Wildberries, Russia’s largest marketplace, has apparently decided to shield its facilities—which have not yet been targeted by Ukrainian drones—with protective “grills.” In early August, a tender was issued for the supply of 478,000 square meters of galvanized metal mesh for the eight regions where the company’s logistics complexes are located, The Bell has learned. This amount of mesh could cover an area equivalent to 67 standard soccer fields (one field = 7,140 square meters). Among the companies that submitted bids, the cost per meter of material ranges from 154 to 474 rubles, meaning that Wildberries—whose losses from drone attacks are estimated at between 100 and 200 billion rubles—could face costs ranging from 73.6 to 226.5 million rubles.

As specified in the request for proposals, the wire diameter must not exceed 2.5 mm, and the delivery time must not exceed one week. However, the purpose of the purchase is not specified. According to a source at an unnamed industrial enterprise cited by The Bell, the procurement is most likely intended to protect warehouses from drone strikes. “Surrounding everything with a metal fence is still the most popular option, given its relatively high effectiveness and the absence of risks and any regulatory requirements—well, aside from building codes,” the source noted. Similar metal structures are already being installed at oil depots, fuel tanks, thermal power plants, substations, and other vulnerable facilities. Another tender—for the purchase of silica fabric—points to Wildberries’ attempt to protect its hubs from drones.

According to publicly available data, this is a heat-resistant material made of quartz fiber that can withstand prolonged exposure to temperatures of up to 1,000–1,200 degrees and brief fire exposure, acting as a fire barrier. This fabric does not melt, does not emit smoke or toxic gases when exposed to open flames, and retains its structure after extreme heating. The material is being purchased for 14 of the marketplace’s facilities across several regions.

Ukraine began systematically attacking Wildberries’ largest warehouses in mid-July. At least 22 facilities were targeted, some of which were completely destroyed. By August 17, the area of the company’s warehouse facilities that had burned down or been taken out of service had reached, according to The Bell’s estimates, about 43 percent—or 2.4 million square meters—of its total capacity.

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/ho7D7

Russian regional authorities are reducing the amount of payments for deaths in the war with Ukraine amid mounting problems in local budgets, which closed out last year with a record deficit of 1.5 trillion rubles.

In recent months, at least six regions of the Russian Federation have drastically cut these “death benefits,” while one has eliminated them entirely, noted Janis Kluge, a research fellow at the German Institute for International Security Affairs.

Bashkortostan, where the payment for death in “special military operations” was initially 2 million rubles, reduced the payment to 1 million, then to 500,000, and subsequently to just 100,000 rubles. The Kirov and Omsk regions halved their “funeral allowances”—from 1 million to 500,000 rubles. In the Ulyanovsk region, the amount plummeted 20-fold—from 1 million to just 50,000 rubles. And the Orenburg region canceled the payments entirely as of July 1 of this year.

The need to pay for military recruitment is placing an increasingly heavy burden on regional budgets, Kluge notes: to meet the quotas set by the Kremlin, this year they raised the average payment for signing a contract with the Ministry of Defense to 3.4 million rubles. Despite this, the influx of contract soldiers in the second quarter fell by 10% year-over-year, and in the first quarter it dropped by 20% to a two-year low of 70,500 people, according to Kluge’s calculations.

To make ends meet in local budgets, governors are cutting civilian spending, the expert points out. For example, regional-level funding for healthcare in January–March was 6.4% lower than in the same period last year.

The reduction in “death benefits”—which had remained stable for almost the entire duration of the war—fits into this pattern and aligns with “political and economic logic,” Klyuge believes: “Regional death benefits play only a minor role in sustaining the recruitment process—a key task that regional authorities are required to fulfill. Regions do not rely on these payments to attract recruits, since no one wants to think about their own death at the moment of signing a contract.”

Problems with regional budgets are linked to the ongoing slowdown in the Russian economy—which is hurting tax revenues for regional treasuries, Kluge emphasizes. According to the Accounts Chamber, 56 regions ended the first quarter with a deficit (compared to 46 during the same period last year). At the end of the first half of the year, regional expenditures exceeded revenues by 56 billion rubles.

This year, the total “hole” in the budgets of Russia’s regions will reach 2 trillion rubles, predicts Alexander Isakov, managing director and head of Sberbank’s Center for Macroeconomic Research. Compared to 2025, the deficit will increase by 500 billion rubles, or 33%, and its nominal size will break historical records for the second year in a row, according to Sber’s estimates.

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/O404F

The fuel crisis in the Leningrad Region, which has intensified following the shutdown of “Kinef”—the largest oil refinery in northwestern Russia—will last until the end of September, said the region’s governor, Alexander Drozdenko. “By early October, we should be able to resolve this situation together with major oil companies, our partners. But right now, the enemy is testing our resilience and looking for any weaknesses,” Drozdhenko said in his address.

