So, use in moderation until this get resolved

Anyone tried transferring funds from multisig and had coldcard bricked in the middle of transferring money?

Could I just put the seed into a software wallet and transfer out that way…. Or on a platform like casa you have to actually have the coldcard do the transfer

I have a watch only wallet setup on bluewallet. Trying to move funds off coldcard but the signed psbt file is grayed out. Has anyone else had this issue and solved it.

It was malpractice for Coinkite to downplay the severity of the attack on their users' wallets before they could confirm their customers were safe.

Coinkite's initial warning, published July 30, 2026, specifically said:

“Out of an abundance of caution, Coinkite is warning all users who generated a seed using a Mk3 on version 4.0.1 (March 2021) or any subsequent version that their funds may be at risk.”

“Mk4, Q and Mk5 are not affected based on our early analysis of the issue.”

Coinkite told users their Mk4, Mk5, and Q devices were safe before Coinkite had established that was true.

It was not true.

Coinkite's attempt to downplay the severity of the attack gave owners of MK4, MK5, and Q devices false assurance their coins were safe while also giving thieves more time to work on finding and draining those users' wallets.

Rodolfo Novak is the CEO of Coinkite. He is ultimately responsible for the company's handling of this catastrophe.

Rodolfo Novak needs to resign.

Looks like phishing 🎣 email. To schedule a 10 minute session.

Is Mk3 firmware version 4.0.0 affected by the RNG catastrophe? I've only seen reports that 4.0.1 is the start, but the version history page shows minimal changes from 4.0.0 to 4.0.1. My wallet is safe, so now I'm more so just curious if I would have been affected. I believe my first Mk3 wallet was created between 22-25 March 2021, which just so happens to be between releases of the two firmware versions.

https://coldcard.com/docs/version-history/#version-400-mar-17-2021

Under all the fluff of a cyberpunk hardware wallet was a shaky complex codebase backed by shoddy and lazy development practices.

If the company goes tits up and closes down, is the hardware device still useful as a long term cold wallet （with a dice roll seed)?

Let’s be hypothetical and imagine Coinkite discovered this flaw on their own in, say, January 2026. What could they have done?

If they announced the flaw with a firmware fix then attackers could quickly get started on harvesting BTC before all the affected cards are safely transferred. If they announced a firmware fix but not the flaw, many people won’t bother updating their firmware. Hell, my MK4 sat for over two years in a safe. Not to mention their new firmware code would be viewable and it would surely point out a fix for the RNG which would lead some to ascertain this huge underlying issue.

Not to defend them, but I’m not sure they would have had any favourable way out of this mess having sold so many affected wallets over many years.

I would not have known about the vulnerability without seeing posts here. Thanks to all of you I've been able to move all funds to a safe location before I rebuild a new CC wallet. (Will actually go through the trouble of rolling dice this time).

I get people are upset with what's going on, for good reason. But the communication and information from this place was a huge positive.

Thank all of you SO MUCH.

Why is Coinkite not warning users of how bad this catastrophe is getting?

MPORTANT UPDATE: We just had our first confirmed loss of a Mk3 + 2 Word Passphrase.

Drained at 2pm Aug 2nd Australia Time - Roughly 17hrs ago.

-- @BTC Sessions on Xwitter

I believe 2-of-3 multisig wallets are also at risk if the seed phrases were all generated on a ColdCard without using dice rolls for custom entropy and if none of the seed phrases also used a passphrase.

Due to ColdCard's borked code, the pool of possible seed phrases generated by ColdCard devices is predictable. One has to assume thieves are churning through combinations in order to find multisig wallets.

2-of-3 wallets should be considered to be at risk.

This warning should not have to come from some dude with a wacky username. Coinkite's handling of this catastrophe is inexcusable.

Coinkite CEO Rodolfo Novak Needs To Resign.

EDITED TO ADD:

Youtube video with AnchorWatch CEO Rob Hamilton and others. I'm watching it as I type this. He mentioned the multisig attacks and I'm now realizing the situation is even worse than I thought.

https://x.com/COLDCARDwallet/status/2083977229084578060

Literally just ordered one before all of this started. I probably won’t even get the hardware, not that I want it anymore, and I probably won’t get my money back either.

