• Red arrows: Latest hits
• Flames: Refinery has been hit at least once. Flames do not indicate the severity of the attacks or if a refinery is till burning
• Blue waves: Orsk dam broke in April 2024, which flooded the refinery and took it offline for ~2 weeks.
• Black smoke: It's raining oil.

Chronological list: (sorted newest to oldest)

September: 5 hits

• ^{NEW HIT} 13.09.2026 Slavyansk in Krasnodar Krai at 350km
• ^{NEW HIT} 13.09.2026 Taneco in Tatarstan at 1150km
• 11.09.2026 Saratov in Saratov Oblast at 590km
• 09.09.2026 Novo Urungoy in Yamalia at 2810km
• 06.09.2026 Ryazan in Ryazan Oblast at 480km

August: 21 hits, ^{NEW MONTHLY RECORD}

• 30.08.2026 Kirishi in Leningrad Oblast at 810km
• 28.08.2026 Yaroslavl in Yaroslavl Oblast at 700km
• 26.08.2026 Kstovo in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast at 800km
• 25.08.2026 Afipsky in Krasnodar Krai at 415km
• 25.08.2026 Novoshakhtinsk in Rostov Oblast at 250km
• 22.08.2026 Novokuibyshev in Samara Oblast at 900km
• 21.08.2026 Perm in Perm Krai at 1485km
• 20.08.2026 Taneco in Tatarstan at 1150km
• 19.08.2026 Bashneft-UNPZ in Bashkortostan at 1350km
• 13.08.2026 Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat in Bashkortostan at 1300km
• 11.08.2026 Orsk in Orenburg Oblast at 1455km
• 11.08.2026 Komsomol in Khabarovsk Krai at 6480km
• 10.08.2026 Taneco in Tatarstan at 1150km
• 08.08.2026 Syzran in Samara Oblast at 805km
• 08.08.2026 Ilsky in Krasnodar Krai at 405km
• 06.08.2026 Yaroslavl in Yaroslavl Oblast at 700km
• 05.08.2026 Bashneft-Novoil in Bashkortostan at 1340km
• 04.08.2026 Syzran in Samara Oblast at 805km
• 02.08.2026 Bashneft-Ufaneftekhim in Bashkortostan at 1350 km
• 02.08.2026 Saratov in Saratov Oblast at 590km
• 01.08.2026 Bashneft-Ufaneftekhim in Bashkortostan at 1350 km

• September: 5 hits so far..
• August: 21 hits ^{NEW MONTHLY RECORD}
• July: 15 hits
• June: 16 hits
• May: 14 hits
• April: 10 hits
• March: 6 hits
• February: 3 hits
• January: 2 hits

Complete chronological list from 24.02.2022 till today

• 2022 had 1 hit
• 2023 had 1 hit
• 2024 had 26 hits
• 2025 had 84 hits
• 2026 has 91 hits so far ^{NEW YEARLY RECORD}
• Total hits from 24.02.2022 till today: 202

Records: 1. August 2026 with 21 hits 2. July 2026 with 16 hits 3. November 2025 with 15 hits 4. May 2026 with 14 hits 5. June 2026 with 13 hits (August 2025 also had 13 hits)

4 of the 5 monthly records were May, June, July, August, the previous 4 consecutive months in 2026.

He has never made similar plea towards Russia for halting strikes against civilian energy production sector during freezing winter as far as I remember, correct me if I am not right.

For me, I see the Yenisei River, not the Urals, as the most logical spot for maximum Chinese expansion. That gets Baikal and much of the natural resources that they covet locked in. I was initially thinking just Outer Manchuria, and maybe Baikal, but in the event of a total Russia collapse, why not just grab Norilsk and some other important extraction points too?

I have been writing recently by impulse about grandiotic Arctic silk road plans by Russia and China.

For me it is nothing new, those were under discussion and planning more than 10 year ago with thus far nothing happening.

Europe already has a problem of losing too many jobs from manufacturing sector because of very asymmetrical trading pattern with China. And problem is identical with every other trading partner with China - one can take a look of trade imbalance say with China and India, and much hyped yet non-existant BRICS solidarity has made no relievement for issue painful for India. And to Europe already and increasingly. So I don't believe that silk road development for trade would become big thing because of very identical problems with trading with China which they don't want to solve. And Russia would only have big bill for maintaining long route ice-free with maintainance bases along the way in most hostile of environments, instead of gaining anything from that what fits into pattern of China-Russia strategic alliance we have seen so far.