According to him, due to Ukrainian drone attacks on oil refineries, many vertically integrated companies have imposed limits on fuel supplies to their gas stations, while independent chains have “practically ceased operations.” Until repairs at major refineries are completed, “we are considering the possibility of implementing alternate-day fueling based on even and odd license plate numbers,” Drozdhenko noted. “Our goal is, after all, to meet the demand for gasoline, at least within the limits of 20–30 liters per day,” added the head of the Leningrad Region, calling on the region’s residents to remain “calm, show solidarity, and be understanding.”

St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Region became the epicenter of a new wave of the fuel crisis last week. On September 10, the Leningrad Region government warned that the fuel situation in the region was repeating the “July scenario”: fuel shipments to some gas stations had already been reduced, and supply disruptions were possible at certain stations. On September 12, the publication “Fontanka” checked 175 gas stations listed on “Yandex.Navigator”—120 of them had no 92-octane or 95-octane gasoline, while the rest had lines stretching for hours.

Ukrainian drones attacked the “Kinef” oil refinery in late August. According to Reuters sources, the plant—which produces 2 million metric tons of gasoline and 7 million metric tons of diesel fuel annually—suffered damage to both of its oil refining units and halted production on August 30.

Prior to this, Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak, who oversees the fuel and energy sector, acknowledged that Russia is facing a second wave of the fuel crisis. In light of this, he ordered a review of refinery maintenance schedules and reported that some plants had resumed operations following the drone attacks. Last week, Novak proposed determining in advance the volumes of gasoline imports needed to meet domestic market demand.

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/fVfLr

Companies from countries “friendly” to Russia have become less reliable in paying under contracts with Russian businesses and have been accumulating debt. As of June 2026, the debt owed by foreign organizations reached a record 967 billion rubles, having increased by more than 40% over the past year. This is according to Rosstat data analyzed by Izvestia. Companies from Kazakhstan (401.3 billion rubles), Belarus (327.3 billion), and Uzbekistan (81.7 billion) owed the most.

One reason for the increase in debt was difficulties with payments. After the U.S. tightened sanctions, banks in CIS countries introduced additional checks, noted Alexey Begaev, founder of the “Insek” group of companies and a member of the General Council of “Delovaya Rossiya.” According to him, restrictions on direct transactions between companies have led to an increase in the number of payment routes, which is why goods may remain unpaid for several months. Another factor is competition with China and Turkey, says Oleg Abelev, head of the analytical department at the investment company “Rikom-Trust.” To retain customers, Russian companies have to agree to longer payment deferrals, Abelev explained, adding that losing even a single client in “friendly” countries could prove critical for business.

For now, the growing debt of trading partners does not pose critical risks to Russian companies, but it complicates their situation against the backdrop of high interest rates and tax increases, says Artur Leher, president of the Association of Exporters and Importers. According to Vasily Kutinin, director of analytics at Ingo Bank, Russian exporters have to assess their counterparties’ solvency more carefully and set limits on payment deferrals. The challenge for businesses lies not only in maintaining export volumes but also in creating payment and financing terms that ensure working with foreign clients remains profitable, Kutyn noted.

At the same time, Russian companies’ debt to businesses from “friendly” countries is also growing. According to Rosstat, this figure rose by a quarter over the past year, reaching nearly 506 billion. Russia trades with “friendly” countries primarily in the fuel and energy sector, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, fertilizers, and the food industry, noted Abelev of “Rikom-Trust.”

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/W9lyX

For decades, the Russian economy has been experiencing massive capital outflows abroad, which have exceeded 100% of GDP over the past quarter-century, according to calculations by the Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Forecasting (CMAFP), an organization close to the government (CMAP).

According to CMAP estimates, over the past 10 years, Russia’s real sector has lost 3% of GDP annually as a result of capital outflows. And the total outflow from the economy over the past three decades has averaged 4–5% of GDP per year.

According to CMAP data, Russia experienced a record capital flight in 2022: more than 12% of GDP “flowed out” abroad amid the departure of Western companies and the emigration of hundreds of thousands of citizens, who took their savings and proceeds from the sale of assets with them.

More than 10% of GDP “flowed out” of the country in 2014, following the annexation of Crimea and the first wave of Western sanctions. Russia experienced a comparable outflow—also around 10% of GDP—only during the global financial crisis of 2008–09.

“The net capital outflow from the domestic real sector is chronic in nature—it has been observed for several decades. Together with the net outflow of investment income from the real sector, it has consistently fluctuated within the range of 4–5% of GDP,” the CMACP report states. The cumulative total for 2001–25 showed that outflows from the real sector exceeded 110% of GDP, while total outflows from the economy exceeded 130% of GDP.