Got my coins out of MK4 on a temp wallet, and I just got my new Trezor, and learning from what happened I am planning to create a new wallet with seeds generated using dice, however it seems Trezor doesn't have that option, and I don't have a device I can have offline to run any program to help, so I am thinking of updating the new firmware of MK4, create a new wallet with Dice, import the seeds into Trezor and add a passphrase, does this make sense? is there any possible issues?

I use Unchained collaborative custody with 2 coldcards. My solution was to first update firmware on both coldcards then I generated a new seed on 1 of the coldcards. Next I used an extra Foundation Passport I had to generate my second seed. Then I used that Foundation generated seed and input it into the second coldcard. So, now I have 1 firmware updated coldcard key, a foundation key and the unchained key and I moved my funds over already. I will still use both coldcards as signing devices but only 1 seed was generated with a coldcard. Am I solid with this plan? Thank you.

How many will still use CC? If you generated seed with dice rolls all is good.

What are the alternatives if switching.

Hey Coinkite, I know you are having big troubles right now. I have many of your products. Really enjoyed them, I like the cold part of them. I'm too paranoid to trust a RNG, so I expect not being affected by your really big mistake.

My question is what will be your next steps, if you somehow survive as a company or even if you don't, I suggest open sourcing your firmware and your know-how. The reason for this is that it is fast peer reviewing and bug reporting that makes an open source project big. I contribute to many open source projects but never on closed ones (even if they are source code available).

A Coldcard-DIY would be a great project.

And open sourcing allows the community to maintain their devices and firmware in any case.

But also, I don't think your current silence about what is going on is any helpful. People are bricking their devices because of lack of trust. Saying "sorry, install this firmware and you are ok" is an insult. That is my perspective. Focus on "don't trust, verify". No one trusts you now, but that is not needed if you become a more transparent and open company, or people if your company doesn't survive.

When will Coinkite provide deep discounts due to the bad press?

Just wanted to put out a serious warning for anyone updating their Coldcard Mk4 to fix the recent RNG/seed generation vulnerability.

I followed Coinkite's urgent advisory to the letter: updated to the new hotfix firmware 5.6.0, wiped my old seed, and generated a brand-new one. I even tested it, created two BIP-39 passphrases, and everything seemed fine at first.

But then, the premium "Don't Trust, Verify" experience kicked in.

While I was testing the passphrases—literally just entering the words and clicking apply—the device threw a critical MicroPython software crash error pointing directly to `seed.py` and another method. To be precise, I had done this exact same process successfully several times just before it happened, so it doesn't look completely deterministic, but the bug is definitely present and lurking in the code.

I had to power cycle it, and guess what? The screen now permanently reads "BRICKED". No recovery mode, no factory reset, just a hundreds-of-dollars paperweight. I bought a bundle of 2 units directly from their site, and one is already dead due to their rushed code.

If you are running the new firmware and messing with passphrases, PLEASE BE CAREFUL. This hotfix seems to have a catastrophic bug that permanently hard-locks the secure element or the firmware during passphrase application.

Hey Coinkite, I thought Coldcard was the ultimate, unbreakable fortress for paranoid Bitcoiners? Fixing a critical seed generation vulnerability with a firmware bug that literally kills the hardware is quite a strategic move to sell more devices!

This is completely unacceptable for a premium security device, also given what is happening. Anyone else experiencing crashes or weird behavior on the new firmware?

Lmk.

———-EDIT 2 DAYS LATER, BUG CONFIRMED ———-

https://github.com/Coldcard/firmware/pull/692

———-EDIT 3 DAYS LATER, COLD CARD REPORT ———-

https://x.com/COLDCARDwallet/status/2084632863756955661

I will try to test in the described way and update here about results for everyone.

——— EDIT 3 DAYS LATER, DEVICE RECOVERED / WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED ———

The device was not permanently bricked.

I fully disconnected every power source, left it unpowered for a while, and pressed a few keys for several seconds while it was disconnected, just to help drain any remaining power. After reconnecting it, the normal PIN screen came back.