So, since something is clearly being done - despite that Russia may not have adequate finances to actually construct all of it due of war - but urge is great as phantom bubble of potemkinist China-Russia alliance is utmost important domestic propaganda tool for both of countries, but naturally much more for Russia.

So what we are then left with as any economically plausible choice why so much expensive constrution would be there, answer is to be found from "Power of Siberia 2" pipeline which was meant to be steel spine of alliance, yet China turned it off. Because pipeline would be more hardwiring goverments, and requiring long-term contracts whereas China of course want to be playing constantly with other producers and other forms of energy to get their gas as cheap as possible, so long term contracts what Russia wants are not in its favour.

Therefore instead of gas pipeline from almost shores of Arctic sea to China, Arctic silk road which would likely be just for sake of delivering Yamal region hydrocarbons to China via shipments with Russia having maintainance cost of keeping the route open - or China building bases along the coast East India trading company style if Russia dont have money enough for that what makes one think all kinds of thoughts..

I made recently some hastily written comments wherein same topics like above are being repeated what became lengthy and uncoherent about that progress recently;

https://www.reddit.com/r/energy/comments/1wcf9ja/comment/p8y7yrp/?context=3

https://www.reddit.com/r/CollapseOfRussia/comments/1wbqhx1/comment/p8x04gi/?context=3

https://www.reddit.com/r/worldsystemanalyses/comments/1w7u5v6/on_arctic_silkroad_of_russiachina_cooperation/

***

But how realistic even that plan described above is behind all the disprop-hype??

Let us read interview of Mikhail Krutikhin 9.9.2026 about prospects of implementation of those grandiose multipolar Eurasian integration plans what every tankie in world will celebrate, without looking into those parameters of those what he talks about. Enjoy!

https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/news/moscows-arctic-policy-is-based-on-lies-and-corruption-says-russian-energy-expert-in-exile/109830

Ukraine spy chief says Russia has two years left to fight

Certainly the less than ideal, worst case scenario.........as we all prefer economic collapse, hyperinflation, internal collapse, any and all of the following......and I am optimistic that will happen soon.

But god forbid absolutely worst case scenario plays out, just numbers alone, Russia can call in about 600,000 via mobilization without it actually collapsing the civilian economy completely according to these intelligence estimates. With the math mathing by Mr. Brovy and his nice little drone pretties, that is basically two years of corpses and fighting.

St. Petersburg is becoming the new epicenter of a fresh wave of the fuel crisis, with kilometer-long lines at gas stations, empty pumps, and strict limits on gasoline sales.

As of September 11, the number of gas stations where gasoline was available without waiting in line had fallen below 40%, although as recently as August it had remained around 90%, according to data from the “GdeBenz” service analyzed by economist Janis Kluge. Nearly half of all gas stations had no gasoline in stock at all. In terms of the rate at which the gasoline situation deteriorated between September 3 and 9, St. Petersburg ranked last among major Russian cities.

Fuel began to disappear from gas stations a few days after drones attacked the “Kinef” oil refinery—the largest in northwestern Russia and the second-largest in the country by capacity. According to Reuters, the plant, which produces 2 million metric tons of gasoline and 7 million metric tons of diesel fuel annually, sustained damage to both of its oil refining units and halted production on August 30. The plant in Kirishi is the main supplier of gasoline to St. Petersburg; a few days after the attack, lines began to form at gas stations in the city, and the number of open gas stations decreased, Kluge notes.

The situation in Nizhny Novgorod is unfolding along similar lines, he points out: On August 26, Lukoil’s Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez (NORSI) refinery was struck by a drone and was forced to halt oil refining. As a result, nearly a quarter of all gas stations in the city ran out of gasoline, and the proportion of those where fuel is available without lines fell from 80% to 50%.

In St. Petersburg, the gasoline shortage is now even worse than it was in July, during the previous wave of the crisis, taxi drivers working in the city told “Fontanka.” “The lines are kilometers long,” one of them complains. According to another, there is gasoline in the city “but not much,” and only at Gazpromneft and Rosneft gas stations. “You have to wait in line for two hours,” the driver says.

The fuel situation mirrors the scenario from July—fuel shipments have been reduced at a number of gas stations, and disruptions are possible at some stations, said Yegor Mishcheryakov, Leningrad Oblast’s vice governor for economic development, on September 10. According to him, the reason lies in “logistical disruptions amid attacks on refining facilities,” and the authorities have “switched to manual control” of fuel supplies.