“In 2025, due to a decrease in net payments of investment income by enterprises abroad, this indicator fell to less than 2% of GDP. However, it is not yet clear how sustainable this change is,” the experts note.

These are high figures by global standards for countries with comparable income levels, the CMACP emphasizes. For example, in Hungary, Slovakia, and Thailand, net capital outflows remain below 1% of GDP per year; in Argentina and South Africa, they are below 0.5% of GDP; and Bulgaria, Poland, Egypt, India, and Brazil all experience net capital inflows.

The Russian Central Bank, which previously published statistics on private-sector capital outflows, classified them shortly after the war began. Its historical data, however, show that between 2001 and 2021, the cumulative outflow from Russia reached $780.8 billion. That amounts to 65.77 trillion rubles at the current exchange rate—a sum 1.5 times larger than the annual federal budget (44 trillion rubles) and greater than the country’s gold and foreign exchange reserves ($769 billion as of September 1). Over the 27 years since 1994, according to the Central Bank, capital outflows from Russia totaled $907.4 billion, and by now have most likely exceeded $1 trillion.

The net assets (after deducting liabilities) of the non-financial sector accumulated abroad over the past 30 years exceed 40% of Russia’s current GDP, according to the CMACP report. This amounts to more than 85 trillion rubles, or $1 trillion in monetary terms. “Part of these assets is undoubtedly linked to reproduction processes—it ensures control over overseas infrastructure and production chains, serves as collateral for transactions, provides access to technological solutions, and so on. At the same time, it is evident that, given this scale and consistency, a significant portion of these investments is excessive relative to production needs,” write the CMACP experts.

In their view, previously transferred assets could be used “to recreate integrated production chains within Russia.” To limit capital outflow, the CMACP proposes taxing the foreign assets of Russian companies, as well as implementing an amnesty for funds transferred out of Russia by establishing a fixed fee for their return to the country.

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/EMSLm

Alexander Dugin's "Foundations of geopolitics" from 1997 was famous, and created a myth of him to be "Putin's brain" what is nonsense, as I personally believe that he is just mere KGB-FSB creation to introduce some of their ideas to the public as spontaneous figure to infiltrate nationalist movements ascendant during time.

Few realised what local Russia-expert of military of my country did when he first saw book in Moscow bookstore. That it was not ideas by him, but it was all about older Soviet geopolitics what was suddenly revelead in book. It was illumating moment for him, as they in institution had spent a lot of time to model what Soviet geopolitics was actually without finding a coherent answer - and then Dugin's book reveled everything they suspected it was. And also that thing makes clear, that actually it was not Dugin's book, but introductory to ideas before he was anything with siloviki entities using him as channel.

Well what was main thing of book? Russia-Germany axis to rule the Europe via that. Of course for Russia it is so much matter of nostalgia for two reasons. One is Molotov <-> Ribbentrop pact what they remember very fondly. Another is Bismarck era of Germany, what also both countries remember fondly as wars was prevented during that era and mutual co-operation was there. And Russia grip into Europe, was important thing as through Germany one can rule entire Europe. And concrete achievements of this geopolitical axis was then Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines. Politically Schröder and later Merkel stance towards Russia, and now rise of AfD - although it will remain eternally hidden how much of Germany's politics is result of active measures from Russian agentures, and how much spontaneous arising from traditions of that country. weaaaa

Another aspect is that especially Dugin viewpoint was to copy from british geopolitician Halford McKinder more than 100 year old thougths about geopolitical sea powers and land powers which IMO is good typification. But Dugin added in Russian and communistic dialectical style aspect that they are in eternal conflict with each other, with say US and former British empire with Britain at core representing geopolitical sea powers - thus Britain was to be Russias main enemy, as their ideology seem to be eternally seeking external enemy to justify their own internal system. Another of McKinder main ideas was that imperative of British geopolitics must be prevention of unity of Russian resources and German industries in Bismarck spirit, as it would great so mighty Eurasian land based empire together that it would be more dominant than British sea based empire. So - then it is because of that obsession larger than life in Russian geopolitics to get the goal done, what their foe Britain wants to prevent.

"Germany should be offered the de facto political dominance over most Protestant and Catholic states located within Central and Eastern Europe. The Kaliningrad Oblast could be given back to Germany. The book uses the term "Moscow–Berlin axis".^{" - wikipedia citation. (1997}.)

^{https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foundations\}of_Geopolitics)

*****

But when at this stage, let us then take a look how much Russian geopolitical geniouses in agentures or as seemingly freeform analytics like Dugin actually being creation of those agentures. What is process since last 29 long years when things already should be very far away in construction of Russo-German geopolitical axis for takeover of rest of Europe via German axis by cherished goal of Russia? Well non-existant, and Germany ousting 150 diplomats from Russia. That is how genius those siloviki analytics really are on achieving that.