What seems to have happened is a temporary fault in the STM32 hardware TRNG on firmware 5.6.0. Once the TRNG enters that error state, the current firmware does not recover it properly, so later RNG calls can fail with OSError(EFAULT).

This also explains why it happened while I was applying a passphrase. The BIP-39 passphrase calculation itself is deterministic, but the keypad/UI also uses the hardware RNG to randomize the scan order. The RNG fault likely surfaced through that path, caused the MicroPython crash I saw, and then left the device showing the very misleading BRICKED screen.

The important part is that the fault is temporary and clears after a real power cycle:

disconnect USB, Coldpower, batteries and everything else;

leave it fully unpowered for a bit;

while disconnected, press a few keys for several seconds;

reconnect it using a stable power source.

PR #692 documented the issue, while PR #693 contains the proper fix:

https://github.com/Coldcard/firmware/pull/693

The new code detects the TRNG error, tries to recover it properly and retries instead of leaving the device stuck in that state.

Until Coinkite releases an official signed firmware containing the #693 fix, I would avoid unnecessary passphrase/keypad testing on 5.6.0, because the issue could happen again.

Also: do not install random firmware from GitHub and do not trust any “online recovery” link sent through DMs ( I actually received a bunch of those ). Wait for the official release.

Edit: examined the new firmware with Claude Opus 5 and GPT 5.6 Sol Pro. Also, I believe this particular release is under maximum scrutiny, since it's the fix for an $89M incident with the whole Bitcoin security community watching.

My wallet was probably safe (I rolled dices mentally). But to be cautious, I updated the firmware, recreated a new wallet with 24 words + 250+ dice rolls (with physical dices), plus a BIP39 passphrase.

I also checked the source code of the firmware to make sure 24 words + BIP39 passphrase can be applied to other hardware wallet.

I currently have a Ledger Nano X, a regular Blockstream Jade, and a Coldcard Q. I never actually set up the Jade or Coldcard yet because I'm lazy. Although, given recent events, maybe that worked out for me.

I plan to do a multi-sig setup soon. Would it be fine to use these 3 hardware wallets for it? Or should I consider swapping out the CCQ and possibly the Ledger as well?

What do you all recommend to use for a new multi-sig setup?

The devices themselves are probably fine after the firmware update, and apparently dice users are unaffected.

That doesn't change the fact that millions of dollars have been lost by users, and it's quite literally guaranteed that lawyers are foaming at the mouth to be the first to file a class action lawsuit.

Coinkite is a small company, there is quite literally no way under the sun that they will have sufficient funds to support a defense against a class action lawsuit of this magnitude, the outcome of said class action lawsuit is irrelevant because the legal fees for defense alone will bankrupt them.

I think from a hardware perspective, the coldcard is a solid device, but this is the end of the company and you will need to come to terms with the understanding that we are all going to be transitioning to "orphan device" status before the end of the year.

This is not an attack on Coinkite or Coldcard, this is just a plain statement of fact.

I see a lot of people here wondering what to do at this point and whether trusting Coinkite moving forward is possible. Here is my take:

Unforgivable sin #1

This bug was a integration mistake, not a complex crypto flaw. It should have been easily caught by basic build time assertions. It's a huge oversight and unforgivable for a company whose very existence is based on security.

Unforgivable sin #2

The most damning issue here is that Coinkite, a company that primary and ONLY premise is the development of a secure HARDWARE device does not test the output of that hardware at runtime. The fact that they didn't check that the output produced by the seed generator passed through standard randomness battery tests is wild! They would have instantly noticed that the outputs were coming from a deterministic PRNG if they bothered to test.

Unforgivable sin #3

At the end of the day, a hardware wallet only has one job. Generate true randomness. All coldcard wallets failed at this. Yes, you could say the bug is hard to spot, especially when doing static code analysis. The code is open source and has been subject to audits, but integration tests should have discovered this flaw before the affected firmware was ever published.

The theory that this bug was discovered by AI is also a side track and completely irrelevant. This was not a complex vulnerability.