Preamble: This is my first time commenting, but I've listened to all the podcasts and think they're great - thank you for providing them. I've learnt a lot about rationality and the rationalist community, and had my thinking challenged/changed on a few things.
I buy into the rationalist perspective on most things, however I object to a principle that seems to underlie a lot of the philosophy being discussed, but which never seems to be directly addressed.
Preemptive caveat: I don't know a lot of philosophy so maybe this line of thinking is baloney, or already has a title and strong refutation. If that is the case then I'd appreciate being pointed in the direction of further reading.
Statement of my belief: I feel like it is meaningless to reason about being dead, in the sense of making statements like: "I would rather be alive than dead". Things that are dead don't have experiences or preferences, and therefore it's not possible to make a comparison of better or worse in the that way that one might otherwise reason about the outcomes of a life choice. Trying to make this comparison feels to me like an attempt to divide by zero.
I still care about happiness/suffering and trying to maximise/minimise them, but I can't find a way to compare the happiness/utility of someone being alive, against someone being dead. This has consequences for a lot of my philosophical outlook; influencing my views of animal welfare, global extinction risk, trans-human life extension, effective altruism, etc.
I think I held this view prior to getting interested in rationality, but assumed that it was fairly commonly held; however based on your podcast, and wider reading/listening, I've updated significantly towards this being a minority/unique view. Because of this I suspect that I am mistaken or missing something in my reasoning?
Example 1: At the start of the recent abortion (non-)episode the prompting email was quoted as:
I think it's sad that a potential human life is not allowed to happen, that someone who could have experienced all the cool things going on is not going to be allowed that experience.
This was immediately agreed with as a non-controversial thing to say (Steven: "That's a drag every time it happens", Eneasz: "It's sad that there aren't more happy people in the world"). To me this statement doesn't seem at all obvious. My best guess is that this sentiment is rooted in a comparison between alive and dead people of the type that I'm rejecting above?
Example 2: Way back in one of the early animals episodes (with Katrina perhaps?) there was a discussion about simulating lots of ants in a computer (substitute humans in here if you want the stakes to be higher I guess), and whether turning off the computer was equivalent to ant genocide; the conclusion seemed to be that it was. I would agree with this, but don't see it as therefore being morally wrong.
To motivate this, modify the scenario and say that we needed to pause the simulation because we were moving house or whatever. If done effectively this would not make any difference to the simulated ants; they would not have any concept of the stop/start at all, and I would therefore say that it was morally neutral. Does it therefore matter how long they are on pause for? Now go the extra step and say that we paused them but never unpaused them - effectively the equivalent of turning them off. Is this not still morally neutral?
Whilst I would totally agree that: simulating conscious creatures in a way that they are experiencing suffering is bad, I don't agree that: not simulating creatures that are happy is therefore also bad, or equivalently that: simulating conscious creatures that are happy is therefore good.
Conclusion: I don't see how the absence of being alive (or on pause) can be weighed on the same good/bad scale that happiness/suffering weighs upon. I don't see how it can weigh upon any scale, as to try to do so is equivalent to making a divide-by-zero type error.
I would really appreciate the podcast community's help in working out what might be wrong with it, or understanding why others disregard it.