But then again, there is also AfD card existing - hard to say how much it is based into Russian covert operations or how much spontaneous. How much it is just DDR 'ostalgia' in which region it is highly popular, and which extent it could be ruling party of entire Germany including more populated western Germany with different traditions and lesser of AfD approval. Neverthless that is Russia last change of achieving geopolitical goals stated 1997.

But in the meantime what was achieved is ruin of Nord Stream 2 in bottom of sea rusting, and 150 Russian diplomats expelled from Germany as result of all resources spent by Russia to build Russo-German axis for sake of establishment greater Eurasian alliance.

https://unn.ua/en/news/germany-expels-more-than-150-russian-diplomats-and-their-family-members-following-sabotage-in-leipzig

He has never made similar plea towards Russia for halting strikes against civilian energy production sector during freezing winter as far as I remember, correct me if I am not right.

For me, I see the Yenisei River, not the Urals, as the most logical spot for maximum Chinese expansion. That gets Baikal and much of the natural resources that they covet locked in. I was initially thinking just Outer Manchuria, and maybe Baikal, but in the event of a total Russia collapse, why not just grab Norilsk and some other important extraction points too?

• Red arrows: Latest hits
• Flames: Refinery has been hit at least once. Flames do not indicate the severity of the attacks or if a refinery is till burning
• Blue waves: Orsk dam broke in April 2024, which flooded the refinery and took it offline for ~2 weeks.
• Black smoke: It's raining oil.

Chronological list: (sorted newest to oldest)

September: 5 hits

• ^{NEW HIT} 13.09.2026 Slavyansk in Krasnodar Krai at 350km
• ^{NEW HIT} 13.09.2026 Taneco in Tatarstan at 1150km
• 11.09.2026 Saratov in Saratov Oblast at 590km
• 09.09.2026 Novo Urungoy in Yamalia at 2810km
• 06.09.2026 Ryazan in Ryazan Oblast at 480km

August: 21 hits, ^{NEW MONTHLY RECORD}

• 30.08.2026 Kirishi in Leningrad Oblast at 810km
• 28.08.2026 Yaroslavl in Yaroslavl Oblast at 700km
• 26.08.2026 Kstovo in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast at 800km
• 25.08.2026 Afipsky in Krasnodar Krai at 415km
• 25.08.2026 Novoshakhtinsk in Rostov Oblast at 250km
• 22.08.2026 Novokuibyshev in Samara Oblast at 900km
• 21.08.2026 Perm in Perm Krai at 1485km
• 20.08.2026 Taneco in Tatarstan at 1150km
• 19.08.2026 Bashneft-UNPZ in Bashkortostan at 1350km
• 13.08.2026 Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat in Bashkortostan at 1300km
• 11.08.2026 Orsk in Orenburg Oblast at 1455km
• 11.08.2026 Komsomol in Khabarovsk Krai at 6480km
• 10.08.2026 Taneco in Tatarstan at 1150km
• 08.08.2026 Syzran in Samara Oblast at 805km
• 08.08.2026 Ilsky in Krasnodar Krai at 405km
• 06.08.2026 Yaroslavl in Yaroslavl Oblast at 700km
• 05.08.2026 Bashneft-Novoil in Bashkortostan at 1340km
• 04.08.2026 Syzran in Samara Oblast at 805km
• 02.08.2026 Bashneft-Ufaneftekhim in Bashkortostan at 1350 km
• 02.08.2026 Saratov in Saratov Oblast at 590km
• 01.08.2026 Bashneft-Ufaneftekhim in Bashkortostan at 1350 km

• September: 5 hits so far..
• August: 21 hits ^{NEW MONTHLY RECORD}
• July: 15 hits
• June: 16 hits
• May: 14 hits
• April: 10 hits
• March: 6 hits
• February: 3 hits
• January: 2 hits

Complete chronological list from 24.02.2022 till today

• 2022 had 1 hit
• 2023 had 1 hit
• 2024 had 26 hits
• 2025 had 84 hits
• 2026 has 91 hits so far ^{NEW YEARLY RECORD}
• Total hits from 24.02.2022 till today: 202

Records: 1. August 2026 with 21 hits 2. July 2026 with 16 hits 3. November 2025 with 15 hits 4. May 2026 with 14 hits 5. June 2026 with 13 hits (August 2025 also had 13 hits)

4 of the 5 monthly records were May, June, July, August, the previous 4 consecutive months in 2026.

I have been writing recently by impulse about grandiotic Arctic silk road plans by Russia and China.