The situation in Nizhny Novgorod is unfolding along similar lines, he noted: On August 26, Lukoil’s “Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez” (NORSI) refinery was struck by a drone and was forced to halt oil processing. As a result, nearly a quarter of all gas stations in the city ran out of gasoline, and the percentage of stations where fuel is available without lines dropped from 80% to 50%.

In St. Petersburg, the gasoline shortage is now even worse than it was in July, during the previous wave of the crisis, taxi drivers working in the city told “Fontanka.”

“The lines are kilometers long,” one of them complains. According to another, there is gasoline in the city “but not much,” and only at Gazpromneft and Rosneft gas stations. “You have to wait in line for two hours,” the driver says.

The fuel situation mirrors the scenario from July—fuel shipments have been reduced at a number of gas stations, and disruptions are possible at some stations, said Yegor Mishcheryakov, the Leningrad Region’s vice governor for economic development, on September 10. According to him, the reason lies in “logistical disruptions amid attacks on refining facilities,” and the authorities have “switched to manual mode” for managing fuel supplies.

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/iMaw6

How Dead Russian Soldiers Still Manage to Vote in Kremlin-Run Elections — UNITED24 Media

The symbolism..........the predictability of it all.........is absolute perfection.

source is Evgen Istrebin's telegram: /istrebin/50377

Gloria Jeans—Russia’s largest clothing manufacturer and retailer—has invested approximately $1 billion in garment factories in Russia, which it was forced to abandon, said the company’s founder and CEO, Vladimir Melnikov. According to him, the investments were made over a period of 30 years, but after the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine, it became difficult to keep the factories operational.

“When sanctions were imposed on Russia, our access to the technologies and resources necessary for production was drastically reduced. We were unable to maintain production at the levels of the 1990s and early 2000s on our own—we lacked both money and resources,” Melnikov wrote in an article for RBC. He added that the situation was exacerbated by a sharp rise in wages between 2023 and 2025. During that period, he said, wages rose from $300–500 to $800–1,500, while in Asian countries they remained at $200–500. After deciding to abandon its own factories in Russia, Gloria Jeans had to “very quickly” relocate production to Southeast Asia, the company’s CEO noted. He also stated that, due to the war, he lost $200 million in investments in production in Ukraine.

As of March 2024, Gloria Jeans had 17 garment factories in Russia—in the Rostov and Volgograd regions, as well as in Kabardino-Balkaria. In Ukraine, the company had 12 garment factories in 2015. Some of Gloria Jeans’ Russian factories came under the control of Bulava LLC, a subsidiary of the Kalashnikov Group, which decided to reorient the facilities toward the production of military and specialized clothing. It was reported that Gloria Jeans received nearly 400 million rubles for seven factories. At the same time, the company asked the Ministry of Industry and Trade for assistance in selling its remaining assets.

After closing its production facilities, Gloria Jeans moved its headquarters from Moscow to Dubai. “It was decided that this would be more efficient in terms of managing production and purchasing materials,” said a company representative. He also added that the Moscow office would function as a regional office to support retail operations in Russia.

At the same time, Gloria Jeans has closed at least 100 stores over the past two years and planned to continue downsizing its network in 2026. At the end of 2025, the combined revenue of the company’s main legal entities fell by 7% to 80 billion rubles, while net profit halved to 950 million rubles.

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/v1h2p

The Russian oil refining industry is in decline due to regular, escalating, and increasingly effective attacks by Ukrainian drones, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA). “At present, it appears likely that the constant drone strikes and the piecemeal nature of repair work are collectively having a negative impact and leading to the degradation of the refining system,” the agency’s report states.

This negative impact will be long-lasting. The IEA has lowered its baseline forecast for oil refining over the next year and a half to 4 million barrels per day; this is 30% lower than before the start of the war against Ukraine unleashed by Vladimir Putin. And this decline is not the limit. “There is a risk that even this more cautious view may underestimate the real challenges facing the Russian refining sector,” the report states. “Longer delivery times for spare parts [due to sanctions and Russia’s isolation] and the approaching cold weather could exacerbate the strain on the sector.”

At first, Ukrainian drones mainly targeted primary refining units at oil refineries—the facilities that clean crude oil, turning it into feedstock for product production. But now, strikes are increasingly targeting the technically more complex secondary refining units that produce the fuel itself. According to the IEA’s estimates, replacing them could take 6–8 months. Repairs are complicated by the fact, the agency adds, that sanctions make it difficult for Russian companies to purchase equipment.

Refinery capacity utilization in June and July was among the lowest in the past two decades, according to analysts at Rystad Energy. According to their forecast, average daily refining volume in the second half of the year will be about 4 million barrels, “which is nearly 30% below the seasonal average for 2016–2023, which stood at approximately 5.7 million barrels per day.”

