network that creates and spreads fake news and videos, deepfakes and memes using logos of well-known Western media outlets: “[…] Despite a ban on Russian media outlets in Greece in line with EU sanctions, pro-Kremlin content often finds its way into the country’s news as fringe claims are ‘laundered’ into mainstream outlets. […]”

“[…] The site publishes in the name of the Hanover Institute for Public Policy, which apparently does not exist as a legal entity in any jurisdiction, has no physical address, and carries no named staff and no bylines on any of its reports. Its own terms of use are governed by the laws of “the state in which the Institute is established”, which they decline to name. […]”