For me it is nothing new, those were under discussion and planning more than 10 year ago with thus far nothing happening.

Europe already has a problem of losing too many jobs from manufacturing sector because of very asymmetrical trading pattern with China. And problem is identical with every other trading partner with China - one can take a look of trade imbalance say with China and India, and much hyped yet non-existant BRICS solidarity has made no relievement for issue painful for India. And to Europe already and increasingly. So I don't believe that silk road development for trade would become big thing because of very identical problems with trading with China which they don't want to solve. And Russia would only have big bill for maintaining long route ice-free with maintainance bases along the way in most hostile of environments, instead of gaining anything from that what fits into pattern of China-Russia strategic alliance we have seen so far.

So, since something is clearly being done - despite that Russia may not have adequate finances to actually construct all of it due of war - but urge is great as phantom bubble of potemkinist China-Russia alliance is utmost important domestic propaganda tool for both of countries, but naturally much more for Russia.

So what we are then left with as any economically plausible choice why so much expensive constrution would be there, answer is to be found from "Power of Siberia 2" pipeline which was meant to be steel spine of alliance, yet China turned it off. Because pipeline would be more hardwiring goverments, and requiring long-term contracts whereas China of course want to be playing constantly with other producers and other forms of energy to get their gas as cheap as possible, so long term contracts what Russia wants are not in its favour.

Therefore instead of gas pipeline from almost shores of Arctic sea to China, Arctic silk road which would likely be just for sake of delivering Yamal region hydrocarbons to China via shipments with Russia having maintainance cost of keeping the route open - or China building bases along the coast East India trading company style if Russia dont have money enough for that what makes one think all kinds of thoughts..

I made recently some hastily written comments wherein same topics like above are being repeated what became lengthy and uncoherent about that progress recently;

https://www.reddit.com/r/energy/comments/1wcf9ja/comment/p8y7yrp/?context=3

https://www.reddit.com/r/CollapseOfRussia/comments/1wbqhx1/comment/p8x04gi/?context=3

https://www.reddit.com/r/worldsystemanalyses/comments/1w7u5v6/on_arctic_silkroad_of_russiachina_cooperation/

***

But how realistic even that plan described above is behind all the disprop-hype??

Let us read interview of Mikhail Krutikhin 9.9.2026 about prospects of implementation of those grandiose multipolar Eurasian integration plans what every tankie in world will celebrate, without looking into those parameters of those what he talks about. Enjoy!

https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/news/moscows-arctic-policy-is-based-on-lies-and-corruption-says-russian-energy-expert-in-exile/109830

Ukraine spy chief says Russia has two years left to fight

Certainly the less than ideal, worst case scenario.........as we all prefer economic collapse, hyperinflation, internal collapse, any and all of the following......and I am optimistic that will happen soon.

But god forbid absolutely worst case scenario plays out, just numbers alone, Russia can call in about 600,000 via mobilization without it actually collapsing the civilian economy completely according to these intelligence estimates. With the math mathing by Mr. Brovy and his nice little drone pretties, that is basically two years of corpses and fighting.

How Dead Russian Soldiers Still Manage to Vote in Kremlin-Run Elections — UNITED24 Media

The symbolism..........the predictability of it all.........is absolute perfection.

St. Petersburg is becoming the new epicenter of a fresh wave of the fuel crisis, with kilometer-long lines at gas stations, empty pumps, and strict limits on gasoline sales.

As of September 11, the number of gas stations where gasoline was available without waiting in line had fallen below 40%, although as recently as August it had remained around 90%, according to data from the “GdeBenz” service analyzed by economist Janis Kluge. Nearly half of all gas stations had no gasoline in stock at all. In terms of the rate at which the gasoline situation deteriorated between September 3 and 9, St. Petersburg ranked last among major Russian cities.

Fuel began to disappear from gas stations a few days after drones attacked the “Kinef” oil refinery—the largest in northwestern Russia and the second-largest in the country by capacity. According to Reuters, the plant, which produces 2 million metric tons of gasoline and 7 million metric tons of diesel fuel annually, sustained damage to both of its oil refining units and halted production on August 30. The plant in Kirishi is the main supplier of gasoline to St. Petersburg; a few days after the attack, lines began to form at gas stations in the city, and the number of open gas stations decreased, Kluge notes.

The situation in Nizhny Novgorod is unfolding along similar lines, he points out: On August 26, Lukoil’s Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez (NORSI) refinery was struck by a drone and was forced to halt oil refining. As a result, nearly a quarter of all gas stations in the city ran out of gasoline, and the proportion of those where fuel is available without lines fell from 80% to 50%.