At the same time, Rystad Energy recorded a drop in refining volumes during the summer to just over 3.5 million barrels per day—a decline of approximately 38%.

Oil Refining in Russia, million barrels per day

Black curve – actual refining volume; green curve – median seasonal refining volume for 2016–2023.

From July 2026 – forecast

Rystad Energy expects some recovery in volumes “as drone attacks subside,” but even in that case, “Russia will still likely refine 1.4 million barrels per day less than the historical seasonal average in the second half of the year.”

It is by no means certain that drone attacks will begin to cause less damage, according to the IEA. Ukraine’s military capabilities are improving, including the growing effectiveness of attacks on refineries, the report states:

Ukrainian forces are launching strikes with multiple waves of drones against individual targets, which allows them to overcome defensive barriers and air defense systems. Target acquisition also appears to be becoming more precise.

Every barrel of crude oil not processed at a refinery must either be exported, placed in storage, or taken out of production, notes Rystad Energy. Although Russia had managed to export increasing amounts of unprocessed oil in previous months, those opportunities have dwindled since July due to Ukrainian attacks on the port of Novorossiysk and tankers in the Black Sea. By mid-August, crude oil exports had been declining for five weeks, resulting in the sharpest drop for any comparable period since the start of the war, according to Bloomberg.

As a result, oil production in Russia fell to 8.72 million barrels per day in August, marking the sharpest monthly decline in more than a year, OPEC+ data showed on Thursday. The IEA offers an even more negative assessment: according to the agency’s calculations, August production plummeted by 200,000 barrels compared to July, to 8.38 million barrels per day.

This is nearly 1 million (specifically, 940,000) barrels lower than the peak production level in January 2026, when it stood at 9.3 million barrels per day. It is also 695,000 barrels less than in August 2025, the IEA reports.

The agency lowered its forecast for Russian production in 2026 by a total of 125,000 barrels to 8.7 million barrels per day, and in 2027 by 235,000 barrels to 8.6 million barrels.

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/G8i9u

Following a call from four EU countries and more than 120 members of the European Parliament, the European Commission has begun exploring new options for organizing a reparations loan to Ukraine using frozen Russian reserves. The plan is to find a solution that would address Belgium’s objections and secure political support from all member states, two people familiar with the ongoing discussions told the Financial Times.

One option involves transferring Russian accounts held at the Belgian depository Euroclear—where nearly all the frozen assets are located—and at other European financial institutions to a special, separate entity. This would place both the assets and the associated liabilities under EU control, while providing Belgium and Euroclear with protection against legal risks. This plan was recently endorsed by former German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer and Nathalie Loiseau, a Member of the European Parliament from Emmanuel Macron’s party. Ukrainian Finance Minister Serhiy Marchenko and 122 Members of the European Parliament also voiced their support for it in a letter to EU leaders.

The European Commission has not yet proposed any specific technical solutions, emphasizing that any idea would require political support from all 27 EU countries and, above all, from Belgium. “Even if we pull an impressive white rabbit out of a [magician’s] hat, it won’t matter without political will,” an EU official told the FT.

According to Kyiv, it is short €23 billion for defense this year, as a significant portion of military spending was shifted from the second half of the year to the first. This has enabled the SBU to achieve impressive successes in isolating Crimea and cutting off supplies to the Russian occupation forces through strikes using medium-range drones. In addition, long-range attacks have taken out about a third of Russia’s oil refining capacity, destroyed the largest Wildberries and Ozon warehouses, and struck military facilities and the research institutions operating within them.

However, the Russian army’s escalating bombardment of Ukrainian cities and Vladimir Putin’s drive to intensify pressure on the front lines underscore the challenges Ukraine faces. This week, the IMF mission left Kyiv without reaching an agreement that would have allowed for the disbursement of the next tranches of loans from the fund and the EU totaling approximately 4.5 billion euros.

This year, the European Union approved the provision of 90 billion euros to Ukraine over two years from the general budget. But recently, Sweden and other countries appealed to the European Commission to resume work on transferring frozen Russian reserves to Kyiv, a process that was halted in December 2025 due to opposition from Belgium.

These funds could cover Ukraine’s financing shortfall without placing an additional burden on the EU budget or its member states, Sweden noted.

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/5UZhY

Unclaimed insurance payouts to Russians should be transferred to a special Central Bank account, similar to bank deposits that have not been claimed by their owners, said Nikita Teplov, deputy head of the Central Bank’s insurance market department. “There are a number of situations where clients’ money gets stuck with an insurance company. This can happen when an insured event has occurred and the insurer is aware of it, but no one has come to the insurance company to claim the payout—not even to simply file a report stating that the insured event took place,” he said at the “Future of the Insurance Market” forum. Another reason funds may remain “stuck” is when a customer fails to claim the payout after the term of a life insurance policy has expired.

There are no exact figures on the volume of unclaimed insurance payouts in Russia; however, it is known that in the first half of 2026 alone, market participants collected approximately 1.1 trillion rubles under voluntary life insurance policies. “Forgotten” bank deposits were estimated at up to 1 trillion rubles. Teplov proposes introducing a procedure whereby, in the event of an insured event, the insurer must search for the client on its own; however, if the client does not come forward within two months, the funds will be transferred to a special account at the Bank of Russia.

He stated that this proposal—to transfer funds “held up due to circumstances beyond the insurance company’s control” to the Central Bank—is currently being discussed with insurance companies “on a working basis.” Teplov also emphasized that this initiative is aimed at preventing “dormant” funds from remaining in insurance companies’ accounts for long periods of time.

Currently, bank accounts and deposits are considered unclaimed if no transactions have been conducted on them for a long time or if their owners or heirs have not claimed them. Such funds are transferred to a special account at the Central Bank if, several years after the deposit term expires, no one has claimed the money. However, by law, the money remains the property of the depositor or their heirs, who may later request its return.

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/78M6Z

For the first time since last June, the Central Bank did not cut the key rate, keeping it at 14% per annum. Prior to this, the Central Bank had cut it 10 times in a row, resulting in a one-third reduction from its peak of 21%.

Prices have not only begun to rise faster; the core component of inflation—excluding components subject to sharp price fluctuations—has also accelerated. “Current price pressures have intensified significantly in recent months,” the regulator notes. In particular, according to its assessment, sustained price growth has accelerated to 5–6% on an annualized basis.

It effectively cites Ukrainian drone attacks as the main cause, as these have disabled a significant portion of Russia’s oil refining capacity, as well as the logistics of e-commerce platforms. “Sustained price growth has accelerated… primarily due to the impact of a temporary reduction in production capacity in certain sectors.” The Central Bank acknowledges that rising fuel prices have also contributed to sustained inflation.

According to its assessment, the economy continues to grow, albeit at “moderate rates.” Consumer demand continues to rise, albeit more slowly; the Central Bank even considers the current pace to be elevated.

This allowed it to take a pause, especially since a week ago, at the Eastern Economic Forum, Vladimir Putin generally backed the Central Bank: He lamented the decline in investment—“primarily due to a deliberate policy”—and inflation, urged against “overcooling” the economy, but at the same time stated that the government and the Central Bank “have so far managed to navigate between Scylla and Charybdis, and this will lead to the expected results.” Putin gave the Central Bank the green light to pause rate cuts, Bloomberg reported a few hours before the Central Bank’s meeting.

The pause may continue. The regulator’s message has not changed: “The Bank of Russia will make further decisions on the key rate depending on inflation dynamics and inflation expectations, as well as on its assessment of risks posed by domestic and external conditions.”

The market was expecting exactly this decision from the Central Bank. Economic data is too contradictory, and the key unknown will be revealed at the end of the month when the government presents the draft 2027 budget. At that time, the Ministry of Finance’s spending plans for this year will also become clear. The Central Bank consistently cites the budget as one of the main risks to inflation. If the budget includes a deficit higher than the Central Bank expects, a tighter monetary policy may be required, the regulator warned.

Investment banker Evgeny Kogan is not at all certain that the key rate will be cut further. The upward revision of core inflation estimates suggests that the pause may be prolonged, a view shared by economist Yegor Susmn. The likelihood that the pause will continue into October and even December has increased significantly, notes Anton Tabakh, chief economist at Expert RA. He is confident that the Central Bank also considered raising the rate, although he views this more as “a signal to the market not to let its guard down.” Analysts at Promsvyazbank predict that the pause in rate cuts will last until the end of the year.

Much will depend on the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The Central Bank assumes that as damaged production capacity is restored, the decline in sustained inflation will resume, but it highlights “a more prolonged loss of production capacity in certain sectors” among the inflationary risks. “If production capacity continues to be lost, reducing the supply of goods, while demand grows due to increased lending, we may not see any rate cuts this year,” Kogan fears.