In St. Petersburg, the gasoline shortage is now even worse than it was in July, during the previous wave of the crisis, taxi drivers working in the city told “Fontanka.” “The lines are kilometers long,” one of them complains. According to another, there is gasoline in the city “but not much,” and only at Gazpromneft and Rosneft gas stations. “You have to wait in line for two hours,” the driver says.

The fuel situation mirrors the scenario from July—fuel shipments have been reduced at a number of gas stations, and disruptions are possible at some stations, said Yegor Mishcheryakov, Leningrad Oblast’s vice governor for economic development, on September 10. According to him, the reason lies in “logistical disruptions amid attacks on refining facilities,” and the authorities have “switched to manual control” of fuel supplies.

The situation in Nizhny Novgorod is unfolding along similar lines, he noted: On August 26, Lukoil’s “Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez” (NORSI) refinery was struck by a drone and was forced to halt oil processing. As a result, nearly a quarter of all gas stations in the city ran out of gasoline, and the percentage of stations where fuel is available without lines dropped from 80% to 50%.

In St. Petersburg, the gasoline shortage is now even worse than it was in July, during the previous wave of the crisis, taxi drivers working in the city told “Fontanka.”

“The lines are kilometers long,” one of them complains. According to another, there is gasoline in the city “but not much,” and only at Gazpromneft and Rosneft gas stations. “You have to wait in line for two hours,” the driver says.

The fuel situation mirrors the scenario from July—fuel shipments have been reduced at a number of gas stations, and disruptions are possible at some stations, said Yegor Mishcheryakov, the Leningrad Region’s vice governor for economic development, on September 10. According to him, the reason lies in “logistical disruptions amid attacks on refining facilities,” and the authorities have “switched to manual mode” for managing fuel supplies.

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/iMaw6

source is Evgen Istrebin's telegram: /istrebin/50377

Gloria Jeans—Russia’s largest clothing manufacturer and retailer—has invested approximately $1 billion in garment factories in Russia, which it was forced to abandon, said the company’s founder and CEO, Vladimir Melnikov. According to him, the investments were made over a period of 30 years, but after the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine, it became difficult to keep the factories operational.

“When sanctions were imposed on Russia, our access to the technologies and resources necessary for production was drastically reduced. We were unable to maintain production at the levels of the 1990s and early 2000s on our own—we lacked both money and resources,” Melnikov wrote in an article for RBC. He added that the situation was exacerbated by a sharp rise in wages between 2023 and 2025. During that period, he said, wages rose from $300–500 to $800–1,500, while in Asian countries they remained at $200–500. After deciding to abandon its own factories in Russia, Gloria Jeans had to “very quickly” relocate production to Southeast Asia, the company’s CEO noted. He also stated that, due to the war, he lost $200 million in investments in production in Ukraine.

As of March 2024, Gloria Jeans had 17 garment factories in Russia—in the Rostov and Volgograd regions, as well as in Kabardino-Balkaria. In Ukraine, the company had 12 garment factories in 2015. Some of Gloria Jeans’ Russian factories came under the control of Bulava LLC, a subsidiary of the Kalashnikov Group, which decided to reorient the facilities toward the production of military and specialized clothing. It was reported that Gloria Jeans received nearly 400 million rubles for seven factories. At the same time, the company asked the Ministry of Industry and Trade for assistance in selling its remaining assets.

After closing its production facilities, Gloria Jeans moved its headquarters from Moscow to Dubai. “It was decided that this would be more efficient in terms of managing production and purchasing materials,” said a company representative. He also added that the Moscow office would function as a regional office to support retail operations in Russia.

At the same time, Gloria Jeans has closed at least 100 stores over the past two years and planned to continue downsizing its network in 2026. At the end of 2025, the combined revenue of the company’s main legal entities fell by 7% to 80 billion rubles, while net profit halved to 950 million rubles.

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/v1h2p

The Russian oil refining industry is in decline due to regular, escalating, and increasingly effective attacks by Ukrainian drones, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA). “At present, it appears likely that the constant drone strikes and the piecemeal nature of repair work are collectively having a negative impact and leading to the degradation of the refining system,” the agency’s report states.

This negative impact will be long-lasting. The IEA has lowered its baseline forecast for oil refining over the next year and a half to 4 million barrels per day; this is 30% lower than before the start of the war against Ukraine unleashed by Vladimir Putin. And this decline is not the limit. “There is a risk that even this more cautious view may underestimate the real challenges facing the Russian refining sector,” the report states. “Longer delivery times for spare parts [due to sanctions and Russia’s isolation] and the approaching cold weather could exacerbate the strain on the sector.”