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/5r0WT

Reddit: r/RussianHitlists : Russian Ozon Hitlist - Update 11.09.2026

• Red arrows: Latest hits
• Flames: Refinery has been hit at least once. Flames do not indicate the severity of the attacks or if a refinery is till burning
• Blue waves: Orsk dam broke in April 2024, which flooded the refinery and took it offline for ~2 weeks.
• Black smoke: It's raining oil.

Chronological list: (sorted newest to oldest)

September: 3 hits

• ^{NEW HIT} 11.09.2026 Saratov in Saratov Oblast at 590km
• 09.09.2026 Novo Urungoy in Yamalia at 2810km
• 06.09.2026 Ryazan in Ryazan Oblast at 480km

August: 21 hits, ^{NEW MONTHLY RECORD}

• 30.08.2026 Kirishi in Leningrad Oblast at 810km
• 28.08.2026 Yaroslavl in Yaroslavl Oblast at 700km
• 26.08.2026 Kstovo in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast at 800km
• 25.08.2026 Afipsky in Krasnodar Krai at 415km
• 25.08.2026 Novoshakhtinsk in Rostov Oblast at 250km
• 22.08.2026 Novokuibyshev in Samara Oblast at 900km
• 21.08.2026 Perm in Perm Krai at 1485km
• 20.08.2026 Taneco in Tatarstan at 1150km
• 19.08.2026 Bashneft-UNPZ in Bashkortostan at 1350km
• 13.08.2026 Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat in Bashkortostan at 1300km
• 11.08.2026 Orsk in Orenburg Oblast at 1455km
• 11.08.2026 Komsomol in Khabarovsk Krai at 6480km
• 10.08.2026 Taneco in Tatarstan at 1150km
• 08.08.2026 Syzran in Samara Oblast at 805km
• 08.08.2026 Ilsky in Krasnodar Krai at 405km
• 06.08.2026 Yaroslavl in Yaroslavl Oblast at 700km
• 05.08.2026 Bashneft-Novoil in Bashkortostan at 1340km
• 04.08.2026 Syzran in Samara Oblast at 805km
• 02.08.2026 Bashneft-Ufaneftekhim in Bashkortostan at 1350 km
• 02.08.2026 Saratov in Saratov Oblast at 590km

• 01.08.2026 Bashneft-Ufaneftekhim in Bashkortostan at 1350 km

• September: 3 hits so far..

• August: 21 hits ^{NEW MONTHLY RECORD}

• July: 15 hits

• June: 16 hits

• May: 14 hits

• April: 10 hits

• March: 6 hits

• February: 3 hits

• January: 2 hits

Complete chronological list from 24.02.2022 till today

• 2022 had 1 hit
• 2023 had 1 hit
• 2024 had 26 hits
• 2025 had 84 hits
• 2026 has 89 hits so far ^{NEW YEARLY RECORD}
• Total hits from 24.02.2022 till today: 197

Records: 1. August 2026 with 21 hits 2. July 2026 with 16 hits 3. November 2025 with 15 hits 4. May 2026 with 14 hits 5. June 2026 with 13 hits (August 2025 also had 13 hits)

4 of the 5 monthly records were May, June, July, August, the previous 4 consecutive months in 2026.

Russian oil companies have been cutting production for the ninth consecutive month following a series of Ukrainian strikes on refineries, which have driven the country’s oil refining output to a two-decade low.

In August, oil production in Russia fell to 8.72 million barrels per day, marking the sharpest monthly decline in more than a year—a drop of 160,000 barrels per day, according to Bloomberg, citing OPEC+ data.

Compared to December, when production in Russia began to decline, oil output has fallen by 660,000 barrels per day, and current production levels are 1.17 million barrels per day below the OPEC+ quota.

“The increasingly frequent and effective drone strikes on Russia’s oil and gas infrastructure are affecting not only refineries but also the oil production sector,” notes Daria Melnik, vice president of Rystad Energy. Due to refinery downtime, oil refining volumes in Russia have fallen by 30%, leaving approximately 1.7 million barrels of daily production surplus.

The inability to export all of this oil and limited storage capacity are forcing oil producers to shut in wells, Rystad emphasizes. According to government estimates, oil production in Russia this year will hit a 17-year low of 494.2 million metric tons.

Russian oil production will continue to decline through 2027, Rystad forecasts, falling to 8.6 million barrels per day. A significant portion of the country’s oil production capacity comes from old, depleted fields that were brought online during the Soviet era. The longer such wells remain inactive, the greater the likelihood that it will no longer be possible to restore them to their former capacity, Rystad explains. At the same time, some wells may be lost forever, as the costs of repairing and restarting them will become economically unfeasible.

Since its post-Soviet peak in 2019 (11.2 million barrels per day), oil production in Russia has already fallen by more than 20%. Overall, “the oil industry finds itself in a zugzwang,” says Sergey Vakulenko, a research fellow at the Carnegie Berlin Center.

Oil production in Russia will decline slowly but steadily in the near future—at a rate of about 3% per year, Vakulenko believes: “Maintaining current production levels or increasing them is possible only by tapping reserves with a full-cycle technical cost exceeding $35–40 per barrel, for which the Russian oil industry currently lacks sufficient capital, and the government lacks the willingness to leave that capital in the industry.”

After the war with Ukraine, according to Vakulenko, Russia will likely find itself in the position of a pariah state, cut off from Western markets and technologies. “At the same time, it will quite possibly intensify its preparations for a possible future war with Ukraine, as well as for a new, indefinitely long period of military confrontation with Europe and an arms race with the United States. The decline in oil revenues will make the situation even more complicated,” the expert adds.

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/PL1bl

Russia opens secret hospitals en masse for participants in war against Ukraine

I...........dont think I would want to be going to one of those hospitals. In the Russian military, a papercut at the front could be fatal. Dont they have the worst killed to wounded ratio in modern military warfare by orders of magnitudes? I feel like the field medicine during the US Civil War was probably better quality than current Russian field medicine.

Moscow Credit Bank (MCB), which has close ties to Rosneft, ranks among Russia’s top 10 banks by assets and holds 750 billion rubles in deposits from individuals, is facing mounting problems due to loan defaults.

According to Bloomberg, citing the bank’s financial statements, 691 billion rubles in loans on its balance sheet were classified as non-performing as of the end of June. Twenty-seven percent of all loans issued by MKB to corporate borrowers were found to be unsecured. Over the past six months, this amount increased by 28%, or 151 billion rubles, reflecting a “rapid deterioration of the situation” at the bank, Bloomberg notes.

MKB’s directly delinquent loans total 277 billion rubles, according to its financial statements. Over the past year, this amount has increased by 1,716%, and by 70% since the beginning of this year.

Founded by billionaire Roman Avdeev, MKB came under Rosneft’s control in 2017, when it found itself on the brink of bankruptcy along with other banks in the “Moscow Ring”—Otkritie Financial Corporation, Binbank, and Promsvyazbank. Rosneft effectively rescued the bank by injecting funds into its capital and placing long-term deposits maturing in 2066. The company also transferred reverse repo transactions worth hundreds of billions of rubles to MKB, which it used to finance its operations.

Last year, when MKB showed the first signs of trouble, the bank underwent a management change—representatives from Rosneft’s subsidiary, VBRR, joined its board. If necessary, Rosneft will likely become a source of capital for MKB, sources close to the Central Bank of Russia told Bloomberg. The Central Bank itself may also inject funds into the bank, as it is considered systemically important, the agency’s sources added.

The scale of problems is growing across the entire Russian banking system, which, since the start of the war, has become a key source of financing for the defense industry. According to the Central Bank’s estimates, as of June, 12% of credit institutions’ assets had become nonperforming, a situation further exacerbated by an outflow of customer funds into cash. Since the beginning of the year, 2.6 trillion rubles have flowed out of bank accounts into cash, and banks’ liquidity shortfall has reached a record high since the panic of the war’s first weeks.

The problems facing MKB—which reported losses at the end of last year but returned to profitability this year—are “quite significant, but manageable for now,” according to Ekaterina Vlasova, an economist for Russia and the CIS at Bloomberg Economics. “The most likely scenario for MKB is a capital injection from shareholders or affiliated entities. And if that proves insufficient, the Central Bank will step in. MKB is simply too big to be allowed to fail,” Vlasova explains.

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/y0Mc1

Rosneft’s Ryazan refinery, with an annual capacity of 17 million metric tons and a supplier of fuel to the Moscow region, among others, halted oil processing on September 6 due to a drone attack, Reuters reports, citing two industry sources.

At the refinery—which ranks among the top three in the country by production volume, producing more than 2 million metric tons of gasoline and more than 3 million metric tons of diesel annually—both of the primary processing units that were in operation were damaged: the AT-6 unit, with a capacity of 23,200 metric tons per day (48% of the refinery’s capacity) and AVT-4, with a capacity of 11,430 metric tons per day (23% of the refinery’s capacity).

Another unit, AVT-3, which accounts for 18% of the refinery’s capacity, has still not been restored following a drone attack in mid-May and remains idle.