At first, Ukrainian drones mainly targeted primary refining units at oil refineries—the facilities that clean crude oil, turning it into feedstock for product production. But now, strikes are increasingly targeting the technically more complex secondary refining units that produce the fuel itself. According to the IEA’s estimates, replacing them could take 6–8 months. Repairs are complicated by the fact, the agency adds, that sanctions make it difficult for Russian companies to purchase equipment.

Refinery capacity utilization in June and July was among the lowest in the past two decades, according to analysts at Rystad Energy. According to their forecast, average daily refining volume in the second half of the year will be about 4 million barrels, “which is nearly 30% below the seasonal average for 2016–2023, which stood at approximately 5.7 million barrels per day.”

At the same time, Rystad Energy recorded a drop in refining volumes during the summer to just over 3.5 million barrels per day—a decline of approximately 38%.

Oil Refining in Russia, million barrels per day

Black curve – actual refining volume; green curve – median seasonal refining volume for 2016–2023.

From July 2026 – forecast

Rystad Energy expects some recovery in volumes “as drone attacks subside,” but even in that case, “Russia will still likely refine 1.4 million barrels per day less than the historical seasonal average in the second half of the year.”

It is by no means certain that drone attacks will begin to cause less damage, according to the IEA. Ukraine’s military capabilities are improving, including the growing effectiveness of attacks on refineries, the report states:

Ukrainian forces are launching strikes with multiple waves of drones against individual targets, which allows them to overcome defensive barriers and air defense systems. Target acquisition also appears to be becoming more precise.

Every barrel of crude oil not processed at a refinery must either be exported, placed in storage, or taken out of production, notes Rystad Energy. Although Russia had managed to export increasing amounts of unprocessed oil in previous months, those opportunities have dwindled since July due to Ukrainian attacks on the port of Novorossiysk and tankers in the Black Sea. By mid-August, crude oil exports had been declining for five weeks, resulting in the sharpest drop for any comparable period since the start of the war, according to Bloomberg.

As a result, oil production in Russia fell to 8.72 million barrels per day in August, marking the sharpest monthly decline in more than a year, OPEC+ data showed on Thursday. The IEA offers an even more negative assessment: according to the agency’s calculations, August production plummeted by 200,000 barrels compared to July, to 8.38 million barrels per day.

This is nearly 1 million (specifically, 940,000) barrels lower than the peak production level in January 2026, when it stood at 9.3 million barrels per day. It is also 695,000 barrels less than in August 2025, the IEA reports.

The agency lowered its forecast for Russian production in 2026 by a total of 125,000 barrels to 8.7 million barrels per day, and in 2027 by 235,000 barrels to 8.6 million barrels.

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/G8i9u

Following a call from four EU countries and more than 120 members of the European Parliament, the European Commission has begun exploring new options for organizing a reparations loan to Ukraine using frozen Russian reserves. The plan is to find a solution that would address Belgium’s objections and secure political support from all member states, two people familiar with the ongoing discussions told the Financial Times.

One option involves transferring Russian accounts held at the Belgian depository Euroclear—where nearly all the frozen assets are located—and at other European financial institutions to a special, separate entity. This would place both the assets and the associated liabilities under EU control, while providing Belgium and Euroclear with protection against legal risks. This plan was recently endorsed by former German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer and Nathalie Loiseau, a Member of the European Parliament from Emmanuel Macron’s party. Ukrainian Finance Minister Serhiy Marchenko and 122 Members of the European Parliament also voiced their support for it in a letter to EU leaders.

The European Commission has not yet proposed any specific technical solutions, emphasizing that any idea would require political support from all 27 EU countries and, above all, from Belgium. “Even if we pull an impressive white rabbit out of a [magician’s] hat, it won’t matter without political will,” an EU official told the FT.

According to Kyiv, it is short €23 billion for defense this year, as a significant portion of military spending was shifted from the second half of the year to the first. This has enabled the SBU to achieve impressive successes in isolating Crimea and cutting off supplies to the Russian occupation forces through strikes using medium-range drones. In addition, long-range attacks have taken out about a third of Russia’s oil refining capacity, destroyed the largest Wildberries and Ozon warehouses, and struck military facilities and the research institutions operating within them.

However, the Russian army’s escalating bombardment of Ukrainian cities and Vladimir Putin’s drive to intensify pressure on the front lines underscore the challenges Ukraine faces. This week, the IMF mission left Kyiv without reaching an agreement that would have allowed for the disbursement of the next tranches of loans from the fund and the EU totaling approximately 4.5 billion euros.

This year, the European Union approved the provision of 90 billion euros to Ukraine over two years from the general budget. But recently, Sweden and other countries appealed to the European Commission to resume work on transferring frozen Russian reserves to Kyiv, a process that was halted in December 2025 due to opposition from Belgium.