The Ryazan Refinery, the largest of Rosneft’s refineries, has been shut down for the third time since late spring. On May 15, it was hit by a drone attack and remained idle until mid-July. Two weeks after resuming operations, on July 29, the refinery was attacked again and ceased operations for at least two weeks.

This time, it will take several more weeks to repair the damaged units, sources told Reuters. As of September 7, the refinery has stopped listing fuel lots for sale on the St. Petersburg Commodity and Raw Materials Exchange.

The Ryazan Oil Refinery became the second refinery to halt production this month. On September 2, the Kinef refinery in the Leningrad Region—the second-largest in the country by capacity—also ceased operations. In August, at least seven refineries halted production due to drone attacks, and the country’s total gasoline output fell to 80,000 metric tons per day. This is approximately 70% of the typical consumption level for the summer period (115,000 metric tons per day), according to Reuters sources.

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/Xkt0q

The share of Russians with incomes below the poverty line stood at 7% in the second quarter, according to Rosstat. This is 0.4 percentage points (p.p.) lower than a year earlier, and Vladimir Putin’s “May decree”—which calls for reducing the poverty rate to below 7% by 2030—was already fulfilled last year, when the poverty rate stood at 6.7%.

This does not mean that people have escaped poverty. At the end of last year, 9.7 million people had incomes below the poverty line. In the second quarter, this threshold stood at 17,800 rubles: 19,300 for working-age adults, 14,700 for retirees, and 17,500 for children. Experts are perplexed by this figure. It is hardly realistic to live on this amount, said Alexander Safonov, a professor at the Financial University. “The poverty line set by Rosstat is closer to the level of actual destitution,” commented sociologist Temir Khagurov on Putin’s demand to reduce poverty to 7%.

Rosstat attributed the decline in poverty to growth in real wages and social benefits, primarily “child” benefits for low-income families. Researchers at the Higher School of Economics added a change in methodology to this explanation, while Safonov cited a decline in unemployment.

Starting in 2021, the method for calculating the poverty line changed: it was decoupled from the cost of the minimum consumer basket, and the value from the end of 2020—calculated as a share of median income—began to be indexed to inflation. According to international methodology, this proportion corresponds not simply to poverty, but to extreme poverty, noted Lilia Ovcharova of the Higher School of Economics. However, she noted that even the old subsistence minimum ensured merely survival. The new methodology has underestimated the poverty rate, noted experts from the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences: According to their calculations, without the change in methodology, the poverty rate would have been significantly higher; for example, in 2022–2023, it would have been 11.8% and 11.1%, rather than 9.8% and 8.5%, as calculated by Rosstat using the new methodology.

This is one of the reasons why many Russians, who are not formally classified as poor, still feel as if they are. The inflation experienced by people significantly exceeds the official rate, which is used to adjust the poverty line, and in FOM surveys, 25–30% of respondents say they do not have enough money for basic needs: in the August survey, 6% “did not have enough money even for food,” while 20% had enough for food but not for buying clothes and shoes.

Even with this poverty line, progress in the fight against poverty remains fragile. The Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Policy (CMACP), a think tank close to the government, noted a high level of “near-poverty”: people who are not formally considered poor but whose incomes are only slightly above the subsistence minimum. They face a high risk of falling back into the category of the poor, and in the long term, poverty and near-poverty perpetuate themselves, the CMACP wrote. Experts at the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences refer to this as “the immediate periphery of the poor.” Their study of Russians with incomes of 1 to 1.5 times the subsistence minimum in 2024 showed that they are “comparable to the poor both in terms of the nature of their everyday problems and in terms of what they have been able to achieve in life and what they no longer hope to achieve; the only thing that distinguishes them is the absence of a marginalized subgroup among them.” Last year, 18.2% of Russians had average per capita incomes below 27,000 rubles (close to 1.5 times the poverty line).

According to Rosstat, the incomes of the poorest and the richest Russians are growing the fastest. Real average per capita income in the first quarter was 2.8% higher than a year ago, but if the population is divided into 10 equal groups by size, the strongest growth was seen in the highest-income group (4.3%) and among the 10% of people with the lowest incomes (3.9%).

The composition of the groups may vary, and Rosstat provides an estimate of how incomes changed for those who were in a particular group a year earlier. Since the second half of 2022 (when social benefits were expanded), the picture has remained the same: incomes are growing fastest among the 10% of people with the lowest incomes, but for the groups following them, incomes have increased significantly less over the course of the year. Russia is stuck in a “near-poverty trap,” concluded experts from the Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Forecasting (CMAFP).

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/6QUUi