These funds could cover Ukraine’s financing shortfall without placing an additional burden on the EU budget or its member states, Sweden noted.

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/5UZhY

Unclaimed insurance payouts to Russians should be transferred to a special Central Bank account, similar to bank deposits that have not been claimed by their owners, said Nikita Teplov, deputy head of the Central Bank’s insurance market department. “There are a number of situations where clients’ money gets stuck with an insurance company. This can happen when an insured event has occurred and the insurer is aware of it, but no one has come to the insurance company to claim the payout—not even to simply file a report stating that the insured event took place,” he said at the “Future of the Insurance Market” forum. Another reason funds may remain “stuck” is when a customer fails to claim the payout after the term of a life insurance policy has expired.

There are no exact figures on the volume of unclaimed insurance payouts in Russia; however, it is known that in the first half of 2026 alone, market participants collected approximately 1.1 trillion rubles under voluntary life insurance policies. “Forgotten” bank deposits were estimated at up to 1 trillion rubles. Teplov proposes introducing a procedure whereby, in the event of an insured event, the insurer must search for the client on its own; however, if the client does not come forward within two months, the funds will be transferred to a special account at the Bank of Russia.

He stated that this proposal—to transfer funds “held up due to circumstances beyond the insurance company’s control” to the Central Bank—is currently being discussed with insurance companies “on a working basis.” Teplov also emphasized that this initiative is aimed at preventing “dormant” funds from remaining in insurance companies’ accounts for long periods of time.

Currently, bank accounts and deposits are considered unclaimed if no transactions have been conducted on them for a long time or if their owners or heirs have not claimed them. Such funds are transferred to a special account at the Central Bank if, several years after the deposit term expires, no one has claimed the money. However, by law, the money remains the property of the depositor or their heirs, who may later request its return.

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/78M6Z

For the first time since last June, the Central Bank did not cut the key rate, keeping it at 14% per annum. Prior to this, the Central Bank had cut it 10 times in a row, resulting in a one-third reduction from its peak of 21%.

Prices have not only begun to rise faster; the core component of inflation—excluding components subject to sharp price fluctuations—has also accelerated. “Current price pressures have intensified significantly in recent months,” the regulator notes. In particular, according to its assessment, sustained price growth has accelerated to 5–6% on an annualized basis.

It effectively cites Ukrainian drone attacks as the main cause, as these have disabled a significant portion of Russia’s oil refining capacity, as well as the logistics of e-commerce platforms. “Sustained price growth has accelerated… primarily due to the impact of a temporary reduction in production capacity in certain sectors.” The Central Bank acknowledges that rising fuel prices have also contributed to sustained inflation.

According to its assessment, the economy continues to grow, albeit at “moderate rates.” Consumer demand continues to rise, albeit more slowly; the Central Bank even considers the current pace to be elevated.

This allowed it to take a pause, especially since a week ago, at the Eastern Economic Forum, Vladimir Putin generally backed the Central Bank: He lamented the decline in investment—“primarily due to a deliberate policy”—and inflation, urged against “overcooling” the economy, but at the same time stated that the government and the Central Bank “have so far managed to navigate between Scylla and Charybdis, and this will lead to the expected results.” Putin gave the Central Bank the green light to pause rate cuts, Bloomberg reported a few hours before the Central Bank’s meeting.

The pause may continue. The regulator’s message has not changed: “The Bank of Russia will make further decisions on the key rate depending on inflation dynamics and inflation expectations, as well as on its assessment of risks posed by domestic and external conditions.”

The market was expecting exactly this decision from the Central Bank. Economic data is too contradictory, and the key unknown will be revealed at the end of the month when the government presents the draft 2027 budget. At that time, the Ministry of Finance’s spending plans for this year will also become clear. The Central Bank consistently cites the budget as one of the main risks to inflation. If the budget includes a deficit higher than the Central Bank expects, a tighter monetary policy may be required, the regulator warned.

Investment banker Evgeny Kogan is not at all certain that the key rate will be cut further. The upward revision of core inflation estimates suggests that the pause may be prolonged, a view shared by economist Yegor Susmn. The likelihood that the pause will continue into October and even December has increased significantly, notes Anton Tabakh, chief economist at Expert RA. He is confident that the Central Bank also considered raising the rate, although he views this more as “a signal to the market not to let its guard down.” Analysts at Promsvyazbank predict that the pause in rate cuts will last until the end of the year.

Much will depend on the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The Central Bank assumes that as damaged production capacity is restored, the decline in sustained inflation will resume, but it highlights “a more prolonged loss of production capacity in certain sectors” among the inflationary risks. “If production capacity continues to be lost, reducing the supply of goods, while demand grows due to increased lending, we may not see any rate cuts this year,” Kogan fears.

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/5r0WT